ENDLESS NIGHT

Cinema and Psychoanalysis, Parallel Histories



Edited by Janet Bergstrom

Endless Night

Cinema and Psychoanalysis, Parallel Histories

Edited by Janet Bergstrom

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
Berkeley Los Angeles London

Some images in the original version of this book are not available for inclusion in the netLibrary eBook.

University of California Press
Berkeley and Los Angeles, California

University of California Press, Ltd.
London, England

© 1999 by
The Regents of the University of California

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Endless night: cinema and psychoanalysis, parallel histories / edited by Janet Bergstrom.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-520-20747-5 (alk. paper). — ISBN 0-520-20748-3 (pbk.: alk. paper)
1. Psychoanalysis and motion pictures. 2. Motion pictures—Psychological aspects. 3. Motion pictures—Philosophy. I. Bergstrom, Janet, 1946- .
PN1995.9P783C56 1999
791.43'01'9—dc21 98-18190
CIP

Printed in the United States of America

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Part of this book was published in an earlier version.
Chapter 2: "Temporality, Storage, Legibility: Freud, Marey, and the Cinema," *Critical Inquiry* 22:2 (1996): 313-43. © 1996 by The University of Chicago Press. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

This book is dedicated
to the memory of
Christian Metz.

Contents

Introduction: Parallel Lines 1
Janet Bergstrom

1. Cinema and Psychoanalysis: Parallel Histories 25
Stephen Heath

2. Temporality, Storage, Legibility: Freud, Marey, and the Cinema 57
Mary Ann Doane

3. The Fetish in the Theory and History of the Cinema 88
Marc Vernet

4. Cyberspace, or the Unbearable Closure of Being 96
Slavoj Zizek *

5. Sartre's Freud: Dimensions of Intersubjectivity in *The Freud Scenario* 126
David James Fisher

6. Freud as Adventurer 153
Peter Wollen

7. Textual Trauma in *Kings Row* and *Freud* 171
Janet Walker

8. Freud and the Psychoanalytic Situation on the Screen 188
Alain de Mijolla, M.D.

9. Hitchcock's Trilogy: A Logic of Mise en Scène 200
Ayako Saito

10. More! From Melodrama to Magnitude 249
Joan Copjec

11. Chantal Akerman: Splitting 273
Janet Bergstrom

Contributors 291

Index 295

Introduction:
Parallel Lines

Janet Bergstrom

The title of this book is taken from a line spoken in Jim Jarmusch's *Dead Man:* "Some are born to sweet delight, some are born to endless night." Endless night, that modality of timeless dark wandering, evokes the remarkably material dreamlike search for intelligibility sustained throughout *Dead Man* without ever being thematized as such or, indeed, as any identifiable state. *Endless Night* seems to me an appropriate designation for this collection of essays, since psychoanalysis and film theory, both, are drawn to the darkness in their quest for logics of meaning.

Context

The idea for this volume goes back to a conference called "Psychoanalysis and Cinema: Parallel Histories," which was sponsored by UCLA's Center for Critical Studies and the Human Sciences in November 1993 to mark the hundred-year anniversaries of these two endeavors that have exercised such a profound influence on our century. The event brought together practicing psychoanalysts with film theorists working from a psychoanalytic perspective and provided a forum for an exchange of views between these two disciplines that have encountered each other all too rarely. Crossing disciplines is never easy, but in this case, dialogue between constituencies seemed blocked to a surprising degree; in fact, one came away from the conference with the strong impression of nonconvergence, on the whole, of lines of inquiry and frames of reference, the sense that these "parallel histories" of cinema and of psychoanalysis were very far apart indeed and were likely to remain so for some time to come. The reasons that psychoanalysts reflect on the cinema are not the same as those that motivate film theorists to draw on psychoanalysis. It follows that the concepts from the cinema and from

psychoanalysis that enter into dialogue within each field are not the same either. We are nowhere near being able to provide a comparative overview which would explain the impasse between these two fields usefully, which might elucidate, for instance, how the history of psychoanalytic concepts has come to operate within each one. This task is all the more difficult because of the complex splitting and proliferation of psychoanalytic institutions within the United States and internationally, which involvesbut is by no means reducible toadherence to differing schools of theory and/or clinical practice. Even today, a cursory review of psychoanalytic journals turns up significant writings by psychoanalysts on literature and art, but not on the cinema.

Yet, I believe that psychoanalysts and film scholars should be able to speak together productively on a whole range of issues. I hope, therefore, that this collection of essays, which consists mainly of the writings of film scholars, will also find its way to psychoanalysts who may be drawn to the perspectives on cinematic representation to be found here. This, in turn, might help bring concepts and data from current psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice into discussions within Cinema Studies and encourage cross-disciplinary projects even as the two disciplines continue to evolve, producing their own internal countertendencies and subspecializations. The essays by psychoanalysts David James Fisher and Alain de Mijolla, M.D., in this collection represent avenues toward a future collaboration.

The "Parallel Histories" event did succeed in inspiring an impressive group of film scholars to present work-in-progress that demonstrated the current form of their engagement with "psychoanalysis and cinema" and, by that very fact, showed how much this field of study has changed since the hugely influential works of the early 1970s which initiated it during those same polemical years when Cinema Studies became an academic discipline. This volume is not a record of the conference proceedings, but all the contributors were participants in that event (either as presenters or as part of the audience) and all of the essays have been marked by the spirit that uniting these writers made possible. While several of the essays were delivered at the conference in draft form, to be reworked and extended later in the light of questions and discussions, the rest were conceived and written subsequently. As an amalgam, they testify to a shift from the 1970s to the 1990s in what we can call "psychoanalytic film theory." They demonstrate how this vein of film theory has renewed itself over time and remains one of the most vital areas within contemporary film theory. For this project, then, the hundred-year parallel histories of psychoanalysis and of cinema operate as the "felt background" against which authors chart new directions in the much younger field of psychoanalysis and film theory.

The authors represented in this collection share a particular history of theory which they are trying to push ahead or test in this way or that. [1] Moreover, they are signaling "unfinished business" that needs to be addressed.

Synoptically, in order to provide a context for the new essays, we should recall the generative matrix from the 1970s that made this work possible, beginning with "Psychanalyse et cinéma," the thick, groundbreaking special issue of the French journal *Communications,* published in May 1975, edited by Raymond Bellour, Thierry Kuntzel and Christian Metz. Almost immediately, in the summer of 1975, Metz's lead essay, "The Imaginary Signifier," was presentednot simply publishedin the British journal *Screen*. Although *Communications* 23 was not the first to introduce psychoanalytic concepts into contemporary film theorythe *Cahiers du Cinéma* had been publishing articles for some years written from Lacanian and Freudian perspectives; *Screen*'s own commitment to psychoanalytic theory dated from its publication in 1972 of the *Cahiers du Cinéma*'s 1970 collective reading of *Young Mr. Lincoln;* Jean-Louis Baudry's essay "Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus" had been published in *Cinéthique* in 1970 [2]it constituted a strong statement that the field of psychoanalytic semiotics had been established as such. In "The Imaginary Signifier," Metz outlined categories within which psychoanalysis and film theory might come together, mapping the field, as it were, before proceeding to the motivating question of his own essay: "What contribution can Freudian psychoanalysis make to the study of the cinematic signifier?"[3] (Those who assume that Metz was thoroughly Lacanian should take note of the way he worded this question.) The issue also contained Bellour's "Le blocage symbolique," a magisterial demonstration of multi-layered textual analysis through a 115-page study of *North by Northwest;* Kuntzel's "The Film-Work, 2," a somewhat different mode of textual analysis more directly inspired by Barthes's *S/Z* and its model, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (hence the echo of Sigmund Freud's theory of the dream-work in Kuntzel's title); Metz's "The Fiction Film and Its Spectator"; and a host of other essays which have had lasting significance.

These essays and many others written from within the same circles of French debate were quickly published in translation in *Screen, Camera Obscura* and other journals, often in conjunction with American and British contributions inspired by the French essays but filtered through their own highly debated and evolving editorial positions. The crucial "Milwaukee Conferences" on film theory succeeded in creating a yearly international forum in which people could see, in person, film theorists from distant cities and lands whose work they had been reading, which aided immeasurably in building an international community of scholars. I would hazard the generalization that work of this kind was focalized by *Screen* through its principal question"What is ideology,"by *Camera Obscura* and *m/f* (London) through their emphases on the representation of sexual difference and textual analysis, and by a host of other editorial positions put forward in bold strokes by nonprofit and largely volunteer-run journals such as *Jump Cut, Ciné-Tracts, Afterimage* (London), *Cinéaste, Discourse, Wideangle* and *Quarterly Review of Film*

Studies, which joined in the sharp debates for and against psychoanalytic film theory or "French" film theory or film theory at all. [4] In recent times, one encounters blanket references to so-called Screen Theory (meaning essays published in *Screen* during the 1970s and 1980s), which I find both curious and unhelpful; according to this usage, positions that were highly contested, often at odds with each other and written from within a specific set of historical and social circumstances are reduced to stereotypes that can, for that very reason, seem easy to dismiss.

Endless Night emphasizes the history of psychoanalytic theory and demonstrates not only that "history" and "theory" have a strong bearing on each other, but that film theory must be written with a strong sense of historical consciousness, curiosity and archeological craft. If Anglo-American scholars insisted on prioritizing theory in the 1970s, it was because there was so much resistance to it. Cinema Studies in general has moved toward historical analysis over the past two decades. The archives (in many senses of the word) have been opening their vaults and catalogues, video has made repeated access to many films possible, interdisciplinary possibilities are richer than ever before, and the Internet has greatly facilitated collaboration and the exchange of information over great distances. During this same period, scholars have gained a better appreciation of what archives could yield in the light of the contemporary field of questions. The fact that so many film historians have been trained in contemporary film theory has had an enormously positive effect on the ways film histories are now being conceptualized, researched and written.

As Cinema Studies has grown as an academic discipline, it has produced specialized areas of research, like all other fields: the amazing quantity of high caliber, international research on "early cinema" is an outstanding example of such specialization, and some contributions to it may be found in these pages. But Cinema Studies has also been particularly vulnerable to dispersion, most obviously through the appeal of "cultural studies," which has given us many brilliant works and continues to do so. The problem is that "cultural studies" has come to be used so broadly that it can encompass almost any approach or subject matter, thereby risking a loss of focus. In other words, cultural studies sometimes functions as a leveling device, and cinema or television or digital media, for that matter, can become difficult to address as such in depth at the very moment, ironically, when a critical mass of scholars finally exists in these adjacent academic fields. At the same time, and for a wide range of reasons, the power that film journals once had has diminished greatly so that they rarely serve to focus polemics or even issues in the way that they did in the 1970s and early 1980s.

It would be impossible to construct a comprehensive bibliography of "psychoanalysis and film theory" today because so much of Cinema Studies since the 1970s has been permeated with concepts drawn from a Freudian

and/or Lacanian framework. Even the literature written in opposition to the use of psychoanalysis has invoked this perspective in order to dispute it. In 1990, E. Ann Kaplan oriented the introduction to her anthology, *Psychoanalysis and Cinema,* to the imbalance between literature and film studies with respect to psychoanalytic theory, and the difficulty of trying to establish parallel lines of engagement between psychoanalysis and the other two disciplines. She presented a history of the literary conjunction, noting that several anthologies had been devoted to it which showed a diversity of methods, and specified that her collection was the first to do the same for Cinema Studies (meaning, the first to do so in English). [5] Subsequently, in 1993 and again in 1995, Kaplan moved toward the analytic community by editing special issues of the psychoanalytic journal *American Imago* on "Psychoanalysis and Film" with the goal of juxtaposing the writings of psychoanalysts with those of film scholars.[6] By now, several anthologies, books and special issues of journals have been published with this purpose (see Selected Bibliography). However, it seems that putting such writings (or speakers at either psychoanalytic or Cinema Studies conferences) side by sideproviding "an opportunity," as Kaplan put it, "for the reader to construct dialogues among the pieces"[7]has not yet generated what we might call a joint project or shared points of reference. This problem may be fundamental. We should recall what Christian Metz had already stated in "The Imaginary Signifier":

> . . . anyone claiming to make any use of psychoanalysis, as I do at this moment for the cinema, is necessarily called on to say what psychoanalysis he is talking about. There are plenty of examples of "psychoanalytic" practices, and more or less explicit accompanying theories, in which all that is vital in Freud's discovery, everything that makes it (should make it) an irreversible achievement, a decisive moment in knowledge, is smoothed out, pared down, "recuperated" as a new variant of ethical psychology or medical psychiatry (humanism and medicine: two great evasions of Freudianism). The most striking example (but far from the only one) is that provided by certain "American-style" therapeutic doctrines . . ., solidly installed more or less everywhere, which are in large part techniques for the standardization or banalization of character, for avoidance of conflict at any price.[8]

In the essays that follow, one will find "psychoanalysis and cinema" inflected in a number of unusual situations, virtually all of them placing an emphasis on the history of theory and, perforce, as de facto, diverse examples of contemporary historiographical inquiry which do not lose sight of cinematic specificity, whether it takes center stage or operates in the background. A return, if I may put it that way, to cinematic specificity does not mean that the consequences of this work necessarily hold only for the cinema; rather, they provide a firm grounding from which those reflecting on other media or in other disciplines may take measure of how any number of issues raised in these pages might translate to their own spheres of activity.

Texts

Those who have followed psychoanalytic film theory since the 1970s will doubtless see the essays in this collection in terms of the evolution of that field; those who have not followed this literature may be surprised to find a directness and lucidity of style and exposition which was not typical of 1970s film theory. Moreover, these essays pertain to new and perhaps unexpected subjects: Janet Walker takes on contemporary issues surrounding child abuse, recovered memories and fantasy to argue why it is crucial for feminism to recognize the interrelationship between actual events and fantasy. Ayako Saito initiates a strong critique of the Lacanian emphasis in psychoanalytic film theory on language and the gaze which, she argues, following French psychoanalyst André Green, has all but eliminated questions of affect from discussion. She invokes Green's structural description of affect in carrying out a textual analysis of the affective structures of Hitchcock's *Vertigo, North by Northwest* and *Psycho*. Stephen Heath invokes Kafka's crycinema is "too visual"as he builds a powerful argument for "figuration" as the key issue to rethinking the conjunction "psychoanalysis and cinema." Slavoj Zizek * and Joan Copjec are often said to represent a "new psychoanalysis" in their Kantian/Hegelian rereading of Lacan. Here, Zizek uses a conceptual shock montage to evoke philosophical difficulties, traps and lures at the heart of the taken-for-granted term "interface" that constitutes the cyber-subject. Mary Ann Doane, as part of a larger project on modernity and technology, investigates Etienne-Jules Marey's and Freud's theories about capturing and storing photographic or mental data as a way to understand that early cinema's retreat (as I would call it) to narrative was a defensive mechanism designed to protect the subject from the anxieties of total, undifferentiated representation that the cinema had made possible. Marc Vernet studies how fetishism impedes the researcher's desire to know, given ready access to documents in the digital/electronic archive. Peter Wollen shows Freud's, Sartre's and John Huston's intellectual and fantasmatic paths converging with uncanny parallelism in the project for Huston's film *Freud,* and how each was carrying through on a belief held since childhood that he was destined to be a conquistador. David James Fisher argues that Sartre's screenplays for Huston's *Freud* are a key part of his intellectual history and how, implicitly and by way of analogy, Sartre advocated there what we would now call an intersubjective approach to psychoanalytic process. Dr. Alain de Mijolla posits that it is nearly impossible to represent the "psychoanalytic situation"with its undramatic silences, transferential relationships and duration of the period of analysisin a film. Joan Copjec puts forward a radical new reading of *Stella Dallas,* arguing that melodrama is a female-specific genre which must be understood in terms of free indirect discourse. My own essay examines a paradox in the representation of mother-daughter relationships in Chantal

Akerman's films in connection with interviews the filmmaker has given since the 1970s to show patterns of ambivalence characteristic of children of survivors of the Holocaust as well as of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's nomadic, "minor" literature.

It is not surprising that we are now seeing, thanks to the distance that the passing of time makes possible, many avenues toward questioning the Lacanian conceptual framework as it was more or less formalized in 1970s film theory, and the reconsideration of a handful of psychoanalytic terms that dominated that discourse and film theory, not only framing but limiting its questions. Stephen Heath takes on these issues directly in his essay "Cinema and Psychoanalysis: Parallel Histories." I quote a passage from his essay at length because it speaks directly to central issues that motivate this volume:

> shifts and fluctuations can be seen in criticism from within psychoanalytic film theory of the conjunction of cinema and psychoanalysis developed in the wake of the journal *Screen*. Much of this criticism has been directed at what is regarded as a reduction of this spectator/film relation to one of pure specularity, effectively suturing cinema into an ideology of the subject that takes little account of the complexity of the latter's constitution (the notion of "suture" was too often limited to just some idea of the seamless effecting in dominant narrative cinema of the spectator-subject as contained unit, but the Lacanian-Freudian insistence is that there is no coherent subject to be thus simply accommodated). No doubt, in its concern to grasp the particular terms of subjectivity realized in a dominant cinematic institution, to demonstrate the subject positioning in which film-in-cinema involves the spectator (even as he or she may take their distances), *Screen* did at times put the weight so heavily on describing the representation made that it fell into an overdeterministic account, a theoreticist version of closure (already there potentially in the concept of suture itself, introduced as it was as part of an attempt to cast Lacan's work as "forming a system" and provide its formalization). *Screen*'s point, of course, was an appropriation of psychoanalysis politically, insofar as it could be made conjuncturally useful, and notably as regards identifying and describing mechanisms of subject inscription for ideology. If such appropriation is open to charges of not being properly psychoanalytic, it remains that "cinema and psychoanalysis" necessarily opens up a field which will not be containable within some enclosure of psychoanalysis itself; as it remains too that attention needs to be given to what investment in the "properly" psychoanalytic carries with it in any given context. "Cinema and psychoanalysis" involves the specificity of psychoanalysis in a way that equally reconceives it, sets it at the distance from itself that its deployment in relation to cinema producesand the same holds in reverse for cinema, reconceived by the psychoanalytic theory and concepts with which it is newly posed.

Heath begins with a vivid image of Lou Andreas-Salomé at the Urania Cinema in Vienna in 1913, who wrote: "cinematic technique is the only one

which allows a rapid succession of images approximating to our own imaginative activity, even imitating its volatility." Her statement inaugurates a tour of early "questions of cinema" (the title of a collection of Heath's essays) in the name of "figuration." Heath's essay reads, to my mind, as a powerful contemporary sequel to one of his most influential essays of the 1970s, "Narrative Space." For Heath's commitment to figuration as the basis of cinema has not changedthe editors of *Screen,* in their "Imaginary Signifier" issue, had already sounded a warning lest "knowledge [produced by psychoanalytic studies of film] will be of more value as corroboration of the theses of psychoanalytic theory than for its contribution to any understanding of the cinema." [9] It is this very point to which Heath, in one section of his essay, holds Slavoj Zizek* these many years later in an effort to pull back reflection on psychoanalysis and cinema as a force for interrogating or pushing the limits of cinematic representation rather than using cinema to demonstrate Lacanian concepts.

Heath points out that Freud's distrust of cinema, as exemplified by his famous refusal to lend his name to *Secrets of a Soul,* turned on the seeming impossibility for cinema to represent the theory and process of psychoanalysis. Reductiveness has not only been a problem for the representation of psychoanalysis in a film, it has presented a constant danger for psychoanalytic film theory which has been "eager to erect its own likenesses of cinema: whether as essence (the imaginary signifier, apparatus theory), as play of signifiers (available for 'filmanalytic' interpretation) or as reflection (offering a site for the display of psychoanalytic concepts)." Heath suggests a way out of this dilemma by citing unorthodox visions of cinematic experience and representation by which Freud's modernist contemporaries, such as Virginia Woolf, Kafka, James Joyce and H.D., evoke questions that should still be at the heart of psychoanalytic film theory. In these writers, as in Freud and Lacan, psychoanalytic theory can never be reduced to static, "mastered" categories.

Zizek's* contribution to this volume, "Cyberspace, or the Unbearable Closure of Being," considers cyber theory as it impacts psychoanalytic conceptions of the subject, principally through the vehicle of the "interface," which he correlates with the frame and the Other Scene. Here we encounter the high-energy Zizek-effect at its most positively charged as Zizek leads us through a dizzying array of figures and cyber references on his inventive, convincing narrative trail, among them (retaining the order in which they appear in his text): J. G. Ballard, Plato, Lacan, Hegel, Schelling, Marx, Saki, *Stargate,* Welles, Kafka, the Lascaux cave paintings, Virtual Reality (VR), Slovenia's Cerknica lake as magic screen, Slovene author Janez Valvasor, *Terminator 2, Indiana Jones,* Deleuze, film noir and the *femme fatale,* Foucault, Chaplin, *pensée sauvage,* Eisenstein's project to film *Capital,* Sherry Turkle, Heidegger, Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels, Multiple User Domains (MUD), Allucquere Rosanne Stone, the Robocop, Judith Butler, John Searle's

Chinese Room argument, artificial intelligence (AI), Kant, Marcuse, Freud, Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD), Malebranche as the philosopher of VR, Napoleon, Descartes, God, Aristotle, an Aztec priest, Schreber, Fredric Jameson, "Deep Ecology," Stalin, *Othello,* de Gaulle, Dostoyevsky and Habermas.

Zizek * asks: How do we get from Plato's cave to a materialist dispositif? According to materialism, the status of true reality beyond the cave is an anamorphic fantasy which cannot be perceived directly, but only through its distorted reflection on the wall of the cave, its "screen." The real line of separation is inside the cave, dividing the material reality the cavemen see around themselves from the elusive appearance of the "suprasensible" event reflected on the cave's wall. As Lacan and Hegel emphasized, the suprasensible is appearance as appearance. To get from one sense of "interface" to another, Zizek reminds us that "in science fiction . . . a window or a door" is often used as the "passage into the fantasmatic dimension. . . . In the history of cinema, perhaps the greatest master of this art of elevating an everyday door or window into the fantasmatic place of passage was Orson Welles; in his version of Franz Kafka's *The Trial,* for example, he systematically exploits the fantasmatic potential of the simple act of opening a door: Always they open onto bewilderingly different places. . . . The 'next room' in *The Trial* always suggests a repressed psychic horror." Isn't this, Zizek asks, the dispositifthe frame through which one can glimpse the Other Sceneof fantasmatic space from the Lascaux paintings to Virtual Reality? Isn't the interface of a computer the last materialization of this frame? The key to the status of VR is the difference between imitation and simulation: VR doesn't imitate reality, it simulates it. Where does that leave us? We occupy the space of "vanishing mediators." We may be led to think of "consciousness" itself as a kind of interface, insofar as it is "the frame through which we perceive the universe," but Zizek cautions that if we do so, we "foreclose the real."

Marc Vernet's "The Fetish in the Theory and History of the Cinema" speaks to utopian claims for digital audiovisual technologies from a different perspective. Vernet argues that there is a connection between the invisible in scoptophilia and the unknowable in film libraries and archives. From his position as head of the new Bibliothèque du Film in Paris, he sees this as the basis of a desire "not to know." Using Metz's distinction between the perceptible and the visible, Vernet points out that digital technologies allow for physical and temporal advantages in film analysis, but they may have the unexpected effect of blocking the desire to do research because digitalized materials do not carry the same pleasure as looking at and handling rare originals. Vernet shows how "the unattainable text," which Raymond Ballour described in an earlier technological era, is still pertinent in today's digital environment.

Mary Ann Doane's essay, "Temporality, Storage, Legibility," brings us back to parallels between the prehistory of cinema and Freud's developing theories while invoking modernity, shock and developments in new recording technologies at the time of "early cinema." She refers, as Vernet does, to the concepts of retrieval and storage, but she does so in order to argue that Freud, the chronophotographer Marey and the cinema all grappled in importantly different ways with the concepts of time, storage, representation and legibility. While cinema was hailed in its early years as the perfect means of storing time, Marey's desire to represent time scientifically in objective and measurable terms led to illegibility when he recorded too many photographic traces in a single image. For Freud, time was antithetical to the notion of storage and the retention of traces in memory; instead, time emerged in his writing as discontinuity and as a secondary effect of the organism's need to protect itself from the increasingly intense stimuli of the outer world. While the early cinema would seem to be eminently readable, and thereby to escape the dilemmas of legibility facing Marey and Freud, it verged on meaninglessness in its desire to show the idiosyncratic, the detail and an opaque sense of here and now. This tendency generated anxiety because cinematic representation could potentially become the space of "real time" without significant demarcations that would provide its audience with a focus of attention. Despite the dominance of the actuality (films purporting to show "real events") in the first decade of the cinema, despite the extensive fascination with the camera's relation to "real time" and movement, and although the cinema was born of the aspiration to represent or store time, Doane argues that an important reason that narrative was quickly mobilized to structure cinematic time was to protect the subject from the anxiety generated by the idea that modernity's new technological media would move toward "total representation."

Doane's, Vernet's, Heath's and Zizek's * essays, each one differently, turn on the historical direction which cinema and then digital media took, and they also look back to the founding premises of these developments which point to roads not taken. In fact, many of the essays in this volume show evidence of the increasing interest in the history of psychoanalysis and its relationships with the early history of the cinema: parallel histories instantiated in so many different ways over the past century.

> *This new art was mine, just as it was everyone else's. We had the same mental age: I was seven and knew how to read; it was twelve and it did not know how to talk. People said that it was in its early stages, that it had progress to make; I thought that we would grow up together. I have not forgotten our common childhood*. . . . JEAN-PAUL SARTE

The essays by David James Fisher, Peter Wollen, Janet Walker and Alain de Mijolla are, to a greater or lesser degree, involved with the famous history

of Sartre's "Freud scenario" and John Huston's film *Freud*. But their combined merits do not stand or fall on the cinematic or psychoanalytic value of the film; rather, that history is seen from four distinct perspectives as the nexus of unexpected historical, theoretical, clinical and textual concerns.

Psychoanalyst and intellectual historian David James Fisher, in "Sartre's Freud: Dimensions of Intersubjectivity in *The Freud Scenario,*" argues that Sartre's screenplay for a film based on Freud, commissioned in 1958 by Huston and posthumously published in 1984, has been misinterpreted as a negligible work by scholars of Sartre and of Freud. Fisher, on the contrary, sees it as a key piece of writing which provides a humane, nonidealized biography of Freud during the first decade of his work, when he experienced his greatest anguish and made his most fundamental discoveries. Fisher analyzes Sartre's portrait according to three themes which he argues must be seen as interrelated and as key to Sartre's view of the simultaneous emergence of Freud the man and the discipline of psychoanalysis: (1) the dialectical relationship between anti-Semite and Jew in turn-of-the-century Vienna; (2) the relationship between physician and patient; and (3) the relationship between fathers and sons. Fisher's reading shows how Sartre proposed a concept of intersubjectivity which is central to all three of these points. An examination of Sartre's drafts for the Freud script as well as correspondence with Simone de Beauvoir shows that Sartre's research for this project and the long process of writing it led him to reverse, at least temporarily, his long-standing opposition to the theory and techniques of psychoanalysis.

In "Freud as Adventurer," Peter Wollen addresses the case of the "Freud scenario" differently, in order to show how Freud, John Huston and Sartre all saw themselves as adventurers seeking glory and an escape from the limitations of family life, as conquistadors. He quotes Freud's revealing and moving reaction upon seeing the Acropolis with his own eyes:

> It seemed to me beyond the realm of possibility that I should travel so farthat I should "go such a long way." This was linked up with the limitations and poverty of our condition of life. My longing to travel was no doubt also an expression of my wish to escape from that pressure, like the force that drives so many adolescent children to run away from home. I had long seen clearly that a great part of the pleasure of travel lies in the fulfillment of these early wishes, that it is rooted, that is, in dissatisfaction with home and family. When first one catches sight of the sea, crosses the ocean and experiences as realities cities and lands which for so long had been distant, unattainable things of desireone feels oneself like a hero who has performed deeds of improbable greatness.

Wollen points out how far Sartre's philosophy was from Freud's, as well as the gulf Sartre perceived between himself and John Huston. Quoting Sartre, "I readily subscribe to the verdict of an eminent psychoanalyst: I have no Superego," Wollen comments, "in other words, no guilt. (Is this so very different from Huston's remark about the unconscious, which Sartre derided:

'In mine, there's nothing at all'?)" Wondering how Freud and Sartre could become aligned, Wollen sees "the central issue at stake in any attempt to tell the story of Freud's years of the discovery of psychoanalysis: the role played by the father in the life of his son." In preparing his script, Sartre worked from four main sources: Freud's letters to Fliess, *Studies on Hysteria, The Interpretation of Dreams* and the first volume of Ernest Jones's biography. Wollen shows how Sartre managed to be amazingly faithful to these writings while at the same time "proposing and experimenting with his own method of enquiry, one which was radically different from Freud's in its methodology." Wollen demonstrates convincingly and elegantly that "the key to this achievement was Sartre's assignment (by Huston) to the period of Freud's early self-analysis, a period before Freudianism congealed into a system and psychoanalysis into an institution. Precisely, we might say, the period when Freud was still an adventurer, not yet (quite) a law-giver."

Janet Walker turns our attention to a different subject in her essay, "Textual Trauma in *Kings Row* and *Freud,*" namely how these films handle the theme of incest. Walker examines them in the light of publicity materials and different versions of their scripts in connection with contemporary literature on post-traumatic stress and psychoanalytically informed film theory. She shows how incest affected both films' operations of scenarization and censorship and resulted in the excision of certain explicit subplots and the oblique representation of others. Walker argues, however, that covert expressions of traumatic subjects remained in these films as "textual scars." Psychoanalytic theories of dissociation are useful for the analysis of "traumatic (film) texts," she continues, because they reject an either/or conception of real events versus psychic fantasies. This explains how the films are able to suggest simultaneously that incest really did occur and that it did not. In an age when incest accusations are often received as "false memories" based on mere fantasy, Walker emphasizes "the need to take back for feminism a conception of sexual assault that involves its psychic dimensions as well as its physical ones."

In "Freud and the Psychoanalytic Situation on the Screen," Alain de Mijolla addresses films that show Freud himself. These fall into two categories: home movies made by his contemporaries such as Philip Lehrman, Mark Brunswick, Princess Marie Bonaparte and René Laforgue, and fiction films. De Mijolla emphasizes that the psychoanalytic situation has almost never been shown in films of any kind: "nothing . . . is less cinematic, because nothing is less visual or less apt to provide the material for a dramatic scene. . . ." The tempo of analysis, for instance, is very different from that of the cinema. The events usually shown in films about psychoanalysisthe immediate fall into hypnotic sleep and the transference attached to hypnosisare the opposite of the slow process of working through, including the significance of the breaks between a sequence of sessions and the duration of psychoana-

lytic therapy. The cinema has almost always failed to make psychic interiority meaningful on the screen.

> *First touch me, astonish me, tear me apart, startle me, make me cry . . . . You will please my eye afterward if you can*. DIDEROT

Excess is a familiar term in contemporary film theory, a term most frequently invoked, I think, in discussions of melodrama. In Joan Copjec's radical and explicitly feminist reading of *Stella Dallas,* "More! From Melodrama to Magnitude," excess is joined with a Lacanian notion of the structural logic of fantasy. Copjec maintains that the excess that distinguishes melodrama as a genre is female-specific and must be reconsidered in terms of free indirect speech ("in Pier Paolo Pasolini's words, with 'reanimated speech,' and with 'the purring of meditative thought, of grumbling, of regretting, of recriminating, etc.' "). Copjec argues that where "omniscient narration presents an objective world that is consistent because it lacks something" (life, contingency) to which a narrator brings intelligibility, free indirect narration represents a world that is profoundly ambiguous rather than incomplete. Countering both Peter Brooks, in his highly influential *The Melodramatic Imagination,* and film theorists of melodrama, Copjec suggests that melodrama constructs "an *indeterminate* reality" about which "nothing definite can be said" because melodramatic excess does not result from a prohibition that "closes off diegetic space by excluding something, but is . . . the cause of the inability of the diegesis to close itself off." Melodrama seems to comport an excess, "an unspecifiable 'more'," because something has not been prohibited or excluded. Rejecting the view that *Stella Dallas* and her world are antinomic, Copjec argues, counterintuitively, that the final scene presents us with a world that includes Stella, and that this is "an extraordinary accomplishment." Stella's passion is, in psychoanalytic terms, hysterical. The hysterical fantasy at issue, however, is not her union with Steven, but rather salvaging his relation to Helen and thereby forming a couple "from which she would be excluded."

Excess figures prominently in many of the essays in this collection. We find it at the beginning and at the heart of Doane's essay: "The advent of mechanical reproduction inaugurated a discursive thematics of excess and oversaturation that is still with us today. The sheer quantity of images and sounds is perceived as the threat of overwhelming or suffocating the subject." Heath invokes excess to describe Kafka's reaction to cinema: " 'I can't stand it, perhaps because I am too visual.' Kafka pulls away from cinema as surface continuity of images, urges an excess in seeing, a more-visual of vision, the force, as Lacan would say, of the eye made desperate by the gaze." And later in his essay, excess describes what Heath calls "Zizek-film," the gesture toward figuration Zizek * can perform, magician-like, in the lecture hall,

in which one perceives "cinema not as the vehicle of an exposition but as a matter of experience, on the edge of the real, at an extreme of psychoanalytic shock. Seen thus, film no longer subtracts from psychoanalysis . . . ; on the contrary, it exceeds it with the very excess with which psychoanalysis has to concern itself, that it faces, comes down to, impasses on." Zizek's * essay is permeated with references to excess, for instance: "Insofar as the impact of VR is rooted in the dynamics of capitalism, no wonder that Marx's analysis of capitalism, his emphasis on the necessary codependence between lack and excess, remains pertinent for our approach to VR."

> *It's too late.* VERTIGO

Ayako Saito challenges the way Lacanian theory, as construed within film theory, has narrowed the field of possibilities of psychoanalytic approaches to cinema. Specifically, she draws attention to the question of affect and how it may be traced through textual analysis. In "Hitchcock's Trilogy: A Logic of Mise en Scène," she argues that affect has attracted little attention within psychoanalytic film theory because of the strong emphasis on the Lacanian psychoanalytic model, which revolves around the question of language and the gaze. Drawing on the writings of André Green (particularly his essay "The Question of Affect"), Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok as well as Raymond Bellour and Lacan, she examines *Vertigo, North by Northwest* and *Psycho* as components of a single filmic system in the light of three psychical structures: melancholia, mania and paranoia/schizophrenia. She demonstrates throughout the course of this textual and theoretical analysis the degree to which the narrative, visual style and dominant affectivity of each film (melancholic in *Vertigo,* manic in *North by Northwest* and paranoid in *Psycho*) are interrelated and are, in fact, determined by one another.

> *People of my parents' generation told themselves: we are going to spare them the story of what happened to us. Because they did not transmit their histories, I searched for a false memory, a kind of imaginary, reconstructed memory rather than the truth, as if I had no access to the things that were true. . . . The jokes are part of the same thing, like a return of the repressed. The jokes were told because life was unbearable. It was a way of denying what happened through mockery, keeping it at a distance by making fun of it. When history becomes unbearable, you stage your own misery and laugh at it*. CHANTAL AKERMAN[10]

My own essay, "Chantal Akerman: Splitting," addresses a paradox in the representation of mother-daughter relationships in Akerman's films by considering them in terms of André Green's essay "The Dead Mother," on the one hand, and literature on children of survivors of the Holocaust, on the other.

Mother-daughter relationships figure prominently in Akerman's films, and feminist film theory in the 1970s and 1980s took her films to be emblematic of many contemporary theoretical questions about the representation of women's subjectivity in film. Overwhelmingly this insistence was identified with Akerman's/the daughter's wish to show the crucial, positive importance of the mother and perhaps as a means by which the daughter might communicate indirectly with the mother, as suggested by the beautiful title of Brenda Longfellow's essay, "Love Letters to the Mother." But the questions of affect which Green poses in "The Dead Mother" allow us to consider Akerman's representation of the mother-daughter relationship from a different perspective, particularly when combined with literature on children of survivors of the Holocaust. For, since she began to make films, Akerman has emphasized in interviews that her mother had been in a concentration camp and that she would never speak about it. This essay addresses the contradictory feelings toward the mother experienced by a daughter of a survivor as represented indirectly in *Saute ma ville* (Blow Up, Town) and *Jeanne Dielman* which, taken together, represent psychical processes of splitting and ambivalence. Akerman described her distinctive approach to the cinema at the time *Les Rendez-vous d'Anna* was released by drawing an analogy with Kafka's "deterritorialization," his "minor literature," as it had been presented a few years earlier by Deleuze and Guattari. Her references to their reading of Kafka, as well as her own observations about Kafka's diaries and letters, provide a way to understand better two unique aspects of Akerman's films: first, her "voice" or her position of enunciation, which is presented to the audience as if it were split; and second, her unusual waypartly conscious and partly unconscious, I believeof focusing her films on her personal experiences. These two aspects are related, for personal experience is presented through Akerman's mode of enunciation as if an invisible wedge had been forced between the represented experience and the audience: we look onto a stylized world that would not be called autobiographical in the usual sense, as we may observe of her more recent film, *Histoires d'Amérique*.

Psychoanalysis and Representation: Theme and Enigma

"She is crying, she is saved." LE MYSTÈRE DES ROCHES DE KADOR

Léonce Perret's 1912 *Le mystère des roches de Kador* was described as the first psychoanalytic film by the 1995 Pordenone Silent Film Festival. Here, the cinema itself is hailed as a tool for psychotherapy. Psychoanalysis and cinema join forces to cure a female subjectSuzannewithin a framework of conventional "mystery." According to the terms of her deceased uncle's will,

Suzanne will inherit his fortune when she reaches adulthood unlessa strange, predictive clauseshe dies, enters a convent or is incapacitated by blindness or madness, in which case the estate passes to her guardian (played by the film's director, Perret). When Suzanne comes of age, her guardian, threatened with public exposure for unpaid debts, proposes marriage to gain access to her wealth. But Suzanne recoils from his question in horrified surprise. Next, he plots to kill her along with the man she loves, Jean d'Erquy, at a lonely cove known as the Roches de Kador. After Suzanne faints on the beach because of a potion slipped into her drink, her guardian, hidden in the rocks, shoots d'Erquy as he reaches the shore in his rowboat. The rising tide is expected to take care of their bodies. Exit the guardian. But despite his injury, d'Erquy manages to drag Suzanne into the boat where the coupleSuzanne deliriouslive through a stormy night at sea and are rescued. D'Erquy recovers but Suzanne has become catatonic.

Enter psychoanalysis: d'Erquy visits a "celebrated foreign alienist physician who has recently moved to Paris," who has been experimenting with a technique that has shown promise in cases like Suzanne's. [11] The doctor hands him a brochure entitled "Lecture to the Academy of Medicine on the observations of Professor Williams regarding the application of the Cinematographe to psychotherapy." An extract is highlighted, like an intertitle, in the booklet that accompanied the film's release, although it does not appear in the restored version of the film: "This marvelous invention, used only recently in 'mental medicine,' seems destined to occupy a prominent place in it very quickly. The luminous vibrations of cinematographic images, transmitted by means of the optic nerve of the retina, are registered on the cells of the cerebral cortex and result in a particular state of hypnosis which lends itself admirably well to therapeutic suggestion." The science of this method is explained no more than this. Instead, we cut immediately to Professor Williams in action, for it is he himself who will create the "cinematographic images" that he will use to cure Suzanne. Once again, we see the lonely beach, but this time Professor Williams commands the space, rather than the evil guardian. He directs the actors (d'Erquy plays himself) and gives directions to the camera operator shot by shot (fig. 1), restaging the scene of Suzanne's originary trauma as closely as he can.

We are also treated to a view of the entire projection apparatus as it is set up for Suzanne's personal screening. Her face devoid of expression, her eyes blank, she is brought to a chair and a mobile screen is wheeled into place before her. Although others will be watching from the sidelines (we see them before and after the main event), they will be watching her, while her eyes are directed toward the screen. The curtains are drawn, the room is dark and the spectacle begins. As the film-within-the-film is projected, we are presented with a series of shots alternating between Suzanne's face, reflecting the "luminous vibrations" from the screen, and the filmic reenactment be-

Figure 1
Le mystère des roches de Kador (Léonce Perret, 1912).
Courtesy Cinémathèque Française.

fore her. Her face takes on expressiveness as she seems to *see* something, and then, breathing heavily, she seems absorbed by what she is seeing and then greatly distressed when d'Erquy is shot (fig. 2) and she watches him struggle to pull her (her double) into the boat to safety. Like a combination of Keaton's *Sherlock, Jr.* and a literalization of Mary, Ann Doane's theses about women spectators being "too close" to the image, she rises and moves toward the screen like a somnambulist (fig. 3), her arms stretched out to the man/the image she has only been able to recognize there, and then she faints. Reviving (brought back from her cinematic and psychic shadow realms by the doctor's smelling salts), she finally recognizes d'Erquy in person and collapses into his arms, followed by the title (representing the doctor's words): "She is crying, she is saved." This display of affect, then, which suits the melodrama's conventions perfectly, makes further explanation unnecessary. Exit psychoanalysis, its task successfully accomplished, as the plot reaches the last act in which the guardian is brought to justice. [12]

It is notable that this episode that uses the cinema as the primary tool to effect a (cathartic) psychoanalytic cure moves from darkness into light, as if literalizating another metaphor: from catatonia to normalization, the woman



Figure 2.
Le mystère des roches de Kador (Léonce Perret, 1912).
Courtesy Cinémathèque Française.

is reestablished within her proper social milieu. The power of psychoanalysis is thematized and subordinated to a story of villainous deceit foiled, which is marked by a sequence of positions to which female subjectivity is led. Suzanne was first subjected to the conditions of her uncle's will, next to the machinations of her male guardian (who caused her to faint, risking her death), then to Professor Williams's experiment with the cinematograph and psychotherapy (from which she faints, to be brought back to "normal life"), and she ends up as d'Erquy's future bride, thus not only "sane" again, but doubly wealthy, since her cure also enables her to become an heiress.

The most intriguing moments of this fascinating little treatise on the cinema, psychotherapy and sexual differencewhich is not without a certain ironic, comedic dimension, thanks partly to Léonce Perret's deliberate overacting of the villain's part but also to the sheer pleasure attached to showing "how the toy works" (the cinema), which parallels the "straight" plot of psychic trauma and the resolution of that mysteryare those which represent Suzanne's psychical opacity. In fact, a good deal of the film before the denouement turns on not knowing who she really is (she appears to be a most independent young woman at the beginning), what she wants or what



Figure 3.
Le mystère des roches de Kador (Léonce Perret, 1912).
Courtesy Cinémathèque Française.

she might be thinking or feeling, particularly after she is rendered "catatonic" (i.e., unreadable). One powerful example representing this second phase, which itself is taken from an iconographic history of ghostly, abstracted images of women with long dark hair loose against flowing white robes, their minds "absent," was incorporated by Jean-Luc Godard into the first section of his televised *Histoire(s) du cinéma:* Suzanne drawn toward the movie screen as if under hypnosis, which we see from behind, thus hiding what her face might seem to tell us "openly." The subjugation of psychoanalysis to melodrama, not unlike the happily-ever-after subjugation of Suzanne to her male entourage throughout most of that film, is the opposite of the dark elusiveness of *Dead Man,* the example with which I opened this essay. In *Dead Man,* psychoanalysis is not an explicit theme, yet the film seems to evoke its logic at every moment, undercutting easy answers and dramatic formulas in its floating, powerfully hypnotic mode of enunciation which continuously and unpredictably unfolds a textual and psychical journey with its ending (its final destination) left beyond plot and representation.

In closing, it is in memory of Christian Metz, a warmly generous, dedicated and forward-looking man, that I would like to urge that we take the

time to re-evaluate our history and try to understand what the stakes are today, when the form and role of the media are quite different than they were twenty years ago, when Cinema Studies has become an academic institution, and when the analytic communities seem to have many meanings for the term "the unconscious."

Notes

I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge my fellow organizers of the conference "Psychoanalysis and Cinema: Parallel Histories," David James Fisher and Vincent Pecora. My sincere thanks go to Lynne Lehrman Weiner for her contribution of three invaluable photographic documents of Freud and Anna Freud taken from the documentary film *Sigmund Freud, His Family and Colleagues, 1928–1947,* which she edited and produced from film footage shot by her father, psychoanalyst Philip R. Lehrman, M.D. Video copies of this film may be viewed at the Library of Congress, the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and the Freud Museum in London. For photographic and material assistance, I would also like to thank Michael Friend; Dominique Païni and Claudine Kaufmann of the Cinémathèque Française; Hans-Helmut Prinzler of the Stiftung Deutsche Kinemathek; and Jeannine Ivy. Attributions of quotations or references not provided in this introduction may be found in the designated essays in this collection. Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

1. Among the accounts available, see *New Vocabularies in Film Semiotics* by Robert Stam, Robert Burgoyne and Sandy Flitterman-Lewis (New York: Routledge, 1992), "Introduction: Deadly Women, Epistemology and Film Theory" in Mary Ann Doane's *Femmes Fatales: Feminism, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), "The Female Spectator: Contexts and Directions" by Janet Bergstrom and Mary Ann Doane, introductory essay to "The Spectatrix," a special issue of *Camera Obscura* on the female spectator (nos. 20–21, May–September 1989), and indeed most of the contributions to that issue.

2. The editorial to *Screen* 16:2 (summer 1975), which featured "The Imaginary Signifier," dates the journal's involvement with psychoanalysis to its publication of "John Ford's *Young Mr. Lincoln:* A Collective Text by the Editors of *Cahiers du Cinéma*" (13:3, autumn 1972), translated from *Cahiers du Cinéma* no. 223 (September 1970); Baudry's essay was originally published as "Cinéma: effets idéologiques produits par l'appareil de base" in *Cinéthique* nos. 7–8 (1970); it appeared in English in *Film Quarterly* 28:2 (winter 1974–75).

3. "The Imaginary Signifier," in Christian Metz, *The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982) 17. I cite this edition because it is more widely available than the 1975 issue of *Screen*.

4. Philip Rosen's anthology *Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) provides the best one-volume selection of this influential work, along with pertinent introductions and bibliographical references. A number of the journals listed in my Selected Bibliography have published anthologies of essays they published during this period.

5. See "Introduction: From Plato's Cave to Freud's Screen," in *Psychoanalysis and Cinema,* ed. E. Ann Kaplan (New York: Routledge, 1990). For a superbly clear history devoted to psychoanalysis and literature, see Shoshana Felman's classic essay "Turning the Screw of Interpretation," in "Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading Otherwise," a special issue of *Yale French Studies* (nos. 55–56, 1977), subsequently published in book form under the same title (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).

6. *American Imago: Studies in Psychoanalysis and Culture* 50:4 (winter 1993), "Psychoanalysis and Film," ed. E. Ann Kaplan.

7. "Introduction to Special Issue of *American Imago* on 'Psychoanalysis and Cinema,' " ibid., 393.

8. "The Imaginary Signifier," 21.

9. "Editorial," *Screen* 16:2 (summer 1975) 5.

10. Ibid.

11. I take the phrase "un célèbre médecin aliéniste étranger récemment installé à Paris" from the thirty-two-page booklet that recounts the story of the film and accompanied its opening at the Gaumont Palace theater in Paris. Gaumont Collection, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, Paris.

12. Richard Abel, in *The Cine Goes to Town* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) 351–53, devotes several pages to this film. As is characteristic of his approach throughout this admirable study of French cinema from 1896 to 1914, Abel is highly sensitive to male/female sexual positioning with respect to hierarchies of power. It seems that there may be some differences between the print he studied at the National Film and Television Archive in London and the French restoration. My thanks to Professor Abel for his communications to me about certain details of the chain of narrative events and their visualization before I had access to the French print, and to Dominique Païni and Claudine Kaufmann of the Cinémathèque Française for facilitating my study of the restored version.

Selected Bibliography

Listed here in chronological order are special issues of journals and books devoted to psychoanalysis and cinema which contain contributions from both psychoanalysts and film scholars. Omissions are inadvertent, translations are my own.

1950. Wolfenstein, Martha, and Nathan Leites. *Movies: A Psychological Study*. The Free Press, 1950; reprinted with a new introduction, New York: Atheneum, 1970.

This is important book is a neglected resource.

1982. *L'Ane: le magazine freudien* no. 7 (winter 1982).

A substantial part of this issue, edited by Pascal Bonitzer and Michel Silvestre, is structured around the question: "The Cinema and the Impossible: Does the Art of the Image Touch the Real?" Contributors: Chantal Akerman, Jean-Pierre Beauviala, Pascal Bonitzer, Michel Chion, Serge Daney, Freddy d'Artois, Jean-Luc Godard, Benoît Jacquot, Claude Léger, Michel Silvestre, Slavoj Zizek *.

1985. Fleming, Michael and Roger Manvell. *Images of Madness: The Portrayal of Insanity in the Feature Film*. Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1985.

1987. Gabbard, Krin and Glen O. Gabbard. *Psychiatry and the Cinema*. Foreword by Irving Schneider, M. D. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.

1987. Smith, Joseph H. and William Kerrigan, eds. Introduction by Joseph H. Smith, M.D. *Images in Our Souls: Cavell, Psychoanalysis, and Cinema*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. Contributors: Stanley Cavell, Micheline Klagsbrun Frank, Timothy Gould, Karen Hanson, Stanley R. Palombo, William Rothman, Irving Schneider, Bruce H. Sklarew, Stephen M. Weissman, Robert Winer.

1989. *CinémAction* no. 50 (1989): "Cinéma et psychanalyse."

> Guy Hennebelle explains in his editorial to this special issue: "This volume follows up, in its own way, on the issue that the journal *Communications* devoted to this theme in 1975, which has scarcely been continued in publications on the cinema. In our view, therefore, *CinémAction's* task was to bring up to date crucial subjects for the seventh (and the 'eighth') art, to furnish readers concerned with these issues with a coherent yet open panorama which would allow them to pursue research and reflection in the direction of their choice." Contributors: Odile Bächler, Alain Bergala, Roger Dadoun, Ana Helena de Staal, Alain Dhote, Franck Évrard, Michel Ferreri, Anne Gillain, Félix Guattari, Hervé Joubert-Laurencin, Dominique Maugendre, Christian Metz, Marcel Oms, Daniel Oppenheim, René Prédal, Claude Noële Pickmann, Jean-Claude Polack, Jean Rouch, Daniel Serceau, Michel Serceau, Moumen Smihi, Pierre Sorlin, Annie Tardits, Francis Vanoye, Marc Vernet.

1993. Walker, Janet. *Couching Resistance: Women, Film, and Psychoanalytic Psychiatry*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.

> This work, written by a film scholar, includes citations from many voices (individuals and journals) located within American psychoanalytic and psychiatric communities.

1993. *American Imago: Studies in Psychoanalysis and Culture* 50:4 (winter 1993): "Psychoanalysis and Film."

> Editor E. Ann Kaplan described this special issue as follows in her introduction to the follow-up volume, published in 1995: "The first issue of *American Imago* devoted to 'Psychoanalysis and Cinema' focused largely on issues to do with the feminine in cinema. The volume revisited, critiqued, and reflected upon seventies and eighties feminist film theories: an essay critiquing theories was followed by one that built on existing paradigms so as to include the psyche among political discourses forming the social field; another opened up the question of race and psychoanalysis, a fourth advanced a theory of fetishistic structure in Hollywood film, and yet another explored phallic women in Hollywood films. A final essay argued for a postmodern psychoanalysis that calls into question the entire process of referring back to 'origins.' " Contributors: Sandy Flitterman-Lewis, Krin Gabbard and Glen O. Gabbard, Molly Haskell, E. Ann Kaplan, Louise J. Kaplan, Ira Livingston.

1994. *Journal of Film and Video* 46:2 (summer 1994): "Psychoanalysis and Film."

> Contributors: Ilsa J. Bick, Krin Gabbard, Nina K. Martin, Robert T. Self.

1995. *Cahiers Jungiens du Psychanalyse* no. 83 (summer 1995): "Cinéma: une approche jungienne." Abstracts in French and English.

In their editorial, the editors Aimé Agnel and Michèle Petit note: "It is astonishing that Jung spoke so little about the cinema, and so negatively." The issue is meant to show, nonetheless, how Carl Jung's writings are pertinent for the study of cinema. Although his work is rather far afield of the study of psychoanalysis and cinema as we know it, this collection may prove useful. Contributors: Aimé Agnel, John Beebe, Marco Bellochio, Meryem de Lagarde, Nérôme Dorvault, Lidia Franquet, Geneviève Guy-Gillet, Daniel Isoppo, Nicole Ward Jouve, Françoise Rondeleux, Mario Serenellini, Christiane Veschambre, Claude Winkler-Bessone.

1995. *American Imago* 52:2 (summer 1995): "Psychoanalysis and Film II."

Editor E. Ann Kaplan explains that this second volume on psychoanalysis and film published by *American Imago* "brings together articles written by male film critics on two main themes, which are explored using psychoanalytic paradigms, namely those of masculinity in the cinema and of cinema aesthetics, the spectator and politics. As in the prior volume [published in 1993], authors use psychoanalysis to varying degrees and in quite different ways." Contributors: Reynold Humphries, Robert Lang, Jonathan Scott Lee, Jurgen Reeder, Michael Walsh.

One
Cinema and Psychoanalysis: Parallel Histories

Stephen Heath

How was it, wondered Lou Andreas-Salomé in 1913, that the cinema had come to play a role of no small significance "for us"? Despite work, weariness and lack of time, she could regularly be found with Victor Tausk and his boys at Vienna's Urania picture house (still there today): "often it is only for half an hour and I always have to laugh at this activity in which we indulge." [1]

Of no small significance *for us,* but not really us *analysts*. In the parallel histories of psychoanalysis and cinema, interest is, on the face of it, one-sided: cinema's in psychoanalysis. When Melanie Klein's ten-year-old patient Richard used to ask at the close of their sessions whether she was going to the cinema that evening, he invariably received the discouraging reply that no, she was not, that she much preferred reading, walking, anything but the movies (ironically, Klein insists in her work on dislike of the cinema as bound up with a refusal of scoptophilia stemming from repression of the sexual curiosity aroused by the primal scene).[2] For Sigmund Freud himself, we have the account given by Ernest Jones of what is said to be the founding father's first encounter with cinema, in New York in 1909, an account that has him only dimly amused by "one of the primitive films of those days," full of "wild chasings" (whereas Sándor Ferenczi, "in his boyish way," became over-excited).[3] If this truly was Freud's first encounter, it would emphasize the disinterest even more: in the year of the New York visit, after all, there were almost eighty cinemas in Vienna and filmsAndreas-Salomé's pointwere easily part of everyday life. More recently, Jacques Lacan could invoke Harpo Marx and *Never on Sunday* to illustrate topics in his discussion of the ethics of psychoanalysis, declare himself astounded by the "female eroticism" in *Empire of the Senses* ("I began to understand the power of Japanese women"), write in praise of *L'Assassin musicien* and subsequently have its

director, Benoît Jacquot, film him for the celebrated *Télévision* programbut then all that does not amount to very much. [4] Andreas-Salomé herself has to laugh and feels obliged to acknowledge cinema's pleasure as superficial, trusting nevertheless that it provides some trace of aesthetic experience for workers deadened by the narrow routine of their lives, as well as for intellectuals professionally fatigued by commitments and cogitations (shades of Ludwig Wittgenstein at the movies, close up to the screen, "totally immersed," taking cinema "like a shower-bath" to wash away his lecture thoughts).[5]

In the early years, psychoanalytic disinterest is partly a matter of intellectual and class disdain for the upstart popular entertainment, so *immature,* as Jones makes clear with his sneer at the boyish Ferenczi and as the enthusiastic Andreas-Salomé herself suggests, having to laugh at her own cinema-going. More importantly, it is a matter of the power of images and of their place, or not, in analytic practice and theory. As juvenile as cinema, it too a child of the late nineteenth century, psychoanalysis has a newness that at once requires and suspects dissemination, the mediation of its insights and ideas to a public that the visual representation of cinema could so strongly reach, but in ways regarded as contrary to the very sense of those same insights and ideas. Indeed, the ready appeal of cinema as an analogy for mental processescinema regarded from the start as a good way of imaging the workings of the mind (Andreas-Salomé provides an example: "cinematic technique is the only one which allows a rapid succession of images approximating to our own imaginative activity, even imitating its volatility")[6]brings exactly by its readiness the danger of the loss of the specificity of psychoanalytic understanding, of the originality of its grasp of psychical apparatus, unconscious and sexuality. How is the talking-cure to be put into images? How is psychoanalytic knowledge to be represented? Freud reacted negatively in 1925 when disciples Karl Abraham and Hanns Sachs urged the advantages of collaboration on a proposal for a film about psychoanalysis, the proposal that became G. W. Pabst's *Secrets of a Soul* (*Geheimnisse einer Seele* premiered in Berlin in March 1926). Abraham and Sachs saw the appeal, were willing to act as the film's "scientific advisors"; Freud saw the danger, intractably maintained his distance from cinema.

Such distance and disinterest notwithstanding, to think about cinema and psychoanalysis today is a substantial undertaking, the histories of the two extending across a century of multiple and complex interactions, one-sided or not. "Cinema and psychoanalysis," moreover, can be a way of enclosing and delimiting a topic that should, on the contrary, be opened up to areas of concern that are not typically takenby film studies at leastas central. There is need, for example, to consider not just how psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts are represented in cinema but also how the recourse to film functions in the analytic session, how the analysand's speech and asso-

ciations and memories may draw and depend on cinema's given sounds and images, its provision of a residue of signifying traces taken up as unconscious material (we watch and grasp films consciously but what counts for us individually in the long run of the psyche may come with quite another urgency, be very different to whatever a film might urge in its images and their ordering, is something only *analytically* calculable). Still, the terms of the enclosure have their specific interest, the more so today when a powerful elaboration of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is rather brilliantly recasting them. The concern here will be with one or two aspects of this, giving some attention to the *resistances* of psychoanalysis: that is, to the difficulties the latter poses to *and itself finds in* its encountersor misencounterswith cinema.

The *Secrets of the Soul* episode is, in fact, the first great *scene* which psychoanalysis makes with cinema and as such, despite its relative familiarity, must be recalled for the issues it raises. Freud is on the one side, the UFA company in the person of producer Hans Neumann on the other; Abraham and Sachs are in between, the mediators: loyal to psychoanalysis, to Freud, while at the same time favoring the film precisely in the interests, as they see it, of Freud and psychoanalysis. The ambition is for a truly "psychoanalytic film," but the problem then arises as to just what that could be; a problem which Abraham and Sachs identify as that of properly showing, properly *figuring* psychoanalysisadequately documenting and responsibly illustrating its theory and practice. Pabst's film will present a real case history and be guaranteed by its advisors, with Sachs, indeed, providing an expository pamphlet to accompany its release. Entitled *Enigma of the Unconscious (Rätsel des Unbewussten),* the pamphlet gives a brief introduction to psychoanalysis, describes the case history, and vouches for the film's achievement: its figuration can be accorded every confidence. [7] Freud, however, lacking any such confidence, is simply overtaken by the sheer inevitability of the project, left only to assert his resolve not to let it implicate *him* (even as he had just seen the announcement in *The Times* of "a psycho-analysis picture . . . soon to be made in Vienna, supervised by Professor Freud and explaining his system"): "There is no avoiding the film, any more than one can avoid the fashion for hair cut in a bob [*Bubikopf*]; I, however, will not let my hair be cut and will personally have nothing to do with this film."[8] The gender-anxious, emasculating image is more than appropriate: the cover of Sachs's pamphlet shows the oval of a woman's face, eyes and forehead in shadow, one long erect finger to her lips in an invitation to silence or secrecy or, exactly, *enigma* (fig. 4). What *does* she want and what does cinema want with psychoanalysis through her, with her for its figure?

Freud's fears turn on this matter of figuration, on the impossibility, as he sees it, of finding without betrayal some figurative representation (*plastische*



Figure 4.
Hanns Sachs, *Psychoanalyse: Rätsel des Unbewussten* (Berlin: Lichtbild-Bühne, 1926).
Courtesy Stiftung Deutsche Kinemathek.

Image not available.

Figure 5.
Sigmund Freud looking out his office window, Vienna, October 1928; © by Lynne Lehrman Weiner (all rights reserved). From the documentary film *Sigmund Freud, His Family and Colleagues, 1928–1947,* edited and produced by Lynne Lehrman Weiner and photographed by Philip R. Lehrman, M.D.

Darstellung) of the terms of psychoanalysis; he gives no credit to Abraham's assurances that means can be found to make them figurable (*darstellbar*). [9] As an example, the latter suggests having the process of repression and the nature of psychoanalytic treatment rendered by a scene showing a noisy interrupter being ejected from a lecture hall and then persuaded to return more peacefully. Freud is unconvinced, dismissive, despite the fact that the illustration is his own, from his Clark University lectures.[10] The "no bad picture [*keine unpassende Darstellung*]" of the popularizing lecture is no good picture for the film, merely underlines the problem: film for Freud is the intruder with whom psychoanalysis cannot successfully negotiate, something in it escapes even as he maintains that psychoanalysis escapes it (psychoanalysis is more than film can show and film's showing troubles psychoanalysis). Significantly enough, early in 1925, the year of the film proposal, he published a piece entitled *Selbstdarstellung* (translated in English as "An Autobiographical Study"): self-presentation, self-portrayal, figuration in Freud's own hands, an outline of psychoanalysis straight from the pen of its founder, no need for film, no compromising images, no *Bubikopf*. That same year too saw the publication of "A Note upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad,' " a piece in which Freud offers *his* image, "a concrete representation [*Versinnlichung*] of the way in which [he tries] to picture [*vorstellen*] the functioning of the perceptual apparatus of our mind."[11] Thirty years into the history of cinema, Freud stays with the *Wunderblock,* the child's toy that is not so childish, that

fulfills the required conditions of complexity to become an analogy for Freud's understanding of the psyche. He does so, moreover, at a time when the trope of cinema as analogy of mental life had become the commonplace already mentioned. Contemporary with Pabst's film, for example, Virginia Woolf writes an essay celebrating cinema's capacity to give the "dream architecture" of our sleep, to depict fantasies no matter "how far fetched or insubstantial," to offer a reality of mind in defiance of conscious syntax and propositions of identity, "some secret language which we feel and see, but never speak." [12]

Introducing the scenario written by Jean-Paul Sartre for John Huston's 1962 film on the beginnings of psychoanalysis, *Freud,* the psychoanalyst J.-B. Pontalis quotes and repeats Freud's objections concerning figuration: "l'image ne *reçoit* pas l'inconscient," which then turns round into "l'inconscient . . . ne se donne pas à *voir*"the unconscious does not present itself to be seen, fall into sight; the image does not receive, entertain, quite simply get the unconscious.[13] Extending the domain of the visible into dreams, reveries, fantasies, and so on, psychoanalysis at the same time crosses the image, disturbs that domain and its domination; what counts is not what is there to be seen but the insistence through it of unconscious desire, which indeed is decisively operative in what is seen. That film and dream were run so easily together (films said to be "dreamlike") was a result of the determinations of figuration in each case. The transformation of dream-thoughts into dream depends on "considerations of representability," the English for Freud's *Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit* (rendered by Lacan as "égard aux moyens de la mise en scène"): "*considerations of representability in the peculiar psychical material of which dreams make use*for the most part, that is, representability in visual images . . . those thoughts will be preferred which admit of visual representation"; dream representability thus involves "a colorless and abstract expression in the dream-thought being exchanged for a pictorial and concrete one."[14] These are the same terms Freud uses in his letter to Abraham objecting to the film project (no way that the abstractions of psychoanalysis"unsere Abstraktionen"can be given acceptable plastic representation, "in irgendwie respektabeler Weise plastisch darzustellen")[15] but the point there for him is that in cinema considerations of representability are everything: the nonfigurative collapses into the figurative, the symbolic becomes a matter of symbols, cinema *holds to* the visual. If indeed films are, as is said, dreamlike, that is of little consequence for psychoanalysis which is, exactly, analysis, interpretation, a work on dreams (*it* renders *them* abstract, refuses to maintain the visual surface, goes for the dream-thoughts). There is no "psychoanalytic dream" and no possibility of a "psychoanalutic film" (other than in the sense that all dreams are matter *for* psychoanalysis, as all films could be, their constructions open to its analysis; if psychoanalysis may *appear* in the picturings of dreams or films, that only *thematically* makes them

"psychoanalytic"), as Freud insists even as Abraham assures him that there can be, that the problem of figuration can be solved. The insistence could be formulated as a Freudian rule: the more you solve that problem, the more effectively the conditions of cinematic representability are satisfied, the further you get from anything that could be seenbut then the seeing is the problemas a *psychoanalytic* film.

Freud's psychoanalysis, that is, interrupts the vision of images, challenges the sufficiency of the representations they make, where cinema aims to sustain vision, to entertainto bind inthe spectator with images. Franz Kafka at this same time talked of cinema putting a uniform on the eye, of its images taking over: "the speed of movements and the precipitation of successive images . . . condemn you to a superficial vision of a continuous kind." In this, it removes something from sight: "I can't stand it, perhaps because I am too visual [*weil ich vielleicht zu 'optisch' veranlagt bin*]." [16] Kafka pulls away from cinema as surface continuity of images, urges an excess in seeing, a more-visual of vision, the force, as Lacan would say, of the eye made desperate by the gaze. The frame of vision"reality," the reality that cinema shows, puts before our eyesis troubled by what it excludes as its very condition and which thereby remains over as the point from which the frame is framed, the troubling blind spot in vision from where the images look backLacan's *objet* a as left over from symbolization, "a bit of the real" ("the field of reality" holds up "only by the extraction of the *objet* a which, however, gives it its frame)."[17] For the too-visual Kafka, cinema's films are akin to false teeth, just artificial fantasies, props for the imagination, *Phantasieprothesen,* unbearable as such. But perhaps, in return, there is *more,* more than just superficially meets the eye, something else that informs the "can't-stand-it" reaction, deciding perhaps Kafka's real trouble with cinema. Woolf, in her essay on cinema, wonders "could this be made visible to the eye?" She thinks, for example, not of the "ordinary forms" of anger, "red faces and clenched fists," but of anger in the image, breaking across it, out of the screen, "a black line wriggling on a white sheet"; not the statement "I am afraid" but "fear itself," something that "burgeons, bulges, quivers, disappears." Watching *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari,* what counts for her is not the film's stated emotions, the effects of its represented visual world; the experiencethe fear itselfis "a shadow shaped like a tadpole" suddenly appearing in a corner of the screen: "It swelled to an immense size, quivered, bulged, and sank back again into nonentity." Woolf moves from figuration, *likeness,* to some "residue of visual emotion," some "accidental," "unintentional" *thing* that sticks out on the screen, radically *obscene*.[18]

It is getting the screen "right" that has always been the priority in cinema's history, involving aspect and illumination to the end of settling the view it gives, rendering it less opaque to the imagesthe framesit receives and reflects, improving its there-for-likeness discretion. We say "naively" of

things filmed moving toward the camera that they are "coming toward the screen," as though emerging from a depth of the image to threaten the protective limit of that depth, the proximate-but-distanced field of our secured vision (confirmed as such in the contained thrill of these almost-out-of-the-screen moments). In the history of psychoanalysis, the screen has provided one of the few analogical-conceptual elaborations from cinema, that of the *dream screen,* proposed by B. D. Lewin in the late 1940s as "the surface on to which a dream appears to be projected," "the blank background present in the dream though not necessarily seen." (Certain writers on cinema have anticipated this dream screen idea: Robert Desnos, for example, in the same year again as the UFA proposal, talked of "the miracle of the screen, neutral ground on which dreams are projected.") [19] Lewin describes it as symbolizing the maternal breast hallucinated by the child asleep after feeding (assuming a white breast, a racial blank) and as the representation of the desire to sleep; on its own in a dream, just the screen, it realizes a regression to primary narcissism. In return, psychoanalytic film theory has made much of the cinema screen as mirror, a mirror reflecting everything but the spectator who is setidentifiedas all-perceiving subject in a cinematic apparatus which reproduces something of the beginnings of the imaginary constitution of the ego in the infant's experience of the mirror stage (the stage that marks for Lacan the emergence of primary narcissism). Cinema is thus characterized essentially in terms of a certain mastery of likeness: the spectator-subject identifies as a point of overall perceptionof encompassing visionand, from that point, with the images on screen that it takes as his or hers, images that it *likes* (gets satisfaction from in their recognition as alike). Accordingly, when narcissism enters this account, it is held largely to an idea of self-recognition confirmed by images, of the subject as coherent with them (at the expense of consideration of the failure of images ever to represent the subject for itself: images for which the subject "takes itself" in the construction of the ego are external, always other, objects not just of love but also of frustration and hate and violence), with fantasy treated concomitantly as little more than a safe space of the imaginary given in a cinematically realized, socially resolved representation that the subject simply assumes (at the expense of consideration of the subject's confrontation in fantasy with the presence of the real). Versions of this, without the apparatus theory, could have been developed readily enough from mainstream psychoanalysis, making films a kind of simulation of what Masud Khan calls "the good dream": the spectator is brought to loosen waking defenses and gains pleasure from the desires allowed through a film's scenes and images, while at the same time distanced from the disruptive force of those desires, happily "asleep" in the safety of the contained filmic space.[20]

"The visually perceived action in ordinary manifest dream contents," says Lewin, takes place "on or before" the dream screen, just as a film is pro-

jected onto a cinema screen and its action seen not as including the screen but as happening on it, in front of it, in a screen-world that catches the spectator in its representations (this impression of a "second screen," the background of a world in which the film's events are placed, allows that "coming-toward-the-screen" effect). Woolf asks what cinema might do "if left to its own devices," without any novelistic second-screening, no covering over of its surprises or disruptions of vision, of its "accidental scenes." Reticent as regards a narrative cinema organized around the succession of actions (she criticized Compton Mackenzie's *Life and Adventures of Sylvia Scarlett* as precisely "a book of cinema," just so many events and incidents), having some interest at least in cinema's technical procedures (she wrote a note on the Friese-Greene color film process), Woolf in her account of the cinema experience sets it between screen-world and screen, elsewhere to the fictions of the one, involving a certain material presence of the other, cutting across both: her blot is fear, something terrifying, for a moment the eye's appetite of vision drained in the loss of any identification, brought up short, skewed out of the image by some "cinema thing" itself. **21**

In the elaboration of a film theory informed by psychoanalysis, so much a focus of critical debate over the last twenty years or more, there have been marked shifts of interest and the fortunes of various concepts have fluctuated. Suture is no longer doing too well, nor, on the whole, is fetishism; the phallus is mostly holding up, while fantasy is fine but prone to disparate appreciations; as for real and symptom, they have come up strong indeed. These shifts and fluctuations can be seen in criticism from within psychoanalytic film theory of the conjunction of cinema and psychoanalysis developed in the wake of the journal *Screen*. Much of this criticism has been directed at what is regarded as a reduction of the spectator/film relation to one of pure specularity, effectively suturing cinema into an ideology of the subject that takes little account of the complexity of the latter's constitution (the notion of "suture" was too often limited to just some idea of the seamless effecting in dominant narrative cinema of the spectator-subject as contained unity, but the Lacanian-Freudian insistence is that there is no coherent subject to be thus simply accommodated). No doubt, in its concern to grasp the particular terms of subjectivity realized in a dominant cinematic institution, to demonstrate the subject positioning in which film-in-cinema involves the spectator (even as he or she may take their distances), *Screen* did at times put the weight so heavily on describing the representation made that it fell into an overdeterministic account, a theoreticist version of closure (already there potentially in the concept of suture itself, introduced as it was as part of an attempt to cast Lacan's work as "forming a system" and provide its formalization). *Screen*'s point, of course, was an appropriation of psychoanalysis politically, insofar as it could be made conjuncturally useful, and

notably as regards identifying and describing mechanisms of subject inscription for ideology. If such appropriation is open to charges of not being properly psychoanalytic, it remains that "cinema and psychoanalysis" necessarily opens up a field which will not be containable within some enclosure of psychoanalysis itself; as it remains too that attention needs to be given to what investment in the "properly" psychoanalytic carries with it in any given context. "Cinema and psychoanalysis" involves the specificity of psychoanalysis in a way that equally reconceives it, sets it at the distance from itself that its deployment in relation to cinema producesand the same holds in reverse for cinema, reconceived by the psychoanalytic theory and concepts with which it is newly posed.

One need here is just to ask: what should film analysis do and what does psychoanalysis have to do with it? Well known is the film analyst (the present writer once hesitantly included) who scrutinizes the film in the hope of possessing it, holding to it as comprehensively*manifestly*identifiable. Raymond Bellour nicely, suggestively, captures the desire at stake: "I spent years in the dark . . . eyes fixed not on my notebook but firmly on the screen, trying to fix, with a hand grown expert but fatally clumsy, ever inadequate, the skeleton outline of the manifold succession of elements that almost always makes up a film" (he is describing his situation in a moment between cinephilia and cinema studies, before the latter gave access to viewing equipment, as too before commercialization of VCRs brought the easy routine of supposed command). [22] The compulsive frenzy of "notabilization" (making as much as possible notable, significantly available) sought to achieve an encompassing vision of the film analyzed that created precisely thereby the experience of it as "unattainable," in the sense not just of a matter of innumerable moving frames that could not be mastered in the dark but also of a symbolic reality that could not be finally settled for the subject, sutured indeed. Bellour's own analyses, so different to many that subsequently projected films into the foregone conclusions of their academic grid, finely demonstrate this play between the film analyst's identifications and the film's continuing divagations at the cost of any subject (self-)possession: *it* eludes, even as the analyst more and more fully represents "his" or "her" filmthe hand grows expert but stays fatally clumsy. The analyst's compulsion, moreover, is the corollary to the particular cinema's own compulsion to visibility, a cinema itself haunted by the possibility of something more than its vision, its controlled continuity of screened reality; analyst and film come across and miss one another on the common ground of their failure not to be seen by this "more"the slippages, splinters, skewings, everything that bears the trace of what is not symbolized, *not in view*.

Understanding of the desire at stake in any film analysis can be gained through consideration of what is envisaged as its end (*aim* and *termination*). A powerful idea taken over from psychoanalysis is interpretationwhat,

indeed, does the psychoanalyst do but look to reveal the meanings of dreams and symptoms and all the various manifestations through which the unconscious finds expression? In film analysis, the recourse to psychoanalysis as interpretative source has mostly worked illustratively, resolving things into the confirmation of a set of given themes, a repeatable psychoanalytic story duly repeated. Which is not without its reason since the Oedipal and other norms can indeed be opportunely brought to bear on the films of "cinema": psychoanalysis, that is, *fits* a cinema culturally permeated by psychoanalytic awareness, developed in societies in which psychoanalysis itself developed (the parallel histories precisely). The difficulty is that film interpretation in these terms functions too easily within *and as* a kind of enclosing imaginary: the cinema's films meet the interpretation they facilitate and from which they in some large sense derive. Themes and explanations pass back and forth between psychoanalysis and cinema in a way that ultimately makes of interpretation an avoidance of any reality of either, as of any reality of their encounter. There is no resistance, no following through of any experience of transference; the film analyst finds him or herself everywhere on screen and there is no trouble between film and interpreter that is not already contained within the interpretative circle, with supposed "divergent" or "critical" readings themselves sustained within the given bounds of sense. [23]

The same is generally true of the contemporary, theoretically aware version of interpretation, in which what is at stake is not so much interpretation of the meaning of films but rather the establishment of a "theoryfilm-analysis" in which psychoanalytic concepts (narcissism, paranoia, repression, whatever) are conjoined with a film in the interests of the interpretative elaboration of issues around (mainly) sexual difference. Psychoanalysis here becomes, as it were, a discourse-generator, making up with film a new genre, a new imaginary (within which, for instance, to construct "the female spectator"). The metapsychological description of the psychical reality of the cinematic apparatus itselfthe cinema's imaginary, its conditions of spectatorship, its structures of identification, and so onequally fed into this (what counts became much less the account of cinema than the theory for which cinema was the rhetorical matter, the ground for the exchange with psychoanalysis around "the subject").

A psychoanalysis is terminable and interminable, comes down ceaselessly on the bedrock impasse of the distinction of the sexes and their resistance to femininity: that resistance, says Freud, "prevents any change from taking place . . . everything stays as it was"; the analyst's consolation being only that the analysand has had "every possible encouragement to re-examine and alter his attitude to it."[24] In Lacan's later work, this altering of attitude is called "going through the fantasy." Where fantasy gives a frame of consistency to the world, offers to make up the lack in the symbolic order and to

answer the question as to "the desire of the Other," analysis seeks to bring the analysand to recognition that there is nothing behind his or her fantasy. Slavoj Zizek *, who has been the major new expounder and extender of Lacanian theory in English-speaking academic circles (and more especially those concerned with cultural and cinema studies), talks of the final moment of analysis as when the analysand accepts his or her being as "*nonjustified by the big Other*."[25] Brought into being in an already given symbolic order that is radically other to it, the subject seeks in a posited big Other the justification for its being, some mandate with which to identify, some truth of being (hence the question as to the Other's desire: what does the Other want of me, what am I for the Other). But if the subject is divided, so is the symbolic: there is no master signifier except precisely the purely negative signifier of division, of the loss experienced through the castration complex, except the phallus as the paradoxical signifier-without-signified representing non-sense within the field of sense, standing for the very enigma of the Other's desire. Fantasy postpones this truth of division; to go through it is for the subject to assume the lack in the Other, to experience the Other's nonexistence, and so give up any assumption that it could provide some final answer, that there is any ultimate guarantee of meaning, any place from which identity can be secured.

What does that mean for cinema and psychoanalysis? Zizek's* striking move is a use of cinema not as an object for psychoanalysis, with films understood through psychoanalytic concepts (though that also features in his work), but as itself providing the means by which those concepts can be truly understood, films as the material with which to explicate psychoanalysis. Conviction of his "proper grasp of some Lacanian concept" comes "only when [he, Zizek] can translate it into the inherent imbecility of popular culture," notably Hollywood cinema: "the notion or complex is explained by way of examples from Hollywood," declares the introduction to *Enjoy Your Symptom* (subtitled *Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out*).[26] There is sometimes more again, however, than understanding concepts. Cinema can be called upon not just to furnish ways of translating; it itself *shows* and can be *shown to show:* "If a student asks 'What is the psychoanalytic Thing?' show him *Alien,*" Zizek will exclaim in a lecture, arm flung screenward as the parasite viscously bursts through human flesh.[27] This is an appeal to figuration of which Freud never dreamed, nor indeed Abraham and Sachs: cinema not as the vehicle of an exposition but as a matter of experience, on the edge of the real, at an extreme of psychoanalytic shock. Seen thus, film no longer subtracts from psychoanalysis, "bobcuts" it off; on the contrary, it exceeds it with the very excess with which psychoanalysis has to concern itself, that it faces, comes down to, impasses on. Cinema translates psychoanalysis but also confronts it: film with Zizekor rather "Zizek-film," the particular new conjunction

he makes out of cinema and psychoanalysisrealizes the unrepresentable, pushes on screen what is more than in representation, *gets it*.

We can come back here to interpretation. It is significant that once past the study of Aimée in his 1932 doctoral thesis, Lacan's seminars and writings offer no developed case histories, dealing more readily in demonstrations from literary and philosophical sources (the *Symposium, Antigone,* Joyce, Kant, Poe . . .) or readings of Freud's great cases and dream analyses (Dora, Little Hans, "Irma's injection" . . .). There is no *display* of interpretation, little attention to ramifying meanings along the signifying chain; indeed, interpretation is seen precisely as directed "not so much at meaning as at reducing signifiers into their non-meaning so that we get back to the determinants of the subject's entire behavior." [28] Everything turns increasingly on the experience of fantasy, of the inertia of fantasy's routine repetition of a constant staging for the subject of "the desire of the Other." As the *real* becomes the prime emphasis of the seminars, it is this going through of the fantasy that is crucial, coming to recognize that the sense fantasy makes masks the nothing "behind," the final absence of sense (*ab-sens* in Lacanese). Fantasy resists interpretation inasmuch as it is thus involved not in a production of meanings (nothing of the metonymy of desire, the unconscious structured like a language) but in the obturationthe screeningof the failure of meaning (analysis seeks to disengage the formula of this obturation, to get at the fantasmatic underpinning of dreams, symptoms, and so on). What the fantasy does is to coordinate the mobile subject of desire in the play of the signifier with the object that fixes it. This is why Lacan talks of a statics*une statique*of fantasy: it always comes round with the same thing, the some thing "which cannot be integrated into the given symbolic structure, yet which, precisely as such, constitutes its identity."[29] Constitutively divided, the subject has no assured identity, no name in the Other of the signifier. A signifier represents a subject for another signifier but no signifier is the subject's own designation: the subject falls between signifiers, always in the interval, always subject to lack. Fantasy fills the void with an object, the *objet a,* at once imaginary and real, outside representation but given a representation in the fantasy as foundation of the illusory unity of the subject. In Jacques-Alain Miller's gloss: "The subject of the signifier is always delocalized, and lacks in being, is only *there* in the object that the fantasy dresses up. The pseudo-*Dasein* of the subject is the *objet a*."[30]

So fantasy in this Lacanian version involves both the confrontation of the divided, lack-in-being subject with the presence of the real, the impossible *objet a,* and the putative filling out of the void of the real by this dressing up of object for subject in a scenario of the Other's desire (fantasy screening in that sense too: concealing the inconsistency in the symbolic order in its projection of consistency, its staging of desire). Fantasy here is absolutely

particular, nowise available for universalization, involves a specific subject matter, exactly *the matter with the subject:* "the absolutely particular way every one of us structures his/her 'impossible' relation to the traumatic Thing." [31] In the film studies version, however, fantasy goes somewhat differently, notably because it has so often been pulled more or less exclusively toward one only of its coordinates, that of the mobility of the subject across the play of signifiers: fantasy as a space in which the subject is everywhere, able successively to assume all the positions in the fantasmatic scenario. This tame version of fantasynomadically open, spectatorially bland, so many equal-opportunities positionshas played a significant role in some approaches to pornography which begin by firmly distinguishing fantasy from reality (but in Lacanian theory, fantasy is fundamental to our sense of reality) and then use the distinction to defend, if not celebrate, pornographic representations which are taken, as fantasy, to ensure a circulation of rolesone can be victim and victimizer equally (supposedly a gain). Where the psychoanalytic insistence is on fantasy as the specific articulation of a relation to the disturbing presence of the real, the scene in which the subject finds support for his or her desire, this cinema account leaves fantasy without specificity, collapsing the subject into an instance of free-floating spectatorial availability, no more than an unproblematic fulfillment of offered positions. Important for psychoanalysis, however, is not moving from one position to another, but the formula, the scenario, which is where the subject is, is *fixed*. "The fantasy is the support of desire; it is not the object that is the support of desire. The subject sustains himself as desiring in relation to an always more complex signifying ensemble. This is apparent enough in the form of the scenario it takes, in which the subject, more or less recognizable, is somewhere, split, divided, habitually double, in his relation to that object, which usually does not show its true face either."[32] What Lacan describes is not open mobility but a definite construction that analysis seeks to bring out, grasping the subject with regard to the complex signifying ensemble in which he or she is sustained in desire. Seeing a film is indeed to be individually involved in different positions, the specific positionings proposed, but the complex negotiation of that seeing implicates a range of fantasy constructions, those operative culturally and socially as well as those psychically determining for this or that spectator, and with all their interactions and disjunctions (and with various processes of identification, or disidentification, both conscious and unconscious). The wish to find ways to recast and revalue the experience of filmsnot just those of pornography but those too, notably, of Hollywood cinemaruns too simply into an account of identifications and meanings in terms of subject mobility that shifts in one go from closed to open systems, from Oedipal law and symbolic blockage to fantasy as ludic freedomwhat Jacqueline Rose describes as an "idealization of psychic pro-

cesses and cinema at one and the same time (something for everyone in both the unconscious and on screen)." [33]

The newly urged psychoanalytic account of fantasy specifies that the order of the signifier and that of *jouissance* are radically discordant. What remains over from the subject's production in the symbolic "always comes back to the same place: to the place where the subject in so far as thinking subjectthe *res cogitans*does not encounter it," so that we are forever called to "an appointment with a real that eludes us"; the real being this resistance, the term of an impossible "enjoyment"*jouissance*whose terrifying presence fouls up the symbolic circuit.[34] In its staging of a scenario of desire, fantasy brings the heterogeneous orders together round the *objet a,* screening their discord and, as it were, allowing the subject to sustain the appointment. It is this account which underpins that "going-through-the-fantasy" idea of the end of analysis. "No analyst to this day," wrote Louis Althusser to a friend in 1963, "has ever (except by chance, and without knowing why) been able truly to end an analysis. Freud himself came a cropper on the subject."[35] But what Freud ran up against was castration, the bedrock impasse; as Lacan would put it, there is no sexual relation. Things run on interminablynothing stops the signifying chainbut it all runs out on the same thing, the traumatic kernel produced in the process of symbolization, the lack in the Other, the *objet a* as surplus enjoyment, the Thing, Freud's *das Ding*. Interpretation comes down to the fundamental fantasy, in which the subject supports him or herself in desirefinds *how to desire*. To go through this is to see through fantasy's screen and recognize the void it masks in a process of "subjective destitution": the Other does not have what the subject lacks and there is nothing behind the screen, no ultimate sense, no absolute reality, nothing "more real." The Lacanian real, on the contrary, is *impossible,* not some substantial unity but always a bit, a scrap, an excrescence.

An important focus for the later Lacan is James Joyce, whose work is said to defy fantasy and speculate on the symptom; "the dimension of the symptom is manifest in Joyce, because that of fantasy does not set a screen," comments Miller.[36] Symptom here refers not to the evident run of symptoms with which a person might appear at the start of an analysis and which might be dissolved through understanding of their meaning, but to the "key symptom," the core of enjoyment around which signification is structured and of which we cannot let go; in Lacan's words, "the way in which each person enjoys the unconscious inasmuch as the unconscious determines him or her"; in Zizek's*, "a particular signifying formation which confers on the subject its very ontological consistency, enabling it to structure its basic constitutive relationship to enjoyment (*jouissance*)."[37] Lacan refers to this as the *sinthome* (an early form of the word, from medieval Latin *sinthoma*): the fantasy can be traversed but the symptom-*sinthome* persists as the irreducible

structuring of enjoyment. It addresses no message to the Other, keeps instead "a sense in the real" (the symptom "is of the effect of the symbolic in the real"). [38] Symptoms fall to analysis, are open to interpretation; the *sinthome* befalls the subject, is the unanalyzable, psychotic (outside discourse) nub that assures it minimum consistency. There is no "curing" the subject of the *sinthome* since without it there is nothing, other than abandonment to the death drive. The end of analysis with the going through of the fantasy can only be *identification with the symptom:* the analysand must come to recognize in the symptom the very support of his or her being, must get to "manage with it."

The exemplariness of Joyce for Lacan is that he gives "the *sinthome* such that there is no way to analyze it"; the Joyce of *Finnegans Wake* baffles interpretation, pushes to the symptom-point of a "pure jouissance d'une écriture" (the *Wake* is just *there,* interminably, as this obdurate cipher of *sens joui,* meaning enjoyed).[39] The unconscious is structured like a language but, in this huge work of language, Joyce "dis-subscribes" from the unconscious, identifies with writing, is dosed to the artifice of analysis: "Joyce the symptom: in that of the symptom, he gives the apparatus, the essence, the abstraction."[40] The *Wake* imposes no fantasy, just this object-text-kernel of enjoyment, a literature with no cinema (not a "book of cinema" in Woolf's sense, though cinema appears in it along with all the other bits and pieces around which its writing pulses), no fantasy constructions of "reality" are allowed to stand, not even the theories and themes of psychoanalysis (above all not even), and no bad pictures; only the *sinthome,* something of the formula of impossible enjoyment, of a sense in the real. Understandably, Lacan is speechless, at a loss, like "a fish with an apple." How could Joyce get there without psychoanalysis, unanalyzed ("it's extraordinary")? Lacan the analyst but Joyce the "afreud," deriding the "grisly old Sykos" in a book that mulls over all the matter of "psoakoonaloose," citing it for the limits of its symbolic purchase, having it confront its failure. "Perhaps analysis would have tricked him with some banal ending," sighs Lacan, who then goes over to Joyce's side, proclaiming himself "sufficiently master of language" to have attained "what fascinates in bearing witness to the specific enjoyment of the symptom," to "opaque enjoyment from excluding meaning."[41]

"Every object," says Lacan, "depends on a relation," every object except the *objet a,* "which is an absolute": "The trouble is that there's language and that relations are expressed there with epithets. Epithets push towards yes or no." Language makes identities, relations, *couples:* "to push towards yes or no is to push towards the couple, because there is a relation between language and sex, a relation which has certainly not yet been altogether made clear but which I've broached."[42] Left over from symbolization, the real is what does not relate, what aborts relation; the key statement of which again

is that there is no sexual relation (although this statement itself is suspect since formulated in the "yes or no" of language: "there is no . . ."). The division of the subject is constitutive, not resolvable, and definitely not in any sexual relation, since the stake for men and women is castration, the phallus always between them, the only partner of each, the very signifier of the subject's division and lack, that from which any subject is entailed (whatever the difference of that entailment as between male and female). "There is good and bad, and then there is the Thing," the prehistoric Other, the primordial Mother-Thing, alien and threatening, the traumatic embodiment of impossible *jouissance;* "good" and "bad" are within representation: "indices of what directs the position of the subject, according to the pleasure principle, in relation to what will only ever be representation, pursuit of a state of election, a state of aspiration, of anticipation of what? Of something which is always at a certain distance from the Thing, although regulated by that Thing, which is there beyond." [43] To put it another way, the real is not *like* anything, any thing.

Cinema works with likeness, its figurations were what filled Freud with suspicion and gloom. The problem is that it holds to figures for desire, is a cinema of epithets, so many representations of good and bad, yes or no identifications, including of the visual that it contains in terms of likeness, on a surface of reality (Kafka's cinema as "too visual"). The trouble with language is the same trouble with cinema, linguistically so too with the coming of sound that those most concerned with the possibilities of film's rendering of psychical processes inevitably oppose (film for a Dorothy Richardson will "go male," fall under a fixed order of meaning that will lose the plasticity of cinema as mind). Woolf's cinema-thing experience is exactly *not* in language: "fear itself, and not the statement 'I am afraid.' " As it is *not* in the identified visual either but in "some residual of visual emotion," with Woolf proposing that experience in 1925 as an exception, a surprising indication of what cinema might do "left to its own devices." Silent cinema's images are full of language's representations, images brought to order by the narrative and its epithets. Freud's reactions that same year to the UFA proposal are themselves in that context: he has no idea of a potential of cinema but he does have the critique of an existing cinema that he has to see as an inadequate mode of translation of psychoanalytic insights given its reliance on a common sense of images. The unconscious does not give itself to be seen and what analysis comes up with of it in the listening silences and resistances and transferences of the analytic situation does not figure (and if Freud retains confidence in the relation of psychoanalysis in language, he nevertheless has difficulty enough with his own case histories: half novels, half scientific papers, and in addition excessively full of the matter of dreams and

symptoms, something more). The woman on the cover of Sachs's *Enigma of the Unconscious* pamphlet puts her finger to her lips for silence but the image speaks loudly, presents the film image *par excellence* of the mystery of the unconscious as the mystery of the woman: what is the history of film in cinema's institution but that of ever-renewed versions of the always failed resolution of the sexual relation in her image, *she*Womanas its idealized and impossible point of attainment, the phallic representation of the Other's enigma. Psychoanalysis, as Freud foresaw in his refusals of film, was indeed quickly adopted as a source of epithets and narrative joins, a whole panoply of terms of identification to feed cinema's images and fictions: fetishism, voyeurism, Oedipal goings on, so many illustrations and figurations that, ironically, film theory"cinema and psychoanalysis"took up, repeated.

The problem of psychoanalytic representation is exacerbated in Lacanian theory which comes back always to what is not-in-representation: the subject is the impossibility of its own signifying representation; there is no signifying representation of *jouissance,* just the gap in the signifying system that symptoms and fantasies serve to hide; the domain of the real is what remains outside of symbolization; the Thing, the void at the center of the real, cannot be integrated into any field of meaning, is "traumatic," "impossible," "*entfremdet*." Of which Thing, Lacan will say that "only a representation represents it," appealing to Freud's concept of *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* (the representative of drive in the domain of representation: "the symbolic representative of an originally missing, excluded ['primordially repressed'] representation"). [44] Outside representation, "there beyond," the Thing has only representatives: not "good" or "bad"just "and then there is the Thing." The problem of analysis is that of passing through representation something which *radically* escapes it (its exclusion, indeed, is the condition of representation); analytic theory cannot represent *jouissance,* only locate it, help the analysand to get some bearings on the real. Of course, psychoanalysis, Lacan's "apposite swindle," *does* itself make representations (what else could it do?), notably in terms of "the rock of castration" and "the maternal thing" ("the pre-symbolic thing" as that). But then Lacan is nonplussed in the face of Joyce's writing, the *sinthome* at odds with representation and with the representationsthe whole representative fiatof psychoanalysis, what it *maintains*. On the one hand in Lacan's work, we have mathematical formalization: the pursuit of "mathemes" that, hopefully, will purely transmit his psychoanalytic teaching, guarantee its integrity; on the other, style: the seminars full of wordplay, syntactical contortions, verbal meanderings (but the two are not so separate, the mathematics is "elastic," the mathemes themselves so many images, illustrative seminar figures, and anyway language is still around, "which is what lames it all"). [45] Lacan is represented in the published seminars but the seminars were also in disarray of any such representation. Miller

as editor establishes a text, brings order, restores the meaning "when the meanderings of the oral style obliterate it"; [46] but then the meanderings, the spiraling drifts, the shifting inconsistencies are what Lacan has of Joyce, of the *Wake,* are *his* "abstraction" in the sense of what is at the core of analytic experience as unrepresentable, nonfigurable *jouissance*.

Freud is disturbed at the prospect of the rendering of the "abstractions" of psychoanalysis by cinema; Lacan is faced with Joyce's act of writing as having given "the essence, the abstraction" of the symptom-*sinthome* and so as halting the analyst's discourse; Woolf, the writer, looks to "something abstract," to a cinema of "movements and abstractions [of which] . . . films may in time come to be composed." "Abstraction" here is a term for the crisis of representation, the question of what might or might not be screened: Freud expects nothing but trouble from any screening of psychoanalysis; Joyce refuses fantasy's screen, expecting nothing from psychoanalysis, which is left with no representations to make; Woolf, who shared the disrespect for psychoanalysis, sees something in cinema more than cinema that could be screened, something that could *mishappen* (those "little accidents"). And questions of screen and representation did, of course, have their early acuteness in cinema, parallel again with the development of psychoanalysis. "Primitive cinema" showed a fascination with the precariousness of the field of vision, of the image in frame; so many of its little films ending in an abrupt fall into blackness, dramatized in some terminating narrative violence or upset or extinctiona nice example is Cecil Hepworth's *How It Feels To Be Run Over* (1900) with its projected spectator-annihilation in a spatter of question and exclamation marks until the inscription "Oh! Mother *will* be pleased" plunges us, evidently enough, into the amorphousness of the original Other, leaves us at Mother's whim ("primitive cinema" has its aptness as a description at least in regard to this primordiality, this lawlessness). *Uncle Josh at the Moving Picture Show* (1902) shows Uncle Josh tearing down the screen but now leaves the film for the spectator intact on screen, with Josh placed as naive ("a country bumpkin") and this film already celebrating a certain history and future of cinema in the films he sees (and we with him, comfortable in our position in cinema as we watch his disturbance): the immediacy of reality as the train races toward the screen (*The Black Diamond Express*), the central spectacle of woman (*The Parisian Dancer*), the narrative action (*A Country Couple*). Twenty years or so on from this, Woolf nevertheless has her cinema-thing experience in that developing future, against it, standing out for cinema's "own devices," the possibility of getting the "residual in vision," what fails representation, falls out of representation's modes, those notably of language.

Some thing again is Zizek's* theme: *das Ding* enshrined, in fact, as the unifying nodal point from which it all makes sense. This sense sustains his

work in its non-nonplussedness. Representation is a topic with which he deals but not a problem in his writing, his representing. For all its theoretical paradoxes, his work stays within the realm of an exuberantly masterful discourse that offers Lacanian psychoanalysis as the basis for truth-claiming propositions: "phallus is the form of mediation-sublation as such," "the desire staged in fantasy is not mine but the desire of the Other," "the Real *qua* Thing is not 'repressed,' it is foreclosed," and all the rest. [47] The twist is that he passes them along with, and through, and across popular culture, appealing to the latter's "inherent imbecility" (as he declares it) as a point of non-sense in the field of academic sense, something obstinately, stupidly other, *imbecile* indeed. This appeal is Zizek's* equivalent to Lacan's baroque linguistic display; it is *his* style. At the same time, however, it takes its place readily enough in the academy, is successfully part of a popular academic culture (and an academic popular culture) which in the United States, as too in differing degrees in certain European countries, is strongly present, well to the fore in one or another version of "cultural studies." Simply, Zizek's grain of sand, thrown gratingly into the well-oiled wheels of the cultural studies machine with its smooth brand of discursive relativism, is this very Thing, the endlessly hammered-home truth of that.

The characteristic turn of phrase with which Zizek picks up his film examples is *let us recall . . .* : "Let us recall Hitchcock's *Rear Window* . . . ," "Let us recall here a detail from Hitchcock's *Frenzy* . . . ," "Let us recall the very last shot of Ivory's *Remains of the Day*. . . ."[48] So much so that he does indeed seem at times to have total recall (naturally another film to which he particularly refers) but what exactly is the status of what one recalls of a film? The answer here, mostly, is illustration, exemplification, testimony: "To exemplify the 'travel in the past' constituent of the fantasy-constellation, let us just recall the famous scene from David Lynch's *Blue Velvet* . . . ," "as illustrated by a scene from *Blue Velvet* . . . ," "Chaplin's *Great Dictator* bore witness to. . . ."[49] Recall runs Lacanian theory in and out of films, deftly "translates" from one to the other, but with no surprises, no surprises *of cinema;* what is surprising is all in the theory which the films elucidate and confirm, the theory which provides Zizek's enunciative position, is what he *knows*. Left out is then cinema, which the process of translation lets drop, the signifier of cinema in Metzian terms, and it is indicative that Zizek has, in fact, little to say about "institution," "apparatus," and so on, all the concerns of the immediately preceding attempts to think cinema and psychoanalysis (films and novels will thus mostly be referred to without any particular distinction between them as forms). Concern with the history of cinema will be solely in terms of the representation of psychoanalytic material; so that, for example, as regards "the progressive modes of how to present 'pathological' libidinal economies" in "the history of modern cinema," "it is [possible] to distinguish three phases" (the sentence as printed reads "impossible" but

three phases *are* distinguished): anchored in the diegetic reality of an objective narrative; reflected in the cinematic form itself as expressive of some diegetic content; rendered directly without reference to any such content, as in "the modernist 'abstract cinema' which renders its 'pathological' content directly, renouncing the detour through a consistent diegetic reality." [50] The kind of avant-garde cinema to which Zizek* here refers can be characterized in terms of direct pathological content only from a psychoanalytic position that reduces cinema to a matter of expression, exactly what such an "abstract cinema" was explicitly challenging in a critique of a specific institution of cinema and its regime of representation (think of Peter Gidal's practice and theory of "structural-materialist film," for just one example). The risk of reduction dogs "cinema and psychoanalysis," the reduction of cinema by psychoanalysis just as much as the reverse, and it is easy to see here one set of psychoanalytic themes simply coming to replace another as the new Lacanian concepts are now resolutely deployed. The significantly original aspect of Zizek's* work, beyond the brilliance of his conjunction of concepts and films (itself undeniably productive), is what was suggested earlier: the creation of something else again, "Zizek-film," but which perhaps depends exactly on a specific *situation:* that of the theorist, the bits of film to be shown on screen, the lecture hall. In the spilling over from theorist to film-bits and back, the irruptions of each into the other, together with the return on and from the listening-watching audience, a certain experience is made to be had of cinemanot cinema left to its own devices but pulled into *its* abstraction, what it can do of the real, the symptom, where it and the analyst can in every sense leave one another.

The Zizekian*-Lacanian Thing is "an unhistorical kernel that stays the same," to which psychoanalysis always returns, the real which remains unchanging through all of what Lacan calls "its little historical emergences," Zizek its "diverse historicizations/symbolizations."[51] If the former showed no particular interest in the historical reality of these emergences, for the latter the historicity suggested is a central emphasis, grasped in terms of a dialectical relationship to this hard core, to the rock which defeats every attempt at symbolic integration and so which, in its very unhistorical coreness, "sets in motion one new symbolization after another."[52] But if "the Real *qua* Thing stands for that X on account of which every symbolization fails," the X is precisely repressed out of the history of which it is the determining precondition: "its repression is not a historical variable but is constitutive of the very order of symbolic historicity."[53] Once this is understood, there is in some sense little more to say, little more, that is, *outside of the field of psychoanalysis itself* (which is why Lacan was not that interested): the Thing just *is* this rock: the rock of castration, the part of the real that suffers from the signifier, the outside of the annihilation of the subject in the death drive, and

so on, nothing of which can change (alas, no jumping over the phallus, "only castration is true"). [54] One could talk about the symbolizations without worrying about the Thingthe pre-Zizek* routineor adopt the insight of an excluded outside and a totalizing master signifier as the basis for a conceptual apparatus providing a new kind of analytic grasp of such symbolizationsZizek's* procedure: the symptomatic analysis of ideological formations, along with the demonstration of the ways in which certain systems of analysis themselves contain this insight. So, for example, Marxism: for which "such a 'real' of the historical process is the 'class struggle' that constitutes the common thread of 'all history hitherto': all historical formations are so many ultimately failed attempts to 'gentrify' this kernel of the real."[55] The class struggle, however, is not the rock of castration, or is so only figuratively: the figurethe symbolizationwhich Marxism proposes. Marxism's "real" (here as elsewhere, Zizek's inverted commas are indicative) is not, in fact, the ultimate real, the unchanging, irrefragable psychoanalytic rock of which, in this vision of things, it is a figure. The containment by historical formations of the class struggle is at a different level from the repression of the Real *qua* Thing, which is *ur-verdrängt,* primordially repressed, "not a historical variable."

Ideology, in Zizek's account, is a fantasy-construction masking "some insupportable, real, impossible kernel," namely social antagonism: "a traumatic social division which cannot be symbolized."[56] The relation between *some* kernel and *the* always-staying-the-same, unhistorical rock-of-castration kernel is not clear: at times the former seems to be stated as equivalent to the latter, at others as its particular symbolization, and at others again as an analogical version of it in the social field. Ideology which always finds its last support in "the non-sensical, pre-ideological kernel of enjoyment" also "implies, manipulates, produces a pre-ideological enjoyment structured in fantasy," a formulation which can leave it uncertain as to whether "pre-ideological" sends us back to the rock of castration or to a particular historicosymbolic articulation of enjoyment, a specific ideological symptom.[57] Doubtless the answer is both, but then Zizek himself feels obliged to talk of "the domain of ideology proper" over into which psychoanalytic notions are to be carried. Fantasy "in the last resort" is "always a fantasy of the sexual relationship"; carried over, this is rewritten as "there is no class relationship," but what kind of force is this rewriting claiming? Psychoanalytic-subject fantasy is not the same as "socio-ideological fantasy," it is their articulation which is crucial, not some equivalence: the psychoanalytic domain of "desire, fantasy, lack in the Other and drive pulsating around some unbearable surplus-enjoyment" is more and less than the social domain with which it intersects in the process of any subject. It is striking that Zizek, whose Lacanian theory puts the emphasis so strongly on the impossible constitution of the subject, so often seems to take the subject for granted in his analyses

of ideology, running psychical and social seamlessly together, translating the one into the other in what often finally seem to be simply equations, unhelpful as such.

One such translation is that of the analysand's going through the fantasy in his or her analysis. Zizek * talks of "going through the social fantasy," traversing, that is, the fantasy-frame of reality"the field of social meaning, the ideological self-understanding of a given society." Identification with the symptom here becomes the experience of "some impossible kernel": "the point of eruption of some otherwise hidden truth of the existing social order."[58] In a psychoanalysis, the aim is the recognition by the analysand in the real of his or her symptom of the only support of their being, abandonment of which equals death. Recognition that there is nothing behind fantasy leads to nothing other than subjective destitution, to realization of the unchanging and unchangeable real of castration and identification with the symptom. In what senses is going through the social fantasy to be equated or put in parallel with this? In what respects are "the reality" and "the field of social meaning," and "the ideological self-understanding of a given society" to be run together? Or, to come back to the concern here, what are we to do with psychoanalysisthe psychoanalytic Thingand cinema, the whole heterogeneity of social practices and discourses the latter implicates, brings with it, *as* it?

When Lacan says that the trouble is that language exists and that it relates, pushing epithetically toward yes or no, he can emphasize for us quite simply that the symbolic looks both to the void around which it turns and to the world of meaning it sustains: language as the articulated join, the realization of psychic and social. To split psychic from social is a *theoretical* psychoanalytic break that precisely then finds the unchangeable, unrepresentable, outside symbolization, primordial *pre-*. In terms of which, it can be easy (for some) to reduce what is then the socio-historical *post-* to so many fantasy-construction "realities," one after the other, in a sequence of norms or contents which make no difference. Thus, "it matters not a whit that the content of [a] proposition is feminist, transgressive, or whatever; once it is correct it is phallic . . . supporting the same mode of identification that supports all norms, phallic identification. Of course, it is necessary that this goes onthe replacement of some norms with others. But it is important to see that the articulation of feminist norms does not subvert the phallic order, for it is part of the phallic order."[59] "Of course" in this light, it might also be important to acknowledge that psychoanalysis itself provides just another set of norms, and that if correct propositions are phallic whatever their content, then those of psychoanalytic theory go the same way (those quoted included), which is only rarely admitted (as in Lacan's style or his speechless-in-the-face-of-Joyce perplexity). The representation of the Thing as rock of castration precludes, as it is meant to, all subverting of the phallic

order; which in turn means that identification of the phallic order is more or less insignificantbeing a foregone conclusion, it tells us nothing in particular. If the kernel is unhistorical, we can look at historicizations without reference to the Thing other than in simple acknowledgment of its there-beyond, invariable sameness or, by analogy, in a use of psychoanalysis to furnish a mode of recognition that is equally applicable to psychoanalysis itself as a particular historicization/ symbolization of the Thing: the Thing is just a name for the surplus excluded from any system as the latter's condition, its very definition; which surplus is variously realized, variously named. Psychoanalysis can never say anything other than that the phallus is contingent at the same time that it can only continue to insist that that contingency is *necessarily* in this phallus form, founding thereby the truth of psychoanalysis, its whole sense.

"I propose that the only thing of which one can be guilty, at least from a psychoanalytic perspective, is to have ceded on one's desire." [60] In his account of Sophocles's *Antigone,* Lacan describes its heroine as taking "to the limit the accomplishment of what we can call pure desire, the pure and simple desire of death as such."[61] Fantasy, in its very staging of desire defends against desire, manages against the abyss of the desire of the Other"against this 'pure' trans-phantasmic desire (i.e. the 'death drive' in its pure form)."[62] So not giving way on one's desire as a matter of psychoanalytic ethics coincides with going through the fantasy as the end of an analysis: "the desire with regard to which we must not 'give way' is not the desire supported by fantasy but the desire of the Other beyond fantasy . . . a radical renunciation of all the richness of desires based upon fantasy-scenarios."[63] Since desire from the psychoanalytic perspective is not in opposition to law but, on the contrary, given from it, there is no question here of some "liberation," of some lifting of oppression in order finally to reach *jouissance*. How then should we understand the desire on which one is not to give way? Whatever the importance, stressed by Zizek*, of the going-to-the-wall, suicidal, death-driven figure of Antigone, it is not evident how the "frighteningly ruthless" pursuit of *jouissance* for which she stands (desire as that) and which exempts her "from the circle of everyday feelings and considerations" could effectively be adopted as an ethical stance (unless "from a psychoanalytic perspective" assumes the severance of the psychic into some purely absolute realm in which persistence in the death drive can be envisaged, ruthlessly indeed, as the logical"guiltless"outcome of psychoanalysis's account of the subject). Others put a different stress, taking Lacan's imperative more prudently as the call not to abandon desire as defense against this subject-obliterative *jouissance:* "in order not to attain the nevertheless longed for *jouissance* of the Other, the best thing is not to cease desiring and be content with substitutes and screens, symptoms and fantasies."[64] In other words, not giving

way on one's desire is an injunction distinct from any sense not just of liberation but also of the simple inversion of that into "radical renunciation." The crux again is the psychic/social imbrication, the need to grasp their articulation without loss of the specificity of *each to and in the other*.

For "cinema and psychoanalysis," this means not merely figuring cinema from psychoanalysis or psychoanalysis as cinema. Freud's fear of the latter, of cinematic figuration, has been overtaken by the psychoanalytic film theory of the last decades, which has erected its own consistencies, its own particular likenesses of cinema. The versions of this liking have been various: as essence (the imaginary signifier, apparatus theory); as play of signifiers (available for "filmanalytic" interpretation); as reflection (mode of translation, theoretical display). Which prompts something of a reversal of the Freudian rule formulated earlier: the more psychoanalysis satisfies its conditions of psychoanalytic representability, the further it gets from cinema-not from some essence "cinema" but from cinema's questions of psychoanalysis, the forcing of its issue. Such a reversal is significant solely inasmuch as it can point, across the intersection of those two "rules," to the dialectical mismatch of cinema and psychoanalysis, to their constant and necessary misencounter, which is only one-sidedly to be expressed through determining reference to the Thing. The reduction of psychoanalysis to a platitude of representation that was effectively part of the history of the dominant narrative cinema went along with a similar reduction of cinema by psychoanalysis, this then informing the latter's reactions of dislike and distrust on that basis (which in the interweaving of these "parallel" histories found justification in the face of the fictions and imagings proposed in that cinema's films); the shift to a different consideration of cinema via the film-studies "cinema and psychoanalysis" emphasis changes nothing of this unless that consideration involve cinema in its heterogeneity to as well as in its availability for the analytic representations made. Where is cinema being seen from and what is the desire that is assured in seeing it from there and what stands out against that seeing, pushing to the real of such a vision, the vision that seeks to maintain that seeing?

Andreas-Salomé, in the early years, loved going to the cinema, though she shrugged off its "superficial pleasure" while also recording its potential significance for exploring and transforming "our psychical constitution." Zizek *, today, loves films, but also calls on them in his work as popular-culturally "imbecile," at the same time that he grasps in them something excessively psychoanalytic: not just some conceptual demonstration, more a standing-out experience that pushes psychoanalysis to the edge of representation, queers its pitch (much as Joyce in writing halts and perplexes Lacan). Lacan's "What I look at is never what I want to see"[65] holds for psychoanalysis's vision of cinema, however much psychoanalysis may elaborate what it likes or dislikes, may seek to avoid the blot in that field of vision, the point

the voidwhere sense runs out. That point is then not just to be left as some sense of non-sense, the void made up in some master discourse of Thing and phallus. The excursion through cinema takes psychoanalysis directly into the stakes of the relations between psychic and social, into confrontation with the sociality of its own discourse, the limits of its representative procedures. "Cinema and psychoanalysis" is, in any consequent realization of what such a conjunction entails, the not giving way on that confrontation, the negotiation of a specific *situation* (hence the extreme interest of Zizek's * situation-demonstrations). Andreas-Salomé wondered about cinema for analysts, "for us," and the focus on kernels of spectatorship is indeed where psychoanalysis seems likely now to play its contributing part, grasping interactions of psychic and social in the development of an account of representation each time that looks to the operative terms of identificationthe makings of and relations to and investments in likeness and liking (and dis-likeness, dis-liking)determiningly at work in such situations, where these include the terms of the proposed negotiation of "cinema and psychoanalysis," of the fantasmatic interchange that yields and that is itself to be gone through as a condition of any appropriation of psychoanalysis politically, and not essentially, as some "it-matters-not-a-whit" fantasy that brings everything down, indifferently, to its fixed position of knowledge. From Andreas-Salomé at the Urania to Zizek* with his VCR, the pleasure and also the momentary traces of detachment carry through, but then Zizek quite specifically sets up the encounter of psychoanalysis with cinema, opens a scene between the parallel histories that is currently where that significance "for us" can be understood, the "for us," of course, being the *critical* issue, so often the assumption and the void of "cinema and psychoanalysis."

(1993–94)

Notes

1. Lou Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule bei Freud: Tagebuch eines Jahres 1912/1913* (Zurich: Max Niehans Verlag, 1958) 102; trans. Stanley A. Leavy, *The Freud Journal of Lou Andreas Salomé* (New York: Basic Books, 1964) 101. For a fascinatingly detailed account of the establishment of cinema theaters in Vienna, see Werner Michael Schwarz, *Kino und Kinos in Wien: Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte bis 1934* (Vienna: Turia & Kant, 1992).

2. Melanie Klein, *Narrative of a Child Anaysis* (1961; London: Virago, 1989) 343, 346 (Richard's enquiries); Klein, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Tics" (1925), in her *Love, Guilt and Reparation* (London: Virago, 1988) 111; Klein, *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* (1932; London: Virago, 1989) 99 (explanation of dislike of the cinema).

3. Ernest Jones, *Sigmund Freud: Life and Work: Years of Maturity 1901–1919,* vol. 2 (London: Hogarth Press, 1955) 62. Cinema is entirely absent from the family recollections of Freud's eldest son, who records that his father "did not appreciate new inventions," citing his intense dislike of telephone and radio; Martin Freud, *Glory Reflected: Sigmund FreudMan and Father* (London: Angus and Robertson, 1957) 121. *Sigmund Freud, His Family and Colleagues, 1928–1947,* the moving, historically complex film made by Lynne Lehrman Weiner from footage of Freud and many other psychoanalysts shot by her father Philip R. Lehrman, renders very clearly Freud's dislike of himself being filmed (when Lehrman entered analysis with Freud, a focus of their sessions became his desire to film the latter, for whom it was a symptom to be dealt with); needless to say given Jones's account of the New York cinema outing, Ferenczi appears in the film as totally at home, grinning happily into camera.

4. Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire livre VII, L'Ethique de la psychanalyse* (Paris: Seuil, 1986) 69 (Harpo Marx), 365–66 (*Never on Sunday*), trans. Dennis Porter, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* (London: Tavistock/Routledge, 1986) 55, 317–18. Lacan, "Le Sinthome," seminar of March 16, 1976, *Ornicar?* 9 (April 1977) 38–39 (*L'Empire des sells*); "Faire mouche," *Nouvel Observateur* 594 (March 29–April 4, 1976) 64 (*L'Aissassin musicien*); *Télévision* (Paris: Seuil, 1974). Perhaps the most consequent of Lacan's references is his little fable of a camera filming in the absence of any human presence to illustrate the idea of a consciousness without ego ("there's not the shadow of an ego in the camera"); *Le Séminaire livre II, Le Moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse* (Paris: Seuil, 1978) 61–3, 210, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 46–47, 177.

5. Cf. Rush Rhees ed., *Recollections of Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 71; Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (London: Vintage, 1991) 423. At least one analyst at the time of Andreas-Salomé's journal entry *was* making some use of cinema: namely Otto Rank, who made extended reference in his study of "the double" to H. H. Ewers's film *Der Student von Prag:* "Der Doppelgänger," *Imago* 3:2 (1914) 97–164; trans. Harry Tucker Jr., *The Double* (London: Maresfield Library, 1989).

6. Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule bei Freud,* 103; trans., 101. The analogy was shared by Rank: "cinematography [*Kinodarstellung*] reminds us in numerous ways of the working of dreams [*Traumtechnik*]"; films, he suggested, might well be able to express certain psychical phenomena in "a clear and sensuous language of pictures [*einer deutlichen und sinnfälligen Bildersprache*]," phenomena that "the writer is often unable to render in words"; "Der Doppelgänger," 97; trans. 4.

7. Hanns Sachs, *Psychoanalyse: Rätsel des Unbewussten* (Berlin: Lichtbild-Bühne, 1926); the cover image to which reference is subsequently here made is reproduced in Ernst Freud, Lucie Freud and Ilse Grubrich-Simitis eds., *Sigmund Freud: Leben in Bildern und Texten* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), published in English as *Sigmund Freud: His Life in Pictures and Words* (New York: Norton, 1987) 224 (same pagination in German and English editions). The idea for the accompanying pamphlet came from Neumann, who envisaged it as an easy-to-understand introduction

"einer leicht fasslichen, populären Schrift üiber die Psychoanalyse" (the film itself was to be a popular, scientific, psychoanalytic film: "einen populär-wissenschaftlichen psychoanalytischen Film"); Karl Abraham, letter to Freud, June 7, 1925, Hilda C. Abraham and Ernst Freud eds., *Sigmund Freud-Karl Abraham Briefe 1907–1926* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1980) 357; trans. Bernard Marsh and Hilda C. Abraham, *A Psycho-analytic Dialogue: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham 1907–1926* (London: Hogarth Press, 1965) 382–83. Sachs maintained a continuing interest in cinema, contributing three pieces to *Close Up,* the London-based film magazine edited by Kenneth Macpherson and Bryher (H.D. was also closely involved), both of whom met Sachs at Pabst's house in 1927. For the connections between *Close Up* and psychoanalysis, see Anne Friedberg, "Writing About Cinema 'Close Up' 1907–33" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Cinema Studies, New York University, 1983) 141–44.

8. *The Times* (August 4, 1925) 8; Sigmund Freud, letter to Sándor Ferenczi, August 24, 1925, cited in Freud, Freud and Grubrich-Simitis eds., *Sigmund Freud: His Life in Pictures and Words,* 224. Abraham and Sachs were based in Berlin and a certain rivalry led to an alternative film proposal from Viennese analysts. The International Psychoanalytical Press, in the person of its managing director, Josef Storfer, announced that it had itself decided to undertake a film and had therefore commissioned a script from "a well-known psychoanalyst"; the film was to be "an authentic representation of Freudian teaching [*einer authentischen Darstellung der Freudschen Lehre*]," avoiding "the danger of a misleading representation or an offensive or nonsensical parody [*die Gefahr einer irreführenden Darstellug bezw. einer anstösigen oder unsinnigen Verballhornung*]." The project was offered by Storfer to various film companies but came to nothing, other than a great deal of ill-feeling, scheming and backbiting, reaching boiling point at the Bad Homburg Ninth International Psychoanalytic Congress in September 1925 (Abraham, for example, alleged that an attempt was made there by Storfer to bribe him and Sachs to abandon the Neumann-UFA film). Storfer's "well-known analyst" was Siegfried Bernfeld whose treatment survives: "Entwurf zu einer filmischen Darstellung der Freudschen Psychoanalyse im Rahmen eines abendfüllenden Spielfilms" (Sketch for a cinematic representation of Freudian psychoanalysis in the form of a full-length film), Siegfried Bernfeld Archive, Library of Congress. Where the UFA film is organized around the presentation of psychoanalysis as therapeutic method ("a life history from the viewpoint of psychoanalysis," that is, as it emerges in the course of a cure), Bernfeld's treats of it as an investigative method, a particular knowledge (the central character, a young man interested in dreams and the workings of the mind, becomes friendly with a psychoanalyst, but this is not developed into a patient/analyst relationship). Bernfeld also envisaged recourse to avant-garde, technologically inspired, modernistic representations. Freud's account of the psychical apparatus was to be depicted with a set involving three stages, one over the other; the topmost, for example, was to have a window-structure in the shape of an eye with a film camera turned outward and film stock running down through a processor set into the floor to a projector projecting the images of the external world onto the ceiling; the superego was to sit at a lectern stacked with telephones and radios; permitted wishes were to have radio antennae on their heads . . . ; see Karl Fallend and Johannes Reichmayr, "Psychoanalyse, Film und Öffentlichkeit: Konflikte hinter den Kulis-

sen," in Fallend and Reichmayr eds., *Siegfried Bernfeld oder Die Grenzen der Psychoanalyse* (Basel/Frankfurt am Main: Stroenfeld/Nexus, 1992) 132–52 (the quotations regarding authentic representation and the avoidance of parody come from Storfer's 1925 "Presseaussendung," as cited in Fallend and Reichmayr, 137; Bernfeld's scenographic imagination of the psychical apparatus is cited on 150–51 and occurs on 24–25 of the original typescript of the "Entwurf"; my thanks to Karl Sierek for letting me have access to his copy of that typescript). The episode is briefly mentioned by Jones, *Sigmund Freud: Life and Work: The Last Phase 1919–1939,* vol. 3 (London: Hogarth Press, 1957) 122.

9. Freud, letter to Abraham, June 9, 1925; Abraham, letter to Freud, July 18, 1925 ("We [Abraham and Sachs] think we have succeeded in principle in presenting even the most abstract concepts"); *Sigmund Freud-Karl Abraham Briefe,* 357–58, 362; trans., 382–83, 387. Paul Federn in 1922 had already drawn the attention of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Association to these problems of cinematic representation: "Federn points out the malicious representation of psychoanalysis [*die böswillige Darstellung der Psychoanalyse*] in *Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler* and encourages us [his fellow analysts] to do something about such representations. Freud categorically refuses"; Protokoll der Sitzung der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung, November 1, 1922, cited in Fallend and Reichmayr, "Psychoanalyse, Film und Öffentlichkeit: Konflikte hinter den Kulissen," 132. Freud's reaction as recorded can be read both as a refusal to engage in public objections to the representations being produced and as a refusal to envisage authorized alternatives, exactly his response to the Neumann proposal.

10. Sigmund Freud, *Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* XI (London: Hogarth Press, 1957) 25–27 (hereafter *S.E.*). Lacan shares something of this unease with imaging: even the diagram of the second topic offered by Freud "merely for purposes of exposition" prompts comment on "the disadvantages of figuration in images [*figurations imagées*] "; Lacan, "R.S.I.," seminar of December 10 1974, *Ornicar?* 2 (March 1975) 90; for the diagram, see Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id, S.E.* XIX (London: Hogarth Press, 1961) 24.

11. Sigmund Freud, *An Autobiographical Study, S.E.* XX (London: Hogarth Press, 1959) 1–74; "A Note upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad,' " *S.E.* XIX (London: Hogarth Press, 1961) 225–32 (quotation, 232).

12. Virginia Woolf, "The Cinema" (1926), *Collected Essays* II (London: Hogarth Press, 1966) 268–72. The piece was first published in the United States in the magazine *Arts* (June 1926) and then in Britain in *The Nation & The Athenaeum* (July 3,1926). In a letter to Vita Sackville-West of April 13, 1926, Woolf records an informal gathering with Dadie Rylands, Eddy Sackville-West and Duncan Grant: "we compare movies and operas: I'm writing that for Todd: rather brilliant"; Nigel Nicolson ed., *A Change of Perspective: The Letters of Virginia Woolf: 1923–1928,* vol. 3 (London: Hogarth Press, 1977) 254 ("Todd" is Dorothy Todd, editor of *Vogue,* for which Woolf had originally intended the piece).

13. J.-B. Pontalis, "Préface" to Jean-Paul Sartre, *Le Scénario Freud* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984) 21. These questions of figuration find a recent echo in the collection of photographs of Lacan published by his daughter Judith. In her prefatory note,

the latter repeats the resistance of psychoanalysis to image"the instrument of analytic practice, speech, cannot be photographed"but publishes the photographs nevertheless on the grounds that they will show Lacan "as he really was [*tel qu'en luimême*]," while also acknowledging that he "used to complain about his person being a screen to his teaching";Judith Miller, *Album Jacques Lacan* (Paris: Seuil, 1991) 9.

14. Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E.* V (London: Hogarth Press, 1953) 344, 339–40; for Lacan's rendering, see Lacan, *Ecrits* (Paris: Seuil, 1966) 511; trans. Alan Sheridan, *Ecrits: A Selection* (London: Tavistock, 1977) 160–61.

15. Freud, letter to Abraham, June 9, 1925, *Sigmund Freud-Karl Abraham Briefe,* 357; trans., 384.

16. Franz Kafka, reported in Gustav Janouch, *Gespräche mit Kafka* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1968) 216. When Janouch told Kafka of a Prague cinema called "Cinema of the Blind [*Bio Slepcu*]" (its license belonged to a charitable association for the blind), the latter commented that *all* cinemas should be so called, 200.

17. Lacan, *Le Séminaire livre XI, Les Quatre Concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse* (Paris: Seuil, 1973) 106; trans. Alan Sheridan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979) 116; *Ecrits,* 554; trans., 223.

18. Woolf, "The Cinema," 270–71.

19. B. D. Lewin, "Sleep, the Mouth, and the Dream Screen," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* XV (1946) 420. Lewin subsequently acknowledged the cinema analogy: "The term was suggested by the motion pictures; because, like its analogue in the cinema, the dream screen is either not noted by the dreaming spectator, or it is ignored due to the interest in the pictures and action that appear on it. However, under certain circumstances, the screen plays a role of its own and becomes perceptible. Then it enters to alter what is called the form of the dream"; "Inferences from the Dream Screen," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* XXIX, part 4 (1948) 224. For Desnos's formulation, see Robert Desnos, *Journal littéraire* (April 25, 1925) in Marie-Claire Dumas ed., *Les Rayons et les ombres* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992) 69.

20. For "the good dream," see M. Masud R. Khan, "Dream Psychology and the Evolution of the Psychoanalytic Situation," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 48 (1972) 424–32; reprinted in Khan, *The Privacy of Self* (London: Hogarth Press, 1974) 27–41.

21. Virginia Woolf, "The 'Movie' Novel" (1918), *Contemporary Writers* (London: Hogarth Press, 1965) 82–84; "I was given the opportunity to see . . . ,"paragraph on Friese-Greene color process included in the "From Alpha to Omega" column, *The Nation & The Athenaeum* (April 5, 1924) 16. For Woolf's question as to cinema "left to its own devices," see "The Cinema," 270.

22. Raymond Bellour, *L'Analyse du film* (Paris: Albatros, 1979) 10.

23. The point is forcefully made by Paul Willemen: "the absence of these two key concepts [transference and resistance] allowed critics freely to delegate their neuroses to the films where they would then be 'read' . . . this reduced the films to the reader's screen memories"; *Looks and Frictions: Essays in Cultural Studies and Film Theory* (London: British Film Institute; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) 225.

24. Sigmund Freud, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," *S.E.* XXIII (London: Hogarth Press, 1964) 252–53.

25. Slavoj Zizek *, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989) 113.

26. Slavoj Zizek, *The Metastases of Enjoyment* (London: Verso, 1994) 175; *Enjoy Your Symptom* (New York: Routledge, 1992) xi.

27. Slavoj Zizek, paper at "Cinema and Psychoanalysis: Parallel Histories" conference, University of California, Los Angeles, November 13, 1993. *Alien*'s alien figures the Thing ("a pre-symbolic maternal Thing") in Zizek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology,* 132.

28. Lacan, *Le Séminaire livre XI, Les Quatre Concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse,* 192; trans., 212.

29. Lacan, *Ecrits,* 775; Zizek, *Enjoy Your Symptom,* 89.

30. Jacques-Alain Miller, "D'un autre Lacan," *Ornicar?* 28 (January 1984) 57.

31. Slavoj Zizek, *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991) 167.

32. Lacan, *Le Séminaire livre XI, Les Quatre Concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse,* 168; trans., 185.

33. Jacqueline Rose, reply to questionnaire on "the female spectator," *Camera Obscura* 20–21 (May–September 1989) 275. Cf. Teresa de Lauretis, *The Practice of Love: Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse Desire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) 123–38. Matters of pornography considered as fantasy were raised for me by Kathy Miriam in discussions at the University of California, Santa Cruz in 1991.

34. Lacan, *Le Séminaire livre XI, Les Quatre Concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse,* 49, 53; trans., 49, 53.

35. Louis Althusser, letter to Franca, December 8, 1963, *Ecrits sur la psychanalyse* (Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1993) 172.

36. Jacques-Alain Miller, discussion of Jacques Aubert, "Sur James Joyce," *Analytica* vol. 4 [n.d.] 16. Joyce, it might be remembered, was instrumental in the opening of Dublin's first regular cinema, the Volta Cinematograph in 1909another kind of speculation; see Richard Ellmann, *James Joyce* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 300–304, 311. Joyce's commercial enthusiasm, however, was not necessarily accompanied by aesthetic celebration; a couple of years earlier, he had commented disparagingly on "a heightened emotiveness which satisfies itself in the sixty-miles-an-hour pathos of some cinematograph," letter to Stanislas Joyce, ?1 March 1907, in Richard Ellmann ed., *Letters of James Joyce,* vol. 2 (London: Faber & Faber; New York: The Viking Press, 1966) 217.

37. Lacan, cited in Jacques-Alain Miller, "Préface" to Jacques Aubert ed., *Joyce avec Lacan* (Paris: Navarin, 1987) 11; Zizek, *Enjoy Your Symptom,* 155.

38. Lacan, "Vers un signifiant nouveau," seminar of March 15, 1977, *Ornicar?* 17/18 (1979) 9; Lacan, "R. S.I.," seminar of December 10, 1974, 96.

39. Lacan, "Le Sinthome,' seminar of March 16, 1976, 38; Miller, "Préface," *Joyce avec Lacan,* 11.

40. Lacan, "Joyce le symptôme I," *Joyce avec Lacan,* 25.

41. Lacan, "Joyce le symptôme II," *Joyce avec Lacan,* 36.

42. Lacan, "Le Sinthome," 33.

43. Lacan, *Le Séminaire livre VII, L'Ethique de la psychanalyse,* 78; trans., 63.

44. Ibid., 87; trans., 71; Slavoj Zizek *, *Tarrying with the Negative* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993) 105.

45. Lacan, *Le Séminaire livre XX, Encore* (Paris: Seuil, 1975) 100.

46. Miller (with François Ansermet), *Entretien sur le séminaire* (Paris: Navarin, 1985) 20. At the same time that he "*decides* meaning," Miller also considers that Lacan's meanderings are his teaching, that the seminars also need "the same reading as the unconscious" (38). The difficulty of these two emphases together, the question as to the representation of psychoanalysis, is the point here.

47. Zizek, *The Metastases of Enjoyment,* 202, 177, 199.

48. Zizek, *Tarrying with the Negative,* 196, 105; *The Metastases of Enjoyment,* 132.

49. Slavoj Zizek, *For They Know Not What They Do* (London: Verso, 1991) 197; *The Metastases of Enjoyment,* 133.

50. Zizek, *Tarrying with the Negative,* 249.

51. Zizek, *The Metastases of Enjoyment,* 199; Lacan, "Le Sinthome," 36; Zizek*, *The Sublime Object of Ideology,* 50.

52. Zizek, *The Metastases of Enjoyment,* 199.

53. Ibid.

54. Lacan, "Vers un signifiant nouveau," seminar of March 15, 1977, 9.

55. Zizek, *The Metastases of Enjoyment,* 199.

56. Zizek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology,* 45.

57. Ibid., 124–26.

58. Zizek, *Looking Awry,* 140.

59. Parveen Adams, "Waiving the Phallus," *Differences* 4:1 (Spring 1992) 82.

60. Lacan, *Le Séminaire livre VII, L'Ethique de la psychanalyse,* 368; trans., 319.

61. Ibid., 329; trans., 289.

62. Zizek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology,* 118.

63. Ibid., 117.

64. J.-D. Nasio, *Cinq Leçons sur la théorie de Jacques Lacan* (Paris: Rivages, 1992) 49.

65. Lacan, *Le Séminaire livre XI, Les Quatre Concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse,* 95; trans., 103.

Two
Temporality, Storage, Legibility: Freud, Marey, and the Cinema

Mary Ann Doane

The advent of mechanical reproduction inaugurated a discursive thematics of excess and oversaturation that is still with us today. The sheer quantity of images and sounds is perceived as the threat of overwhelming or suffocating the subject. In his 1927 essay on photography, Siegfried Kracauer appeals to figures of natural disaster to capture the anxiety attendant upon the accelerated diffusion of photographic images. He refers to "the blizzard of photographs" and the "flood of photos" that "sweep away the dams of memory. [1] Excess is embodied within the form of the photograph itself to the extent that it represents a spatial continuum without the gaps or lacks conducive to the production of historical significance. This continuum of the photograph becomes, in Kracauer's argument, the continuum of a photography that supports an overwhelming and ultimately meaningless historicism. Hence, we have the crucial and yet puzzling problem of the development and maintenance of a photographic archive, as so provocatively delineated by Allan Sekula.[2] What taxonomic principle can govern the breakdown and ordering of a "flood" or a "blizzard"?

The excess and unrelenting continuum of mechanical reproduction is not, however, limited to the consideration of space (and Kracauer himself is insistent upon historicism's dependence upon the fullness of a temporal continuum). The emergence of mechanical reproduction is accompanied by modernity's increasing understanding of temporality as assault, acceleration, speed. There is too much, too fast. From Georg Simmel to Walter Benjamin, modernity is conceptualized as an increase in the speed and intensity of stimuli. Time emerges as a problem intimately linked to the theorization of modernity as trauma or shock. Time is no longer the benign phenomenon most easily grasped by the notion of flow but a troublesome

and anxiety-producing entity that must be thought in relation to management, regulation, storage, and representation. One of the most important apparatuses for regulating and storing time was the cinema. As Friedrich Kittler has pointed out, the cinema and phonography held out the promise of storing time at the same time that they posed a potential threat to an entire symbolic system.

> What was new about the storage capability of the phonograph and cinematographand both names refer, not accidentally, to writingwas their ability to store time: as a mixture of audio frequencies in the acoustic realm, as a movement of single picture sequences in the optic realm. Time, however, is what determines the limits of all art. The quotidian data flow must be arrested before it can become image or sign. . . . whatever runs as time on a physical or . . . real level, blindly and unpredictably, could by no means be encoded. Therefore all data flows, if they were real streams of data, had to pass through the defile of tile signifier. [3]

Before the invention of phonography and cinema, written texts and musical scores were Europe's only means of preserving time. Each was clearly dependent upon writing as a symbolic system and eschewed the apparent fullness, presence and unrelenting continuum of the forms of mechanical reproduction.

Time hence became very insistently a problem of representation. Accompanying the cinema as a new technology of temporality was a sustained discourse on time in the philosophical, psychoanalytic, and scientific realms. I have chosen to explore here two very disparate, if not diametrically opposed, attempts to analyze time that nevertheless converge in their specification of the framework of terms within which time can be understooda framework crucial to the representational/historical trajectory of the cinema. In Sigmund Freud's work, time is an undertheorized concept that seems to operate as a symptom whose effects are intensified by the excessive trauma of modernity so that modernity becomes, in part, a pathology of temporality. The impasse of his spatial model of memory forces him to produce a theory of temporality as the discontinuous mode of operation of the psyche itself. Time is not "out there," to be measured, but instead the effect of a protective configuration of the psyche. Freud chooses for his exemplary machine and model, not the cinema, photography, or phonography, but the comparatively old-fashioned Mystic Writing-Pad. In contrast, Etienne-Jules Marey marshaled the latest technologies of sequential photography (and, in most historical accounts, anticipated the cinema) in order to capture and measure an objective temporality that nevertheless always seemed to elude representation. Together, Freud and Marey figure the limits of the representational problematic within which the cinema developed as a specific mode of organizing and regulating time. Both theorists conceptualized time as a problem of storage or representation and its failure.

At first glance, it would seem that psychoanalysis is infused with questions of temporality, that temporality would be one of its most indispensable concepts. For the psychoanalytic subject is delineated as the site of historical inscriptions and the psychoanalytic encounter specified as a process of remembering, repeating, and working through. Whether or not Freud is accountable for espousing a notion of stages or phases of development, it is clear that for him the specificity of sexuality in the human being is linked to its diphasic nature. The French rereading of Freud has isolated the concept of *Nachträglichkeit,* or deferred action (*après coup*), as crucial to the thinking of psychical determination, so that the traumatic effect of an event is understood as the reverberation between two events separated across time. Freud also exerts an extraordinary amount of effort searching for an apparatus capable of representing memory. And Jacques Derrida can claim, particularly insofar as it supports his own theory of writing and the logic of the trace, that "memory . . . is not a psychical property among others; it is the very essence of the psyche: resistance, and precisely, thereby, an opening to the effraction of the trace." [4] Michel Serres, on the basis of Freud's adherence to the thermodynamic principles of conservation of energy (the economic point of view) and the tendency toward death (the death drive), claims that "Freudian time is irreversible" and therefore in line with contemporary movements in physics and the other sciences of the late nineteenth century, as well as technological innovations ("As soon as one can build them and theorize about themsteam or combustion engines, chemical, electrical, and turbine engines, and so forththe notion of time changes").[5]

On the other hand, and despite the marks of its apparent importance, the concept of temporality is also, in a way, radically absent from Freud's work. In his 1915 metapsychological paper "The Unconscious," Freud made it quite clear that the unconscious lacks a concept of time: "The processes of the system *Ucs.* are *timeless;* i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. Reference to time is bound up, once again, with the work of the system *Cs.*"[6] The same negative characteristics are reiterated in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.[7] The unconscious is described in *The Interpretation of Dreams* as a storehouse of contents and processes that are immune to the corrosive effects of temporality. In fact, according to Freud, the idea that wear and tear *are* fundamental effects of time is a commonly held but mistaken one.

> Indeed it is a prominent feature of unconscious processes that they are indestructible. In the unconscious nothing can be brought to an end, nothing is past or forgotten. . . . For the fading of memories and the emotional weakness of impressions which are no longer recent, which we are inclined to regard as self-evident and to explain as a primary effect of time upon mental memory-traces, are in reality secondary modifications which are only brought about by laborious work.[8]

Freud elaborates here the counterintuitive idea that the passage of time does not diminish "memories" and "impressions" in the unconscious, which remain at some level as vivid for the adult as for the child. The unconscious stores all, relinquishes nothing and is, most insistently, outside of time. Given the fact that the major impulse of psychoanalysis is the de-privileging of consciousness and that time is resolutely linked to the phenomenon of consciousness, it is perhaps not surprising that Freud nowhere expounds a full-fledged theory of temporality.

Freud's very few direct references to time as a concept have always struck me as enigmatic, if not opaque. "A Note upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad' " (1925) is devoted to a problem concerning memory that Freud had isolated as early as the 1895 *Project for a Scientific Psychology*. In order to understand memory and its operation it is crucial to conceptualize a surface that can both retain a limitless number of traces or inscriptions and yet be continually open to the reception of fresh impressions. Freud resolves the difficulty by appealing to an apparatusa toy, in effectthe Mystic Writing-Pad, in order to represent memory. It is appropriate as an analogy because it is a multilevel system, its three layers constituted by a wax slab, a thin sheet of translucent waxed paper and a transparent piece of celluloid. When written on, the wax slab permanently retains the traces of that writing, but when the two upper sheets are raised, the writing is erased from them and they are free to receive new impressions. In Freud's analogy, the two upper sheets correspond to the system perception-consciousness, while the wax slab is comparable to the unconsciousa storehouse of traces. The "appearance and disappearance of the writing" is analogous to the "flickering-up and passing-away of consciousness in the process of perception." [9] Freud is particularly interested in the working of the system. Because the layers continually break contact, discontinuity and periodicity are the basis of the pad's operation. He ends the short essay with a speculation: "I further had a suspicion that this discontinuous method of functioning of the system *Pcpt.-Cs.* lies at the bottom of the origin of the concept of time" ("MWP," p. 231). This tantalizing theoretical proposition is simply left dangling and it is nowhere followed through or elaborated. Time appears here as the after-thought of an attempt to deal with memory.

The "Note upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad,' " which, after all, is extremely brief and speculative, is not the only place where Freud confronts the concept of time yet manages to make it marginal within his own discourse as well as theoretically a by-product or aftereffect of some other process. In the course of his investigation of the hypothetical life processes of the simplest living organism in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle,* Freud takes a discursive detour to consider the question of time:

> our abstract idea of time seems to be wholly derived from the method of working of the system *Pcpt.-Cs.* and to correspond to a perception on its own

> part of that method of working. This mode of functioning may perhaps constitute another way of providing a shield against stimuli. I know that these remarks must sound very obscure, but I must limit myself to these hints. (*BPP,* p. 28)

It is not clear why Freud has to limit himself to "these hints" in a work as highly speculative, wide-ranging and ambitious as *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. But certainly time's alliance with consciousness determines its displacement as a category. For within psychoanalysis, the familiar, everyday concept of consciousness becomes strange (Freud refers to the "inexplicable phenomenon of consciousness" ["MWP," p. 228]).

Given the obscurity or even opaqueness of Freud's direct references to temporality, it might be useful to take a detour through his theorization of memory before returning to the concept of time. A close examination of Freud's treatment of memory and temporality reveals the continual recurrence of three themes: (1) the insistence upon inscription as a metaphor for the processes of memory; (2) the retention of a notion of storage and the corresponding problem of localization; and (3) the close association established between time and the protection of the organism from external stimuli. All of these motifsinscription or trace as representation, storage, and protection from an overload of stimulihave been activated in an attempt to theorize the nascent cinema. My discussion of the psychoanalytic texts is preparatory to an analysis of the conceptual encounters and intersections between the two institutions in their formulation of a relation to time in modernity.

While time is marginalized in Freud's work, it is clear that he was obsessed throughout his career, at both the clinical and the metapsychological levels, with the problem of memory. He invoked a plethora of apparatuses (the camera, the telescope, the microscope), metaphors, analogies and mythologies in an attempt to find its proper theoretical representation. But the metaphorical complex that insistently returns, from the 1895 *Project for a Scientific Psychology* to the "Note upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad,' " where Freud believes he has finally found what he is looking for, is that of inscription, mark or trace, pathway. This vocabulary is most persistent in the construction of the elaborate neurological fable begun and quickly abandoned by Freud in the unpublished *Project*. Searching for a scientific basis for the study of the psyche, he here appropriates the terminology and theoretical paradigms of late nineteenth-century neurophysiology, and even utilizes its concept of the neurone as the material particle or minimal unit in question. He makes a distinction, roughly equivalent to that between consciousness and the unconscious, between permeable neurones and impermeable neurones. It is the impermeable neurones which are the "vehicles of memory and so probably of psychical processes in general" [10] precisely because they offer difficulty or resistance to the passage of quantity. Retention of

traces is a direct result of resistance and the permeable neurones retain nothing. The impermeable neurones, the vehicles of memory, are "permanently altered by the passage of an excitation" (*PSP,* p. 300).

The term "facilitation" is the Standard Edition's translation of *Bahnung,* which means "pathbreaking" (and is derived from a word meaning "road"). The translator of Derrida's "Freud and the Scene of Writing" uses the term "breaching" (for Derrida's *frayage*) and claims that "it is crucial to maintain the sense of the *force* that breaks open a pathway, and the *space* opened by the force." [11] A metaphorics of pathbreaking is certainly appropriate, for Freud understands the process of facilitation as one that makes the neurones more capable of conductionless impermeable. Facilitation opens up a space, engraves a course, eases a movement. But the initial resistance is absolutely crucial. As Derrida points out, "If there were only perception, pure permeability to breaching, there would be no breaches. We would be written, but nothing would be recorded; no writing would be produced, retained, repeated as legibility."[12] Recording and legibility are precisely the stakes.

Although Freud abandons quite quickly the neurophysiological framework of the *Project,* its terms and descriptions persistently infect his discourse and leave their mark on his attempts to find a new way of representing psychical processes. As late as *Beyond the Pleasure Principle,* in the course of constructing the fantasy of a simple organism and its relations with the external world, Freud invokes the same terminology and the same scenario as in the *Project*.

> It may be supposed that, in passing from one element to another, an excitation has to overcome a resistance, and that the diminution of resistance thus effected is what lays down a permanent trace of the excitation, that is, a facilitation. In the system *Cs.,* then, resistance of this kind to passage from one element to another would no longer exist. (*BPP,* p. 26)

He continues to theorize memory in terms of resistance and engraving. In the "Note upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad,' " a stylus will do, rather than a pen, since only an instrument whose pressure will leave its mark is required. The wax slab is cut into, its material permanently altered or displaced. Derrida predictably celebrates Freud's choice of a writing apparatus as the culminating analogy in his theory of memory, but it is crucial to remember that the Mystic Writing-Pad will accept any type of mark or engraving. The traces on the pad are not necessarily phonetic writing. It is enough that they are retained without disallowing further receptivity to fresh impressions. Indeed, given the fact that the Mystic Writing-Pad is, after all, a child's toy (and as Derrida himself points out, more sophisticated technologies of recording were readily available at this time), it might be more likely to receive iconic representations or nonsense.[13]

What I would like to stress, on the other hand, about Freud's vocabulary and complex metaphorics in his search for an adequate means of representing memory is not their relation to any concept of writing but their resolute materialism. Memory is the effect of a blockage, the resistance of some unthinkable material and its ultimate failure. A barrier is *breached* and a certain violence is suggested in the notion of "breaking a path." Memory traces are conceptualized as an actual etching into a material. Long after Freud relinquishes the neurophysiological model, he retains its dream of a material ground that would support a true "scientific" endeavor.

Such a resolute materialism in the description of memory demands a corresponding notion of storage, location, place. It is difficult to conceive of an etching or a trace that is not located *somewhere*. One of the aspects of neurophysiology first and most adamantly rejected by Freud, however, was precisely the idea of physiological localization. In "The Unconscious," he states,

> Research has given irrefutable proof that mental activity is bound up with the function of the brain as it is with no other organ. We are taken a step furtherwe do not know how muchby the discovery of the unequal importance of the different parts of the brain and their special relations to particular parts of the body and to particular mental activities. But every attempt to go on from there to discover a localization of mental processes, every endeavor to think of ideas as stored up in nerve cells and of excitations as traveling along nerve-fibers, has miscarried completely. ("Ucs," p. 174)

Nevertheless, Freud retains the idea of a "mental topography" and "regions in the mental apparatus." Figures of space and place are pervasive in much of his writing, and the topographic point of view continues to compete successfully with the dynamic and economic points of view. The very terms in which Freud describes his quandary in the attempt to represent memory are indicative of the critical need for a concept of space. The difficulty in thinking memory has to do with two seemingly incompatible needs: unlimited receptive capacity (a "clean" or "open" space) and the retention of permanent traces (a space of storage). A notepad is an impossible metaphor because it will soon "fill up," it constitutes a finite space. Similarly, a chalk board is infinitely receptive but can retain no traces. The dilemma posed by a spatial conceptualization leads Freud to the notion of layering and depths as well as that of a periodic contact between the layers. But the terms are clearly posed as those of space, room for inscription, emptiness and fullness. And, ultimately, Freud's desire is to think both the receptive layer and the retentive layer as infinite spaces. For the unconscious, the site of memory, is in a sense a truly ideal space of unlimited storage, a perfect library where nothing is ever lost. Perhaps this is why, in the context of elaborating an earlier analogythat of the compound microscope or photographic

apparatusFreud emphasizes the ideality of place (location): "psychical locality will correspond to a point inside the apparatus at which one of the preliminary stages of an image comes into being. In the microscope and telescope, as we know, these occur in part at ideal points, regions in which no tangible component of the apparatus is situated" (*ID,* p. 536). What Freud requires is a virtual spacea space which is thinkable but not localizable.

It may be true that Freud, given his pre-Saussurean relation to linguistic phenomena, was unable to think what much of his own theory suggests quite palpablythe unconscious as structured like a language. But he *was* able to think of the unconscious as a space, a storehouse, a place outside of time, infinitely accommodating, where nothing is ever lost or destroyed. It is also a place where processes occur, where thing-representations are cathected to a greater or lesser degree. But there is no contradiction between its elements, which are all simply *there*. The link between the unconscious and the idea of storage or a reservoir is elaborated by Jean Laplanche in an essay on psychoanalysis, time and translation: "It is the *inexhaustible stores of material* [my emphasis] that each human being in the course of his existence strives as a last resort to translate into his acts, his speech, and the manner in which he represents himself to himselfit is this untranslatable that I term the unconscious. . . ." [14] It is only at the cost of a serious distortion of Freud's work that one could see the unconscious as *only* or even primarily a place of storage. But it is also problematic to completely ignore this vein of his thought.

The first two thematic motifs that I have isolatedthe insistence upon a metaphysics of inscription or engraving and the resultant requirement for some kind of notion of locality or storageare elaborated in the course of developing a theory of memory. The third motifthe close connection reud established between a concept of time and the need for protection from external stimulibrings memory back into relation with temporality.

Freud claims, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle,* that "*Protection against* stimuli is an almost more important function for the living organism than *reception of* stimuli" (*BPP,* p. 27). His understanding of the "external world" does not change much from the 1895 *Project* to the 1920 speculative tract. It is consistently envisioned as a surplus of stimulations, an overwhelming mass of energies perpetually assaulting the subject and liable to break through its defenses. In the *Project* he states, "there is no question but that the external world is the origin of all major quantities of energy, since, according to the discoveries of physics, it consists of powerful masses which are in violent motion and which transmit their motion" (*PSP,* p. 304). This same thermodynamic conception reemerges in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* in the speculative hypothesis of the "simplest organism": "This little fragment of living substance is suspended in the middle of an external world charged with the most powerful energies; and it would be killed by the stimulation emanat-

ing from these if it were not provided with a protective shield against stimuli" (*BPP,* p. 27). The intensity of the concern in this text for external energies and the phenomena of shock and trauma has been linked directly to the extensive shellshock resulting from the highly technologized First World War, but it is also an expression of generalized anxieties about modernity and its assault on the senses. It is not surprising that Walter Benjamin fastens on *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* in his attempt to theorize the relation of Marcel Proust and Charles Baudelaire to the concepts of shock, memory, and modernity. **15**

The top layer of the Mystic Writing-Padthe transparent celluloid sheetis conceived of entirely in terms of protectionit functions "to keep off injurious effects from without" and is "a protective shield against stimuli" ("MWP," p. 230). The celluloid and the waxed paper together are analogous to the system perception-consciousness and its protective shield, and the intermittent and discontinuous operation of these two layers together is directly linked to Freud's enigmatic reference to time. The reference is immediately preceded by a discussion of a notion that Freud says he has "long had" but "hitherto kept to" himselfa notion about the perceptual apparatus's method of operation. The unconscious sends out cathectic innervations in "rapid periodic impulses" into the system perception-consciousness. When this system is cathected, it can receive perceptions that are then transmitted as impressions to the unconscious system of memory; when the cathexis is rapidly and periodically withdrawn, consciousness is "extinguished" (remember the previous reference to the "flickering-up and passing-away" of consciousness)**16** and the system cannot function. The description of this process is strikingly similar to that of intermittent motion in the cinema (Freud refers to the "periodic non-excitability of the perceptual system" ["MWP," p. 231]). Freud claims, "It is as though the unconscious stretches out feelers, through the medium of the system *Pcpt.-Cs.,* toward the external world and hastily withdraws them as soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from it" ("MWP," p. 231). This entire discussion ushers in the tantalizingly brief reference to time"I further had a suspicion that this discontinuous method of functioning of the system *Pcpt.-Cs.* lies at the bottom of the origin of the concept of time" ("MWP," p. 231). Time as discontinuity emerges as a secondary effect of the organism's need to protect itself from the stimuli of the outer world. And since modernity is perceived as an astonishing increase in the stimuli bombarding the subject, it follows that time would become a particularly acute problem in modernity.

In "A Note upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad,' " perception-consciousness is a transparent protective sheet and a layer of wax paper; in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle,* it is a hardened shell, resistant to the massive energies of the external world. But nowhere is it a surface that is capable of retaining traces.

Indeed, consciousness in Freud's view is absolutely antithetical to the notion of storage or retention"excitatory processes do not leave behind any permanent change in its elements but expire, as it were, in the phenomenon of becoming conscious" (*BPP,* p. 25). The dilemma of memory and its relation to storage assigns to consciousness the function of pure receptivity. Consciousness is the site of all that is transitory, in flux, impermanent. The retention or representation of memory traces is reserved for the unconscious. This is the thinking behind Freud's well-known statements in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (which are echoed in "MWP") that "becoming conscious and leaving behind a memory-trace are processes incompatible with each other within one and the same system" and "*consciousness arises instead of a memory-trace*" (*BPP,* p. 25). What can "instead of" mean here? "In place of"? "In order to block (memory)"? "At the expense of"? What remains clear is the absolute incompatibility of memory and consciousness. And because consciousness is so fully bound up with the concept of timethrough the periodicity or discontinuity of its functioningit would seem inevitable that within Freud's system, time and memory are absolutely incompatible as well. Time is that which leaves no recordit emerges from the failure of representation. This scenario produces the unconscious as the dream of a memory uncorrupted by time. Time is not an inert process, external to the subject, weighing down on memories, contributing to their weakening and diminishment. Instead, it is an effect, a kind of mirroring of the operation of the psychical system. Within psychoanalysis, the commonly held view that memory is the residue of time is an impossible one.

Time is therefore conceptualized within the problematic of determining what is storable, what is representable. Memory is representation itself; time its inconceivability. Time is antithetical to the notions of storage and retention of traces. This is a rare point of contact between Freud and Henri Bergson, who condemns the pervasive attempt to spatialize time (particularly in a positivist science) and argues the indivisibility of movement and the impossibility of real instants. However, for Bergson, time is unrepresentable because it is flux, absolute unity, indivisibility. For Freud, time is intimately linked with the very phenomena of discontinuity and difference. Furthermore, for Bergson time is a crucial and central concept in the delineation of subjectivity, whereas for Freud it is a by-product of more significant psychical processes. It could almost be said that for Freud time is a *symptom* of the subject's agonistic relationship with its environment.

The psychoanalysis of time, which produces through negation an image of its operation in its association with an inexplicable consciousness, needs to be seen in the context of another endeavor at the turn of the century to analyze time. While time is for Freud what is, above all, unrepresentable, there was nevertheless a widespread and concerted, if not obsessive, attempt in a number of fields, including physiology, to isolate and analyze the instant, to make an invisible time optically legiblein other words, to ade-

quately represent the phenomenon that Freud opposes to the trace. What determines the direction of much of this research is the overwhelming desire to know what happens within the duration of a fraction of a second, in other words, to know that aspect of time which is not accessible to vision. In an essay on photography, Benjamin reiterates this impulse to dissect time: "While it is possible to give an account of how people walk, if only in the most inexact way, all the same we know nothing definite of the positions involved in the fraction of a second when the step is taken." [17] The best-known proponent of this endeavor, and the figure who is most frequently isolated as a primary scientific precursor of the cinema, is Etienne-Jules Marey, who spent his life generating careful and detailed depictions of bodies in movement, first through graphic inscriptors and, later, photographic apparatuses. Marey labeled his photographic technique "chronophotography," literally, the photography of time.

Marey participated in a general movement within physiology during the latter half of the nineteenth century that involved the production of a concept of life adequate to modernitya concept of life as movement, process, change. As Lisa Cartwright has eloquently argued, instruments and techniques were developed as the support of a "vivifying physiological gaze."[18] Autopsy and vivisection interfered with or annihilated life processes and were therefore antithetical to the aims of physiology. Physiologists could have no interest in the "dead instant." Marey proclaimed that "motion is the most apparent characteristic of life; it manifests itself in all the functions; it is even the essence of several of them."[19]

Thus, Marey's ostensible object was movement, that is, the correlation of space and time as a body successively changes its position. It is therefore arguable that his interest in time was merely secondary, a by-product of the obsessive concernmore proper to a physiologistwith the analysis of bodies in motion. Nevertheless, the trajectory of Marey's own career, his incessant struggle with the development of newer, more readable modes of representation of his object, and his explicit awareness of the tension between spatial and temporal categories in his work all suggest, as I will attempt to demonstrate below, the ultimate privileging of temporality and its scientific representation and measurement. Marey's dream, whether acknowledged or not, was that of cutting into time, slicing it in such a way that it could become representable. Movement remained the clearest and most accessible expression of duration. Initially and apparently adhering to a body, movement was progressively disengaged from that body first through the techniques of geometric chronophotography (discussed below) and later through Marey's growing interest in the more apparently abstract and bodiless realms of fluid dynamics and the flow of air currents.

Marey's obsessive concern with the measurement and graphing of movement across time emerged from the problems involved in understanding physiological time, a project he inherited from Hermann von Helmholtz,

one of the figures most closely connected with the "discover" of the laws of thermodynamics. Initially at stake was internal physiological time, a time inaccessible to the naked eye. Helmholtz was the first to investigate the speed of the transference of a shock along the extension of a nerve to the point of muscular contraction. Marey was particularly interested in the concept of "lost time" invoked by Helmholtz to label the time during which nothing seems to happenthe time between the reception of the nervous shock or impulse by the muscle and the muscle's contraction: "Now, it results from the experiments of Helmholtz, that all the time which elapses between the excitement and the motion is not occupied by the transference of the nervous agent; but that the muscle, when it has received the order carried by the nerve, remains an instant before acting" (*AM,* p. 43). Marey disputes the reigning hypothesis that the speed of the "nervous agent" varies under certain influences and, instead, proposes that the variable duration is attributable to "those still unknown phenomena which are produced in the muscle during the *lost time* of Helmholtz" (*AM,* p. 44). According to Anson Rabinbach, in his study of energy and fatigue, "This lost time, which consists of the relationship between duration and energy expenditure, is for Marey a basic component of the economy of the body." [20] Already, at this early stage, the urge to make a "lost time" visible and knowable is in evidence.

In his early work, Marey constructed a series of instruments (the sphygmograph, the myograph) designed to expand or replace the deficient human senses in the measurement of internal processes. He later applied this refined and altered instrumentation to the production of graphic inscriptions capable of representing the movement of horses cantering, trotting or galloping, the movement of insect wings and the flight of birds. From the start, indexicality was the major stake of Marey's representational practices. It was crucial that the body whose movement was being measured be the direct source for the tracing. This required a complex apparatus of wires, India rubber tubing, and other connectors between body and recording instrument. Marey repeatedly refers to this type of tracing as "automatic." The phenomenon is the author of its own record: "In experiments . . . which deal with time measurements, it is of immense importance that the graphic record should be automatically registered, in fact, that the phenomenon should give on paper its own record of duration, and of the moment of production. This method, in the cases in which it is applicable, is almost perfect."[21] Marey was not unaware of the resistant properties of the conducting material itself and diligently searched for the most "immaterial," the most self-effacing link between the body and the recording instrument, tending ultimately to privilege air pressure. Photography was, in this respect, ideal since its means of connecting object and representationlight waveswere literally intangible and greatly reduced the potentially corruptive effects of mediation. It is telling that François Dagognet subtitled his study of Marey

A Passion for the Trace and that this work is an extended celebration of indexicality: "Marey's brilliance lay in the discovery of how to make recordings without recourse to the hidden hand or eye. Nature had to testify to itself, to translate itself through the inflection of curves and subtle trajectories that were truly representative. . . . The 'trace' . . . was to be considered nature's own expression, without screen, echo or interference: it was faithful, clear and, above all, universal." [22] Attempting to disengage entirely the notion of human authorship from Marey's graphic method, Dagognet repeatedly refers to it as "direct writing" or "direct inscription."

Inextricably linked, for Marey, with the obsession with indexicality was the attribute of the clarity or lucidity of the representationits *legibility*. The curve of a graph tracing the path of a moving object was eminently readable, assimilable in little more than a glance. Marey consistently contrasted the graphic method favorably to phonetic language and statistics, heavily mediated forms of representation that were potentially obscure and unappealing (as well as slowinstantaneity was an aspiration): "Language is as slow and obscure a method of expressing the duration and sequence of events as the graphic method is lucid and easy to understand. As a matter of fact, it is the only natural mode of expressing such events; and, further, the information which this kind of record conveys is that which appeals to the eyes, usually the most reliable form in which it can be expressed" (*M,* p. 2). All of the positive attributes Marey associated with the graphic methodindexicality, instantaneity, readabilityilluminate his later predilection for photography as a privileged mode of scientific representation.

And, indeed, after Marey's contact with the work of Eadweard Muybridge, published in a French journal in 1878, he replaced some of his graphic inscriptors with photographic ones and developed the technique that finally lodged his name within histories of the cinemachronophotography. The photographic method did not necessarily increase the precision or the accuracy of the graphic method of inscription. But it did allow for greater detail and ease in specifying the successive spatial positions of the subject. Unlike Muybridge, Marey used a single camera and photographic plate to register these successive positions. As a result, and in contrast to Muybridge's separately framed images (see fig. 6), the chronophotograph included all of the recorded successive positions of a single subject within the same frame (see fig. 7). As Marta Braun points out, this technique compromised an entire tradition of Western representation.

> Their [the chronophotographs'] novelty would certainly have been disconcerting to the untutored viewer, because the traditional Western pictorial delineation of time and space would make them hard to read. Since the advent of linear perspective in the Renaissance, the frame of an image has, with rare exceptions, been understood to enclose a temporal and spatial unity. We read what occurs within the frame as happening at a single instant in time



Figure 6.
Eadweard Muybridge.
Courtesy George Eastman House.

Figure 7.
Etienne-Jules Marey.

> and in a single space. Marey's photographs shattered that unity; viewers now had to unravel the successive parts of the work in order to understand that they were looking not at several men moving in single file, but at a single figure successively occupying a series of positions in space. **23**

Given Marey's desire to steadily decrease the intervals between the successive positions of the subject in order to clarify the movement's temporal progression, these positions were inevitably superimposed and blurred, figures overlapped, outlines became indistinct (see figs. 8–11). There was an overcrowding of detail in the photographic method.

In *Movement,* Marey illustrates this confusion with the image of an "Arab horse at a gallop" in which he claims that "the large surface covered by each image cause[s] almost complete superposition" (*M,* p. 58). He concludes that "the applications of chronophotography are, as we have seen, limited by interference from superposition and consequent confusion" (*M,* p. 62). This is a spatial difficultya finite space (on a fixed plate) must accommodate a minimum number of images. As a consequence of the resulting superimposition, the legibility of time is seriously impaired since it requires the distinct separation of legible units and Marey has already stipulated that a pronounced advantage of photography is that it "would permit the exact measurement of time intervals" (*M,* p. 33). Problems of legibility linked to the overlapping, blurring and superimposition of figures were due, in a sense, to the fact that there was *too much* detail in the photographic method.

Marey attempted to solve that problem by gradually excising details that might be distracting and using blacker backgrounds. This tendency in his work ultimately resulted in some amazingly abstract representations. Marey clothed his subjects completely in black, attaching luminous dots to their joints and connecting them with luminous striping, and then he photographed them against a black background (see figs. 12–15). The outcome was a series of chronophotographs consisting only of lines and curves in space ("geometric chronophotography"). Marey's trajectory here is quite astonishing. He moves from the graphic method to the photographic method only to defamiliarize, de-realize, even de-iconize the photographic image. Why, then, did Marey use photography at all? Pragmatically speaking, photography, and not the graphic method, worked where it was difficult or impossible to maintain a physical connection between the moving object and the recording instrument. The flight of birds would be an exemplary instance of this problem, and Marey's first attempts, in the realm of photographic methods, involved the development of a "photographic gun" inspired by a similar instrument employed by the astronomer Pierre-César Jules Janssen. But Marey was also drawn to the wealth of detail automatically made available by photography and was excited about the possibilities the new medium harbored of making visible the previously hidden secrets



Figures 8–11.
Etienne-Jules Marey.

of movement: "When it is a matter of registering all the details of a man's movements, both as regards change of position and attitude of the body and limbs, mechanical registration is out of the question. It is at this point that chronophotography comes to the rescue" (*M,* p. 134).

Chronophotography is much more suited to the representation of space than is the graphic method. And Marey, in fact, viewed the antagonistic relationship between space and time as a potential obstruction to his project, which, because it was explicitly concerned with movement, required references to both spatial and temporal coordinates. He referred to the difficulty of "harmoniz[ing] two such incompatible notions" (*M,* p. 57). In fixed plate chronophotography, a moving object that covers only a small surface area will allow the registration of a large number of images, enhancing the representation of time while restricting that of space. A large animal or human being, on the other hand, uses up so much space in its movements that it is difficult to get the necessary quantity of images without superimposition and confusion. With a very small number of different positions, the legibility of time is diminished. Marey himself was intensely aware of the tension between the two categories:

> In this method of photographic analysis the two elements of movement, time and space, cannot both be estimated in a perfect manner. Knowledge of the positions the body occupies in space presumes that complete and distinct images are possessed; yet to have such images, a relatively long temporal interval must be had between two successive photographs. *But if it is the notion of time one desires to bring to perfection* [my emphasis], the only way of doing so is to greatly augment the frequency of images, and this forces each of them to be reduced to lines. [24]

The legibility of the image is directly affected by the desire to perfect a representation of time. In fixed plate chronophotography, this is true even if the figures are reduced to lines, for the finite surface area of the plate will eventually limit the number of lines that can be recorded without superimposition and consequent illegibility as well.

Geometric chronophotography and increasing the number of openings (windows) in the disk shutter were two strategies Marey adopted for dealing with the dilemma. Marey, however, never embraced wholeheartedly the most obvious resolution of the problemthe substitution of moving film for the fixed plates, which would theoretically increase almost limitlessly the surface area of the recording medium. Although his experiments with moving film are crucial to arguments that Marey was deeply involved in the "invention of cinematography,"[25] he had serious difficulties with the problem of stabilizing a fast-moving strip of film for an adequate (unblurred) registration of the image. Furthermore, Marey had little interest in the synthesis of movement, which was the goal of cinematography, and, in an extraordinary



Figures 12–13.
Etienne-Jules Marey.

move, he would attempt to rearrange the images taken with moving film so that they embodied the characteristics of fixed plate chronophotography. In other words, he would laboriously cut out the individual images from a strip of film, place them next to one another so that they slightly overlapped, and rephotograph them. Or he would project the images and trace their outlines onto another image that would then resemble those of his geometric chronophotography (see figs. 16 and 17). There is a drive toward horizontality here that works to suppress the separation between individual film frames (the site of loss, discontinuity in film). It is as though Marey were obsessed by a graphic aspiration so that he devised ever more ingenious methods, through geometric chronophotography and his manipulation of the images of moving film, to transform photographic modes of representation into graphic ones.

For the graphic method had one distinct advantage over the photographic: its record of a movement left no temporal gaps, and its inscription therefore allowed complete continuity. Chronophotography, on the other hand, was based on intermittency, and, despite Marey's strategy of increasing the number of windows in the disk shutter, it would always entail a necessary temporal elision. Marey was haunted by this lost time. With respect to the chronophotography of a tortoise's cardiac cycle, Marey maintains: "these [temporal] measurements do not pretend to rival in exactness those derived from the graphic method, which are almost infinitely accurate. When the commencement and termination of a phenomenon is measured by means



Figures 14–15.
Etienne-Jules Marey.

of a discontinuous series of images, there may be an error as regards both stages. The commencement and termination may occur between two exposures of the photographic plate, and it is impossible to say exactly when they occur" (*M,* p. 282n). By the nature of the technique, something is invariably lost. Marey consistently compares this unavoidable temporal loss with the fullness, the "almost infinite accuracy," the "perfection" of the graphic method. Chronophotography "only gives an approximate idea of the sequence of the various phases of movement, because its record is one of intermittent indications, instead of the continuous record of a curve" (*M,* p. 287). The points, lines, and curves of geometric chronophotography not only reduce the overwhelming and excessive detail of the photographic image but also allow chronophotography to mimic the graphic method. Indeed, the points traced by the movement of a joint on the body can be readily connected to form a graph. Marey claims with delight, "In geometrical photographs, thanks to the great number of the images, the discontinuity of the phases almost entirely disappears, and the actual path followed by each point of the body can be seen represented almost as a continuous curve" (*M,* p. 145). In a roundabout way, Marey returns to the goal of producing a pure graph of time.

Marey's continual technical problems that drove him to refine and perfect laboriously his equipment all emerge from the conflict between legibility and illegibility in sequential photography. Because the various positions of Muybridge's figures were separated in distinct frames, he did not experience this difficulty. But this aspect of Muybridge's work was also a cause of Marey's criticism of it. Not only did Muybridge have no way of measuring the time of the movements he recorded, the positions of the figures were too far apartit was often impossible to determine how the figure moved from one position to the next. Too much time was lost. Since Marey had always been primarily interested in "a technical apparatus that could make visible minute changes over time'les infiniment petits du temps' " [26]his search led him to desire smaller and smaller units of a continuum that he himself conceptualized as "infinitely divisible." If, in his photographic work, Marey respected the integrity of time and attempted to register its smallest displacements, he produced an unreadable record (due to excessive overlapping and superimposition). If he strove for legibility in his documents, he betrayed his object (time) and compromised his attempt to represent it adequately. Marey's oscillation between the graphic and the photographic is symptomatic of the extent to which he constantly grappled with the problems of legibility and recording. It is significant that the limit or failure of Marey's scientific endeavorthe blurred imagewas subsequently taken up by modernism (especially Italian futurism) as evidence that the perfect representation of time (particularly its more "modern" aspects of speed and dynamism) was precisely illegibility (nondifferentiation).[27]



Figure 16.
Etienne-Jules Marey.

The quandary emerges, of course, from the very technology of the photographic apparatusthe need for a hiatus between exposures of the photographic plate or plates to insure an unblurred image. As deficient as Muybridge's technique was, his series produced a representation of that hiatus in the form of the frames separating images. Most of Marey's chronophotography did not. Such an absence, together with the subjection of photography to the graphic aspiration as outlined above, points to a desire to represent *all* timeto a dream of representation without loss.

In his theory of the psychical apparatus, Freud recognized the necessity of intervals of nonreceptivity in the registration/inscription of mnemic traces. Recording (of memory) is not continuousthere must be gaps, lacks, losses in order to protect against overwhelming energies. And it is the discontinuous functioning of the system perception-consciousness that produces those gaps and in this way produces the notion of time. For Marey, on the other hand, time is "out there"a continuum which, although infinitely divisible, is divisible nevertheless. He is faced with the dilemma, however, that pure and direct recording of time would result only in noise. Freud's theory of the unconscious exhibits an aspiration for perfect storage that is antithetical to the concept of time (the unconscious is "timeless"); Marey's chronophotography evinces a desire for a pure representation of time that would ultimately, if it were attainable, be antithetical to the notion of the legible trace (which was the support and goal of his endeavor). Although both of these discourses are imbued with contradictions, they put into play in decisively important ways concepts of temporality and storage that are crucial to much thinking about the cinema as the medium, par excellence, of time.

It is well known that both Freud and Marey resisted the cinema, Freud refusing to contemplate or authorize a film about psychoanalysis, Marey condemning the cinema's collaboration with defective senses. **28** Marey claimed



Figure 17.
Etienne-Jules Marey.

that "Cinema produces only what the eye can see in any case. It adds nothing to the power of our sight, nor does it remove its illusions, and the real character of a scientific method is to supplant the insufficiency of our senses and correct their errors. To get to this point, chronophotography should renounce the representation of phenomena as they are seen by the eye." [29] Cinema presents the illusionand the commercially successful illusionof what Marey could only dream about, the possibility of a continuous and nonselective recording of real time. In concealing the division between frames, it refuses to acknowledge the loss of time on which it is based. From Marey's point of view there is a double deception at work here: the lie that truth resides in visibility, in what the eye can see, and the pretense that the cinema replicates time perfectly, without loss.

Nevertheless, the cinema has been conceptualized in ways that reinscribe the terms of Freud's and Marey's attempts to correlate storage and time. The early cinema was quickly embraced as the site of an ideal storage, a medium capable of recording images that would then be impervious to the passage of time. Hence, the recurrent motif of the cinema as a machine that conquers death. Noel Burch cites, in this context, two journalistic reviews of the Lumières' first screening, both of which contain references to the conquest of death (*Le Radical:* "Speech has already been collected and reproduced, now life is collected and reproduced. For example, it will be possible to see one's loved ones active long after they have passed away"; and *La Poste:* "When these cameras are made available to the public, when everyone can photograph their dear ones, no longer in a motionless form but in their movements, their activity, their familiar gestures, with words on their lips, death will have ceased to be absolute").[30] Even Marey's assistant, Georges Demeny, whose conflicts with Marey were partially fueled by his avid interest in cinematography, invoked the rhetoric of a conquest over death when referring to the potential of moving and speaking images:

> How many people would be happy if they could for a moment see again the living features of someone who had passed away! The future will replace the still photograph, locked in its frame, with the moving portrait, which can be given life at the turn of a wheel! The expression of the physiognomy will be preserved as the voice is by the phonograph. The latter could even be added to the phonoscope to complete the illusion . . . . We shall do more than analyze [the face]; we shall bring it to life again.[31]

Death, the most corrosive effect of time, is vanquished by an apparatus understood to contain the potential for flawless storage.

On the other hand, the cinema's novelty and its decisive difference from photography were both linked to its ability not to resist time but to store or represent it. The first films could easily risk banality in their subject matter

since their fascination was indissociably linked with their sheer representation of movement through time. The more familiar, everyday and recognizable the activity, the more appreciable the pure act of its re-presentation. The Lumières filmed such subjects as the demolition of a wall, a snowball fight, workers leaving the factory, the arrival of a train, children clamdigging and jumping off a pier into the sea. Perhaps this fascination with the technologically supported ability to inscribe time helps to explain the dominance of the actuality, the presentation of an unstaged incident, during the first ten or so years of the cinema. But these tendencies to exploit the familiar and the recognizable would seem to remove the cinema decisively from the problematic confronting both Freud and Mareythat of the difficult relations among time, representability, and legibility. The early cinema would seem to be, above all, eminently readable.

Yet, one characteristic of the cinema set it apart from earlier processes of representing time, such as writing and music, and associated it with the ever-present and consistently disturbing potential of meaninglessness, of providing the spectator with *nothing to read*. And that is the camera's capacity to record indiscriminately. [32] Beyond the inevitable selectivity of framing and angle, the camera always seems to evade the issues of subjectivity, agency and intentionality in the process of an unthought and mechanical recording. In reception, this can readily be transformed into the questions, What does it mean? and What is it for? In his attempt to differentiate the "discourse network of 1900" from the "discourse network of 1800," Friedrich Kittler specifies the former, at least partly, as the generating, recording and collecting of nonsense, an endeavor in which the new technological media were particularly determinant. While the discourse network of 1800 stressed the mother's voice as the anchor of meaning and understanding, the discourse network of 1900 dissociated memory and meaning and stressed the materialism of signsto the extent of excluding subjectivity. For Kittler, the master science of this discourse network is psychophysics, whose experiments transformed memory into pure registration or inscription at the physiological level. During 1879–80 and 1883–84, Hermann Ebbinghaus, its founder, conducted experiments in which he measured the amount of repetitions necessary to memorize strings of varying lengths of nonsense syllables. Because the individual syllabic combinations were deliberately chosen for their meaninglessness, their inability to be associated with any significant context, the purity of memory as a physiological function was allegedly guaranteed. For Kittler, this is evidence that around 1900, "memory is taken from people and delegated to a material organization of discourse."[33]

Kittler, in an astonishing gesture, goes so far as to make psychoanalysis subordinate to (and in league with) the positivist science of psychophysics: "This is the reason for psychoanalysis. Material discarded by psychophysics

can be resorted and then decoded. Freud's discourse was a response not to individual miseries but to a discourse network that exhaustively records nonsense, its purpose being to inscribe people with the network's logic of the signifier" (*DN,* p. 282). This would explain Freud's peculiar attentiveness to slips of the tongue, errors and symptoms, which he organized into the material phenomena of psychical life. Kittler analyzes the extent to which the case histories deal with submeaningful elements, such as letters ("S.P." or "Espe" in the Wolf Man case): "All of Freud's case histories demonstrate that the romanticism of the soul has yielded to a materialism of written signs" (*DN,* p. 283).

Similarly, film deals with the idiosyncratic, the detail, the element that cannot automatically be integrated into an immediately meaningful context: "Technology makes it possible for the first time to record single and accidental messages. . . . The entire discourse network of 1900 is fed by the return of an opaque thisness" (*DN,* p. 338). Such a "thisness" is indisputableit is simply there, while the sheer act of recording it transforms it into an archival moment that cannot be ignored. Kittler makes film, as well as psychoanalysis, subordinate to the master discourse of psychophysics: "In the discourse network of 1900, discourse is produced by RANDOM GENERATORS. Psychophysics constructed such sources of noise; the new technological media stored their output" (*DN,* p. 206). Kittler takes the term *noise* from information theory, and computer technology, in fact, infuses his analysis of both discourse networks. He activates the term *noise* as the polar opposite of the term *information* in order to stress the resistance to meaning that characterizes the contemporary discourse network. Nevertheless, the idea that the new technological media "store noise" is a paradoxical one at best. For noise is defined as "an unwanted signal or a disturbance" or "a disturbance interfering with the operation of a mechanical device or system." [34] In information theory, it refers to "irrelevant or meaningless bits or words occurring along with desired information (as in a computer output)."[35] In the language of technicians, noise often refers to an interference generated by the apparatus itself, and from that point of view the idea of "storing noise" suggests that the sharpness of the distinction between what is "out there" to be recorded and what is traced by the machine is lost.

In any event, the concept of an archives of noise is a difficult one to think. But it does speak to the enormity of the changes introduced by mechanical reproduction. Certainly the capacity to record the singular and the opacity of the "thisness" captured and presented by the machine that Kittler describes is linked to the promise of an ability to represent the unforeseen, the unintended. Dai Vaughn's homage to the Lumières is based on the notion that the principal effect of the early cinema and its principal promise was that of spontaneity, of unwilled communication. He points to the unexpected and disturbing wave (a wave that appears suddenly and

seems to interrupt the smooth progress of the boat being rowed) in *A Boat Leaving Harbour* as evidence of the force of contingency in the new medium:

> Such an invasion of the spontaneous into the human arts, being unprecedented, must have assumed the character of a threat not only to the "performers" but to the whole idea of controlled, willed, obedient communication. And conversely, since the idea of communication had in the past been inseparable from the assumption of willed control, this invasion must have seemed a veritable doubling-back of the world into its own imagery, a denial of the order of a coded system: an escape of the represented from the representational act . . . . [*A Boat Leaving Harbour*] survives as a reminder of that moment when the question of spontaneity was posed and not yet found to be insoluble: when the cinema seemed free, not only of its proper connotations, but of the threat of its absorption into meanings beyond it. **36**

Vaughn perceives this spontaneity, the capacity to represent the unforeseen, as an exhilarating potential of the cinema that was subsequently annihilated in the management and control exerted over filmic significations. But the ability to represent everythingboth the planned and the unplannedalso constituted, as Vaughn suggests, a threat. The anxiety generated would be that of sheer undivided extension, of a "real time" without significant moments, of a confusion about where or why to look. If everything is recordable, nothing matters except the act of recording itself.

Something of the overwhelming effect of this recording process is visible in the very bulk of the archives left by Muybridge and Mareythousands of stills of the sequential gestures of animals, men, women and children performing everyday movements. Although he never mentioned Marey by name, Bergson was quite critical of the leveling of temporal moments that was an inevitable effect of sequential photography.**37** And he did not acknowledge the distinction Marey himself saw between his own enterprise and that of cinematography because both were based on dividing time into a series of static images. When Bergson claims that "the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind,"**38** it is in defiance of the concept of "ordinary knowledge" and its ability to apprehend time. Both the ancients and the moderns, according to Bergson, were guilty of spatializing time and hence of a "cinematographical mechanism," but at least the ancients were capable of isolating moments and lending them an aesthetic significance.

> Of the gallop of a horse our eye perceives chiefly a characteristic, essential or rather schematic attitude that sculpture has fixed on the frieze of the Parthenon. But instantaneous photography isolates any moment; it puts them all in the same rank, and thus the gallop of a horse spreads out for it into as many successive attitudes as it wishes, instead of massing itself into a single attitude, which is supposed to flash out in a privileged moment and to illuminate a whole period.**39**

Time, in effect, becomes banal and meaningless.

The problem of the early cinema's relation to time hence becomes one of generating difference. The actuality's embodiment of "real time" very quickly becomes only an aspiration (actualities contain cuts), and the cinema avoids the representational difficulties posed by Rainer Maria Rilke's notion of a "globe on the scale of the earth." [40] According to Bergson, the Greeks could isolate the exemplary moment and compel it to signify while Marey and the cinema level all moments until each is the same as the otherproducing an overwhelming sameness and banality. The problem the cinema must address early in the century is precisely its ability to record singularity. The cinema confronts the difficult task of endowing the singular with significance, of manufacturing an event in a medium designed to record, without predilection, all moments. It is not surprising, from this point of view, that the cinema embraces narrative as its primary means of making time legible. Despite the dominance of the actuality in the first decade of the cinema, despite the extensive fascination with the camera's relation to "real time" and movement, narrative very quickly becomes its dominant method of structuring time. Born of the aspiration to represent or store time, the cinema must content itself with producing time as an effect.

Freud, Marey, and the cinema all grapple, in quite different ways, with the relations among the concepts of time, storage, representation and legibility. For Marey, the desire to represent a time that he conceives of as objective and measurable inevitably produces dilemmas of legibility. In Freud, the very concept of time emerges from the failure of storage or representation, the discontinuous functioning of a psychical apparatus designed to protect the subject from overwhelming energies. For Marey, time is infinitely divisible; for Freud, time is division itself. What both theorists disallow, however, is a notion of time as degradation, degeneration, wearing down. For Marey, time is the support of movement and hence of lifeit enables them. For Freud, the unconscious is a site of perfect storage characterized by its timelessness. Time, instead of gnawing away at memories, is the effect of a system that protects them. The unconscious is a haven, the pure space of representation, and the subject becomes the site of a perfect reading, without loss. Such a scenario guarantees legibility for the psychoanalyst since no memory, no detail, no minute clue to the working of the psyche, can be irrevocably lost. But it also helps to explain Freud's resistance to technology. If the unconscious provides us with a perfect record, the cinema as a prosthetic memory is simply unnecessary.

In the work of Freud and Marey, time seems to be continually at odds with legibility. For Freud, temporality is indissociably linked with a consciousness which is opaque or "obscure"it is the unconscious which is readable. For Marey, time is an entity which resists his instruments, his scientific technology for the production of readability. Time as homogeneous and contin-

uous is antithetical to the differential mapping of photographic technology. For both, time disallows its own record. What temporality eschews is representation. Freud and Marey, in different ways, stake out the terms of the impossibility of cinema insofar as it strives to be a legible record of time.

Freud and Marey resisted the cinema because it adhered to the senses and was not amenable to the abstraction required either to illustrate the basic concepts of psychoanalysis or to produce scientific knowledge. In its hyper-indexicality it could not dissociate itself from the realm of the contingent or the material. It is clear, as Vaughn suggests, that cinema posed a threat to an entire system of representation. But for Freud and Marey the danger did not lie so much in the loss of control and agency in willed communication as in the implicit refusal of limit or limitation. The threat was one of over-presence, of excessive coverage, of a refusal of the distinction or differentiation that would insure legibility. To the extent that cinema strove for the status of total record, strove to confirm the senses and their potential apprehension of anything and everything, it constituted itself as a failure of representation. Such a logic anticipates Kracauer's anxieties about photography's and film's inscription of a spatial and temporal continuum without gap, of a "blizzard" or "flood" of images. The historical transition in the early cinema from a focus on actualities to an insistence upon narrative would be one way of ameliorating such fears. From this point of view, I do not think it is too far-fetched to suggest that in the cinema, as in psychoanalysis, time is produced as an effect, at least in part to protect the subject from the anxieties of total representation generated by the new technological media.

Yet Freud's and Marey's conscious rejection of the cinema was also accompanied by an unconscious complicity with its very aspirationsthe desire to store or represent time, the rejection of mortality (especially in the case of Freud, who continually attempted to demonstrate that death was accidental, contingent rather than inevitable). Freud, Marey and the early cinema collaborate in a tendency to perceive time as a persistent and troubling problem that holds in tension two different understandings of representation: representation as the record, trace, or inscription of that which is outside itself (for instance, time, as elusive as it may be); and representation as the production of temporalities with no referent other than that of the representational system itself (the psyche, the cinema). The latter understanding of representation persists and is strengthened in modernity but only at the cost of harboring within itself the dream of the first.

Notes

I would like to thank Miriam Hansen, Tom Gunning, Joel Snyder, Kristen Whissel, Mark Cooper and Tom Mitchell, as well as the members of a feminist reading group

at Brown University (Ellen Rooney, Christina Crosby, Susan Bernstein, Karen Newman and Coppelia Kahn) for their helpful comments and suggestions. I am especially grateful to Marta Braun for her insights and warm encouragement and for her generosity in allowing me access to her collection of Marey's chronophotography.

1. Siegfried Kracauer, "Photography," *Critical Inquiry* 21 (winter 1995) 432.

2. Allan Sekula, "The Body and the Archive," *October* 39 (1986) 3–64.

3. Friedrich Kittler, "Gramophone, Film, Typewriter," *October* 41 (1987) 104.

4. Jacques Derrida, "Freud and the Scene of Writing," in his *Writing and Difference,* trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) 201.

5. Michel Serres, *Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy,* ed. Josué V. Harari and David F. Bell (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) 71–72.

6. Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (hereafter abbreviated *S.E.),* trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953–1974) XIV, 187; hereafter abbreviated "Ucs."

7. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle,* in *S.E.* XVIII, 28; hereafter abbreviated *BPP*.

8. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams,* in *S.E.* V, 577–78; hereafter abbreviated *ID*.

9. Freud, "A Note upon the 'Mystic Writing-Pad,' " in *S.E.* XIX, 231; hereafter abbreviated "MWP."

10. Freud, *Project for a Scientific Psychology,* in *S.E.* I, 300; hereafter abbreviated *PSP*.

11. Derrida, "Freud and the Scene of Writing," 329.

12. Ibid., 226.

13. Although Derrida's conceptualization of writing situates it beyond and against the narrow understanding of phonetic writing, locating it in the more general context of the logic of the trace and deferred action, I would argue that his concept is inescapably propped upon and dependent upon that of phonetic writing.

14. Jean Laplanche, *Seduction, Translation, Drives,* trans. Martin Stanton, ed. John Fletcher and Martin Stanton (London: Institute of Contemporary Arts, 1992) 174.

15. Walter Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism,* trans. Harry Zohn (London: New Left Books, 1973) 113–17.

16. The German phrase is "mit dem Aufleuchten und Vergehen des Bewusstseins." See Sigmund Freud, "Notiz über den 'Wunderblock,' " in *Gesammelte Werke* XIV, ed. Anna Freud et al. (London: Imago, 1940–[1952]) 7.

17. Benjamin, "A Short History of Photography," in *Classic Essays on Photography,* ed. Alan Trachtenberg (New Haven: Leete's Island Books, 1980) 202–203.

18. Lisa Cartwright, *Screening the Body: Tracing Medicine's Visual Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995) viii.

19. E.-J. Marey, *Animal Mechanism: A Treatise on Terrestrial and Aërial Locomotion* (New York: D. Appleton, 1874) 27; hereafter abbreviated *AM*.

20. Anson Rabinbach, *The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) 93.

21. Marey, *Movement,* trans. Eric Pritchard (New York: D. Appleton, 1895), p. 3; hereafter abbreviated *M*.

22. François Dagognet, *Etienne-Jules Marey: A Passion for the Trace,* trans. Robert Galeta with Jeanine Herman (New York: Zone Books, 1992) 30, 63.

23. Marta Braun, *Picturing Time: The Work of Etienne-Jules Marey (1830–1904)* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) 66.

24. Cited in ibid., 83.

25. See, for example, ibid., 150–98 and 255–62.

26. Rabinbach, *Human Motor,* 97.

27. The work of Marcel Duchamp (especially *Nude Descending a Staircase, No. 2* [1912]), Anton Giulio Bragaglia and Giacomo Balla is frequently cited as indicative of the range of Marey's influence in art and photography. See Braun, *Picturing Time,* chap. 7: "Marey, Modern Art and Modernism" and Rabinbach, *Human Motor,* 115.

28. See Braun, *Picturing Time,* esp. 155–56, for a discussion of Marey's attempts to develop a motion picture camera.

29. Cited in ibid., 255.

30. Cited in Noel Burch, *Life to Those Shadows,* trans. and ed. Ben Brewster (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) 20–21.

31. Cited in Dagognet, *Etienne-Jules Marey,* 162.

32. This would be an attribute of phonography as wellanother technology for inscribing time. Although I do not have the space or time to pursue this question here, phonography raises many of the same issues with respect to the representation of time as cinematography. I have chosen to limit my investigation here to photographically based modes of representation (sequential photography, cinema).

33. Friedrich A. Kittler, *Discourse Networks 1800/1900,* trans. Michael Metteer with Chris Cullens (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990) 211; hereafter abbreviated as *DN*.

34. *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam, 1973) 778.

35. Ibid.

36. Dai Vaughan, "Let There Be Lumière," in *Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative,* ed. Thomas Elsaesser (London: British Film Institute, 1990) 65, 66–67.

37. However, Bergson certainly knew Marey since they both worked at the Collège de France during the years 1900 to 1904 and both were members of a group organized to study psychic phenomena (including telepathy and levitation). See Braun, *Picturing Time,* 279.

38. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt, 1911) 306.

39. Ibid., 332.

40. Rainer Maria Rilke, *The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge,* trans. M. D. Herter Norton (New York: Norton, 1964), cited in Kittler, *Discourse Networks* 326.

Three
The Fetish in the Theory and History of the Cinema

Marc Vernet

I find myself today in an unusual situation since, after having spent years trying to produce cinema theory, I have changed my professional activity and am now creating a cinema library in Paris, called the Bibliothèque du Film, in conjunction with the Cinémathèque Française and the French film school FEMIS (Fondation Européenne des Métiers de l'Image et du Son). As a theorist, the archives of the cinema are of greatest interest to me in the areas of American film and censorship in French cinema. As director of a developing library, I am interested in the principles which implicitly govern (particularly in France) the relationship between archives and research. One may note in passing that too often theory is either based on the traditional histories of the cinema, taking their propositions as the truth, or else seems to want to invent its own history of the cinema without much regard for the richness and diversity of the data that is available.

As a theorist of the cinema, I am intrigued above all by the concept of the unrepresentable, that which one cannot see, in that it is fundamental to scoptophilia. I divide the regime of the image according to the distinction made by Christian Metz, between the perceptible and the visible. The film viewer is doubtless more sensitive to what is perceptible than to what is visible, and one can conceive of the viewer's look as a "barred view," since he or she is precluded from having what is desired in the image (an object that can be seen).

In this context, I would like to suggest the following question: is there a connection between the presence of the invisible in scoptophilia and the presence of the unknowable in archives?

Everyone is familiar with Raymond Bellour's article "The Unattainable Text," [1] which is concerned with the impossibility of citing a film in a written essay because of the material difference between cinema and writing, or the

radical difference between the photographic frame enlargement inserted into a written text and the image the spectator has seen on the screen. Bellour's point of departure is actually the unattainable copy of the film, because it was written in those days before the VCR: it was extremely difficult to persuade someone to lend a printif one could be foundfor even a few days. But there is another dimension to Bellour's article: after a long and difficult quest to find a copy of the much-desired film, we may discover that we are incapable of finding the idea or the example we were looking for or that we thought we would find once we had the film itself.

Certainly the working conditions of the researcher have changed. Today we have access to a film library richer by far than anything available to us before, thanks to video cassettes, videodiscs and an abundance of films on television. What is more, film archives now have at their disposition films, video, microfilm and microfiche, and also digital media with immense data storage capacity such as videodisc, Photo CD and CD-ROM. Increasingly film archives are able to offer services that were previously unimaginable through multimedia programs that allow interactive access to large numbers of documents from many sources. One can simultaneously access a film, its scripts, storyboards, director's notes and correspondence, production stills, etc. But in this initial excitement about easy access to vast resources after nearly a century of deprivation and scarcity, we should not lose sight of certain facts. Just because today we have access to video cassettes and videodiscs does not mean that the issues raised by Bellour are no longer relevant to our research. Rather, the issues raised in "The Unattainable Text" are still fundamental to the way we work.

Let me give an example drawn from my personal experience with fragile documents that require protection and restoration before they may be consulted in a library. At first I thought it would be necessary and also desirable to transfer manuscripts, press clippings and posters to digital media. Transferring these documents would make research more democratic, since computer or video access would make these resources available to large numbers of users rather than restricting them to a privileged few. Then I began to consider the substantial pleasure associated with handling, with great caution and respect, these tangible traces of the past. There is, if not an erotic dimension, at least a certain affect that is beneficial to research and necessary to the desire at the heart of cinema study which cannot be replaced by viewing videodiscs or CD-ROMs. This is not simply a respect for original documents, imbued with the aura of history. There is something equally important at work which forms a part of the researcher's emotional response. Confronted with the kind of historical object that tends to disappear, it is as if the researcher has encountered the last member of a species on the verge of extinction. The document demands attention and care, a protective attitude, to the degree that it is perceived to be rare. We experience

this emotional state because we believe we are holding the last trace, the last copy.

Our explicit, conscious reasons for doing historical or theoretical research on the cinema may represent the collusion of the past, memory and fiction. Our reasons may be little more than justifications for our love of ephemeral cinematographic objects belonging to the bygone era of our childhood or the past of our parents and grandparents. Our love for these objects may not be directed toward new knowledge or ideas, but rather toward a profound silence in which we refuse knowledge and which we refuse to speak or write about. Christian Metz, at the beginning of *The Imaginary Signifier,* drew attention to the role of redirected fascination in the secondarized desire to do research. And Karl Abraham's studies of voyeurism and fetishism provide many examples of intellectual activity which has as its objective nothing more than escaping a problem and avoiding its solution. [2] I am often amazed at the resistance in the fields of cinema theory and history to the logical consequences of a new concept or a newly established fact. As we know, fetishism is one of the forms of resistance to knowledge.[3]

Fetishism in Cinema Theory

Christian Metz has written many texts on fetishism, for instance, the chapter of *The Imaginary Signifier* entitled "Disavowal, Fetishism" and his later essay, "Photography and Fetish."[4] We might also mention in this context his essay on special effects, "Trucage et cinéma,"[5] to the degree that it addresses what the spectator perceives in the image without being able to see it (an effect which is perceptible but invisible).[6]

To my mind, Metz advances several principles of fetishism. The frame simultaneously separates the image from its real or imaginary context and protects the image from the "exterior." From this perspective, the frame is simultaneously a limit and a guarantee, and it functions in two senses: it evokes a larger vision (that desire to see beyond the frame) and it impedes the immediate realization of that larger vision at the same time as it protects against an undesired irruption (of all that could come from beyond the frame). The function of the frame is intimately connected to the look insofar as the look represents the eroticization of the image, the scene, in that moment when the spectator strives to see in the image that which is not offered to be seen. The role of off-screen space in this scheme has been defined by Metz as an object of both desire and fear. The desire to look is tied to the fear of not being able to see, either because of an obstacle interposed between the object of the look and the viewer or because of blindness as a punishment for looking. The perverse game of obstructed vision simultaneously menaces the look and protects the voyeur: he or she is always able

to hide behind these obstacles, but they also threaten the voyeur because they withhold the object of desire from view. The necessary presence of this obstacle to vision is equally grounded in the fact that the voyeur is aware that there are things he or she cannot or does not want to see. The obstacle to vision is thus both a support and a stimulant: it can hide what the voyeur does not want to see while representing the object behind the prohibition that the voyeur intends to violate.

Another principle emphasized by Metz is the moment "just before." This concept is well known from Freud's article on fetishism: the young boy takes as fetish the object seen just before the discovery of the woman's sex. The selection of the fetish that represents the moment "just before" indicates a resistance to the development of action, the flow of time and the development of the narrative situation. This selection indicates the desire to return to the past, to the time preceding the discovery, refusing the present and the future, as well as to freeze the course of time. It is worth noting that in this passage, the object chosen as the fetish is very important for the fetishist, but it is usually something ordinary (a chair, a piece of underwear, a lock of hair). A given fetish is remarkable only to its fetishist. And the famous discovery the fetishist makes is, on the one hand, a discovery for him alone and, on the other, not a positive discovery but rather a disappearance, an absence marking the place he expected to see it or where it should have been. The fetish is an attempt to mask this absence, and an attempt to return to the time when it was still possible to assume everything was in place.

Yet another principle of Metz's defines fetishism not as a perversion but rather as a psychical process characterized by the fetishist's struggle between belief and knowledge, by the drive to restore a disparaged belief (we could also say, to repair or restore a wounded body, since that is how the fetishist perceives the female body), and also by the refusal of the fetishist to recognize sexual difference. What is interesting here is the hesitation, the position of uncertainty in the fetishist (whether man or woman): between the sexes; between self and otherprojecting onto oneself that which is believed to have been seen in the other; between belief and knowledge; and finally between symbolic distinctions, since the fetishist manifests perversion of the symbolic insofar as it must challenge difference. The fetishist is thus engaged in a dubious struggle to know who is who, what can be called this and what can be called that. This struggle resembles the detective film, where the real question is not so much who committed the crime, but rather who among the innocent should be identified as "guilty" and who among the guilty should be pronounced "innocent."

In my opinion, Metz's analysis of fetishismits role in our love of the cinemahas not received the attention it deserves, and we have not drawn from it all that we might. There may be two reasons for this. The first is the

enduring influence of Marcelin Pleynet's ideas about perspective in painting, which suggest that the system of representation in question was developed by the bourgeoisie to affirm the control of the bourgeois humanist subject over the world. According to this conception, the subject triumphs insofar as he is the owner of the look, the gaze. It is not unreasonable to find an echo of this conception in the Metzian notion of the omniscient spectator, who is called, literally, all-seeing (*tout-voyant*), insofar as Metz himself considered it useful to insist that this omniscience is precisely such because the subject is looking for that which cannot be seen, that which cannot be offered to the subject's vision. In other words, the look is still marked by lack. The second reason that Metz's analyses in this area have not been followed to their conclusions has to do with feminist studies, which have from the outset been more concerned with the affirmation of sexual difference, the affirmation of the notion of the female spectator, than with the question of cross-identification between the sexes or bisexuality. Fortunately, it seems to me that now these restrictions have been superseded in cinema theory. The concept of the patriarchal possession of the look is no longer in fashion, or is less central than before, and fetishism, understood in the larger sense of its relationship to lack, can now recover its place in the analysis of sexual agency in the cinema.

Before going further in the analysis of our relationship to the cinema, I'd like to summarize briefly some aspects of the fetish: (1) The fetish is a partial object taken out of its context, as if it had been extracted from an ensemble or from a complete body. This extraction reveals operations of isolation (which prevent associations considered dangerous for the subject) and displacement (the fetish both points to and veils what is at stake for the fetishist). In this sense, the fetish is linked to a screen memory. (3) The fetish is the sign of an attempt to represent in the form of an object something that has disappeared or indeed never existed. (3) The fetish wavers between an extremely high value and an empty value, insofar as the fetish object has little intrinsic value. (4) As symbol of a lost object (the feminine penis, belief), the fetish is close to the *objet a,* close to that which first of all belongs to someone else. As we know, Jacques Lacan defines the *objet a* as that which is a part of the body that has been separated and lost (like hair that has been cut). The fetish would be thus the *objet a* separated from the other in order to deny that possibility for oneself.

Four Situations: Cinephilia, Censorship, Film Noir, the Archives

Cinephilia can be taken in two ways. It is the desire to know everything about films, to develop an encyclopedic knowledge about them, a desire which privileges secondary information, and it has to do with the cultural

eclecticism offered by noncommercial screenings rather than movies playing in ordinary theaters. But in both cases, cinephilia, in its French variant (the love of cinema par excellence), came about in the context of scarcity. One had to be active and motivated to satisfy this obsession with cinema, since it meant a lifestyle built around complex schedules of films one might never be able to see again. The cinema was like a series of phantoms the cinephile was trying to capture at out-of-the-way venues, at odd hours or at distant festivals. It strikes me that our love of cinema depends to a great extent on its fugitive, evanescent character.

For a long time we have accepted as axiomatic that film is definitively inscribed on celluloid, the opposite of a concert or a play, which varies with every performance. You can see the same film many times and it never changes. Today, however, we may have several different versions of a film: alternative endings for test audiences, restored copies, variants for foreign distribution and so on. This goes beyond our impression of the film as a dismembered body. Rather, the film in and of itself is perceived as a mutilated body, like one of Frankenstein's creatures.

This leads me to describe a strange event that occurred in 1989, when the Cinémathèque Française presented a film that had been banned in 1955, *Le Rendez-vous des quais,* directed by Paul Carpita. I went to the screening to find out more about the history of this extraordinary relic which, I knew, had been subject to cuts several times before its release, including some made by the director. To my amazement, the audience seized upon a totally imaginary idea, a collective delusion, that a secret place existed somewhere in Paris where the censors had stored all the pieces of film they had ordered to be cut over the years. But it is a matter of public record that in France the film censorship board never wields the scissors; its role is limited to advising directors and producers of offending passages so that they can make the required modifications themselves. In France, only the church has taken up the scissors in the name of censorship. But at the discussion after the screening of *Le Rendez-vous des quais,* it seemed necessary that the State should be the perverse agency doing the cutting rather than the film industry, the custodians of public decency or mayors who ordinarily, in the name of the public, demand that films be censored.

This anecdote becomes all the more interesting in light of the fact that the state-controlled censorship of this film was matched by equally strong censorship by the Communist Party, which produced the film, and by the film's director. Thus, the audience, which pretended to desire knowledge, was blind to the history of the censorship of this film as well as to itself, since it projected its own perversity, its own censorship, its own desire to rewrite history, onto the State. Thus we can reconstruct, in the heart of the desire to see and to know, the desire not to see and not to know. This was evidenced by the designation of a fetish (the cut sequences of censored films)

which, at the very moment the audience thought it had vanquished censorship by finally viewing the suppressed film, reestablished the desire for a place where censorship was carried out and where other hidden treasures could be discovered.

In this story about *Le Rendez-vous des quais,* we can establish that, as in Vladimir Propp's writings and as in the dream, persons are less significant than functions. If it was first the producers and distributors who were suspected by the audience of removing from view a certain expected object of the imaginary, next it was the State. The important thing was to set up a confrontation between the public, fantasizing an invisible object, and an authority (surely of a paternal nature) that made cuts from the film that excised the fetish desired by the spectator. My last point concerning *Le Rendezvous des quais:* the film viewed in 1989 was not the one censored in 1955, since the producer and the director had made important cuts in the film between these two dates. In fact, there have been many versions of the film, as indicated by the different lengths cited for it between 1955 and 1989. But although interest in multiple versions and restored films has steadily grown, in this instance the audience acted as if the title of a film could correspond to one version only.

We need to demonstrate how fetishism, in its attachment to primordial belief, is at the heart of cinephilia. To the example of censorship we could add the case of film noir. French film critics, under specific historical circumstances (Paris following the Liberation, after the ban on American films had been lifted and the Blum-Byrnes Accord reopened the market), invented a new film genre, film noir. In doing so, they forgot about the films of the interwar period, and they did not have access to studio archives. Today an examination of film production reveals without any question that this critical invention can be dispensed with, yet the repetition without variation of the same partial arguments continues as it has for decades. This reassessment is not without difficulty, or more precisely, not without resistance, since it is always hard to bring about the abandonment of preexisting beliefs.

It is no longer necessary to underscore the fact that in our work we must understand fetishism and voyeurism in the largest possible sense, as psychical operations which insure the attachment to an anterior belief which persists despite the facts, and at the same time, admit the presence at the very heart of voyeurism of a fundamental blind spot out of which the scopic drive arises. The difficulty comes from the fact that no one, not the spectator, the historian or the theoretician, can escape this blindness. If the theorist of the cinema can attempt to represent the role of fetishism in the perception of cinema to the spectator, the critic and the historian, the spectator is going to remind the theorist that fetishism is inevitably at work in his or her own activity since the desire to know must be recognized as another form of the desire to see. The blind spot for the theorist, a question of fetishism, will be

recognized as a perversion (and a *fortiori* an archaic, masculine one) when it should be posed as an ineluctable dimension of our relation to cinema and our knowledge of it since it is a fundamental dimension of our relation to knowledge itself.

Translated by Hamilcar Otopengo

Notes

1. Raymond Bellour, "The Unattainable Text," *Screen* 16:3 (autumn 1975).

2. Karl Abraham, "Remarks on the Psycho-Analysis of a Case of Foot and Corset Fetishism" (1910) 125–36, and his "Restrictions and Transformations of Scoptophilia in Psycho-Neurotics with Remarks on Analogous Phenomena in Folk-Psychology" (1913) 169–234; in *Selected Papers of Karl Abraham,* trans. Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey (1927; London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1947).

3. David Bordwell, in *Making Meaning* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), suggests the degree to which academia in the United States demonstrates a form of resistance to knowledge by the nearly universal and obligatory tendency to repeat received ideas. In another context, the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has analyzed this phenomenon; see Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *The Inheritors: French Students and Their Relation to Culture,* trans. Richard Nice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

4. Christian Metz, *The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema,* trans. Celia Britton, Annwyl Williams, Ben Brewster and Alfred Guzzetti (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). The section I refer to was originally published in 1975. Metz's essay "Photography and Fetish" was originally published in *October* 34 (fall 1985).

5. Christian Metz, "Trucage et cinéma," in *Essais sur la signification au cinéma* II (Paris: Méridiens-Klincksieck, 1972) 173–93.

6. We note here that certain visual effects are perceptible and visible, while others are imperceptible and invisible. A third category is comprised of those where the spectator knows that there has been a visual effect, but cannot see any traces which betray it in the image.

Four
Cyberspace, or the Unbearable Closure of Being

Slavoj Zizek *

The Other Scene

In J. G. Ballard's short story "The Gioconda of the Twilight Noon," the hero, recovering from an eye disease, spends his days in a deck chair close to the seashore, listening to the sounds of the gulls, immobilized due to the bandage covering his eyes. The sounds of the gulls repeatedly evoke in him a strange magic scene in the course of which he climbs the stairs of a mysterious sea-cave, at the top of which a half-veiled woman, the ultimate incestuous object of desire, is awaiting him (the last line of the story characterizes the hero as "an eager, unrepentant Oedipus"); however, he always awakens just before the woman's identity is revealed. When, finally, the doctor proclaims him cured and takes off his bandage, the scene no longer appears to him; in despair, he makes a radical choice, steps outside at noon and looks straight at the sun until he goes blind, hoping that, in this way, he will be able to view the scene in its entirety . . . This story stages the choice between reality and the fantasmatic real accessible only to a blinded subject. The gap between the two is that of anamorphosis: from the standpoint of reality, the real is nothing but a formless stain, whereas the view of the fantasmatic real blurs the contours of "reality."

The dispositif of Ballard's story is none other than that of Plato's myth of the cave from his *Republic* (which, incidentally, is also a cinematographic dispositif *avant la lettre*). How are we to modify this basic idealist dispositif in order to get a *materialist* dispositif? According to materialism, the status of true reality (of the sun outside the cave) beyond the bodily reality of the cave is that of an anamorphic fantasy, of something which can never be perceived directly, but only through its distorted reflection on the empty wall of the cave which serves as its "screen." The true line of separation thus runs within the cave itself, between the material reality the cavemen see around

themselves and the elusive "anamorphic" appearance of the "suprasensible," "incorporeal" event on the wall of the caveas was emphasized by Jacques Lacan (and, well before him, by Hegel), suprasensible is appearance as appearance. Or, to put it in yet another way: if the main problem of idealism is how we are to pass from the ever-changing "false" material phenomenal reality to the true reality of Ideas (from the cave in which we can perceive only shadows to the daylight in which we can catch a glimpse of the sun), the problem of materialism from Lucretius through Friedrich Schelling's *Weltalter* and the Marxian notion of "commodity fetishism" to Gilles Deleuze's "logic of sense" is the exact opposite, namely *the genesis of the semblance itself:* how does the reality of bodies generate out of itself the fantasmatic surface, the "incorporeal" sense-event?

The minimal dispositif of the relationship between signifier, reality and the fantasmatic Real is provided by Saki's famous short story "Window": a guest arrives at a country house and looks through the spacious French window at the field behind the house; the daughter of the family, alone at home and thus the only one to receive him, tells him that she now lives alone in the houseall other members of the family had died recently in an accident. Soon afterward, when the guest looks through the window again, he sees the members of the family approaching slowly across the field, returning from the hunt; convinced that what he sees are ghosts of the deceased, he runs away in horror (the daughter, of course, is a clever pathological liar; for her family, she quickly concocts another story to explain why the guest left the house in a panic). So, a few words providing the proper symbolic context suffice to transform the window into a fantasy frame and to transubstantiate miraculously the muddy tenants into frightful apparitions.

At a more elaborate level, one finds the same dispositif in one of the better modern science-fiction films, Roland Emmerich's *Stargate,* the story of a young scientist who solves the enigma of a gigantic ring made of unknown metal, discovered in Egypt in the 1920s: after one enters the appropriate seven symbols, the ring starts to function as a "stargate"by stepping through the hole in its middle, one enters another, alternative universe, i.e., a different time-space dimension. What makes the ring operative is the identification of the missing seventh symbol: we are thus dealing with symbolic efficiency, not with a scientific inquiry into material causalityit is the inscription of the appropriate symbols which activates the ring in its capacity of the fantasmatic frame, as in Saki's "Window," where the symbolic intervention transubstantiates the ordinary window-frame into a screen of fantasmatic apparitions. [1] What is crucial here is the topological structure of this dispositif: not only the hole in reality which functions as the opening to the Other Scene of fantasy, but also a kind of topological twist, turning-into-itself, of reality, best exemplified by the theatrical stage: if we look at it from a spectator's seat, we are engrossed in the fantasmatic space, whereas if we

go backstage, we are immediately struck by the poverty of the mechanism responsible for the stage illusionthe fantasmatic space dissipates, "there is nothing to see."

In science-fiction literature and cinema, a mirror, a window or a door often serves as the passage into the other, fantasmatic dimension: one of the standard scenes in science fiction is that of a subject who opens up a door and, instead of the expected reality beyond its threshold, encounters something wholly unexpected (a ghastly real)the secret is often "the secret beyond the door." In another version of the same procedure, the subject looks into the mirror and sees in it "something else," not the reflection of everyday reality this side of the mirror. [2] In the history of cinema, perhaps the greatest master of this art of elevating an everyday door or window into the fantasmatic place of passage was Orson Welles; in his version of Franz Kafka's *The Trial,* for example, he systematically exploits the fantasmatic potential of the simple act of opening a door: "Always they open onto bewilderingly different places. . . . The 'next room' in *The Trial* always suggests a repressed psychic horror."[3] When the ordinary woman doing her laundry in a decayed room opens up the small doors at the bottom of the room and ushers K. through it, K. all of a sudden finds himself in a large room in which something like a political rally is going on, with hundreds of people packed to the rafters and the air thick with smoke . . . The adventure which befalls K. in his office building stands in clear contrast to this sudden passage from a small private space into a large public space: walking along a brilliantly lit corridor in the large and modern office building, K. opens the door to a tiny storage closet, where he finds a man in leather whipping two corrupt policemen against whom he had earlier laid a complaint: "The huge corporate workroom has given way to a claustrophobic torture chamber, an ugly little space lit with a naked bulb and filled with cringing figures."[4] This scene renders perfectly the twisted logic of the superego: it culpabilizes K. by merely realizing, in an excessively literal way, his own complaint against the Courtin the guise of the obscene sadomasochist sexualized torture, K. receives the truth of his own demand to the Other of the Law.

And is not this dispositifthe frame through which one can glimpse the Other Scenethe elementary dispositif of fantasmatic space from prehistoric Lascaux paintings to computer-generated Virtual Reality (VR)? Is not the *interface* of a computer the last materialization of this frame? What defines the properly "human dimension" is the presence of a screen, a frame, through which we communicate with the "suprasensible" virtual universe to be found nowhere in reality: it was already Lacan who pointed out that the proper place of Plato's Ideas is the surface of pure appearance. This hole derails the balance of our embeddedness in the natural environs and throws us into the state of "out-of-joint": no longer "at home" in the material world, striving for the Other Scene which, however, remains forever "virtual," a

promise of itself, a fleeting anamorphic glimmer accessible only to a sideview. The point is not only that man is a *zoon teknikos,* interposing artificial technological environs, his "second nature," between himself and his raw natural environs; it is rather that the status of this "second nature" is irreducibly *virtual*. To go back to the example of interface: "virtual" is the space we see on the screen of the interface, this universe of signs and splendid images through which we can freely surf, the universe projected onto the screen and creating on it a false impression of "depth"the moment we cross its threshold and take a look at what lies "effectively" behind the screen, we encounter nothing but senseless digital machinery. This fantasmatic scene and the symbolic order are strictly correlative: there is no symbolic order without the fantasmatic space, no ideal order of *logos* without the pseudo-material, "virtual," Other Scene where the fantasmatic apparitions can emerge, or as Schelling put it, there is no Spirit without Spirits, no pure spiritual universe of Ideas without the obscene, ethereal, fantasmatic corporeality of "spirits" (undead, ghosts, vampires . . .). Therein, in this assertion of the unavoidable pseudo-material fantasmatic support of Ideas, resides the crucial insight of true ("dialectical") materialism.

What is an Interface?

What is a fantasy screen, an "interface"? Sometimes we find it even in nature, as in the case of the Cerknica lake in Slovenia: this intermittent lake (during its seasonal eruption, the water throws fishes into the air) was experienced as a kind of magic screen, a miracle of something emerging out of a void. As early as the seventeenth century, this phenomenon intrigued natural scientistsa Slovene author, Janez Valvasor, became a member of the British Royal Academy for providing an explanation of this mystery (an intricate network of underground channels with different pressures). Perhaps, this is the most elementary definition of a *mechanism:* a machine which produces an effect in the precise sense of a "magical" *effect* of sense, of an event which involves a gap between itself and the raw bodily materialitya mechanism is that which accounts for the emergence of an "illusion." The crucial point here is that the insight into the mechanism does not destroy the illusion, the "effect," it even strengthens it insofar as it renders palpable the gap between the bodily causes and their surface-effect (suffice it to recall the series of "The making of . . ." films which accompany high-budget productions such as *Terminator 2* or *Indiana Jones*). The same goes more and more for the political campaign ads and publicity in general: first the stress was on the product (or candidate) itself, then it moved to the effect-image, while now it is shifting more and more to the making of the image (the strategy of making an ad is itself advertised). The paradox is thatin a kind of reversal of the old cliché according to which Western

ideology dissimulates the production process at the expense of the final productthe production process, far from being the secret locus of the prohibited, of what cannot be shown, of what is concealed by the fetish, serves as the fetish which fascinates with its presence. [5]

It was Deleuze who, long before the fashion of VR, elaborated the status of virtuality apropos of the mystery of *event*. From the prehistoric paintings on the walls of the Lascaux caves to VR, we confront the same enigma: how is it possible for us to suspend reality and become engrossed in the virtual space of the fantasmatic screen? How can the "incorporeal" event emerge out of the mixture of bodies, of bodily causes?[6] We seem to know everything about the social and artistic background of film noir: the traumatic impact of the Second World War on established gender roles, the influence of German expressionism, etc., but all this is clearly not sufficient to account for the emergence of the noir universe with its unique flavor of all-permeating corruption embodied in the figure of the *femme fatale*. It is the same with courtly love: one can play indefinitely the historicist game of sources and influencesthe hidden reference to Arab esoteric traditions; the incestuous triangle of the knight, his Lady and the paternal figure of her husband; the difficult situation of the dispossessed knight in disintegrating feudalism; etc. There is, however, an insurmountable gap, a "nothing," which separates forever this mixture of material causes from the event of the miraculous emergence of the Lady . . . This Deleuzian claim that the sense-event cannot be reduced to the mixture of bodily causes also allows us to locate properly the Foucauldian project of "archeology": what Michel Foucault aims at is not the reduction of an event to the network of its causes (no matter how heterogeneous and contingent they are), but the rules of the emergence and disappearance of events, rules whose status is totally different from the laws which regulate the mixture of bodily causes and effects.

The key to the status of VR is provided by the difference between imitation and simulation:[7] VR doesn't *imitate* reality, it *simulates* it by way of generating its semblance. In other words, imitation imitates a preexisting real-life model, whereas simulation generates the semblance of a nonexisting realityit simulates something that doesn't exist. Let us take the most elementary case of virtuality in a computer, so-called "virtual memory": a computer can simulate far greater memory than it actually has, i.e., it can function *as if* its memory is larger than it effectively is. And does the same not hold for every symbolic arrangement, up to the financial system which simulates a far larger extent of coverage than it is effectively able to provide? The entire system of deposits, for example, works on the presupposition that anyone can, at any moment, withdraw his or her money from the banka presupposition which, although it can never be realized, nonetheless renders possible the very "real," "material" functioning of the financial system.

The consequences of this difference between imitation and simulation are more radical than they may appear. In contrast to imitation, which sustains belief in preexisting "organic" reality, simulation retroactively "denaturalizes" reality itself by way of disclosing the mechanism responsible for its generation. [8] In other words, the "ontological wager" of simulation is that there is no ultimate difference between nature and its artificial reproductionthere is a more elementary level of the Real with reference to which both simulated screen-reality and "real" reality are generated effects, the Real of pure computation: behind the event viewed through interface (the simulated effect of reality), there is pure subjectless ("acephal") computation, a series of 1 and 0, of + and -. In his *Seminar II,*[9] where Lacan develops for the first time this notion of the series of + and -, he reduces it precipitously to the order of the signifier; for that reason, one should reread these passages from the perspective of the opposition between signifier and letter (or writing) established in *Seminar XX:*[10] subjectless digital computation is neither the differential symbolic order (the symbolic realm of meaning is part of the pseudo-reality manipulated on the screen) nor reality outside the screen of the interface (in bodily reality behind the screen, there are only chips, electric current, etc.). The wager of VR is that the universe of meaning, of narrativization, is not the ultimate reference, the unsurpassable horizon, since it relies on pure computation. Therein resides the gap that forever separates Lacan from postmodernist deconstructionism: the latter conceives science as one of the possible local narrativizations, whereas for Lacan, contemporary science enables us to gain access to the Real of pure computation which underlies the play of multiple narrativizations. This is the Lacanian Real: the purely virtual, "not really existing," order of subjectless computation which nonetheless regulates every "reality," material and/or imaginary.

The Virtual as Real

One can see, now, in what precise sense the status of Virtuality is ambiguous: this term refers simultaneously and in an irreducible way to the virtual status of the fantasmatic "reality" we perceive on the screen of the interface and to the pure computation which cannot be reduced to its materialization in the electric current running through computer chips. If we are not to miss this ambiguity, one should adopt toward cyberspace a "conservative" attitude, like that of Chaplin vis-à-vis sound cinema: Chaplin was far more than usually aware of the traumatic impact of the voice as a foreign intruder on our perception of cinema. In the same way, today's process of transition allows us to perceive what we are losing and what we are gaining; this perception will become impossible the moment we fully embrace and feel fully

at home in the new technologies. In short, we have the privilege of occupying the place of "vanishing mediators." Such a chaplinesque attitude compels us to resist the seductive charm of the two contemporary myths about cyberspace, which are both based on the commonplace according to which we are today in the middle of the shift from the epoch of modernism (monological subjectivity, mechanistic Reason, etc.) to the postmodern epoch of dissemination (the play of appearances no longer grounded in reference to some ultimate Truth, the multiple forms of constructed Selves):

Myth 1. In cyberspace, we witness a return to *pensée sauvage,* to "concrete," "sensual" thought: an "essay" in cyberspace confronts fragments of music and other sounds, text, images, video clips, etc., and it is this confrontation of "concrete" elements which produces "abstract" meaning. Are we not here again back at Eisenstein's dream of "intellectual montage"of filming *Capital,* of producing Marxist theory out of the clash of concrete images? Is not hypertext a new practice of montage? [11]

Myth 2. We are witnessing today the move from *the modernist culture of calculation to the postmodernist culture of simulation*.[12] The clearest index of this move is the shift in the use of the term "transparency": modernist technology is "transparent" in the sense of retaining the illusion of an insight into "how the machine works," i.e., the screen of the interface was supposed to enable the user direct access to the machine behind the screen; the user was supposed to "grasp" its working, in ideal conditions even to reconstruct it rationally. The postmodernist "transparency" designates almost the exact opposite of this attitude of analytical global planning: the interface screen is supposed to conceal the working of the machine behind it and to simulate as faithfully as possible our everyday experience (the Macintosh style of interface, in which written orders are replaced by simple mouse-clicking on iconic signs); however, the price of this illusion of a continuity with our everyday environs is that the user becomes "accustomed to opaque technology"the digital machinery "behind the screen" retreats into total impenetrability, even invisibility. In other words, users renounce the endeavor to grasp the functioning of the computer, resigning themselves to the fact that, in their interaction with cyberspace, they are thrown into a nontransparent situation homologous to that of their everyday *Lebenswelt,* a situation in which they have to "find their bearings," to act in the mode of tinkering (*bricolage*), by means of trial and error, not simply to follow some preestablished general rulesor, to repeat Sherry Turkle's pun, in the postmodernist attitude, we "take things at their interface value." If the modernist universe is the universe, hidden behind the screen, of bytes, wires and chips, of electric current running, the postmodernist universe is the universe of naive trust in the screen

which makes irrelevant the very quest for "what lies behind it." "To take things at their interface value" involves a *phenomenological* attitude, an attitude of "trusting the phenomena": the modernist programmer takes refuge in cyberspace as a transparent, clearly structured universe which allows for a momentary evasion of the opacity of his or her everyday environs, in which the programmer is part of an *a priori* unfathomable background, full of institutions whose functioning follows unknown rules which exert domination over the individual's life. For the postmodernist programmer, in contrast, the fundamental features of cyberspace coincide with those described by Martin Heidegger as the constitutive features of our everyday life-world (the finite individual is thrown into a situation whose coordinates are not regulated by clear universal rules, so that the individual has gradually to find a way through it).

In both these myths, the error is the same: yes, we are dealing with a return to premodern "concrete thought" or to the nontransparent life-world, but this new life-world already presupposes a background of the scientific digital universe: bytes, or, rather, the digital series is the real behind the screen, i.e., we are never submerged in the play of appearances without an "indivisible remainder." Postmodernism focuses on the mystery of what Turkle calls the "emergence" and what Deleuze elaborated as the "sense-event": the emergence of pure appearance which cannot be reduced to the simple effect of its bodily causes; nonetheless, this emergence is the effect of the digitalized Real.

Apropos of the notion of the interface, the temptation here is, of course, to bring it to the point of its self-reference: what if one conceives of *"consciousness" itself, the frame through which we perceive the universe, as a kind of "interface"?* However, the moment we yield to this temptation, we accomplish a kind of foreclosure of the real. When users playing with the multiplicity of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels say to themselves, "What if real life (RL) itself is just one more IRC channel" or, with respect to multiple windows in a hypertext, "What if RL is just one more window," the illusion to which they succumb is strictly correlative to the opposite one, i.e., to the commonsense attitude of maintaining our belief in the full reality outside the virtual universe. That is to say, one should avoid both traps, the simple direct reference to external reality outside cyberspace, as well as the opposite attitude of "there is no external reality, RL is just another window." [13]

In the domain of sexuality, this foreclosure of the Real gives rise to the New Age vision of the new computerized sexuality, in which bodies mix in ethereal virtual space, delivered of their material weight, a vision which is *stricto sensu* an ideological fantasy, since it unites the impossible: sexuality (linked to the real of the body) with the "mind" decoupled from the body,

as ifin today's universe where our bodily existence is (perceived as) increasingly threatened by environmental dangers, AIDS, etc., up to the extreme vulnerability of today's narcissistic subject to actual psychic contact with another personwe can reinvent a space in which one can fully indulge in bodily pleasures by getting rid of our actual bodies. In short, this vision is that of a state with neither lack nor obstacles, a state of free floating in the virtual space in which desire nonetheless somehow survives . . .

The Threatened Frontier

Instead of indulging in these ideologies, it is far more productive to begin with how computerization affects the hermeneutic horizon of our everyday experience. This experience is based on three lines of separation: between "true life" and its mechanical simulation; between objective reality and our false (illusory) perception of it; between my fleeting affects, feelings, attitudes, etc., and the remaining hard core of my Self. All three of these boundaries are threatened today:

First, techno-biology undermines the difference between "natural" life-reality and "artificially" generated reality: already in today's genetic technology (with the prospect of the free choice of sex, hair color, IQ . . .), living nature is posited as something technically manipulable, i.e., in principle, nature as such coincides with a technical product. The circle is thus closed, our everyday hermeneutical experience is undermined: technology no longer merely imitates nature, rather it renders visible the underlying mechanism which generates it, so that, in a sense, "natural reality" itself becomes something "simulated," and the only "real" is the underlying structure of DNA.

Second, insofar as the VR apparatus is potentially able to generate the experience of "true" reality, VR undermines the difference between "true" reality and semblance. This "loss of reality" occurs not only in computer-generated VR, but, at a more elementary level, already with the growing "hyperrealism" of the images that medias bombard us withmore and more, we perceive only color and outline, no longer depth and volume: "Without visual limit there can be no, or almost no, mental imagery; without a certain blindness, no tenable appearance." [14] Or, as Lacan put it, without a *blind spot* in the field of, vision, without this elusive point from which the object returns the gaze, we no longer "see something," i.e., the field of vision is reduced to a flat surface, and "reality" itself is perceived as a visual hallucination.

Third, the MUD (Multiple User Domains) technology in cyberspace undermines the notion of Self, or self-identity of the perceiving subject: the standard motif of "postmodern" writers on cyberspace, from Stone[15] to Turkle, is that cyberspace phenomena like MUD render palpable in our everyday experience the deconstructionist "decentered subject." The lesson of

it is that one should endorse this "dissemination" of the unique Self into a multiplicity of competing agents, into a "collective mind," a plurality of self-images without a global coordinating center, and disconnect it from pathological trauma: playing in Virtual Spaces enables me to discover new aspects of "me," a wealth of shifting identities, of masks without a "real" person behind, and thus to experience the ideological mechanism of the production of Self, the immanent violence and arbitrariness of this production/construction.

These three levels logically follow one another: first, within "objective reality" itself the difference between "living" and "artificial" entities is undermined; then, the distinction between "objective reality" and its appearance gets blurred; finally, the identity of the self which perceives something (be it appearance or "objective reality") explodes. This progressive "subjectivization" is strictly correlative to its opposite, to the progressive "externalization" of the hard kernel of subjectivity. This paradoxical coincidence of the two opposed processes has its roots in the fact that, today, with VR and techno-biology, we are dealing with the loss of the surface which separates inside from outside. This loss jeopardizes our most elementary perception of "our own body" as it is related to its environs; it cripples our standard phenomenological attitude toward the body of another person, in which we suspend our knowledge of what actually exists beneath the skin surface (glands, flesh . . .) and conceive the surface (of a face, for example) as directly expressing the "soul." On the one hand, inside is always outside: with the progressive implantation and replacement of our internal organs, techno-computerized prostheses (bypasses, pacemakers . . .) function as an internal part of our "living" organism; the colonization of the outer space thus reverts inside, into "endolocolonization," [16] the technological colonization of our body itself. On the other hand, outside is always inside: when we are directly immersed in VR, we lose contact with reality, i.e., electro-waves bypass the interaction of external bodies and directly attack our senses, "it is the eyeball that now englobes man's entire body."[17]

Another aspect of this paradox concerns the way the progressive immobilization of the body overlaps with bodily hyperactivity: on the one hand, I rely less and less on my proper body, my bodily activity is more and more reduced to giving signals to machines which do the work for me (clicking on a computer mouse, etc.); on the other hand, my body is strengthened, "hyperactivated," through body-building and jogging, pharmaceutical means, as well as direct implants, so that, paradoxically, the hyperactive superman coincides with the cripple who can only move around by means of prostheses regulated by a computer-chip (like the Robocop). The prospect is thus that the human being will gradually lose its grounding in the concrete life-world, i. e., the basic set of coordinates which determine its (self-) experience (the surface separating inside from outside, a direct relationship to one's

own body, etc.). Tendentially, total subjectivization (reduction of reality to an electromechanically generated cyberspace "window") coincides with total objectivization (the subordination of our "inner" bodily rhythm to a set of stimulations regulated by external apparatuses).

At a more fundamental level, however, this "derailment"this lack of support, of a fixed instinctual standard, in the coordination between the natural rhythm of our body and its surroundingcharacterizes man as such: man as such is "derailed," he eats more than "natural," he is obsessed with sexuality more than "natural," i.e., he follows his drives with an excess far beyond "natural" (instinctual) satisfaction, and this excess of drive has to be "gentrified" through "second nature" (man-created institutions and patterns). The old Marxist formula about "second nature" is thus to be taken more literally than usual: the point is not only that we are never dealing with purely natural needs, that our needs are always-already mediated by cultural processes; moreover, *the labor of culture has to re-instate the lost support in natural needs,* to re-create a "second nature" as the recompense for the loss of support in the "first nature"the human animal has to re-accustom itself to the most elementary bodily rhythms of sleep, feeding, movement.

What we encounter here is the loop of (symbolic) castration, in which one endeavors to reinstate the lost "natural" coordination on the ladder of desire: on the one hand, we reduce bodily gestures to the necessary minimum (of clicks on the computer-mouse . . .), on the other hand, we attempt to recover our lost bodily fitness by jogging, body-building, etc.; on the one hand, we reduce bodily odors to a minimum (by regularly taking showers, etc.), on the other hand, we attempt to recover these same odors through toilet water and perfume, etc. This paradox is condensed in the phallus as the *signifier* of desire, i.e., as the point of inversion at which the very moment of "spontaneous" natural power turns into an artificial prosthetic element. That is to say, against the standard notion of phallus as the siege of male "natural" penetrative-aggressive potency-power (to which one then opposes the "artificial" playful prosthetic phallus), the point of Lacan's concept of phallus as a *signifier* is that phallus "as such" IS a kind of "prosthetic," "artificial" supplement: it designates the point at which the big Other, a decentered agency, supplements the subject's failure. When, in her criticism of Lacan, Judith Butler emphasizes the parallel between mirror image (ideal-ego) and phallic signifier, [18] one should shift the focus to the feature they effectively share: both mirror image and phallus *qua* signifier are "prosthetic" supplements for the subject's foregoing dispersal/failure, for the lack of coordination and unity; in both cases, the status of this prosthesis is "illusory," with the difference that, in the first case, we are dealing with imaginary illusion (identification with a decentered immobile image), while in the second case, the illusion is symbolic; it stands for phallus as pure semblance.

Back to the threatened limit/surface which separates inside from out-

side: the very threat to this limit determines today's form of the hysterical question, i.e., today, hysteria stands predominantly under the sign of vulnerability, of a threat to our bodily and/or psychic identitysuffice it to recall the all-pervasiveness of the logic of victimization, from sexual harassment to the dangers of food and tobacco, so that the subject itself is more and more reduced to "that which can be hurt." Today's form of the obsessional question "Am I alive or dead?" is "Am I a machine (does my brain really function as a computer) or a living human being (with a spark of spirit or something else irreducible to the computer-circuit)?"; it is not difficult to discern in this alternative the split between A (*Autre*) and J (*jouissance*), between the "big Other," the dead symbolic order, and the Thing, the *living* substance of enjoyment. According to Turkle, our reaction to this question goes through three phases: (1) first, the emphatic assertion of an irreducible difference: we are not machines, there is something unique about us; (2) then, fear and panic when we become aware of all the potentials of a machine: it can think, reason, answer our questions; (3) finally, disavowal, i.e., recognition through denial: the guarantee that there is some feature of human beings inaccessible to the computer (sublime enthusiasm, anxiety . . .), allows us to treat the computer as a "living and thinking partner," since "we know this is only a game, the computer is not really like that." Suffice it to recall the way John Searle's polemics against AI (artificial intelligence, in his Chinese Room thought experiment) was "gentrified" and integrated into the user's everyday attitude: Searle has proven that a computer cannot really think and understand language*so, since there is the ontological-philosophical guarantee that the machine does not pose a threat to human uniqueness, I can calmly accept the machine and play with it . . .*

Is this split attitude, in which "disavowal and appropriation are each tied to the other," [19] not a new variation on the old philosophical game of "transcendental illusion" practiced by Kant apropos of the notion of teleology: since I know the computer cannot think, I can act, in my everyday life, as if it really does think?

Identifications, Imaginary and Symbolic

At a different level, this same ambiguity determines the way we relate to our screen personae. On the one hand, we maintain an attitude of external distance, of playing with false images: "I know I'm not like that (brave, seductive . . .), but it's nice, from time to time, to forget one's true self and to put on a more satisfying maskthis way, you can relax, you are delivered of the burden of being what you are, of living with yourself and being fully responsible for it . . ."

On the other hand, the screen persona I create for myself can be "more myself" than my "real-life" person (my "official" self-image) insofar as it renders visible aspects of myself I would never dare to admit in RL. Say, when I

play anonymously in MUD, I can present myself as a promiscuous woman and engage in activities which, were I to indulge in them in RL, would bring about the disintegration of my sense of personal identity . . .

These two sides are, of course, inextricably intertwined: the very fact that I perceive my virtual self-image as mere play allows me to suspend the usual hindrances which prevent me from realizing my "dark half" in RL, and to externalize freely all my libidinal potentials. When a man who, in his RL social contacts, is quiet and bashful, adopts in VR an angry, aggressive persona, one can say that he thereby expresses the repressed side of himself, a publicly nonacknowledged aspect of his "true personality," i.e., that his "electronic id is here given wing"; [20] however, one can also claim that he is a weak subject fantasizing about more aggressive behavior in order to avoid confronting his RL weakness and cowardice. Acting out a fantasy scene in VR allows us to bypass the deadlock of the dialectic of desire and its inherent rejection: when a man bombards a woman with flirtatious promises about what sexual favors he would like to bestow on her, her best answer is "Shut up, or you will really have to do it!" In VR, I can do it, act it out, without really doing it and thus avoid the anxiety connected with the RL activity: I can do it and since I know that I'm not really doing it, the inhibition or shame is suspended. This is one way to read Lacan's dictum "Truth has the structure of a fiction": I can articulate the hidden truth about my drives precisely insofar as I am aware that I'm just playing a game on the screen. In cyberspace sex, there is no "face to face," just the *external* impersonal space in which everything, inclusive of my most intimate *internal* fantasies, can be articulated without inhibitions. What one encounters here, in this pure "flux of desire," is, of course, the unpleasant surprise of "repressive desublimation" (Herbert Marcuse's phrase): the universe freed of everyday inhibitions turns out to be a universe of unbridled sadomasochistic violence and will to domination.[21]

In order to conceptualize the two poles of this undecidability, Turkle resorts to the opposition between "acting out" and "working through" the difficulties of RL:[22] I can follow the escapist logic and simply act out my RL difficulties in VR, or I can use VR to become aware of the inconsistency and multiplicity of the components of my subjective identifications and work them through. In this second case, the interface screen functions in a way homologous to the psychoanalyst: the suspension of the symbolic rules which regulate my RL activity enables me to stage or externalize my repressed content which I am otherwise unable to confront. (Do we not encounter here again the logic of *acceptance through disavowal:* I accept my fantasies insofar as "I know it's only a VR game"?) The same ambiguity is reproduced in the impact of cyberspace on community life. On the one hand, there is the dream of the new populism, in which decentralized networks will allow individuals to band together and build a participatory grassroots political

system, a transparent world in which the mystery of impenetrable bureaucratic state agencies is dispelled. On the other hand, the use of computers and VR as a tool to rebuild community results in the building of a community *inside* the machine, reducing individuals to isolated monads, each of them alone, facing a computer, ultimately unsure if the person she or he communicates with on the screen is a "real" person, a false persona, an agent which combines a number of "real" persons or a computerized program. Again, the ambiguity is irreducible.

However, this ambiguity, although irreducible, is not symmetrical. What one should introduce here is the elementary Lacanian distinction between imaginary projection-identification and symbolic identification. The most concise definition of symbolic identification is that it consists in assuming a mask which is more real and binding than the true face beneath it (in accordance with Lacan's notion that human feigning is the feigning of feigning itself: in imaginary deception, I simply present a wrong image of myself, while in symbolic deception, I present a true image and count on it being taken for a lie). [23] A husband, for example, can maintain his marriage as just another social role and engage in adultery as "the real thing"; however, the moment he is confronted with the choice of actually leaving his wife or not, he suddenly discovers that the social mask of marriage means more to him than intense private passion. The VR persona thus offers a case of imaginary deception insofar as it externalizes (it displays) a wrong image of myself (a fearful man playing a hero in MUD), and a symbolic deception insofar as it renders the truth about myself in the guise of a game (by way of playfully adopting an aggressive persona, I disclose my true aggressivity).

In other words, VR confronts us, in the most radical way imaginable, with the old enigma of transposed/displaced emotions at work, from the so-called "weepers" (women hired to cry at funerals) in "primitive" societies to the "canned laughter" on a TV screen: when I adopt a screen persona in MUD, the emotions I feel and "feign" as part of my screen persona are not simply false: although (what I experience as) my "true self" does not feel them, they are nonetheless in a sense "true"the same as watching a TV miniseries with canned laughter where, even if I do not laugh but just stare at the screen, tired after a hard day's work, I nonetheless feel relieved after the show. This is what the Lacanian notion of "decenterment," of the decentered subject, aims at: my most intimate feelings can be radically externalized; I can literally "laugh and cry through an other." More generally, this mystery is the mystery of the symbolic order as such, as exemplified by the enigmatic status of what we call "politeness": when, upon meeting an acquaintance, I say "Glad to see you! How are you today?" it is clear to us both that, in a way, I "do not mean it seriously." (If my partner suspects that I am really interested, he or she may even be unpleasantly surprised, as though I were aiming at something too intimate and of no concern to meor, to

paraphrase the old Freudian joke, "Why are you saying you're glad to see me, when you're really glad to see me!?") However, it would nonetheless be wrong to designate my act as simply "hypocritical," since, in another way, I do mean it: the polite exchange does establish a kind of pact between the two of usin the same sense as I do "sincerely" laugh through the canned laughter (the proof of it being the fact that I effectively do "feel relieved" afterward).

At a somewhat different level, we encounter the same paradox apropos of virtual sex, which compels us to accept the blurred line of separation between "things" and "mere words." Their separation is not simply suspended, it is still here, but displaceda third realm emerges which is neither "real things" nor "merely words," but demands its own specific (ethical) rules of conduct. When I play sex games with a partner on the screen, exchanging "mere" written messages, it is not only that the games can effectively arouse me or my partner and provide us with a "real" orgasmic experience (with the further paradox that, whenand ifI later encounter my partner in RL, I can be deeply disappointed, turned off: my on-screen experience can be in a sense "more real" than the encounter in reality); it is not only that, beyond mere sexual arousal, my partner and I can "really" fall in love with each other without meeting in RL. What if, on the Internet, I rape my partner? On the one hand, there is a gap which separates it from RLwhat I did remains in a sense closer to impoliteness, to rude, offensive talk. On the other hand, it can cause deep offense, even emotional catastrophe, which is not reducible to "mere words." And, back to Lacan: what is this middle-mediating level, this third domain interposing itself between "real life" and "mere imagination," this domain in which we are not dealing directly with reality, but also not with "mere words" (since our words do have real effects), if not the symbolic order itself?

Where Is the "Decentered Subject"?

When deconstructionist cyberspace ideologists (as opposed to the predominant New Age cyberspace ideologists) try to present cyberspace as providing a "real life," "empirical," realization or confirmation of deconstructionist theories, they usually focus on how cyberspace "decenters" the subject. Both Stone and Turkle approach this via the relationship between Multiple User Domains and the post-traumatic Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD). There are four variations of the relationship between the Self and "its" Body which violate the standard moral-legal norm of "one person in one body":

Many persons in a single body (the "pathology" of MPD). This version is "pathological" insofar as there is no clear hierarchy among the plural-

ity of persons, i.e., no One Person guaranteeing the unity of the subject.

Many persons outside a single body (MUD in cyberspace). These persons refer to the body which exists outside cyberspace, in "reality," with the (ideological) presupposition that this body accommodates a "true person" behind the multiple masks (screen personae) in VR.

Many bodies in a single person. This version is again "pathological" insofar as many bodies immediately coalesce with a single collective person and thereby violate the axiom "one bodyone person." Suffice it to recall the fantasy of aliens, "multiple bodies, but one collective mind," or the case of hypnosis, in which the person of one body possesses another body, not to mention the popular image of "totalitarian" communities that function like an ant colonythe Center (Party) totally controls their individual minds.

Many bodies outside a single person (institution, "legal"or, as they put it in France, "moral"person). This is how we "normally" relate to an institution: we say "the State, Nation, company, school . . . wants this," although "we know well" that the institution is not an actual living entity with a will of its own, but a symbolic fiction.

The temptation to be avoided here is to proclaim too hastily the limit, which in both cases separates "normal" from "pathological," to be "deconstructed." The difference between the subject who suffers from MPD and the subject who plays in MUD does not reside in the fact that, in the second case, there still persists a kernel of Self firmly anchored in the "true reality" outside the virtual play. The subject who suffers from MPD is rather too firmly anchored in "true reality": what he or she lacks is, in a sense, lack itself, i.e., the void which accounts for the constitutive dimension of subjectivity. That is to say, the "multiple Selves" externalized on the screen are "what I want to be," the way I would like to see myself, the figurations of my ideal ego; as such, they are like the layers of an onion: there is nothing in their middle, and the subject is this "nothing" itself. It is therefore crucial to introduce here the distinction between "Self" ("person") and subject: the Lacanian "decentered subject" is not simply a multiplicity of good old "Selves," i. e., partial centers; the "divided" subject does not mean there are simply more Egos/Selves in the same individual, as in MUD. The "decenterment" is the decenterment of the $ (the void of the subject) with regard to its content ("Self," the bundle of imaginary and/or symbolic identifications); the "splitting" is the splitting between $ and the fantasmatic "persona" as the "stuff of the I." *The subject is thus split even if it possesses only one "unified" Self,* since this split is the very split between $ and Self. In more topological terms: the subject's division is not the division between one and another Self, between two contents, but *the division between something and nothing,* between the feature of identification and the void.

"Decenterment" thus first designates the ambiguity, the oscillation between symbolic and imaginary identificationthe indecidability as to where my true point is, in my "real" self or in my external mask, with the possible implication that my symbolic mask can be "more true" than what it conceals, the "true face" behind it. At a more radical level, it points toward the fact that the very sliding from one to another identification or among "multiple selves" presupposes the gap between identification as such and the void of $ (the "barred subject") which *identifies itself,* i.e., which serves as the empty medium of identification. In other words, the very process of shifting among multiple identifications presupposes a kind of empty band which renders possible the leap from one to another identity, and this empty band is the subject itself.

Malebranche as the Philosopher of VR

It is crucial to keep open the radical ambiguity of how cyberspace will affect our lives: this does not depend on technology as such but on the mode of its social inscription. Immersion in cyberspace can intensify our bodily experience (new sensuality, new body with more organs, new sexes . . .), but it also opens up the possibility that the one who manipulates the machinery which runs cyberspace may literally *steal* our own (virtual) body, depriving us of control over it, so that we no longer relate to our body as "our own." What one encounters here is the constitutive ambiguity of the notion of mediatization: [24] originally this notion designated the gesture by means of which a subject was stripped of its direct, immediate right to make decisions; the great master of political mediatization was Napoleon, who left to the conquered monarchs the appearance of power while they were effectively no longer in a position to exercise it. At a more general level, one could say that such a "mediatization" of the monarch defines the constitutional monarchy: in it, the monarch is reduced to the point of a purely formal symbolic gesture of "dotting the I's," of signing and thus conferring the performative force on the edicts whose content is determined by the elected governing body. And does not, *mutatis mutandis,* the same hold also for today's progressive computerization of our everyday lives in the course of which the subject is also more and more "mediatized," imperceptibly stripped of his or her power, under the false guise of its increase? When our body is mediatized (caught in the network of electronic media), it is simultaneously exposed to the threat of a radical "proletarianization": the subject is potentially reduced to the pure $, since even my own personal experience can be stolen, manipulated, regulated by the mechanical Other.

One can see how the prospect of radical virtualization bestows on the computer a position strictly homologous to God according to Malebranchean occasionalism. Nicolas de Malebranche, a disciple of Descartes, drops Des-

cartes's ridiculous reference to the pineal gland in order to explain the coordination between the material and the spiritual substance, i.e., body and soul; how, then, are we to explain their coordination, if there is no contact between the two, no point at which a soul can act causally on a body or *vice versa?* Since the two causal networks (that of ideas in my mind and that of bodily interconnections) are totally independent, the only solution is that a third, true Substance (God) continuously coordinates and mediates between the two, sustaining the semblance of continuity: when I think about raising my hand and my hand effectively rises, my thought causes the raising of my hand not directly but only "occasionally"upon noticing my thought directed at raising my hand, God sets in motion the other, material, causal chain which leads to my hand effectively being raised. If we replace "God" with the big Other, the symbolic order, we can see the closeness of occasionalism to Lacan's position: as Lacan put it in his polemics against Aristotle in "Television," [25] the relationship between soul and body is never direct, since the big Other always interposes itself between the two. Occasionalism is thus essentially a name for the "arbitrary of the signifier," for the gap that separates the network of ideas from the network of bodily (real) causality, for the fact is that it is the big Other which accounts for the coordination of the two networks, so that, when my body bites an apple, my soul experiences a pleasurable sensation. This same gap is targeted by the ancient Aztec priest who organizes human sacrifices to ensure that the sun will rise again: the human sacrifice is here an appeal to God to sustain the coordination between the two series, the bodily necessity and the concatenation of symbolic events. "Irrational" as the Aztec priest's sacrificing may appear, its underlying premise is far more insightful than our commonplace intuition according to which the coordination between body and soul is direct, i.e., it is "natural" for me to have a pleasurable sensation when I bite an apple since this sensation is caused directly by the apple: what gets lost is the intermediary role of the big Other in guaranteeing the coordination between reality and our mental experience of it. And is it not the same with our immersion into VR? When I raise my hand in order to push an object in virtual space, this object effectively movesmy illusion, of course, is that it was the movement of my hand which directly caused the dislocation of the object, i.e., in my immersion, I overlook the intricate mechanism of computerized coordination, homologous to the role of God guaranteeing the coordination between the two series in occasionalism.[26]

So, since the computer coordinates the relationship between my mind and (what I experience as) the movement of my limbs (in VR), one can easily imagine a computer which runs amok and starts to act like an Evil God, disturbing the coordination between my mind and my bodily self-experiencewhen my mind's signal to raise my hand is suspended or even counteracted in (virtual) reality, the most fundamental experience of the

body as "mine" is undermined. Thus it seems that cyberspace effectively realizes the paranoiac fantasy elaborated by Schreber, the German judge whose memoirs were analyzed by Freud: [27] the "wired universe" is psychotic insofar as it seems to materialize Schreber's hallucination of the divine rays through which God directly controls the human mind. In other words, does the externalization of the big Other in the computer not account for the inherent paranoiac dimension of the wired universe? Or, to put it another way: the commonplace is that, in cyberspace, the ability to download consciousness into a computer finally frees people from their bodiesbut it also *frees the machines from "their" people . . .*

With reference to the mirror relationship between the dispersed "me" and my mirror image, this means that, in the wired universe of VR, my mirror image is externalized in the machine, in the guise of a stand-in which replaces me in cyberspace, so that the body which is "mine" in RL is more and more reduced to an excremental remainder. The crucial point is thus to persist in the utter ambiguity: yes, there is an "indivisible remainder," we can never cut the links from our real body and float freely in cyberspace; since, however, our bodily self-experience itself is always-already "virtual," symbolically mediated, this body to which we are forced to return is not the constituted body of the full self-experience, of "true reality," but the formless remainder, the horror of the Real.

The Cyberspace Superego

The conclusion to be drawn is that, notwithstanding all the talk about "the end of the Cartesian paradigm," we continue to dwell within these conceptual coordinates. According to Fredric Jameson,[28] one of the antinomies of postmodernity is the antinomy of constructionism and essentialism: on the one hand, the vertiginous progression of universal "virtualization," the more and more insistent notion that everything is (socially, symbolically, technically . . .) "constructed," contingent, lacking any guarantee in a preexisting ground; on the other hand, the desperate search for a firm foundation whose foremost expressions are not different religious or ethnic "fundamentalisms" but rather the return to Nature according to the contemporary ecological stance. Within the domain of the postmodern New Age anti-Cartesianism, this antinomy assumes the shape of the tension between so-called "Deep Ecology" and New Age techno-spiritualism: the first advocates a return to the spontaneous experience of nature by way of breaking with the attitude of technological domination, whereas the second sets its hopes on a spiritual reversal brought about by the very opposite, the complete technological reproduction of reality (the notion that, in some not too distant future, by way of their full immersion into VR, human subjects will be

able to cast off the anchor that attaches them to their bodies and change into ghost-like entities floating freely from one to another virtual body).

It is thus easy to discern the crux of the attraction exerted by the ecological stance: it presents itself as the only credible answer to the hubris of the modern subject, to the permanent instability built into capitalist logic. That is to say, the problem of today's ethics is how to install a Limit in our universe of postmodern relativism in which no agency possesses the unconditional authority to tell us "you can go so far and no further!" Ecology emerges here as the only serious contender against postmodern relativism: it offers *nature itself,* the fragile balance of the Earth's ecosystem, as the point of reference providing the proper Measure, the unsurpassable Limit, for our acts*this gesture of procuring an "objective" justification for the Limit is ideology at its purest*. Against the deep-ecological reassertion of the Limit, one should therefore vindicate Schelling's seemingly "pessimist," "reactionary" insight that the universe as such is "out of joint," that a radical dislocation is its positive ontological condition. [29] Or, with reference to the Schellingian antagonism of contraction and *expansion:* is not VR the extreme form of expansion, of the loss of our anchorage in the contracted physical body? And is not ecology a no less extreme contractive reaction to this loss? We can return now to the opposition between "Deep Ecology" and New Age techno-spiritualism: the fantasy of the reestablishment of natural balance with humanity relegated to its subordinated part, as well as the fantasy of the evaporation of bodily inertia in comprehensive virtualization, are two opposed strategies for the disavowal of *splitting* between what we call "reality" and the void of the Real filled by a fantasmatic content, i.e., the elusive, intangible gap which sustains "reality."

Insofar as the impact of VR is rooted in the dynamics of capitalism, no wonder that Marx's analysis of capitalism, his emphasis on the necessary codependence between lack and excess, remains pertinent for our approach to VR. As Hegel already pointed out in his theory of civil society, the paradox of modern poverty is that the lack of wealth does not depend on society's limited productive capacities but is generated by the very excess of production, by "too much wealth"surplus and lack are correlative, lack (the poverty of the "rabble") is the very form of appearance of the excess of production. On that account, any attempt to "balance" the lack and the excessand what is the economic policy of Fascism if not a desperate attempt to reintroduce a fundamental balance into the cycle of social (re)productionis doomed to fail: the very attempt to abolish lack (poverty) by producing more wealth leads to more poverty . . .

On a somewhat different level, we encounter a homologous codependence of lack and excess in the Stalinist version of "totalitarianism": how does the superego function in the Stalinist bureaucratic universe? The supreme examples of it, of course, are the Stalinist purges. The double bind

that pertains to the very notion of the superego is best embodied in the fate of Stalin's ministers of the interiorYezliov, Yagoda, Abakoumov. There was a constant pressure on them to discover ever new anti-Socialist plots, they were always reproached for being too lenient, not vigilant enough; the only way for them to satisfy the demand of the Leader was thus to invent plots and to arrest innocent people. However, this way, they were laying the ground for their own violent demise, since their successor was already at work, collecting evidence of how they were actually counterrevolutionary agents of imperialism killing good, dedicated Bolsheviks. The victim's innocence is thus part of the game, it enables the self-reproducing cycle of revolutionary purges which "eat their own children." This impossibility of achieving the "proper measure" between lack and excess (of zeal in the fight against counterrevolution) is the clearest index of the superego-functioning of the Stalinist bureaucracy: we are either too lenient (if we do not discover enough traitors, this proves our silent support for counterrevolution) or too vigilant (which, again, makes us guilty of condemning dedicated fighters for Socialism). [30] This codependence of lack and excess is, perhaps, the core of what we call "modernity."[31]

Another case of the codependence between lack and excess is provided by the paradoxical role of the "narrow band" (the fact that, for structural reasons, the picture is always limited, reduced) in the process of symbolization: it is this lack, this *limitation* itself, which activates the *excessive* wealth of imagination (suffice it to recall the almost proverbial example of a child with simple wooden toys, whose imagination is far superior to the one playing with intricate electronic equipment). Therein resides the impasse of the complete immersion into VR: it saturates the force of imagination, since everything is already rendered to our eyes. This also accounts for the structural impasse of so-called "interactive storytelling" in which, at every turn of the story, the reader is free to select his or her own version of the events (the hero can win over or lose the desired lady, etc.). Experience shows that such a constellation gives rise to a double discontent in the reader: (1) there is "too much freedom," too much depends on me, instead of yielding to the pleasures of the narrative, I am bombarded with decisions to be made; (2) my naive faith in diegetic reality is disturbed, i.e., to the horror of the official ideology of interactive storytelling, I read a story in order to learn what "really" happened to the hero (did he "really" win over the coveted lady, etc.), not in order to decide about the outcome.[32] What underlies this frustration is the demand for a *Master:* in a narrative, I want somebody to establish the rules and assume responsibility for the course of eventsexcessive freedom is frustrating to the utmost. More than an answer to the threat of an actual ecological catastrophe, Deep Ecology is an attempt to counter this lack of an "objective," imposed set of rules that limits our freedom. What one should bear in mind here is the link between this limitation and our "sense of re-

ality": in the interactive virtual universe, reality lacks its inherent limitation and is thus, as it were, deprived of substance, changed into a kind of ethereal image of itself.

The Need for a Master

What implicit rule is then actually violated in an "interactive" narrative? When we watch a performance of *Othello,* we know well what lies ahead, yet we are nonetheless full of anxiety and again and again shocked at the tragic outcome, as if, at another level, we were not quite sure that the inevitable would happen again. Do we not encounter here a new variation on the motif of the prohibition of the impossible and/or of the injunction to do what is already in itself necessary? Of the gap that separates the two deaths, symbolic and real? The gap exemplified by the ancient Aztec priest who organizes human sacrifices to ensure the rising of the sun, i.e., who is alarmed by the seemingly "irrational" prospect that the most obvious thing will not happen? And is not the same gesture of freely asserting the inevitable constitutive of the position of a Master? By means of his "Yes!," a Master merely "dots the I's," attests the unavoidablehe acts as if he has a choice where effectively there is none. (For that reason, there is something inherently *asinine* about the position of a Masterwhose main role is to *state the obvious*.)

Suffice it to recall today's relationship between the Western great powers and Russia: in accordance with the silent pact regulating this relationship, Western states treat Russia as a great power on condition that Russia doesn't (effectively) act as one. One can see how the logic of the offer made to be rejected (Russia is offered the chance to act as a great power, on condition that it politely rejects this offer) is connected with a possibility which has to remain a mere possibility: in principle, it is possible for Russia to act effectively as a great power, but if Russia is to maintain the symbolic status of a great power, this possibility must not be taken advantage of. Is, therefore, Russia's position today (treated as a great power on condition that it doesn't act as one) not the position of the Master as such?

Another aspect of the Master's paradoxical position concerns the enigmatic ritual practiced in Europe of passing exams and the announcement of their results: there has to be a minimal gap, a delay, between the actual examination, the direct measurement of our capacities, and the moment of the public proclamation of the resultan in-between time when, although the die is already cast and we know the result, there is nonetheless a kind of "irrational" uncertainty as to "what the Master (proclaiming the results) will say," as if it is only via its public proclamation that the result becomes actual, "for itself." [33] Or, to put it in yet another way, the problem with writing on the computer is that it potentially suspends the difference between "mere drafts" and the "final version": there is no longer a "final version"

or a "definitive text," since, at every stage, the text can be further worked on *ad infinitum*every version has the status of something "virtual" (conditional, provisional). This uncertainty, of course, opens up the space of the demand for a new Master whose arbitrary gesture would declare some version as the "final" one and thus bring about the "collapse" of virtual infinity into definitive reality.

The tautological emptiness of the Master's Wisdom is exemplified in the inherent stupidity of proverbs. Let us engage in a mental experiment by way of trying to construct proverbial wisdom out of the relationship between terrestrial life, its pleasures and its Beyond. If one says "Forget about the afterlife, about the Elsewhere, seize the day, enjoy life fully here and now, it's the only life you've got!" it sounds deep. If one says exactly the opposite, "Do not get trapped in the illusory and vain pleasures of earthly life; money, power and passions are all destined to vanish into thin airthink about eternity!" it also sounds deep. If one combines the two sides"Bring Eternity into your everyday life, live your life on this Earth as if it is already permeated by Eternity!"we get another profound thought. The same, of course, goes for its inversion: "Do not try in vain to bring together Eternity and your terrestrial life, accept humbly that you are forever split between Heaven and Earth!" If, finally, one simply gets perplexed by all these reversals and claims: "Life is an enigma, do not try to penetrate its secrets, accept the beauty of its unfathomable mystery!" the result is, again, no less profound than its reversal: "Do not allow yourself to be distracted by false mysteries which just dissimulate the fact that, ultimately, life is very simpleit is what it is, it is simply here without rhyme or reason!" Uniting mystery and simplicity again results in wisdom: "The ultimate, unfathomable mystery of life resides in its very simplicity, in the simple fact that there is life . . ."

This tautological imbecility points toward the fact that a Master is excluded from the economy of symbolic exchangenot wholly excluded, since he occupies a special, exceptional place in it. For the Master, there is no "tit for tat," since in a way *tit is already its own tat*. In other words, when we give something to the Master, we do not expect anything in return, since this gift to the Master functions as its own rewardwe are honored when the Master accepts our gift. Is it not often, with the persons toward whom we entertain a relationship of transference, that they do us a favor by merely accepting our gift? [34] This refusal to be caught in the circle of exchange is what ultimately defines the attitude of a Master: the decline of the figure of the Master in modern capitalist societies follows from the definition of modern society as the society of exchange. Even when Masters seem to participate in an act of exchange, they are actually consummating the paradoxical exchange of gifts which does not yet function as the proper act of exchange: in the ritual of potlatch, for example, when I en-

deavor to organize an even more sumptuous feast for my guest than he or she did previously for me, the point is not to "reimburse the debt" but to repeat and outdo the excess of the gift.

So what is a Master? The conductor of an orchestra, for example: what the conductor does is in a sense superfluous, i.e., a perfectly tuned orchestra would have no need of one. Precisely as suchas superfluousthe conductor adds the crucial *je ne sais quoi,* the unfathomable tact and accent . . . *The Master thus gives body to the irreducible excess of contingency over Necessity*when the playing of the orchestra follows with full necessity, the master-conductor is no longer needed. The gesture constitutive of the Master is best exemplified by a tense political situation in which a leader is torn between two options: either to assert his proper position in its extreme purity or to formulate that position broadly enough in order to present it as a wide "umbrella" able to embrace all conflicting currents. The outcome is utterly "undecidable": adopting the unreconcilable "extreme" stance can isolate the leader as unacceptable, yet it can also be perceived as the resolute measure which clearly designates the desired Goal and thus attracts broad masses (General Charles de Gaulle's resolute "No!" to collaboration with the Germans in 1940 transformed him into a leader); adopting an ill-defined "umbrella" stance can lay the ground for a broad coalition, but it can also be perceived as a disappointing sign of irresolution. It is sometimes better to limit oneself pragmatically to "realistic," attainable goals; at other times, it is far more effective to display the attitude of "No, this is not enough, the true utopia is that, in the present state of our society, we can achieve even these modest goals; if we want truly to attain even these goals, we must aim much higher, we must change the general condition!" This, perhaps, is the feature which distinguishes a "true leader": the ability to risk stepping into the extreme which, far from portending ostracism, *finds universal appeal and grounds the widest possible coalition*. Such a gesture, of course, is extremely risky insofar as it is not decidable in advance: it may succeed, but it may also turn the leader into a figure of ridicule, a lone extremist nut. This is the risk a "true leader" has to assume: one of the lessons of history is that, in a political struggle between a moderate pragmatist and an extremist, it has been the extremist who (later, after taking over) has been able effectively to realize the necessary pragmatic measures.

The decline of this function of the Master in contemporary Western societies exposes the subject to radical ambiguity as to his or her desire. The media constantly bombard the subject with requests to choose, addressing him or her as the subject who is *supposed to know what he or she really wants* (which book, clothes, TV program, place to go on vacation . . .): "press A, if you want this, press B, if you want that," or, to quote the motto of the recent "reflexive" TV publicity campaign for advertisement itself, "Advertisementthe right to choose." However, at a more fundamental level, the

new media radically deprive the subject of the knowledge of what he or she wants: they address a thoroughly malleable subject who must constantly be told what is desired, i.e., the very evocation of a choice to be made performatively creates the need for the object of choice. One should bear in mind here that the main function of the Master is to tell the subject what to desire: the need for the Master arises in answer to the subject's confusion, insofar as he or she does not know what is wanted. What, then, happens in the situation of the decline of the Master, when the subject is constantly bombarded with the request to give a sign as to what is wanted? The exact opposite of what one would expect: it is when there is no one there to tell you what you really want, when all the burden of choice is on you, that the big Other dominates you completely and choice effectively disappears, i.e., is replaced by its mere semblance. One is tempted to paraphrase here Lacan's well-known reversal of Dostoyevsky ("If there is no God, nothing is permitted at all"): if no forced choice confines the field of free choice, the very freedom of choice disappears.

The suspension of the function of the (symbolic) Master is the crucial feature of the Real whose contours loom at the horizon of the cyberspace universe: the moment of implosion when humanity will attain the limit impossible to transgress, the moment at which the coordinates of our societal life-world will be dissolved and we will lose ground in our environs. [35] At this moment, distances will be suspended (I will be able to communicate instantly through teleconferences with anyone anywhere on the globe); all information, from texts to music to video, will be instantly available on my interface. However, the obverse of this suspension of the distance which separates me from a faraway foreigner is that, due to the gradual disappearance of contact with "real" bodily others, a neighbor will no longer be a neighbor, since he or she will be progressively replaced by a screen specter; the general availability will induce unbearable claustrophobia; the excess of choice will be experienced as the impossibility to choose; the universal direct participatory community will exclude all the more forcefully those who are prevented from participating in it. The vision of cyberspace opening up a future of unending possibilities of limitless change, of new multiple sex organs, etc., conceals its exact opposite: an unheard-of imposition of radical closure. This, then, is the Real awaiting us, and all endeavors to symbolize this real, from utopian (the New Age or "deconstructionist" celebrations of the liberating potentials of cyberspace) to the blackest dystopian ones (the prospect of the total control by a God-like computerized network), are just this, i.e., so many attempts to avoid the true "end of history," the paradox of an infinity far more suffocating than any actual confinement.

Or, to put it in a different way, the virtualization cancels the distance between a neighbor and a distant foreigner, insofar as it suspends the presence of the Other in the massive weight of the Real: neighbors and foreign-

ers, all are equal in their spectral screen-presence. That is to say, why was the Christian injunction "love thy neighbor like thyself" so problematic for Freud? The proximity of the Other which makes a neighbor is that of *jouissance:* when the presence of the Other becomes unbearable, suffocating, it means that we experience his or her mode of *jouissance* as too intrusive. The Lacanian proof of the Other's existence is *jouissance* of the Other (in contrast to Christianity, for example, where this proof is Love). In order to render this notion palpable, suffice it to imagine an intersubjective encounter: when do I effectively encounter the Other "beyond the wall of language," in the real of his or her being? Not when I am able to describe her, not even when I learn her values, dreams, etc., but only when I encounter the Other in her moment of *jouissance:* when I discern in her a tiny detaila compulsive gesture, an excessive facial expression, a ticwhich signals the intensity of the real of *jouissance*. This encounter with the real is always traumatic, there is something at least minimally obscene about it, I cannot simply integrate it into my universe, there is always a gap separating me from it. This, then, is what "intersubjectivity" is actually about, not the Habermasian "ideal speech situation" of a multitude of academics smoking pipes at a round table and arguing about some point by means of undistorted communication: without the element of the real of *jouissance,* the Other remains ultimately a fiction, a purely symbolic subject of reasoning. [36] And what is contemporary "postmodern" racism, if not a violent reaction to this virtualization of the Other, a return of the experience of the "neighbor" in his or her (or their) intolerable, traumatic *presence?*

Notes

1. One of the motifs often encountered in science fiction is that of a group of travelers who pass through a "stargate" into another spatial dimension (alternative universe, etc.); once they arrive there, something goes wrong, so that they are unable to return to their home and are forever stuck in the Other Space. Is, however, this not the situation of all of us, human mortals, dislocated, caught in a fantasmatic universe, condemned to a shadowy existence from which there is no escape?

2. In one of the stories of the English omnibus film *Dead of Night* (1945), the hero casts a glance at the mirror in his common, modern bedroomwhat he sees there is another, dark, "Gothic" room with antiquated furniture and a fire burning in the fireplace.

3. James Naremore, *The Magic World of Orson Welles* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) 248–49.

4. Ibid., 248.

5. At a somewhat different level, another sign of the same tendency is the fact that today, failures themselves have lost their Freudian subversive potential and are becoming more and more the topic of a show: some of the most popular shows on

American TV are "The best bloopers of . . ." programs which bring together clips from TV series, movies, news, etc., which were censored because something stupid occurred (the actor confused his lines, slipped . . .). From time to time, one even gets the impression that the slips themselves are carefully planned so that they can be used in a show about the making of the show. The best indicator of this devaluation of the slip is the use of the term "Freudian slip" ("Oh, I just made a Freudian slip!") which totally suspends its subversive sting.

6. Deleuze's example is the "event" of the breakdown of the splendor of the "roaring twenties" in F. Scott Fitzgerald's later novels; see Gilles Deleuze, *La logique du sens* (Paris: Minuit, 1967) 180–81.

7. As to the distinction between imitation and simulation, see Benjamin Wooley, *Virtual Worlds* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).

8. Andrew Cutrofello's *The Owl at Dawn* (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1995), a sequel to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* covering the period from Hegel's death to today, closely imitates the structure of Hegel's "original" as well as its styleso why does the reading of this book give rise to anxiety in a Hegelian (like myself)? What one is afraid of is not that Cutrofello will fail, but that he will succeedwhy? One reads *The Owl at Dawn* as a pastiche, as an ironic imitation of Hegel's "original," so if it succeeds too well, this means that, in a sense, the "original" itself is already a fake, that its status is that of ironic imitationthe success of *The Owl at Dawn* retroactively denaturalizes the "original."

9. See lecture XXIII ("Psychoanalysis and Cybernetics") in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psyhoanalysis, 1954–1955,* trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York: Norton, 1988).

10. See chap. 3 of Jacques Lacan, *Le séminaire, livre XX: Encore* (Paris: Seuil, 1975).

11. As to Eisenstein, see V. V. Ivanov, "Eisenstein's Montage of Hieroglyphic Signs" in *On Signs,* ed. Marshall Blonsky (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) 221–35. In his *Modern Epic* (London: Verso, 1996), Franco Moretti defines the literature of "magic realism" (Gabriel Garcia Marquez and company) as the dialectical inversion of the opposition between the traditional enchanted universe and the disenchanted universe of modernity: from within the perspective of the traditional closed universe, the process of modernization itself (the arrival of trains and cars, electricity, phones . . .) which disturbs the routine of old customs appears as the ultimate magic. Is this not also the formula of the New Age cyberspace cult which perceives the highest digital technology as the return to the premodern magical universe?

12. See Sherry Turkle, *Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).

13. This double trap is homologous to the double trap apropos of the notion of ideology: the simple reliance on pre-ideological external reality as the measure of ideological distortion is strictly correlative to the attitude of "there is no external reality, all we are dealing with is the multitude of simulacra, of discursive constructs." See Slavoj Zizek *, "Introduction," in his *Mapping Ideology* (London: Verso 1995).

14. Paul Virilio, *The Art of the Motor* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995) 4.

15. See Allucquere Rosanne Stone, *The War of Desire and Technology* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).

16. Virilio, *The Art of the Motor,* 113.

17. Ibid., 148.

18. See chap. 2 of Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

19. Turkle, *Life on the Screen,* 126.

20. Ibid., 205.

21. In other words, *computerization undermines performativity*. By claiming this, we are not resurrecting the myth of the good, old precomputerized times when words really counted. As Jacques Derrida, but also Lacan, emphasized again and again, the performative can always, for structural reasons, go wrong. It can only arise against the background of radical undecidabilitythe very fact that I have to rely on the other's word means that the other remains for me forever an enigma. What tends to get lost in virtual communities is this very abyss of the other, this very background of undecidability: in the "wired universe," the very opaqueness of the other tends to evaporate. In this sense, the suspension of performativity in virtual communities is the very opposite of the suspension of performativity in the psychoanalytic cure, where I can say anything to the analyst, all my obscene fantasies about him or her, knowing that my analyst will not be offended, will not "take it personally."

22. Turkle, *Life on the Screen,* 200.

23. Or, to take a rather vulgar everyday example: being slightly overweight, I have at my disposal two strategies to conceal this fact. I can put on a shirt with vertical lines which makes me appear slender or I can, on the contrary, put on a shirt with horizontal lines, counting on the fact that the persons I meet will (mis)perceive my overweight as the illusion created by my inappropriate dress: "Look, this stupid shirt makes him fat, whereas he is really not so fat!"

24. As to this ambiguity, see Virilio, *The Art of the Motor*.

25. See Jacques Lacan, "Television," *October* 40 (1987).

26. The main work of Malebranche is *Recherches de la vérité* (1674–75; the most available edition, Paris: Vrin, 1975). In our reading of Malebranche, we rely on Miran Bozovic, "Malebranchian Occasionalism, or, Philosophy in the Garden of Eden," *Filozofski Vestnik* 1 (Ljubljana: Slovene Academy of Sciences, 1995). Incidentally, occasionalism also enables us to throw new light on the exact status of the Fall: Adam was brought to ruin and banished from Paradise not because he was simply led astray by Eve's sensuality; the point is rather that he made a philosophical mistake and "regressed" from occasionalism to vulgar sensual empiricism according to which material objects directly, without the mediation of the big Other (God), affect our senses*the Fall is primarily a question of Adam's philosophical convictions*. That is to say, prior to the Fall, Adam fully mastered his body and maintained a distance toward it: since he was well aware that the connection between his soul and his body is contingent and only occasional, he was at any moment able to suspend it, to cut himself off and to feel neither pain nor pleasure. Pain and pleasure were not ends-in-themselves, they served only to provide information about what is bad or good for the survival of his body. The Fall occurred the moment Adam excessively (i.e., beyond the scope needed to provide the information necessary for survival in the

natural environs) yielded to his senses, the moment his senses affected him to such an extent that he lost his distance toward them and was distracted from pure thought. The object responsible for the Fall, of course, was Eve: Adam fell when the view of Eve naked momentarily distracted him and led him astray into believing that Eve in herself, directly and not only occasionally, was the cause of his sexual pleasureEve is responsible for the Fall insofar as she gives rise to the philosophical error of sensual realism. When Lacan claims that *la femme n'existe pas,* one has to read this proposition as a decisive argument for occasionalism and against sensual empiricism: when a man enjoys a woman sexually, the woman is not a direct but only an occasional cause of his enjoyment, he enjoys a woman because God (the big Other, the symbolic network) sustains her as the object of satisfaction. In other words, "Eve" stands for the primordial fetishist disavowal of "castration," of the fact that the effect of a sensual object (woman) is not directly grounded in its properties, but is mediated by its symbolic place. And, as was already pointed out by Saint Augustine, the punishment, the price Adam had to pay for his Fall, was, quite appropriately, that he was no longer able to master his body fullythe erection of his phallus escaped his control. If, then, the Fall involves a change in Adam's philosophical attitude, and, furthermore, if it is the Fall which creates Woman, which brings her into beingnot at the ontic level, but as to her ontological status, as the temptress correlative to man's desire (things are thus even worse than Otto Weininger thought: as to her ontological status, Woman is the outcome of man's philosophical error)what, if any at all, was the philosophical attitude of *Eve?*

27. The notion of this connection between cyberspace and Schreber's psychotic universe was suggested to me by Wendy Chun, Department of English, Princeton University.

28. See "The Antinomies of Postmodernity" in Fredric Jameson, *The Seeds of Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

29. There are two notions of Limit at work here: the Limit as the inherent form, the "proper measure," which enables us to lead a balanced existence; and the Limit as the asymptotic borderline whichif we come too close to itcauses a catastrophic disintegration of our universe.

30. The same paradox of the superego is clearly discernible in the impasse of sexual harassment: there is no "proper measure," no unambiguous line of demarcation separating "correct" sexual flirting from "incorrect" harassment. Sexual play as such is "excessive," "aggressive," i.e., the same act or feature which, from one perspective, is perceived as harassment, can, in different circumstances, turn the partner on. In short, one has to violate the rules (the PC rules as well as the macho rules of conquest). If one goes beyond the limit, one is either harassing or successfully flirting; if one stays below the limit, one is either perceived as a weakling or, again, successfully flirting. There is no meta-rule to guarantee the success or the correctness of our procedure. To put it another way, the subject is caught between provocation and prohibition, between guilt and "being wimpy": the other, the one you endeavor to seduce, is ambiguously provoking you to make a passif you dare do it, you are guilty, if you do not, you are a wimp . . .

31. Lacan provides the general matrix of this codependence between lack and excess in his (unpublished) seminar on *Identification* (1961–62), by means of refer-

ence to the Kantian distinction between the empty notion without object and the object without notion: the "barred" subject as the void of negativity $ is an empty notion without object, a hole in the (symbolic) structure, whereas the *objet a* (object small a), the cause of desire, is an excessive object without notion, a surplus over the notional structure, an inert remainder with no place in the structure. As such, these two elements are correlative: the surplus object functions as the placeholder of the subject's lack, i.e., the subject "encounters itself" among objects in the guise of a surplus which resists symbolization. For a more detailed account of it, see chap. 5 of Slavoj Zizek *, *Metastases of Enjoyment* (London: Verso, 1994).

32. Cinema executives obsessed with audience testing new films through special previews and then frantically reshooting the endings, etc., fall victim to the homologous illusion: as a rule this utter adaptability to the whims of the public ends up in failurewhat the public wants is a Master capable of *imposing* his version on it, not a pliable servant . . .

33. One is even tempted to risk a wild hypothesis and to claim that this gap has a physiological basis in the *double* climax of the orgasmic experience: first, there is the "point of no return" after which, for a couple of seconds, we "float in bliss"; then, the ensuing second climax releases the tension. The cliché according to which Richard Wagner's climactic moments (the finale of the overture to *Lohengrin,* the finale of *Tristan*) are "orgasmic" thus seems justified: here, too, the climactic moment is double, i.e., the first climax ends the restraint, sets free the forces, but does not yet release the tensionfor that, another climax is needed . . .

34. During my stay at Princeton University in 1996, I was told that, as a Visiting Fellow, I could freely visit the lounge and enjoy lunch or dinner. I would not have to pay for anything, since the fact that I socialize with students and other faculty members is already considered enough of a profit for the University. In short, when I visit the lounge and have lunch or dinner, the price I pay for it is that I visit the lounge and have lunch or dinner . . .

35. For an outline of this unsurpassable limit, see Paul Virilio, *Cybermonde, la politique du pire* (Paris: Textuel, 1996).

36. For that reason, one is even tempted to replace the term "multiculturalism" with "multiracism": multiculturalism suspends the traumatic kernel of the Other, reducing it to an aseptized folklorist entity.

Five
Sartre's Freud:
Dimensions of Intersubjectivity in *The Freud Scenario*

David James Fisher

Dedicated to my former teachers,
Germaine Brée and George L. Mosse

Jean-Paul Sartre, the philosopher of freedom, was an unrepentant moviegoer, a lifelong enthusiast of the cinema. He went to the movies often, for the pure sensual enjoyment of viewing. Sartre experienced emotional freedom there: his imagination could soar. From the time he was a boy in Paris, he and his mother were accomplices in escaping the oppressive, patriarchal tutelage of Sartre's grandfather, Charles Schweitzer, by going to see silent thrillers together. Movies entered Sartre's arsenal in struggling against the rigidities and pretensions of high culture. His charming autobiographical account of his visits in 1912 to the Panthéon Cinema on the rue Sufflot blends phenomenological descriptions of the sights, smells and sensations of the movie theater with a democratic assertion of Sartre's parallel history with the cinema: "This new art was mine, just as it was everyone else's. We had the same mental age: I was seven and knew how to read; it was twelve and it did not know how to talk. People said that it was in its early stages, that it had progress to make; I thought that we would grow up together. I have not forgotten our common childhood. . . ." [1]

Sartre and Psychoanalysis

I view *The Freud Scenario* as Sartre's most important, most highly elaborated and best realized text on psychoanalysis. It has been neglected for at least five reasons:

1. It was written as a screenplay and screenplays do not command the same level of serious attention as do philosophical treatises, essays, novels, biographies, plays and cultural criticism;

2. the text was unfinished (as were a number of Sartre's most significant writings);

3. it has been unfairly and inaccurately equated with John Huston's film, *Freud;*

4. Sartre himself repudiated the work in his lifetime, as did Simone de Beauvoir after his death;

5. major commentators on Sartre's relationship to psychoanalysis have failed to consider this work [2] or have minimized its significance, including one of Sartre's foremost English translators and critics.[3] The author of a recent book, *Sartre and Psychoanalysis,* provides no sustained analysis of the text, arguing that Sartre remained opposed to Freudian metapsychology before, during and after his writing of the Freud scenario.[4] Several scholars have perceived the text's brilliance as a piece of dramatic writing, but have failed to provide a detailed interpretation of its thematic structure.[5]

Sartre first encountered psychoanalytic theory as a schoolboy in a French lycée in the 1920s. His fascination with it persisted until the 1970s, as can be seen in his final work, the multiple volumes of his biography of Gustave Flaubert, *The Family Idiot*. During this fifty-year period, Sartre's ambivalence toward psychoanalysis was marked. Initially he was attracted to the phenomenological possibilities of psychoanalytic method, its capacity to describe and illuminate aspects of an individual's fantasy and emotional life. Later, in 1957, he spoke of psychoanalysis as "the one privileged mediation" in elucidating children's lives and family relationships inside a given society.[6]

Yet a number of issues distanced him from psychoanalytic theory and technique, first and foremost Sigmund Freud's conception of the unconscious. The idea that consciousness was split through the psychical mechanisms of repression and censorship was unacceptable to Sartre. He believed that the Freudian unconscious served to rationalize and create alibis for bad faith, one of the central tenets of his own philosophy as developed in *Being and Nothingness* (1943).[7]

Sartre thought that Freud mistakenly biologized meaning by accounting for it ultimately in neurophysiological and evolutionary terms, whereas for Sartre meaning was an expansive social project involving the creation of value and significance in the individual's life. He also objected to Freud's attempt to reduce human behavior to environmental and biological determinism, that is, to psychosexual urges and unconscious striving. Such a view, Sartre contended, violated the possibilities for freedom, choice, intentionality, responsibility and good faith, despite the limitations of each individual's historical situation. Along the same lines, Sartre refused psychoanalytic nosology. Instead of categorizing personalities into diagnostic clusters and thereby reifying them, Sartre emphasized the individual's choice, which, according to his existential philosophy, was the fundamental project of being.

Sartre also strongly opposed the authoritarian techniques that he associated with classical psychoanalysis where the analyst became the privileged subject while the analysand was relegated to the position of object. Sartre worked toward a more reciprocal, egalitarian model for what he called existential psychoanalysis. Finally, Sartre objected to psychoanalytic methodology. He viewed Freudian psychoanalysis as regressive, and thought that there was something infantilizing about the analytic situation itself. Sartre wished analysis to be progressive as well as regressive, to have a synthetic as well as an analytic function and to reach out to the future as much as it delved into the past.

At the very least, in Sartre's drafts of his script for Huston's film, written between 1958 and 1960, he revised his earlier repudiation of Freud (since the 1940s) and orthodox psychoanalysis, a critique that had been grounded in superficial readings of selected writings and was excessively violent because of Sartre's hyperbolic need to polemicize against competing theories. Sartre demonstrated that he understood and embraced the concept of the dynamic unconscious: its power and efficacy in the analysis of defensive operations, transferential and countertransferential distortions, and the exploration of subjective meanings in the emotional life of the individual, including the analyst. Likewise, he no longer rejected Freud's theory of psychic determinism because he now saw how it could be incorporated into a framework in which freedom and necessity were also operative concepts. He even revised his opposition to Freud's language, no longer dismissing it as the antiquated residue of nineteenth-century biology and psychiatry. Sartre came to appreciate how Freud had broken with these discourses, inventing a new language for psychology and a new discipline of systematic inquiry at the interface of the mind and body as well as between two subjectivities.

As Sartre immersed himself in research on Freud's topographical model, in which the key conflict is between the unconscious and the conscious, he reversed his dismissal of psychoanalytic metapsychology. The way in which Freud discovered and practiced his theory neither depersonalized nor reified his patients, and Freud did not assume the doctor's social, moral, psychological or intellectual superiority over the patient. The Freud Sartre depicts in his screenplay changes as he grows older: the mature Freud does not impose his values or theories on his patients. He does not regard his patients as passive objects to be classified, observed, disciplined and cured, nor does he practice his craft according to strict scientific rules in an atmosphere of abstinence and silence but rather as a joint, open-ended undertaking in which both analyst and analysand have clear responsibilities and commitments.

In short, Sartre's Freud scenario was the decisive moment in his fifty-year history of ambivalence toward psychoanalysis. For a brief conjuncture, and in brilliantly executed fictional form (although paradoxically in a failed text that Sartre would later discard), the otherness of psychoanalysis became less

alien, less remote and less an object of contempt. It was a moment in which the existential-Marxist Sartre gave way to a Freudian Sartre, a Sartre who temporarily became the intellectual and affective son of Freud. Sartre was notorious for thinking outside the boundaries of conventional wisdom and stretching the limits of language. In his best writings, he had an empathic ability to comprehend others who had a different ethnic, sexual, intellectual and vocational formation from his own. He wrote on the Jewish question as a non-Jew, [8] on homosexuality as a nonhomosexual[9] and on psychoanalysis as neither an analyst nor analysanda typical pattern, then, of Sartre's capacity to think against himself about subjects beyond his lived cultural or emotional experience.

In composing a fictional biography of Freud, I believe that Sartre was pursuing his own self-analysis and writing part of his own autobiography. Perhaps his great sense of affinity with Freud derived from their joint capacity to fight intellectual and moral battles and oppose consensus thinking while promoting an honest, self-reflexive discourse. The existential Sartre had placed bad faith at the center of his project of demystification: the individual was enjoined to be suspicious of what others showed of themselves, to be aware of the tricks of consciousness and the human capacity for duplicity. The Freudian Sartre became acutely aware of the deceptions as well as self-deceptions derived from unconscious conflicts, the multiple distortions of superego and ego ideal pathology which resulted in massive unconscious guilt and shame for the individual, distortions that disrupted what we now call the intersubjective bond, often resulting in violence to one or both individuals involved.

Sartre and Huston

Sartre's screenplay was commissioned by John Huston for $25,000 in 1957. Huston asked for a script about the heroic period of Freud's seminal discoveries, which Sartre wrote in three installments between 1958 and 1960. It was to be an "intellectual suspense story," in Huston's words.[10] Huston admired Sartre's theatrical skills: in fact, he had produced *No Exit* on Broadway in 1946. According to de Beauvoir, Sartre accepted the assignment strictly for money, and she dismissed the results as insignificant.[11] In an interview in 1969 with the editors of *New Left Review,* Sartre historicized his "repugnance for psychoanalysis," while describing that he broke with Huston over the project "precisely because Huston did not understand what the unconscious was. That was the whole problem. He wanted to suppress it, to replace it with the pre-conscious. He did not want the unconscious at any price." Sartre held that his immersion in the French Cartesian tradition had formerly led him to be "deeply shocked by the idea of the unconscious." Though still reproaching psychoanalysis for being a "soft" theory with a syncretistic

rather than a dialectical logic, though still opposed to the mechanistic, biological and deterministic features of analytic thought, Sartre found himself "completely in agreement with the *facts* of disguise and repression, as facts." He also claimed to be intellectually astonished by Freud's mind: in reading *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* "your breath is simply taken away." [12]

In 1975 Sartre disavowed his work on the Freud scenario in the following terms: "There was already something comical about the project, which was that I was being asked to write about Freud, the great master of the unconscious, after I had spent my whole life saying that the unconscious does not exist."[13] In a second interview that year, Sartre repeated his opposition to the theory of the unconscious and voiced his bitterness toward Huston: "Around 1958, John Huston sounded me out on doing a film about Freud. He picked the wrong person, because one shouldn't choose someone who doesn't believe in the unconscious to do a film to the glory of Freud. . . . I wrote a complete script. In order to do it, I not only re-read Freud's books, but also consulted commentaries, criticism, and so forth. At that point, I had acquired an average, satisfactory knowledge of Freud. But the film was never shot according to my script, and I broke off with Huston."[14]

Sartre needed the money but, beyond that, he was intellectually and emotionally intrigued by the project. He accepted the invitation, plunging into a serious reading of early texts by Freud, including *Studies on Hysteria,* the case history of Dora and *The Interpretation of Dreams*.[15] He studied the French translation of the first volume of Ernest Jones's biography of Freud and commissioned a translation of the two subsequent volumes. He had access to Freud's relationship with Wilhelm Fliess through *The Origins of Psychoanalysis,*[16] a collection of letters between the two men which detailed the process of Freud's discovery of early childhood psychosexual development and bisexuality, his self-analysis, and his insights into the universal aspects of the Oedipus complex. He also read critical commentary on Freud and the psychoanalytic movement.

Sartre explained his intentions as a screenwriter in an interview with Kenneth Tynan in 1961:

> what we tried to doand this was what interested Huston especiallywas to show Freud, not when his theories had made him famous, but at a time, around the age of thirty, when he was utterly wrong; when his ideas had led him into hopeless error . . . . That, for me, is the most enthralling time in the life of a great discovererwhen he seems muddled and lost, but has the genius to collect himself and put everything in order. Of course it is difficult to explain this development to an audience ignorant of Freud. In order to arrive at the right ideas, one must start by explaining the wrong ones, and that is a long process: hence the seven hour scenario.
>
> The other problem was that Freud, like the majority of scientists, was a good husband and father who seems never to have deceived his wife, and even to

> have been a virgin before he was married . . . . In short, his private life was not very cinematic. We therefore had to blend the internal and external elements of Freud's drama; to show how he learned from his patients the truth about himself. [17]

Three versions of the project were written, which were later published as *The Freud Scenario:* a 95-page typewritten synopsis (1958), a long first draft (1959) which could easily have resulted in a film over five hours long, and an even lengthier second version (1959–60) that came to some 800 typed pages. Between the first and second drafts, Huston and Sartre agreed to work at Huston's home in St. Clerans, Ireland. Together for ten days, the two strong-willed, intransigent men developed a fierce mutual hostility. Everything collided: culture, sensibility, character. Sartre saw Huston as a controlling Hollywood director, affluent, narcissistic, shallow, anti-intellectual and self-deceived; while to Huston, Sartre was a bohemian Parisian intellectual, megalomaniacal, a writing and speaking machine, seemingly blind to external beauty, and oblivious to the practical necessities of the medium of film. This was a creative collaboration that was doomed to failure.

Here is Sartre to de Beauvoir on Huston: "The man has emigrated. I don't know where. He's not even sad: he's *empty,* except in moments of childish vanity, when he puts on a red dinner jacket or rides a horse (not very well) or counts his paintings or tells his workmen what to do. Impossible to hold his attention for five minutes: he can no longer work, he runs away from thinking."[18] In return, here is Huston on Sartre: "a little barrel of a man and as ugly as a human being can be. His face was both bloated and pitted, his teeth were yellowed and he was wall-eyed."[19] Sartre reported again to de Beauvoir about his "boss": "Speaking of his 'unconscious,' concerning Freud, [Huston says], 'In mine, there is nothing.' And the tone indicates the sense, *no longer* anything, even the old unavowed desires. A gross lacuna."[20] And again, listen to Huston on the impossibility of working in collaboration with Sartre: "I've never worked with anyone so obstinate and categorical. Impossible to have a conversation with him. Impossible to interrupt him. You'd wait for him to catch his breath but he wouldn't. The words came out in an absolute torrent."[21]

Finally, Huston decided to remove Sartre from the project by bringing in another writer, justifying his decision on the basis of pragmatic considerations. Years later, Sartre's memory still evoked repugnance in him:

> A filmmaker takes a risk when he decides to use someone like Sartre in the sense that filmmakers are still looked upon as being despoilers of intellectual works. You decide to get, possibly, the man who is best suited to do the work. He then proves unsuitable because he really has no idea of what the film medium actually requires. You have to then either use someone else, or cut down what that person has done for you, and then you run the risk of being criticized for having ruined what was originally given to you. I thought Sartre

would be ideal for it. There's a little smell of sulphur about everything Sartre does. . . . [22]

The only area of agreement between the two involved an inspired casting decision. Sartre wanted to have Marilyn Monroe play the lead role of Cecily Kortner, a woman who suffers from hysterical symptoms.[23] (Cecily was a composite character drawn from Josef Breuer and Freud's *Studies on Hysteria* and Freud's case history of Dora.) This was a potentially brilliant device to exploit and comment critically on the Hollywood star system in view of Monroe's status as a celebrity actress and patient. But Monroe did not play the part. In all probability it was psychoanalytic politics that prevented her from doing so. Anna Freud, in London, let it be known that she strongly objected to the idea of a Hollywood film about her father's life and work, arguing that it would trivialize his ideas and his cause. She evidently used her influence on Monroe's psychoanalyst in Los Angeles, Ralph Greenson, to dissuade Monroe from accepting the role.[24]

With the personal rift between director and writer deepening as the length of the script increased, Huston made known his wishes to replace Sartre as the principal writer. Wolfgang Reinhardt, Huston's producer and the son of Max Reinhardt, greatly admired Sartre's philosophy and thought his original treatment was good: he sided with Sartre against Huston.[25] In the end, it was Sartre who decided to leave Huston. As a final gesture of his contempt for the director, Sartre removed his name from the script and stipulated that it should not appear in the credits when the movie was released. In fact, Sartre thought Huston lacked intellectual and artistic integrity: "It was not because of the cuts that I removed my signatureI knew perfectly well that cuts would have to be madebut because of the way in which they were made. It's an honest piece of work. Very honest. But it's not worthwhile for an intellectual to take responsibility for questionable ideas."[26]

Although the final screenplay was a hybrid creation[27]Charles Kaufman and Wolfgang Reinhardt collaborated with HustonHuston claimed that "much of what Sartre had done was in our versionin fact, it was the backbone of it. In some scenes his dialogue was left intact."[28] Huston's *Freud,* starring Montgomery Clift in the title role and Susannah York as Cecily, was released in 1962. While it was critically acclaimed, it was a commercial flop. *The Freud Scenario* was published four years after Sartre's death by Gallimard in 1984 as part of French psychoanalyst J.-B. Pontalis's prestigious series "Knowledge of the Unconscious." It contained Sartre's synopsis, both versions of his screenplay and an introduction by Pontalis. An English translation appeared in 1985.

In my view, Sartre's Freud scenario is a major event in French intellectual history as well as in the evolution of Sartre's thought, marking one master thinker's encounter with another. I shall not focus on Sartre's theory of

the cinema, [29] his other writings on movie making or psychoanalytic issues related to Huston's film.[30] Rather, I will speak to three overlapping themes: (1) Sartre's depiction of the dialectic of anti-Semite and Jew in turn-of-the-century Vienna; (2) Sartre's dramatization of how Freud's clinical work with patients coincided with and provoked his self-analysis, which yielded significant personal transformations; and (3) Sartre's understanding of how Freud's struggles with father surrogates became linked to his intersubjective grasp of the father-son conflict.

The Dialectic of Anti-Semite and Jew in Turn-of-the-Century Vienna

When interviewed about his script on Freud, Sartre claimed he had introduced a social and political dimension into it by emphasizing the prevalence of anti-Jewish opinions in Central Europe at the turn of the century: "There is one great problem that the analysts tend to sidetrack: Viennese anti-Semitism. It seems to me that Freud was profoundly aggressive, and that his aggressions were determined by the anti-Semitism from which his family suffered. He was a child who felt things very deeply, and probably immediately."[31]

Viennese antisemitism saturates the three versions of Sartre's screenplay. It was not a theme emphasized in Jones's biography nor in the psychoanalytic literature on Freud through the late 1950s,[32] and it was dropped from Huston's movie. In a scene that takes place in August 1885, Freud, then twenty years old, is walking with his fiancée, Martha, on the Ringstrasse. They pass a street vendor hawking antisemitic tracts and reciting anti-Jewish slogans to a crowd of passersby. Freud reacts spontaneously to this blatant display: seizing one of the pamphlets and tearing it to shreds, he utters a single word: "Imbecile!"[33]

Later, in a scene before the Vienna Medical Society in October 1886, Freud encounters the antisemitism of the "respectable" middle classes, represented by this group of physicians. Freud makes a speech summarizing Jean-Martin Charcot's research on hysteria, including male hysteria and the possibility of hypnotism as a mode of treatment, which he has learned during his recent five-month stay in Paris. Professor Theodor Meynert takes the lead in condemning Freud's lecture sarcastically, without rational argument. When Freud leaves the amphitheater, several doctors in the audience allege that Freud's arrogance before his elders seems like a Jewish trait and that his studies in Paris with Charcot, who had been scientifically discredited, reflect Freud's Jewish cosmopolitanism and his lack of national roots in Austria. A dejected Freud is convinced that the theories he presented have been resisted because he is Jewish.

In another address before the same medical society ten years later, after the pathbreaking publication of *Studies on Hysteria* with Breuer, Freud presents his theoretical paper on the sexual origin of neuroses, a paper summarizing his views on the traumatic effects of the seduction of children by adults. Breuer is in the audience but refuses to endorse Freud's positions in public. He urges his younger colleague to be cautious, reminding him that these conservative male doctors will object violently to the insinuation that fathers have sexually molested their daughters. Freud delivers his address in a dignified fashion. His audience reacts with howls, shouts, whistles and stamping feet. Sartre indicates that no one in the audience is below forty years of age. In such a context, dialogue is impossible. Freud is somber, hard and disillusioned. He states ironically: "I thank my colleagues for their kind attention: not for one moment have they failed to show the calm and objectivity appropriate to true men of science" (*FS,* p. 320). As Freud exits from the meeting hall, the doctors shout: "Dirty Jew! Dirty Jew! Filthy Yid! Back to the ghetto! Back to the ghetto!" (*FS,* p. 321).

In a telling scene with Cecily Kortner, Sartre's Freud confronts the subtle yet insidious antisemitism of the wealthy middle classes, a Christian antisemitism which hypocritically distinguishes between "good" and "bad" Jews. The "good" ones have attempted to assimilate. They have money, manners and patriotic opinions; in other words, they appear to be bourgeois. As a young doctor attempting to escape poverty and driven by personal ambition, Freud is shown to be intensely self-conscious about his impoverished social status. He even reproaches himself about his "worn and slightly outmoded" clothing (*FS,* p. 394). Freud's consciousness of himself as a poor Jew in this context transforms him into a social reformer. "By force of circumstance," as Sartre puts it, he becomes "a spokesman for all poor people" (*FS,* p. 395).

In the scenario, Freud articulates his despair about his intellectual and moral isolation because of Viennese antisemitism, a racism that merges with parochialism and a pervasive mean-spiritedness. His inability to leave the city means that he will have to conduct his research alone, in radical opposition to the cultural mainstream, which, in his eyes, is morally reprehensible and scientifically bankrupt. "Do you like Vienna?" Freud says: "I hate it. Petty People! Petty loves! Petty riffraff! And if you count the tourists, more anti-Semites than there are inhabitants" (*FS,* p. 232). In the second version of Sartre's scenario, Freud voices his opposition to Viennese antisemitism with "an expression of passionate fury." He not only hates the anti-Semites who hate him, but he has arrived at a pragmatic, unsentimental assessment of the dangers of such racial degradation: "In the old days, they drove our family out of Germany. During my childhood, they drove us out of Moravia. Tomorrow, they may drive us out of Vienna" (*FS,* p. 399).

Sartre's Freud has a penetrating gaze devoid of self-deception. He accepts his Jewishness in the face of the Viennese contempt for the Jewish minority,

which resulted in "quarantining" Jews, giving them the status of lepers, even at the university. This reality wounded the young Freud, who had academic ambitions. Freud's good faith solution, to use Sartre's term, pivots on cultural insight and self-understanding: he will confront his situation as a despised other by neither retreating nor assimilating. (Sartre depicts Breuer opting for assimilation.)

Instead, Freud rejects the domination of the gentile majority, refusing to be objectified and stigmatized as a Jew. With anger he tells Breuer: "I won't be a good Jew, an honorary *goy*" (*FS,* p. 401). Neither submissive nor passive, Freud determines to rechannel his aggression: he will take revenge on the gentile world by developing his intellectual and emotional faculties to their fullest. He chooses to pursue his scientific research alone and to push his theoretical hypotheses to their limits. Being Jewish in an antisemitic context fuels his passion for originality, nonconformity and boldness of thought: "To be like everybody else: sometimes that's my dream. Ruled out! Everybody elsethat means the *goyim*. If we aren't the best at everything, they'll always say we're the worst. Do you know that a Jew is condemned to genius? Seeing that I'm damned, I'll make them afraid. I'll avenge myself, I'll avenge all our people. My ancestors have bequeathed to me all the passion they used to put into defending their Temple" (*FS,* p. 401).

The post-Holocaust Sartre had lectured to his Parisian audience in 1945 that man was existentially condemned to be free. [34] The psychoanalytic Sartre of *The Freud Scenario* postulated that the secular, atheistic, Jewish Freud was condemned to be extraordinary, a genius in the midst of a reifying and potentially murderous antisemitic population. Freud's ambition to be the "best" was catalyzed in part by his personal need to counter and transcend the antisemitic stereotypes and racial practices that pervaded turn-of-the-century Vienna, including the attitudes of many Jews toward themselves. Sartre's Freud will learn how to defend himself with a powerful and increasingly disciplined rage. He will struggle and take responsibility for himself as a Jew, physician, father and theorist, and he will forge his own destiny with the invention of psychoanalysis.[35]

Freud and His Patients

The Freud Scenario depicts how Freud's interactions with patients progressed toward a reversal of the authoritarian practices of nineteenth-century European medicine as well as the reifying concepts of positivistic science. This movement, nothing less than a paradigm shift, required a bond of reciprocity between Freud and his patients, grounded in the analyst's fundamental respect for their suffering and aspirations. Freud came to believe that his patients' internal psychological conflicts would not be overcome unless he

was simultaneously engaged in a parallel self-analysis. We see Freud gradually rejecting the notion of the doctor's superiority over patients; rather, he learns how to heal without depersonalizing or objectifying them, no matter how severe their symptomatology. Rather than regard them as pathological others who were to be observed, classified, manipulated and cured, Freud learned to approach patients noncondescendingly, in an environment of mutual collaboration, trust and dialogue. Just as analysts should not view patients as clinical specimens, they should also avoid imposing their own narratives (as we would say today), values or research projects onto their therapeutic work. The psychoanalyst was explicitly enjoined to interact with the patient in a compassionate, attentive mode designed to maximize introspective dialogue.

Sartre came to realize that psychoanalytic method was intrinsically inter-subjective; it was predicated on a voluntary and joint understanding by two free subjects, each speaking to the other in an unfettered, increasingly authentic (according to Sartre's existentialist terminology) dialogue, each with mutual responsibilities. "The subject of the scenario is really: a man sets about knowing others because he sees this as the only way of getting to know himself; he realizes he must carry out his research upon others and upon himself simultaneously. We know ourselves through others, we know others through ourselves" (*FS,* p. 505).

According to the first version of Sartre's scenario, the film begins in a Viennese hospital ward in September 1885. Freud's teacher, Dr. Meynert, in the course of his rounds, stops at the bed of a blind female patient and lectures coldly and dogmatically to his younger colleagues, treating the patient in an accusatory, perfunctory manner. Meynert calls hysteria "a supposed illness." He describes hysterics as liars, actresses and, most egregiously of all, patients who waste doctors' valuable time (*FS,* pp. 5, 7, 9, 11). Our first view of Freud at age twenty-nine reveals a conflicted individual: he believes in the efficacy of empirical science and reason, yet he is baffled by "forces within us" which cannot be explained by physiological factors. He feels compelled to solve these riddles by throwing light on the hidden forces in himself (*FS,* pp. 18, 20, 21). As depicted by Sartre, Freud's earliest view of psychopathology blurs the line between himself and his patients, between the apparently normal and the pathological. Studying sickness also illuminates the behavior and internal forces at work in normal men and women; sickness only "underlines and intensifies" certain characteristics of the healthy (*FS,* p. 509).

As he intuited the possibilities of constructing a depth psychology, Sartre's Freud developed the concepts of transference and resistance which became central to the emerging psychoanalytic clinical method. Freud at first resisted his own observations about the doctor/patient dyad. He was uneasy when he saw that Dr. Breuer's female patients found Breuer exceedingly

attractive. But after one of Freud's own female patients embraced him, he began to hypothesize that psychical conflict caused by sexual desires might be at the root of neurotic personality disorders (*FS,* p. 520). Through his exploration of his transference toward his patients and their transference toward him, Freud began his investigations into the dynamics of amorous attachments, concentrating on "forbidden and impossible feelings being entertained for someone else" (*FS,* p. 524).

As a clinician, Sartre's Freud maintains the stance of an intrepid researcher and committed philosopher who wants to find out the darkest, unembellished truth. To this end, he repudiates hypnotism and embraces the method of free association. The talking cure emerges as Freud gradually subdues his anxieties and zeal in order to gain his patients' trust, as he learns to listen and immerses himself in his patients' words, their manner of speaking and the inner world they reveal. After repeated mistakes, he realizes that working with patients is as much an affective process as it is an intellectual one. It is Freud's intellectual curiosity and his desire to express the subjective dimensions of truth that impel him to contest the authority of Meynert, thereby calling into question the prevailing medical and scientific practices of his day (*FS,* p. 85).

In scenes portraying Freud's work with Karl von Schroeh, a fictionalized forty-year-old obsessional neurotic with phobic symptomatology, we glimpse the pre-psychoanalytic Freud struggling with himself to develop a viable way of interacting with and learning from his patients. Sartre depicts a deeply conflicted Freud. When he feels at ease, he projects a natural authority, kindness and attentiveness in the rapport he builds with his patients. He replies to their concerns with sincere empathy for their pain and distress. He is able to listen to them and communicate with them effectively.

However, when Freud does not understand what he hearsfor example, when themes of parricide and the fear of castration surface in the analysis of a young manhe becomes anxious and sometimes repulsed. The patient's terror becomes his own. Freud's resistance is manifested in defensiveness or evasiveness: he is tempted to flee from his patient or to respond aggressively. Disoriented by his own unanalyzed anxieties and guilt feelings, Freud commands his patient not to think such thoughts. He abruptly calls off a session. He becomes hostile when he looks at his patient, and becomes distressed, almost "demented," by the "idiotic and disgusting things" he has been told (*FS,* pp. 91, 97, 98, 100, 105). With another patient, the adolescent hysteric Dora, Sartre portrays an intrusive and judgmental Freud, reacting harshly and countertherapeutically when Dora tells him she is reading Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*. A frowning, interdictory Freud asserts that this novel is "disgusting" (*FS,* p. 110).

Sartre shows that in devising a coherent method to arrive at deep truths about his patients, Freud has to discipline himself in order to respond to

their words, fantasies and emotions. Otherwise his patients will not confide in him (*FS,* p. 131). This Freud observes that the physician-patient relationship is like that of a romantic couple, marked by shifts in power relations and saturated with desire, anxieties, guilt and fantasies, including the analyst's. Sartre's Freud learns to respect the various dimensions of the transference only when he moves toward accepting and mastering his own powerful and sometimes primitive transference to his patients, "the strange and profound bond between them [Breuer and Cecily], the intimacy between them" (*FS,* p. 147).

The analyst's responsibility, then, is to work with the transference rather than abuse transferential relationships with patients or retreat from them, which would be irresponsible and constitute a fundamental violation of what Freud would later define as analytic method (*FS,* p. 161). Sartre's Freud discovers that the psychoanalytic method involves understanding and undoing defensive processes to allow the truth to unfold, no matter where it may lead. Interpreting resistance permits the patient a way of comprehending and resolving his or her internal struggles, particularly those that involve transference (*FS,* p. 167).

In an important scene depicting Freud's deepening rapport with Karl, Sartre suggests the psychic misery that links patient and doctor. Freud grasps the possibility of overcoming his scientific detachment. He renounces posturing as a cunning detective searching for clues from an unwitting suspect. On the contrary, he learns to work compassionately and collaborate in a shared project of investigation, enlightenment and movement toward health and maturity. "But what distinguished [Freud] from a policeman is his neutral air, devoid of mistrust, almost benevolent: he is not dealing with a rival or enemy but with a patient, and we sense that he is determined to give him of his best. For the first time, we must sense the *couple* relationship between patient and doctor" (*FS,* p. 421).

Later in the same scene, Sartre shows Freud overreacting to Karl's parricidal fantasies, his regressive episodes and his desperate longing to be helped. Because Freud is disturbed by the disintegrating content of what Karl experiences, he himself becomes anxious, regressing to the authoritarian mode of the late nineteenth-century medical scientist. He becomes sardonic, objective, stern and, most crucially, betrays a desire to dominate the patient. Freud behaves sadomasochistically as if he were the domineering parent and Karl were a surrendering child, a variation on the master/slave dialectic. Freud has not yet learned to tolerate his own uncertainties and blind spots, nor the regressive pull of the analytic relationship on the analyst. Sartre explains the intersubjective drama of the scene with lucidity: "From their exchange of looks, this time we gain a radical insight into the bond between patient and psychiatrist (and into the genesis of transference and counter-transference). This image must be powerful enoughand, in a cer-

tain way, disturbing and disagreeable enoughfor us to recall it when Freud, much later, broaches the problem of transference. And the unpleasant thing about the couple which has just formed is precisely the very faintly homosexual appearance of domination and submission" (*FS,* p. 423).

Under the influence of hypnotism, Karl relives vivid scenes of castration between him and his father, including fantasies of rape and homosexual incest. Freud is nauseated by these reenactments and he resumes his scornful voice, demanding that Karl forget what he has just recounted. Instead of working toward restoring his patient's memory despite his own powerful resistance, Freud contradicts Karl's words and repeats clichés about filial piety (*FS,* p. 430). The session with Karl also begins to impinge on the doctor's unconscious desires. In a nightmare following this session, Freud calls his patient "a filthy swine" (*FS,* p. 433).

It is only after a brutally honest self-analysis that Sartre's Freud will be able to master his intense puritanical anxieties and guilt, and his need to reassure and be reassured. His self-analysis allows him to work through the disruptive dynamics of domination and submission in his work with his patients. By the end of the scenario, Freud will have achieved an internal calm. He will possess radical insight into himself, at least while he is analyzing his patients. Only after this self-analysis will Freud escape from his paralyzing self-doubt, enabling him to resolve the chronic mood swings and aggressivity that had prevented him from being genuinely receptive to his patients. He achieves inner tranquillity, and because of this, a receptive, sensitive demeanor which projects his caring respect for the patient. "The man we see today is (at least in his relations with his patients and their relatives) rid of the doubts, passions and the shyness which we associate with him (and which he will recoverthough less intensivelywhen he is personally involved). On the contrary, he displays a calm, deep-rooted authority (which derives from his work and his knowledge) . . ." (*FS,* p. 443).

The mature Freud realizes that an analyst who is annoyed with patients, who brags about himself and forces issues, employing techniques that demand compliance or exploit suggestibility quickly lead to therapeutic impasses, if not outright failures in treatment. He also realizes that the cathartic method of analysis does not relieve patients of their symptoms permanently. Aware of the dynamic interplay between analyst and patients, aware of the unconscious lures of his patients and his own susceptibility to being tricked, he begins to learn to avoid these traps. And, according to Sartre, "It is Freud's strength to admit his mistakes calmly" (*FS,* p. 450). Sartre emphasizes that the analyst need not pose as a superman. When listening attentively, the analyst is able to use recurring feelings of anger and malevolence at patients and their families in a constructive fashion. Sartre's Freud begins to succeed in freeing himself from his own "tyrannical violence and despotism" (*FS,* p. 453).

Freud is able to do this because he undertakes a penetrating, long-term self-analysis, including his own dreams, using the method of free association and gradually incorporating his reflections on the multiple manifestations of transference in his life. In his notes, Sartre urges Huston to focus on Freud's face, which should illustrate the wish for self-understanding as well as the torments and pleasures of self-reflection: "To read a forceful resolve to peer into himself and decipher his own riddles" (*FS,* p. 466). Self-analysis, then, becomes a form of self-acceptance and self-interrogation, a method to gain perspective on one's deepest contradictions, particularly the internal conflict between arousal and hatred, hostility and guilt.

In contrast to Freud, Breuer has backed away from investigations that probe too deeply because they may intrude upon or violate the patient's soul. Breuer is equally distrustful of Freud's theories about how the mind is structured. But Freud has left Breuer behind. He will advocate "healing through knowledge," while Breuer will avoid that form of investigation as dangerous and forbidden (*FS,* p. 467).

According to Sartre, Freud, the analyst, masters his clinical art when he replaces scientific weightiness with playfulness and spontaneity, albeit within a framework of benign neutrality, that is, within the context of the analytic situation that is formal, tactful and courteous. The analyst is enjoined to engage his analysand; the attention and accessibility of the analyst to the patient reciprocate the injunction to the patient to say what comes to mind without censorship or delay. "[Freud] has retained his air of passionate, slightly crazy gaiety. Even in his voice there is something frivolous and wild. He is very sincere (through exploiting his sincerity): he means that an adventurer of science is everything but 'serious' " (*FS,* p. 482).

Freud creates an impasse with his patients when he violates his newly discovered method, engages in power struggles or verbal duels, or asserts his authority and insists on the patient's compliance. All of these things provoke rebelliousness and create distance in the analytic situation because his patients try to protect themselves from being judged and dissected (*FS,* p. 488). When Sartre's Freud relinquishes the posture of the pitiless hunter or avid researcher and perceives the patient's call for help, the battle ends. He can be moved and his remarks become gentle (*FS,* p. 496). As we watch Freud integrating the analytic process, both the patient's inner resistance and his own internal resistance to the material begin to dissolve. When Cecily asks him not to disturb her chain of associations (*FS,* p. 497), he can respond with receptive silence. On the other hand, when Freud experiences shame, as when Cecily imagines herself as a prostitute, Freud derails the intersubjective analytic process by making premature, incorrect interpretations (*FS,* p. 500).

The method Freud develops encourages the analyst to listen and attend

to the vicissitudes of free association without knowing in advance what he may encounter. As the analyst begins to tolerate uncertainty, he learns to accept his and his patient's own capacity for surprise. Surprise generates insight and vitality in the analytic dialogue, opening up significant pathways for further psychic exploration. "She stops, taken aback. Freud is looking at her in astonishment: he realizes simultaneously that he has made a mistake and that he has just discovered a more important trail" (*FS,* p. 500). Surprise, then, can be amplified into joint conviction about the efficacy of the reflective process: "Thus the doctor and his patient look at one another, equally disconcerted, in mutual astonishment and curiosity" (*FS,* p. 501).

The climactic doctor/patient scene in Sartre's Freud scenario captures the mutual anguish and liberating potential of psychoanalytic therapy for both members of the dyad. This potential is fully intersubjective in that it is co-created and reciprocal. The episode pivots on Freud's willingness to disclose conflicted aspects of his own mental life to Cecily. These disclosures include secret details about Freud's family history which he has previously associated with powerful feelings of shame and guilt. Sartre clearly had strong convictions about this scene because he included a version of it in the original synopsis he wrote for Huston in 1958, in which Freud responds to a shattered Anna O. by revealing a screen memory in a flashback, voicing his erotic desire for his mother and his conflicted feelings of love, reproach and murderous intent toward his father (*FS,* p. 537). Cecily herself is racked by wildly fluctuating wishes toward both of her parents, an ambivalence with roots in an early childhood trauma which becomes attached to painful, disintegrating memories or converted into physical symptoms and feelings of humiliation and self-loathing.

SCENE IN CECILY'S ROOM.

CECILY: What are you thinking about?

FREUD: My past.

CECILY: Did I try to kill my mother?

FREUD: Yes. Or rather, it wasn't you who tried to do that, it was the child Cecily who came back from the dead and thought Madga was being sent away.

CECILY (*disgustedly*): The child Cecily was a little monster.

FREUD: No, she was a child. That's all. I've won Cecily. Thanks to you, I think I understand both of us. And that I can cure us. (*A pause*.) Do you know the story of Oedipus?

CECILY: He killed his father, married his mother and put his own eyes out, so he wouldn't be able to see what he'd done anymore.

FREUD: Oedipus is everybody. (*A pause*.) I must talk to you a bit about myself. In neuroses, I've viewed the parents as guilty and the children as innocent. That was because I hated my father. It's necessary to reverse the terms.

CECILY: It's the children who are guilty!

FREUD (*smiling*): Nobody's guilty. But it's the children who . . . (*Flashback to primal scene between Jakob and Frau Freud and two-year-old Sigmund*.)

FREUD: I loved my mother, in every way: she fed me, she cradled me, she took me into her bed and I was warm. (*Flashback to Freud's mother slipping between sheets of bed next to child*.)

FREUD: I loved her in the flesh. Sexually.

CECILY: You mean I was in love with my father?

FREUD: (*He speaks as if to himself. He seems to be almost asleep*.) I was jealous of mine because he possessed my mother. I loved him and hated him at the same time. (*FS,* pp. 370–71)

Sartre, here, is not advocating the practice of mutual analysis, in the manner of Sándor Ferenczi's experiments. He is not criticizing psychoanalytic technique from the perspective of antipsychiatry or existential psychoanalysis. Rather, through a dramatic, even a melodramatic, version of psychological discovery, Sartre invents a dream-like sequence that leads to a joint epiphany. Sartre is making a philosophical statement about depth psychology, namely that the decisive moment of illumination in the history of psychoanalysis and in Freud's personal history involved a lived mutual relationship between two individuals, each of whom arrived at insight when they simultaneously learned to speak, decipher and hear. Such understanding could only occur within the light of a passionate, intimate, two-party relationship. Sartre condenses this intersubjective process into one sentence: "Cecily listens to him, but translates as she does so: it is her own story she hears" (*FS,* p. 371).

Sartre penned an important letter on November 9, 1963, to serve as the forward to R. D. Laing and David Cooper's book, *Reason and Violence*. In praising their efforts to construct "a truly human psychiatry," Sartre summarized his own thinking regarding the proper study of the family and how best to conceptualize mental illness. We can also view it as a critical commentary on his intentions in his scenario for Huston's *Freud*: "Like you, I believe that one cannot understand psychological disturbances *from the outside,* on the basis of a positivistic determinism, or reconstruct them with a combination of concepts that remain outside the illness as a lived experience. I also believe that one cannot study, let alone cure, a neurosis without a fundamental respect for the person of the patient, without a constant effort to grasp the basic situation and to relive it, without an attempt to rediscover the response of the person to that situationand like you, I thinkI regard mental illness as the way out that the free organism, in its total unity, invents in order to be able to live through an intolerable situation." [36] Sartre's scenario shows Freud and his patients within that lived intersubjective experience and able to reflect on it as part of a psychoanalytic dialogue. We witness Sartre's Freud as he gains respect for the patient's individuality, work-

ing systematically from the inside, jettisoning the remnants of nineteenth-century positivism and medical detachment, while he carries out the affective and subjective experience of his own self-analysis.

The Bonds of Paternity: A Portrait of Freud

In a celebrated passage of his autobiography, *The Words* (1963), Sartre attributed his life-long theory and practice of freedom to the death of his father, Jean-Baptiste Sartre, which occurred when he was fifteen months old. The paragraph concludes with a psychoanalytic reference, which can also be read as a provocation:

> The death of Jean-Baptiste was the big event of my life: it sent my mother back to her chains and gave me freedom.
>
> There is no good father, that's the rule. Don't lay the blame on men but on the bond of paternity, which is rotten. To beget children, nothing better; to *have* them, what iniquity! Had my father lived, he would have lain on me at full length and would have crushed me. As luck had it, he died young. . . . I move from shore to shore, alone and hating these invisible begetters who bestraddle their sons all their life long. I left behind me a young man who did not have time to be my father and who could now be my son. Was it a good thing or a bad? I don't know. But I readily subscribe to the verdict of an eminent psychoanalyst: I have no Superego. [37]

Instead of dismissing this passage as bravado or evidence of Sartre's psychological naiveté, I would like to propose that we read Sartre ironicallythat the death of his father was an event of monumental significance in his life and that Sartre, as a result of writing this work on Freud, was conscious of it. Writing Freud's fictional biography allowed Sartre to undertake some of the work of paternal mourning. In describing how Freud navigates the bonds of paternity with his various father surrogates and finally his own father, we can observe Sartre coming to terms with the psychological burden of being fatherless.

The Freud of Sartre's scenario is not the usual Hollywood protagonist. He has depth, texture, inner divisions and he does not particularly like himself. He resembles the mental patients he treats. Sartre's Freud is burdened by multiple psychical symptoms which are probably manifested as physical problems, including arrhythmia, breathlessness and burning around the heart (*FS,* p. 528). Moreover, he is phobic about traveling in trains, which is a displacement of his deep-seated fear of death, and he is addicted to cigars (*FS,* p. 510).

Emotionally, Sartre's Freud possesses many traits common to a depressive personality: he is frequently gloomy, tense, ascetic, secretive, preoccupied with himself and uncertain of his ability to escape his own madness (*FS,*

p. 87). He is melancholic, has difficulties in regulating his self-esteem and is torn apart by destructive impulses and a powerful desire for independence which is constantly thwarted. He is ashamed of his poverty and has great difficulty building a private practice that can support his large family. For Sartre, Freud's material poverty is linked to being Jewish in an antisemitic context. It becomes a persistent source of anger and resentment that drives his sadism, self-loathing and contempt for others (*FS,* p. 395).

One of the chief tensions of the script revolves around Freud's capacity to work through his aggressivity: skill he turn his gaze against himself in the form of self-disgust and self-sabotage? Will he turn it against his patients, thereby returning to the stance of the cold physician who dominates his patients (*FS,* p. 210)? Or, will he be able to follow Charcot and move toward self-clarification and the caring alleviation of his patients' misery (*FS,* p. 250)?

Sartre's Freud, then, is astonishingly vulnerable: he is persistently depressed and lost; he is often furious and dismayed; and he experiences himself in the world as if he were a monster and his affective state as if he were someone vile (*FS,* p. 276). The face of this young man reflects his tortured inner world (*FS,* pp. 394, 399).

I do not want to suggest that Sartre's portrait of Freud is one-sided, static or excessively pathologizing. As he was carrying out his research for the project, he delightedly said to his colleague, the psychoanalyst J.-B. Pontalis (both were on the editorial board of *Les Temps Modernes*), "That Freud of yours, I must say, he was neurotic through and through." [38] Coming from Sartre, this was a compliment of the highest order. The neurotic Freud also has healthy and admirable traits, especially an indomitable quest for knowledge, a boundless curiosity. Sartre's Freud moves from someone who does not know, but wants to know, to one who creates an innovative method for investigating and uncovering psychic reality. As a man with a rigorous background in science, Freud is devoted to rational thinking and empirical experimentation, even when his subject became the irrational (*FS,* p. 20).

Freud's empathic understanding of the other is thematized in the screenplay through a dramatization of the vicissitudes of his self-analysis. In the absence of viable options and because of a logic internal to the structure of his own character, Freud turns to teachers, colleagues and mentors, in short, to father surrogates, to find his way. Three main father surrogates receive extensive and, at times, riveting attention in Sartre's scenario: Freud's teacher, the neurologist and psychiatrist Theodor Meynert; Freud's friend and older colleague, the psychiatrist Josef Breuer; and the Berlin nose and throat specialist, the slightly younger Wilhelm Fliess.

Meynert plays a disappointing and destructive role throughout the script. In a splendidly rendered scene at his death bed, lifted from Freud's *Inter-*

pretation of Dreams, [39] Freud receives some belated recognition from this scientific father. Meynert confesses that he has been a (male) hysteric his entire life. His pompous academic bearing disguised this shameful secret; his hypocritical scientific rhetoric served to deny his symptoms: "I've kept the secret . . . all my lifeeven from myself; I've refused to know myself" (*FS,* p. 135). The scene concludes with the dying Meynert urging Freud to resume his courageous research into the unconscious roots of neurosis, even if it means scrutinizing Freud's own darkest and most painful secrets: "A disciple of knowledge must *know,* mustn't he? I don't know who I am. It's not I who has lived my life: it's an Other. Break the silence. Betray us. Find the secret. Expose it to the light of day, even if it means revealing your own. It's necessary to dig, deep down. Into the mud" (*FS,* p. 136).

Freud's relations with Breuer are even more complicated than with Meynert. Breuer becomes an intimate friend, co-worker and supporter of Freud, and there is genuine warmth between their two families. Though both Freud and Breuer are secular Jews, Freud is militantly atheistic and irreverent in his attitudes while Breuer is assimilationist. Freud accepts money and patient referrals from Breuer with ambivalent feelings because he wants to be independent and he is acutely wary of his vulnerability to financial dependence. (Breuer is well established in Viennese medical circles and has built up a wealthy clientele.)

In Sartre's script, Breuer establishes an easy rapport with Cecily, a young, attractive, intelligent and remarkably sensitive hysterical patient. The "strange and profound bond" between them develops into an erotic transference (*FS,* p. 146). When Breuer is confronted with the fact that Cecily has fallen in love with him, immense difficulties arise because he remains oblivious to his own erotic feelings for her (*FS,* pp. 523–24). Sartre shows that Breuer cannot organize these disorienting urges because he has no theory or technique to calm his anxieties: he has rejected Freud's theory of the sexual etiology of neuroses as repugnant.

Sartre dramatizes the situation further by indicating Mathilde Breuer's concern about the amorous bond between her husband and Cecily, followed by her jealousy and rage. She pressures Breuer to take her on a second honeymoon to Venice to remove him from Cecily. Breuer declares prematurely that Cecily is cured but the day he leaves, Cecily manifests the symptoms of hysterical childbirthshe imagines she is pregnant with Breuer's child. Freud is called to help Cecily through this emergency, but her mother wonders if her daughter's illness was not iatrogenic, that is, precipitated by Breuer's mismanagement of the case.

Just as Cecily was abandoned by her physician because of unresolved and barely acknowledged erotic transferences to her, so too was Freud abandoned by Breuer. In advancing his more radical theories concerning the

sexual origins of neuroses and the ways in which repression becomes the motive force of intrapsychic conflict, causing defensiveness, compromise formations, guilt and disturbances of memory, if not amnesias, Freud would be forced to go it alone. Sartre's Freud reacts strongly to Breuer's abandonment: he feels betrayed and temporarily depleted of strength, which leads to a crisis in self-confidence and self-assurance. Freud needs to take stock of himself to prevent himself from falling under the sway of a beloved authority figure.

According to Sartre's scenario, Freud regains his composure when he begins to formulate the psychoanalytic theory of transference, which helps him comprehend his own and Breuer's therapeutic failures and also enables him to grasp the structural motive for Cecily's feelings and fantasies toward Breuer (which are displaced onto him when he begins to treat her). An intersubjective analysis of transference provides Freud with a way to understand the meaning of Breuer's betrayal of him, his weakness. Only through confronting the intense affective bond between physician and patient, only through acceptance of the inevitability of transference as a revised edition of older and more primitive relationships, will Freud be able to see his way clear. These new editions of some earlier persons are aroused and displaced onto the person of the physician. The work of analysis is to bring these facsimiles into focus, to extrapolate the latent meanings in them.

Freud's resolution of his transferential relationship with Fliess will yield the concept of the transference neurosis, a cornerstone of Freud's analytic therapy. Fliess presented Sartre's Freud with a new challenge, namely pursuing his research as a visionary and building theory as a prophet (*FS,* p. 172). Fliess exhorted Freud to be great and to believe unconditionally in his greatness. They were twins according to Fliess, scientific geniuses of the same mold. If Freud was awed by Fliess's Prussian demeanor and by his mathematical intellect, he was equally fascinated by Fliess's concept of constitutional bisexuality and by his theories of sexual rhythms and periodicity.

As Sartre's plot unfolds, Fliess reveals himself to be another omnipotent doctor, only this time without the modesty of the scientific researcher or the caretaking vocation of the clinical healer. In breaking with Fliess, Freud deepens his introspective abilities: he discovers his unconscious desire for a master (*FS,* p. 317) and learns that an intense attraction to friends often conceals the opposite need, namely to hate the person he loves (*FS,* p. 273). Breaking with Fliess enables him to pursue his own project autonomously, without being under anyone's orders or conceptual umbrella. Freud's next task is to understand and work through his unconscious hostility to his own father (*FS,* pp. 376–77). The break with Fliess, then, becomes truly emancipatory in a Freudian sense: it leaves a man of forty who knows, despite his

fears, that he must relinquish what is infantile in himself, including an array of self-deceptions and psychological ignorance, in order to approach maturity (*FS,* p. 273).

Sartre's script contains a number of riveting scenes with members of Freud's family. Freud's father, Jakob, is described as something of a babbler, a bit senile, but with a natural capacity for tenderness. He is seventy but appears much older. Freud realizes he harbors a vast unregulated supply of anger and guilt, remorse and embarrassment toward his enfeebled father. He is unable to look at him. Freud associates Jakob's financial troubles with an even more profound sense of disillusionment. As a boy, Freud had idealized his father, seeing him as an incarnation of Moses: strong, hard and implacable. In reality, Jakob was a flawed and frightened human being, intimidated by superior forces in society, unable to summon up courage. Sartre narrates a scene that takes place in 1862 when Sigmund, then six years old, and Jakob, then forty-five, are confronted by a heavyset, well-dressed anti-Semite who forces them onto the street: "Not on the sidewalk, Jew!" The man is haughty and menacing, knocking Jakob's cap into the gutter, exclaiming, "Pick up your cap and stay in the roadway" (*FS,* pp. 284–85). Jakob's obsequiousness as he stoops to pick up his cap in this humiliating situation enrages his son. It also demolishes Freud's intense idealization of his father.

Later that evening, in view of his father's apparent cowardice and weakness, Freud draws a lesson from Roman history: "Hamilcar makes his son Hannibal swear to avenge the Carthaginians." Freud is identified with Hannibal the avenger, insisting that his father is Hamilcar. The child then savagely intones, "I mean to avenge my father, the hero Hamilcar, and all the humiliated Jews. I shall be the best of all, I shall beat everybody, and I shall never retreat." Sartre adds that this episode will weigh on "his son's entire life," the struggle to eradicate being ashamed of his father (*FS,* pp. 286–87).

The day after Jakob's funeral in 1896, Sartre's Freud remains tormented about his dead father, telling Fliess, "His death is driving me mad." Freud needs to come to terms with this shattering event: "Whether he hates him or loves him doesn't matter; the event that counts most in a man's life is his father's death" (*FS,* p. 536). This is a paraphrase of the celebrated passage in the preface to the second edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams,* in which Freud announces the subjective intention of his text, namely, "my reaction to my father's deaththat is to say, to the most important event, the most poignant loss of a man's life." [40]

To come to terms with his surges of monstrous hatred for his father, somewhat incomprehensible because of a faint but persistent love for him, Freud decides to conduct a self-analysis. It begins when he admits: "What

makes you think I'm not repressing, in the depths of my unconscious, some childhood memory that is . . . vile? I ought to apply my own method to myself. If only I could squeeze myself like a lemon. . . ." Echoing a phrase from Cecilly, it is again the patient and the analytic setting, that is, the intersubjective context, that shows Freud the way toward authentic self-awareness (*FS,* p. 342).

One aspect of his self-analysis allows Freud to accept the intersubjective sources of his own jealousy and hostility toward his father without blaming either his father or himself for weakness. He begins to understand his father's situation more realistically and historically: "And out of jealousy I accused him of being incapable of raising or even feeding his family. But it wasn't true: it was anti-Semitism that ruined him" (*FS,* p. 371).

In the final scene in the screenplay, we find Freud in front of Jakob's grave in the Jewish cemetery in Vienna. Freud encounters Breuer there, and begins to realize the strength and durability of his psychological change. With his father dead, he can now admit, "A part of myself is buried there." Freud resolves to pursue his self-analysis, applying the method of free association and dream interpretation to himself so that he can liberate himself from the paralyzing ambivalence and infantilism of his thralldom to the other father figures in his life. Despite his father's tender love for him, Freud was both jealous and aggressive in return. The combination terrified him. Moreover, he realized that he was unable to accept the presence of unheroic weakness in Meynert, Breuer or Fliess because it aroused the memory of Jakob Freud's cowardice, the traumatic event of de-idealization before the anti-Semite (*FS,* pp. 380–81).

Freud, in effect, will no longer be torn apart by his chronic aggression toward his father figures and no longer obsessed with finding strong fathers to love and protect him. He can exploit his own abundant vitality that was depleted in perpetual struggles against himself. Having examined the deep sources of his hatred, he will be able to love again. Having buried his father and transcended his need for father surrogates, Freud has earned the right to be autonomous, to work alone, to be the sole witness and evaluator of his work, but more crucially to be a loving father to his own children and to his "adopted sonsmen who'll believe in my wordsif any such can be found. I'm the father now" (*FS,* p. 382). Both the insights and utterances of Freud at his father's grave are authentic because they are affectively charged; for the first time, he is able to gaze at his father's grave and read his father's name engraved on the tombstone. He does so with emotion, "tears beginning to roll down his cheeks" (*FS,* p. 383).

Sartre's original synopsis opens with Freud's voice-over, at age sixty, surrounded by his most trusted disciples. He reminisces: "Everything began with my father's death" (*FS,* p. 505). In working with patients who have suffered the traumatic loss of parents, Sartre's Freud clarified the central im-

portance of the psychic role of the father: "The Father! Always the Father! I felt acutely anxious; I don't know why. But I wanted to get to the bottom of it and I knew I'd go to the very end this time" (*FS,* p. 530). In 1901, where the script ends, Freud is described as "free, absolutely free" (*FS,* p. 538). Freedom means no longer needing a guardian, no longer being under somebody's influence or criticism, being relieved of internal criticism, no longer depressed or anxious, capable of choice, reflection and imagination. The renewed Freud is calm and can stand upright. He has just broken with Fliess.

A young physician arrives, someone who has been attending Freud's lectures at the university and who is familiar with his writings. The disciple senses the groundbreaking direction that Freud's work will take as well as its potential clinical benefit for mankind. He is full of enthusiasm and wishes to question his master. Freud, for his part, accepts him slightly ironically, but with courtesy and dignity, adding in voice-over narration: "I was forty-one. It was my turn to play the role of father" (*FS,* p. 539).

J.-B. Pontalis has questioned the view that Sartre was advancing either a "personal or original 'interpretation' " of Freud in *The Freud Scenario*. [41] I should like to disagree with his assertion by suggesting five original contributions.

First, Sartre's dialectical mind and his sensitivity to various forms of racism combine with a growing historical consciousness to transform his Freud scenario into an extension of his earlier reflections on the Jewish question. Sartre privileges Freud's social dilemmas as a secular Jew in Vienna, a point of view that is de-emphasized in the analytic literature and in Jones's biography, as well as in the Huston film.

Second, most accounts of the early Freud focus on his writings on the psychology of the unconscious via his elucidation of psychosexuality in human thought, fantasy and behavior. Sartre's portrait ingeniously displaces sexuality toward aggression. Perhaps because of the French writer's own violence and preoccupation with violence,[42] Sartre zeroes in on the vicissitudes of aggression in Freud's greatest decade of imaginative and theoretical fecundity. It is possible that Sartre's extremely negative transference to Huston which arose while he composed the script alerted him to Freud's unconscious struggles with transference figures and with his own hostile urges. Sartre's focus on aggression and its vicissitudes explains the gloominess of the portrait, but also the exuberant aspects of Freud's liberation from his internal oppression. Sartre's fictional biography shows Freud gradually coming to terms with his vengeful resentment, the sadistic aspects of his guilt, the masochistic aspects of his shame, and resolving both his superego and his ego ideal pathology.

Third, Sartre dramatizes the subversive aspects of analytic methodthe dialectic of free association and meticulous analysis of transferencethrough

powerful scenes in which two characters interact. As Freud learns to respect his patients, he is able to work analytically from the inside, not from the safe distance of pseudo-scientific objectivity. By stressing the intersubjective aspects of the analytic dyad, Sartre makes an early compelling case for the constructivist point of view of psychoanalysis, namely that the analytic situation pivots around one subject interacting with another subject, establishing reciprocal attachments, mutual responsibilities, co-created meanings and a shared sense of process.

Fourth, Sartre avoids trivializing Freud's discovery of the Oedipus complex. He breathes new light into the concept by showing the Oedipal configuration from multiple points of view and from different perspectives of gender, generation and development. Sartre emphasizes Freud's realization and working through of his ego ideal and superego pathology.

Fifth, Sartre powerfully dramatizes three relationships which are deeply conflicted in different ways: between anti-Semite and Jew, on the one hand, and between physician and patient, father and son, on the other. From Sartre's perspective, all of these relationships are necessarily alienating. He shows how, in the context of Freud's lived history, these conflicts could dehumanize an entire group of men and women, reducing individuals to the condition of subhuman objects. Sartre's Freud is tormented by these converging predicaments, but struggles to overcome alienation and isolation, including the distortions of the self and the incoherence of thought and behavior that result from reification (the process of transforming a person into a thing). The resulting analytic process is shown to have striking effects on the perception and treatment of the mentally ill as well as on the difficulties of being a son in a patriarchal society.

The way out of reification in this text, the way of recapturing the authenticity of the other (as Jew, patient, son), turns simultaneously on practical and theoretical work. As he blurs the boundaries between mental illness and health, Freud will learn to see these relationships as dialectical ones that require a rigorous intersubjective approach. Freud's triumphant solution in the script occurs when he develops a discipline explicitly designed to help the analysand become conscious of the genuine sources of this alienation as well as his authentic needs and desires. That solution is optimistically offered to Sartre's audience through the vehicle of psychoanalytic intersubjectivity.

Notes

The author wishes to thank the following readers for their incisive critiques of this paper: Janet Bergstrom, Germaine Brée, Peter Gay, James Grotstein, Peter Loewenberg, George L. Mosse, Joseph Natterson, Robert Nye and Robert Stolorow.

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Words,* trans. Bernard Frechtman (1963; New York: Braziller, 1964) 122.

2. Gerald N. Izenberg, *The Existentialist Critique of Freud* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Charles Hanly, *Existentialism and Psychoanalysis* (New York: International Universities Press, 1979); Ivan Soll, "Sartre's Rejection of the Freudian Unconscious" in *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre,* ed. Paul A. Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1981) 582–604; Lee Brown and Alan Hausman, "Mechanism, Intentionality, and the Unconscious: A Comparison of Sartre and Freud" in Schilpp, *Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre,* 539–81.

3. Hazel E. Barnes, "Sartre's Scenario for Freud," *L'Esprit Créateur* 29:4 (1989) 52–64.

4. Betty Cannon, *Sartre and Psychoanalysis: An Existential Challenge to Clinical Metatheory* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991) 7–8.

5. Relatively positive assessments of *The Freud Scenario* may be found in Ronald Hayman, *Sartre: A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987) 351–68; Gertrud Koch, "Sartre's Screen Projection of Freud," *October* 57 (summer 1991) 3–17; Elisabeth Roudinesco, *Jacques Lacan & Co.: A History of Psychoanalysis in France, 1925–1985,* trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) 166. Though he does not analyze *The Freud Scenario,* see Douglas Collins, *Sartre as Biographer* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980) 89–91, 149–50 for Sartre's sensitivity to Freud and particularly his borrowing from the French psychoanalyst Angelo Hesnard.

6. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Method,* trans. Hazel E. Barnes (1963; New York: Vintage, 1968) 61.

7. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956) 557–615.

8. Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew,* trans. George J. Becker (New York: Schocken, 1948).

9. Sartre, *Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr,* trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Braziller, 1963).

10. John Huston, *An Open Book* (New York: Knopf, 1980) 303.

11. Barnes, "Sartre's Scenario for Freud," 63.

12. Sartre, "Itinerary of a Thought: Interview with Jean-Paul Sartre," *New Left Review* (1969), 45–47.

13. Sartre, "Self-Portrait at Seventy" in *Life/Situations: Essays Written and Spoken,* trans. Paul Auster and Lydia Davis (New York: Pantheon, 1977) 72.

14. Schilpp, "An Interview with, Jean-Paul Sartre" in Schilpp, *Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre,* 12.

15. J.-B. Pontalis, Preface, in Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Freud Scenario,* ed. J.-B. Pontalis, trans. Quintin Hoare (1984; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) xi, xiii.

16. Schilpp, *Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre,* 12; Elisabeth Roudinesco, "Sartre lecteur de Freud," *Les Temps Modernes* 46, nos. 531–33 (1990) 589–613.

17. Sartre, *Sartre on Theater,* ed. Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, trans. Frank Jellinek (New York: Pantheon, 1976) 130.

18. Sartre, *Quiet Moments in a War: The Letters of Jean-Paul Sartre to Simone de Beauvoir* (New York: Scribners, 1993) 297–300.

19. Huston, *An Open Book,* 295.

20. Sartre, *Quiet Moments in a War,* 300.

21. Huston, *An Open Book,* 295.

22. Gerald Pratley, *The Cinema of John Huston* (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1977) 133.

23. Huston, *An Open Book,* 289.

24. Huston, *An Open Book,* 301; Stephen Farber and Marc Green, *Hollywood on the Couch* (New York: Morrow, 1993) 157–59.

25. Huston, *An Open Book,* 297–99.

26. Sartre, *Sartre on Theater,* 320, n.9.

27. John Huston and Wolfgang Reinhardt, *Freud* (typescript, 1962; in University Research Library, Arts-Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles).

28. Huston, *An Open Book,* 298.

29. Dana Polan, "Sartre and Cinema," *Post-Script* 7:1 (1987), 66–88.

30. Krin Gabbard and Glen O. Gabbard, *Psychiatry and the Cinema* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) 106–110; Janet Walker and Diane Waldman, "John Huston's *Freud* and Textual Repression: A Psychoanalytic Feminist Reading," *Close Viewings,* ed. Peter Lehman (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1990) 282–300.

31. Sartre, *Sartre on Theater,* 131.

32. Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* (New York: Basic Books, 1953) vol. 1: 22, 292–93, 339; Ernest Jones, *Free Associations: Memories of a Psychoanalyst* (1959; New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Publishers, 1990) 199–205; Ernst Kris, Introduction to *The Origins of Psycho-Analysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Drafts and Notes: 1887–1902,* by Sigmund Freud, ed. Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud and Ernst Kris, trans. Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1954) 3–47.

33. Sartre, *The Freud Scenario,* 507–8; hereafter abbreviated *FS*.

34. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism,* trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947) 41.

35. Ibid., 17, 22, 35, 47, 49.

36. R. D. Laing and David G. Cooper, *Reason and Violence: A Decade of Sartre's Philosophy 1950–1960,* intro. J.-P. Sartre (New York: Pantheon, 1964) 6.

37. Sartre, *The Words,* 18–19.

38. Pontalis, Preface, xii.

39. Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,* trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953) V, 438.

40. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams,* xxvi.

41. Pontalis, Preface, xv:

42. Annie Cohen-Solal, *Sartre,* trans. Anna Cancogni (1985; New York: Pantheon Books, 1987) 44, 46, 63, 66, 72, 83, 153, 163, 181–82, 328, 509; Ronald Hayman, *Sartre: A Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987) 56, 88–89, 247, 252, 267, 271, 280, 282, 344–45, 384–85, 400, 422, 448–49, 474–80.

Six
Freud as Adventurer

Peter Wollen

In 1936 Sigmund Freud wrote an open letter to the then-famous French writer Romain Rolland on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. It was published the next year under the title "A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis." [1] In this letter Freud described an incident which occurred on an unplanned trip to Athens, which he made in 1904, accompanied, as he often was on his vacation travels, by his younger brother, Alexander. Naturally, Freud went to visit the Acropolis, where he experienced a feeling that he described as follows: "By the evidence of my senses I am now standing on the Acropolis, but I cannot believe it."[2] This *Entfremdungsgefühl,* or feeling of estrangement, this unsettling doubt as to the reality of his experience, Freud saw as a defensive measure, an act of repudiation. The basis for this repudiation lay in Freud's own childhood doubts that he would ever see Athens.

> It seemed to me beyond the realm of possibility that I should travel so farthat I should "go such a long way." This was linked up with the limitations and poverty of our condition of life. My longing to travel was no doubt also an expression of my wish to escape from that pressure, like the force that drives so many adolescent children to run away from home. I had long seen clearly that a great part of the pleasure of travel lies in the fulfillment of these early wishes, that it is rooted, that is, in dissatisfaction with home and family. When first one catches sight of the sea, crosses the ocean and experiences as realities cities and lands which for so long had been distant, unattainable things of desireone feels oneself like a hero who has performed deeds of improbable greatness.[3]

The longing to travel, to escape from the limitations of family life, to run away from home, was very deep-seated in Freud. In the heroic period of the

discovery of psychoanalysis, Freud's letters to Wilhelm Fliess [4] make it abundantly clear how important it was for him, despite shortage of money, despite pressures of work and family, despite anxieties about railroad accidents and heart failure, to get away from home, to travelto climb mountains, to descend into caves, to go on sea voyages, to visit distant cities in foreign lands. Not only that: Freud saw his intellectual work in the same kind of terms (work which we now see as laying the foundations of psychoanalysis). He was embarked, metaphorically, on a voyage of intellectual discovery, an exploration of the unknown.

On April 28, 1896, after giving a paper, "On the Aetiology of Hysteria," to the Vienna Society for Psychiatry and Neurology, Freud wrote to Fliess, complaining about the "icy reception" given him by "the donkeys" and Richard von Krafft-Ebing's peremptory dismissal of his thesis as a "fairytale": "This, after one has demonstrated to them the solution of a more-than-thousand-year-old problem, a *caput Nili* [source of the Nile]."[5] On January 3, 1897, he wrote to Fliess: "Dear Wilhelm, We shall not be shipwrecked. Instead of the channel we are seeking, we may find oceans, the more detailed exploration of which will be left to those who come after us, but if we do not prematurely capsize, if our constitutions can stand it, we shall arrive. *Nous y arriverons*."[6] On August 26, 1898, he wrote: "I shall be able to make good use of Nansen's dreams; they are completely transparent. I know from my own experience that his psychic state is typical of someone who dares to do something new and relies on his confidence and who, by taking a wrong route, probably discovers something original, but far less than he had anticipated."[7] On May 28, 1899: "I gave myself a present, Schliemann's *Ilios,* and greatly enjoyed the account of his childhood. The man was happy when he found Priam's treasure, because happiness comes only with the fulfillment of a childhood wish. This reminds me that I shall not go to Italy this year. Until next time!"[8] Throughout this period he compared the completion of *The Interpretation of Dreams* with the longed-for attainment of Rome. (And of Karlsbad, the spa-resort, to which, in a Jewish joke loved by Freud, a poor Jew is traveling without a ticket. Taken off the train at each station and beaten, he persists in his journey, confident he will get there, "if my constitution can stand it.")[9]

Most dramatically of all, on February 1, 1900, the dream book now published, ignored and derided, Freud wrote to Fliess, telling him that "I am actually not at all a man of science, not an observer, not a thinker. I am by temperament nothing but a *conquistador*an adventurer, if you want it translatedwith all the curiosity, daring and tenacity characteristic of a man of this sort. Such people are customarily esteemed only if they have been successful, have really discovered something, otherwise they are dumped by the wayside."[10] And then on May 7 of the same year, he confided that "it would be a fitting punishment for me that none of the unexplored regions

of psychic life in which I have been the first to set foot will ever bear my name or obey my laws." And, he continues, "Yes, I really am forty-four now, an old, somewhat shabby Jew." [11]

Freud the adventurerplainly this was the Freud that John Huston admired, identified with and saw as the subject of his film. Huston had cut his industry teeth as a screenwriter on bio-pics for Warners in the late thirties: Benito Juarez, the Mexican revolutionary; Dr. Paul Ehrlich, the German discoverer of a cure for syphilis; Alvin York, the First World War hero recycled for the fight against Fascism. Huston saw himself (or himselves) as an adventurer too. His autobiographical romance, *An Open Book,*[12] began its narrative with the life of his maternal grandfather, John Gore, after whom Huston was named. He describes how his grandmother, Adelia, came to marry: "Security played no part in Adelia's choice. She married the adventurer, John Gore. Their daughter, Reah Gore, was my mother."[13] Gore was a footloose pioneer in the opening up of the West, who made and lost fortunes and died penniless in a rundown hotel in Waco, Texas, an empty half-pint whiskey bottle on the floor beside his bed. Huston's mother (Rhea), a professional reporter, married an itinerant actor, Walter Huston, threw him out, married again, left her new husband, "bored with the narrow, formal society of the St. Paul suburbs,"[14] and eventually embarked on a life of travel. Huston imbibed the ethos of adventure from his earliest years and lived it to the full, as he understood it, wandering from home to home, making and losing millions, gambling, womanizing, fighting, hunting, stealing and mesmerizing. (Literally! He learned how to hypnotize from a psychiatrist when he made his film about war trauma, *Let There Be Light*.)

In his early twenties, Huston (who, like Freud and Sartre, became an atheist) was much impressed by William Bolitho's book *Twelve Against the Gods,* a hagiographic account of the lives of twelve adventurers, with an introduction that, Huston confessed, "had an enormous effect on my life."[15] It is a trashy book, but the introduction provides a kind of racy justification for the wish to run away from home. A few samples:

> The adventurer is an outlaw. Adventure must start with running away from home . . . . The moment one of these truants breaks loose, he has to fight the whole weight of things as they are; the laws, and that indefinite smothering aura that surrounds the laws, that we call morals; the family, that is the microcosm and whiplash of society; and the dead weight of all the possessors, across whose interwoven rights the road to freedom lies . . . . The adventurer is a truant from obligations. . . . His first enemy we know, the mechanical interlocking weight of law, social and moral. The second is the unknown itself . . . . If he fails, he is a mere criminal.[16]

Bolitho notes that "every age produces its peculiar type, conquerors in antiquity, discoverers in the Middle Ages, prospectors in the nineteenth century . . . . Concurrently the field has cramped with the mapping of the world.

The geographical unknown, the easiest of access and the most naively alluring, has gone. There is a telephone line to Lhasa, flags on each pole. . . ." He asks, "Is adventure, with these handicaps, a thing of the past?" The astute reader might well pause on the example of one of the twelve, Mahomet, and the observation that the religious adventurer must make, not an earthly journey, but "the grand Dante circuit of Heaven and Hell." [17]

This was the image that governed Huston's view of Freud, and as we know ("*Flectere si nequeo superos Acheronta movebo*")[18] was in Freud's own mind from 1896 onward. The idea of a film about Sigmund Freud came to Huston and Wolfgang Reinhardt while they were writing *Dr. Ehrlich's Magic Bullet* for Warners: an obvious transition from the cure for venereal disease of the body to the cure for that of the mind. *Freud,* howeveran independent production under Huston's own controlwas to be different from those old genre films, with their lovable Zola and their banal Pasteur. This *auteur* biopic would be full of "sheet lightning and sulfur";[19] it would breathe brimstone: "Freud's descent into the unconscious should be as terrifying as Dante's descent into Hell. With this in mind, Wolfgang and I went to Paris to see Jean-Paul Sartre."[20] Huston was a long-time admirer of Sartre's work. His friend and collaborator, Peter Viertel, recounts how, on the occasion of his first meeting with another literary hero, Ernest Hemingway, Huston provocatively praised Sartre and vigorously defended him against Hemingway's onslaught, refusing to concede to the old monster on the worth of Sartre's *The Age of Reason*.[21] But, of course, it was *No Exit* that Huston had in mind when he went to Paris in 1958 to discuss *Freud*. *No Exit* was Sartre's own vision of Hell as bad faith and objectification by others, which Huston had himself produced, to great acclaim, on the New York stage.

Sartre too was surprisingly preoccupied by the theme of adventure. He traced the origin of this formative character trait in his autobiographical romance, *The Words,* started just before the Freud script, but completed immediately afterward. There he recounts how, barely able to read, he would browse in his grandfather's library: "I launched out into incredible adventures. I had to climb up on chairs, on tables, at the risk of causing avalanches that would have buried me. The works on the top shelf remained out of reach for a long time."[22] There he embarked on "voyages" through the world of writing, a world of infinite variety, there he "would be La Pérouse, Magellan, Vasco da Gama," there he "would discover strange natives" and "distant, impenetrable Kaffirs would spring out at the turn of a page."[23] Endlessly reading, and taken also to the cinema, the child Sartre played out the roles of knight-errant, swashbuckler, vagabond, outlaw. Finally, when he was about eight years old, these imaginary little Jean-Pauls crystallized around the figure of Pardaillan, the adventure hero created by the popular novelist Michel Zévaco: a swashbuckler on the side of the people, fighting against tyrants, who "made and unmade Empires, and, in the fourteenth century,

predicted the French Revolution." [24] Soon Sartre began to write, imitating and exaggerating Zévaco. "I wanted to change the adventure novel radically. I threw verisimilitude overboard. I multiplied enemies and dangers tenfold."[25] His explorer hero performed incredible feats, an extreme adventurerSartre notedwho later reappeared in his mature work as Goetz von Berlichingen,[26] the monster-martyr of *The Devil and the Good Lord* (a play Huston had earlier wanted to film, even discussing the project with Sartre while making *Moulin Rouge* in Paris).

Gradually Sartre transferred his investment from the adventure hero to the adventure writer: "Great writers are akin to knights-errant in that both elicit passionate signs of gratitude. . . . Despite their physical defects, their primness, their seeming femininity, writers risked their lives as free lances in mysterious combats." He chose to become "a true paladin whose exploits would be real books."[27] But the transference proved a difficult one: Pardaillan would never quite go away. He became one aspect of the writer, the knight who "had never taken orders from the king,"[28] who pulled himself up out of nothingness by his own bootstraps, a self-made rather than predestined writer-knight. Gradually, Sartre claims, the writer overcame the knight; he became an "ex-Pardaillan." Illusory victory: on the last page of the book, he admits "Pardaillan still inhabits me."[29]

Indeed, we continue to meet Pardaillan throughout Sartre's careerwith Sartre, in Sartre, as Sartre. In 1929, the summer he met Simone de Beauvoir, he bought secondhand copies of *Pardaillan* and *Fantomas* to give her, so that she could understand him; in the lean years of the thirties, his travel plans collapsed, his writings unpublished, he complained that Pardaillan was slipping away from him; and in the book that brought him his first success, *Nausea,* the central character, Roquentin, is a failed adventurer turned writer. In a passage cut from the published book, he noted, "The idea of traveling, or rather of adventure, became an obsession." And again: "Every single one of my theories was an act of conquest and possession. I thought that one day, with the help of them all, I'd conquer the world."[30] Like Freud, like Huston, Sartre dreamed of adventure and glory. Right at the end of his life, in the interviews Simone de Beauvoir published under the title *Adieux,* Sartre returned, unexpectedly, to the image of Pardaillan. De Beauvoir asked him about his always being "uncomfortable" in his own body and he replied: "Yes, but this is more complex, and it will lead us to Pardaillan." She pressed him further: "You spoke of Pardaillan. What did you mean?" Sartre replied that he had long ago developed "an imaginary body"that of Pardaillan, the swashbuckler, which gave him the feeling of being "a powerful warrior."[31] With this imaginary body, he acted more violently, as though the world was "heavier" than it really was, before being brought back to the ground by weariness and fatigue. He described how, before he could even read, he saw himself climbing up into blazing houses to rescue young girls

by carrying them out on his back. He remembered going to the gymnasium and boxing (as Huston did, too) and even fighting a match when he was in a prison camp, disappointed that the result was a draw: "Pardaillan didn't have drawn matches." [32] He talked about his denial of age, his wish to be young, and, finally, most revealingly of all, his work-related addiction to amphetamines, to speed: "I perceived myself through the motion of my pen, my forming images and ideas. I was the same active being as Pardaillan, neglecting. . . ." "The real body," de Beauvoir cut in, "which was in the act of destroying itself and against which you always had an almost aggressive attitude."[33]

Thus the knot was tied, linking Freud, Huston and Sartre, three musketeers, bound together by the red thread of adventure, an adventure which led all three to glory: to the Royal Society in London (Freud's name joined to those of Newton and Darwin), to the Oscar ceremony in Los Angeles (Best Screenplay, Best Director), to the Nobel Prize, a nomination refused, a journey to Stockholm gloriously unmade. It is time now to return to Athens, to the Acropolis, where, his goal accomplished, Freud felt alienated from the evidence of his achievement, from his personal moment of glory. After discussing his adolescent fantasy of running away from home, of leaving the familiar far behind, Freud went on to discuss the feeling of transgression that had ruined his enjoyment, his transgression against the paternal imago. "It must be that a sense of guilt was attached to the satisfaction in having gone so far: there was something about it that was wrong, that was from the earliest times forbidden. It was something to do with a child's criticism of his father, with the undervaluation that took the place of the overvaluation of earlier childhood. It seems as though the essence of success were to have got further than one's father, and as though to excel one's father were still something forbidden."[34] It was the feeling of "piety" that had "interfered" with the "enjoyment."

Sartre made Freud's relationship with his father the central issue of his scenario for Huston's *Freud*. His synopsis started with a voice-off: "Everything began with my father's death," and ended with a Wellesian "bookend," another voice-off: "I was forty-one. It was my turn to play the role of father." Freud had finally come to the realization that he loathed and hated his father, because he desired his mother, but also because he "reproached him with being too old, with not having been able to help him, with having left him destitute. And these reproaches hid his jealousy and his secret wish to see him die."[35] Freud had discovered the Oedipal drama within himself. Throughout the period of the film, Sartre noted, Freud, "dissatisfied with his own father, has transferred his filial affection" to a succession of paternal figures: Theodor Meynert, Josef Breuer, Fliess. At last, having completed his self-analysis, having gone "down to the hidden depths," he is "finally free, absolutely free." "He's beginning to live."[36] The last image of the film, as

described in the synopsis, was to be that of a young doctor coming up to Freud, asking to share his compartment in the train with him, to ask him questions, to try and understand the implications of Freud's work. In a word, to play the role of son to Freud's father, an offer Freud accepts, ironically, unenthusiastically, but nonetheless willingly.

Sartre's version of Freud's discovery of psychoanalysis roughly followed the standard Freudian version of the romance: through his self-analysis, Freud came to abandon the full-scale "seduction theory" of hysteria, emphasizing instead the role of fantasy and infantile sexuality. It was the death of his father in 1896 which freed Freud to complete his self-analysis, and thus to acknowledge the aggressivity which, Freud now believed, had led him to wish the worst of his father and even suspect him of incest. The seduction theory had posited widespread paternal sexual abuse of children in the real world, not excepting Freud's own father from guilt. In contrast, the Oedipal theory, which now moved to center stage, accused the sons instead, but only of parricidal fantasies, a much lighter charge, and one which maintained a degree of "piety" toward the father. His father now dead, his self-analysis complete, Freud was thus able to assume the paternal role himself (and, in Sartre's synopsis, to be treated with the proper "piety").

It is undoubtedly odd that Sartre should end up apparently so close to orthodox Freudianism, when, as is well known, he was generally extremely critical of Freudian psychoanalysis and dubious about many of its central tenets, including the unconscious, the Oedipus complex, the role of fantasy, and so on (although the Magda episodes, which Huston was "prevailed upon" to cut, did show some reservation). To see how this alignment of Sartre and Freud came about, I think we have to look more closely at the central issue which is at stake in any attempt to tell the story of Freud's years of discovery: the role played by the father in the life of his son. Sartre himself, paradoxically perhaps, was extremely hostile to fatherhood, certainly as an institutional reality. While he was sitting around in Huston's country house in Ireland, supposedly invited to lick the scenario for *Freud* into shape, he received the reviews of his latest play, *The Condemned of Altona*. This was a play which clearly demonstrated the baleful influence exerted by a father, in this case a leading industrialist, the dynastic head of a Hamburg shipbuilding firm, over his son, who became an SS officer, a mass murderer. In Sartre's words, he was "doomed to impotence by his father's power" [37] and driven to seek a twisted form of power for himself through the SS. It is perhaps Sartre's most extreme attack on fatherhood, transferring responsibility for the son's massacres from the Nazi son, "gripped by the past," to the capitalist father who despised the Nazis but, of necessity, for the good of the firm, colluded with them. This reflected, of course, Sartre's growing anticapitalist militancy during the Algerian war.

Then, immediately after writing his scenario for *Freud,* Sartre completed

The Words, in which he celebrated his own lack of a father. Sartre's father, Jean-Baptiste Sartre, something of an adventurer himself, had died when Sartre was only one year old, of an infection contracted in Indochina. In *The Words,* he writes: "The death of Jean-Baptiste was the big event of my life: it sent my mother back to her chains and gave me freedom. There is no good father, that's the rule. Don't lay the blame on men but on the bond of paternity, which is rotten. To beget children, nothing better; to *have* them, what iniquity! Had my father lived he would have lain on me at full length and would have crushed me. As luck would have it, he died young." The same paragraph ends with the following words: "I readily subscribe to the verdict of an eminent psychoanalyst: I have no Superego." [38] In other words, no guilt. (Is this so very different from Huston's remark about the unconscious, which Sartre derided: "In mine, there's nothing at all"?)[39]

In the *Freud* scenario, Sartre dealt with Jakob Freud's death through the analysis of a dream. On November 2, 1896, Freud wrote to Fliess thanking him for his letter of condolence and then recounting a dream which he had the night after his father's funeral. "I was in a place where I read a sign: 'You are requested to close the eyes.' I immediately recognized the location as the barbershop I visit every day."[40] Freud later gave another account of this same dream in *The Interpretation of Dreams,* in which he suggested a possible variant for the wording of the sign ("You are requested to close an eye") and also noted that the "printed notice, placard or poster" was "rather like the notices forbidding one to smoke in railway waiting-rooms."[41]

In the earlier letter to Fliess, significantly, Freud mentioned that he "was kept waiting" in the barber's shop, which thus indeed became a kind of waiting room. As a result, Freud was then late arriving at the "house of mourning" which offended the assembled family, already irritated by Freud's insistence on a "quiet and modest" ceremony. Freud interpreted the words, "You are requested to close the eyes," both as an expression of his actual duty toward the dead (to close his father's eyes), and as an appeal by Freud to his family to overlook his own inadequate sense of filial duty. Or, as he put it, "the dream thus stems from the inclination to self-reproach that regularly sets in among the survivors." (This, of course, is similar to the self-reproach that Freud felt on the Acropolis.) Freud expanded a little on this in *The Interpretation of Dreams,* reading "close an eye" as "wink at" or "overlook," as he hoped that unsympathetic family members would overlook his own "puritanical simplicity" (which he justified now as reflecting his father's "own views on such ceremonies").

Plainly the dream may have reflected Freud's "self-reproach" as a survivor, but the underlying wish was the wish to be exculpated, as in the now-notorious dream of "Irma's injection." Exculpated of what? Survival? Being late to the funeral? Delving into his father's past? Perhaps all of these, but

also, of course, Freud's undeniable resentment and hostility toward his father, thrown into an embarrassing light by his father's actual death. Freud does not mention this. Indeed, in the public *Interpretation of Dreams,* rather than the private letter to Fliess, he does not even mention being late for the funeral, and even changes the date of the dream to the day before it took place! Moreover, his most hostile comment on his father was still to come, only three months later, in February, when he wrote to Fliess, apropos of child abuse: "Unfortunately, my own father was one of those perverts and is responsible for the hysteria of my brother [Freud's companion on the Acropolis] and those of several younger sisters." [42] In October, he mentioned the Oedipus story for the first time, but only in relation to his desire for his mother and consequent "jealousy" of his father, with no suggestion yet of parricidal impulses.

However, there was another important aspect of the dream which Freud also ignored: the association with "No Smoking" signs in railway waiting rooms. Three years earlier, in October 1893, Freud had written to Fliess, worried about his heavy smoking, and commenting that, "as far as smoking is concerned, I shall scrupulously follow a prescription of yours; I did this once before when you gave your opinion in regard to it (railroad stationperiod of waiting). But I did miss it greatly."[43] Freud, of course, remained addicted to smoking all his life. This addiction figured prominently in Sartre's script, perhaps because of the obvious analogy to Sartre's own problems with amphetamines and other drugs. Freud also worried about the possible connection that smoking might have with his heart problems, which he feared would kill him prematurely, fueling his "dread of dying." (Indeed, later scholars have wondered whether his heart problems shouldn't be classified as hysterical symptoms, without a real organic basis.) Fliess repeatedly tried to stop Freud from smoking, issuing prohibition after prohibition, which Freud somehow contrived to ignore or circumvent.

Fliess and Freud also discussed Freud's railway phobia a great deal, a phobia which did not actually stop Freud from traveling, but caused him considerable anxiety before boarding the train. Ernest Jones notes that "he retained in later life relics of the latter anxiety (*Reisefieber,* travel fever) in being so anxious not to miss a train that he would arrive at a station a long whileeven an hourbeforehand."[44] Thus smoking and station waiting rooms together played a crucial part in Freud's own neuroses. They were tied in to his relationship with Fliess, both because he traveled by train to see Fliess and because Fliess tried to prevent Freud from smoking while waiting for the train.

In his own analysis, of course, Freud was led to consider the light that childhood scenes could throw on these problems. In 1897 he concluded that addiction in general (alcohol, morphine, tobacco) was a substitute for

the "primary addiction" of compulsive masturbation. [45] He also argued that the sexual fantasies and longings associated with hysteria might originate from the repression of masturbation. At this point, Freud had not yet made the connections between sexual excitement, autoerotic activity and train travel, which he later described so vividly in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*.[46] Train travel appeared there as the epitome of pleasurable movement in general (rocking, swinging, shaking and so on) and Freud also noted that when the sexual pleasure of travel was repressed, it could lead to feelings of nausea, and sufferers "will be terribly exhausted by a railway journey, or will be subject to attacks of anxiety on the journey, and will protect themselves against a repetition of the painful experience by a dread of railway travel."[47]

Freud was quite explicit about the nature of the secondary sexual repression he had undergone in connection with railway journeys. When he was two years old, Freud's father uprooted his family from Freiburg, in Moravia (now the Czech Republic), and took them first to Leipzig, then to Vienna. This was Freud's first railway journey. Two incidents occurred which he later recounted. Passing through the station at Breslau, he remembered "the gas jets, which were the first I had seen, reminded me of the souls burning in hell. I know something of the context here. The anxiety about travel which I have had to overcome is also bound up with it."[48] On the train from Leipzig to Vienna, some time later, Freud's "libido towards *matrem* was aroused." During the journey, he wrote to Fliess, "we spent a night together, and I must have had the opportunity of seeing her *nudam*."[49] In the same letter, he also tells Fliess how he had discovered the "primary originator" of his own sexual life. It was not his father, as he had feared, but his nurse, "an ugly, elderly but clever woman who told me a great deal about God and hell, and gave me a high opinion of my own capacities."[50]

It is almost too good to be true. "You are requested to close the eyes": surely, if we are to follow Freud's own chain of associations, we should note that the blending of barber's shop into railway waiting room will lead us, via repressed memories and fantasies associated with train travel, not only to Freud's travel phobia but also to his tobacco addiction. The travel phobia takes us back to the early childhood scenes: scenes of sexual pleasure and fantasy ("libido towards *matrem,*" repressed scopophilia: "You are requested to close the eyes!") and to the fiery punishments of hell, imbibed from the Czech Catholic nurse and seductress: "Death and sexuality," the same pairing that disturbed Freud's memory of Luca Signorelli's great fresco at Orvieto, with its naked female bodies and its eternal flames of hell. And it was from Orvieto that Freud anxiously retreated to Lake Trasimene, Hannibal's furthest point south, only to remind him of his own frustrated longing for Rome (and for revenge on Rome).[51] Addiction, on the other hand, would

have led Freud back to the prohibition on masturbation, itself related to train travel, to his seduction perhaps, and ultimately to his father. And all these passing thoughts (these free associations) were themselves, Freud noted, like the transient views unreeling through the train window, accompanied by a deep longing. Later, in "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman," Freud described analysis itself as a form of train travel: "One may bring up as an analogy the two stages of a journey. The first comprises all the necessary preparations, today so complicated and hard to effect, before, ticket in hand, one can *at last* go on the platform and secure a seat in the train. One then has the right, and the possibility, of traveling to a distant country." [52] Waiting, then adventure. And, of course, we should also bear in mind the historical and phenomenological linkages between train travel and the cinema, each providing a sequence of views in movement. Finally, both smoking and trains were connected with adventure: smoking, like the speed of the train, gave Freud the sense of exhilaration he needed for his discoveries; trains, later supplemented by steamships, were his principal means of travel.

In Sartre's script, Fliess's prohibition on smoking in waiting rooms is clearly what marked him as a father-figure, despite his younger age than Freud's. Freud describes him as a tyrant, and is disappointed when Fliess permits him to smoke again: "In any case my real tyrant is you [not Breuer]. Do you know that you disappointed me when you allowed me to smoke. It gave me pleasure to deny myself in order to obey you."[53] In essence, Sartre's view, it seems to me, was that Freud needed Fliess so that he could be both, so to speak, "infantilized" and "feminized," which, in turn, would enable him to understand first his own and then Cecily's hysteria. Immediately afterward, Freud, after demonstrating his train phobia, boards the train and dreams of his three substitute fathers (Meynert, Breuer, Fliess), whom he joins in a smoking compartment to play cards. Suddenly they are replaced by Freud's own father, Jakob, who offers Freud his help, and Freud realizes he must understand his relationship to his own father if he is to free himself from the surrogates. Jakob then becomes the ticket inspector, punches their tickets, and the dream ends. In this fictional dream, the surrogate fathers have been revealed as "dead men," dummies (in the card-playing sense), and, on awakening, Freud muses on his need, as "the living one," to free himself from them.[54]

Sartre's view was that autonomy and freedom could only be achieved when the paternal bond was fully broken, not displaced onto others. In Sartre's own autobiographical example, the death of his father, Jean-Baptiste, freed him from an otherwise inevitable crushing weight of prohibitions, expectations and mandates. In the script, Freud, after Jakob Freud's death, is now able to exculpate his father from the accusations of sexual abuse Freud himself had made. The guilty father becomes innocent, no longer a burden,

and this in turn leads to Cecily's exculpation of her father. As required by the romance, the feeling of guilt is thus displaced from the father onto the children.

Soon afterward, Cecily's cure is completed after Freud explains the Oedipus story to her and she exclaims: "It's the children who are guilty." But Freud replies: "Nobody's guilty" [55] (i.e., "Don't lay the blame on men but on the bond of paternity") and tells how his own father's failures in life were brought about not by his own shortcomings, but by rampant antisemitism, not by an interior character flaw but by an exterior social force. Freud's earlier reproaches were thus based on a misunderstanding, a misrecognition of his father. Similarly, Cecily now comes to understand that her "monstrousness" too was simply imagined. The guilt she bore for driving her mother to suicide was a misunderstanding"It was an accident!"based on a misrecognition of her mother, who explains: "I swear to you. I never thought of killing myself. We're used to hardship in my family, and we live with our misfortunes."[56] Again, I think there is a subtext here. In Sartre's script, Freud's father once again becomes the shabby Galician Jew, and Cecily's mother is once again the working-class prostitute. Psychoanalysis was necessary to reach the point of cure, but the final moment of cure depended on the subjects (both Freud and Cecily) realizing that they have misrecognized their oppressive parents; instead they must now see their parents as themselves victims within a social (and political) perspective. Then, by implication, the aggression, instead of being mistakenly and guiltily directed against the imaginary parents, can presumably be freely turned on the real villains of the piece: the anti-Semites and the exploiters.

Sartre's project was one of enfolding a critique of psychoanalysis within marxism, and a critique of marxism within what we might call existential phenomenology, to create the foundations of a practical ethics. In the script, this final enfolding is demonstrated by the way in which the psychoanalytic work is presented as the joint project of Freud and Cecily, Freud's "teacher." They work through their neuroses together to arrive at a cure together. The unconscious, in this view of things, is not an entity, a continent to be discovered, but a history of secrets, masks and deceptions, encapsulated by the command, "You are requested to close the eyes"; it is the result of repeated choices not to see, not to acknowledge, not to remember. These choices may be motivated by a self-protective impulse, but, in Sartre's opinion, it is precisely this attempt to safeguard the self from reality that causes neurosis. The self-as-identity must be repeatedly undone, annihilated, in order for the subject to arrive at the point where he or she is free.

Analysis, in this sense, is similar to the progressive-regressive method which Sartre explained in his 1957 *Search for a Method,* a cyclical movement back into history and then forward again to the present, repeatedly narrowing and expanding the field of enquiry from individual detail to social general-

ity, always re-thinking oneself as one re-thinks the other. In preparing his script, Sartre worked from four main sources: Freud's own letters to Fliess, *Studies on Hysteria, The Interpretation of Dreams* and the first volume of the Jones biography. It is amazing to me how faithful to the Freudian record, as established by these books, Sartre was able to be, while at the same time proposing and experimenting with his own method of enquiry, one which was radically different from Freud's in its methodology. The key to this achievement, of course, was Sartre's assignment (by Huston) to the period of Freud's early self-analysis, a period before Freudianism congealed into a system and psychoanalysis into an institution. Precisely, we might say, the period when Freud was still an adventurer, not yet (quite) a law-giver.

A final word about "filial piety," the root cause of Freud's strange and quixotic feeling on the Acropolis. At the end of Sartre's synopsis, Freud, now cured, able to assume the paternal role, is faced by a son who comes to him in a spirit of "filial piety." [57] In the script, as opposed to the synopsis, the son never appears. Instead, Freud goes to lay a wreath on his father's grave. There, by chance, he encounters one of his "dead fathers," Breuer, who asks him, "Will you be able to love again?" Freud replies, "Yes. My children . . . and adopted sonsmen who'll believe in my wordsif any such can be found. I'm the father now."[58]

It is a very Sartrean moment. Sartre, of course, had only adopted children: surrogate sons, young men who believed his words (or wanted to)André Gorz, Olivier Todd (who rebelled), Benny Lévy, and finally, a daughter, Arlette El Kaim, whom he adopted legally and who thus became his sole legitimate heir. In this sense, he chose to burden a daughter with the paternal weight, leaving the sons, lighter, to leap forward. In his book *Search for a Father,*[59] Robert Harvey points out the ethical implications of Sartre's concept of the surrogate son, able to start from nowhere, but guided by a father-figure who could help him, without possessing or mandating him. This, of course, was what Jakob Freud was quite unable to do. Hence, in Sartre's view, Freud's conditional need for the three surrogate fathers. To run away from home, as far as the Acropolis, Freud needed to forge a more burdensome paternal bond to be broken. Sartre himself never faced this problem, or so he claimed. The bond was broken for him.

Huston's problem was quite different. "My only recurrent dream," he notes, on the third page of his autobiography, "is one in which I'm ashamed of being broke and having to go to my father for moneysomething that happened only a time or two, and then he pressed the money on me. There was an instance when I was flat-assed broke and didn't go to him, and, when he found out afterwards, he was deeply hurt. Why then should I have that dream in which I feel weak, dissolute and shiftless? It doesn't match up with anything, symbolically or otherwise."[60] In contrast to Sartre, on the subject of the paternal bond, it is remarkable that the Hustons are the only family

to have had three consecutive generations of Oscar winnersgrandfather, father, daughtereach standing where their father stood.

Strangely enough, Huston too had a surrogate son, Pablo Albarran, a teenage Mexican extra on the set of *Treasure of the Sierra Madre* to whom Huston took a liking, made his personal assistant and then brought home to California. Lauren Bacall remembered, "He was like a little pet. He was very cute and John decided he was this perfect little mascot." [61] Back in California, Huston's then-wife, Evelyn Keyes, found herself looking after Pablo: "This was one of the careless things John did. You don't bring a kid home when you're married without asking your wife."[62] Soon Pablo was sent off to boarding school and to college, eventually returning to Mexico and becoming a photographer, the first of many failed careers. Somehow Huston never got around to adopting Pablo officially and never seemed to have felt much responsibility for him. "That's your problem, isn't it?" he would say. He hired Pablo for illegal jobs in Mexico occasionally and then blamed him if things went wrong. Huston didn't reply to his letters and didn't visit when he came to Mexico. Finally, on location for *Reflections in a Golden Eye,* Huston did something: he hired Pablo as a messenger. "I thought I was treated like a slave," Pablo remarked. When Pablo's marriage broke up, Huston took his wife's side: "That was the end." Pablo ended up as a caretaker. He never tried to contact Huston again. "I think he would have felt better if I had," Pablo said. "But he taught me never to crawl. And that's the best lesson anybody could teach you."[63] Perhaps this story of surrogate fatherhood, the paternal bond and filial piety does something to explain John Huston's own single repeated dream.

Finally, there is Freud's own family. His daughter Anna became a model of filial piety, outlasting the surrogate sons (Carl Jung, Jones, etc.), never going too far, preserving Freud's memory and safeguarding his legacy. Loyal to her father, she opposed the making of the film *Freud,* and influenced it in an unusual way. Both Huston and Sartre, in a meeting of minds, thought that Marilyn Monroe was perfect to play Cecily, but Monroe's Los Angeles analyst told her that Anna Freud was against the film and she refused the part. Marilyn Monroe had seen Anna Freud herself briefly for psychoanalytic help in 1956, and her New York analyst was Marianne Kris, the daughter of Freud's family doctor. It was through Marianne Kris that Monroe left a substantial sum to Anna Freud's Hampstead Clinic. So there was nothing surprising in her rejection of a role in a film of which Anna Freud disapproved. Marilyn Monroe was simply the instrument of filial piety.

And, as Freud finally hinted in his letter to Romain Rolland, there was an insoluble contradiction between the two mandates his father had left him: first, to go far, to become an adventurer, to run away from home, from God and religion, to leave Galicia far behind and travel, not just to Freiburg or even the Viennese ghetto of Leopoldstadt, but all the way to the Acropolis;

and then the second mandate: to observe filial piety, the core of the very tradition that Freud was expected to leave behind. In this sense, Sartre, who had no filial piety of his own, was the ideal person to portray Freud the adventurer and, at the same time, show piety to Freud's father, the ineffective, old, uneducated, somewhat shabby Galician Jew who said nothing when his hat was knocked off into the gutter.

Notes

1. Sigmund Freud, "A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis," *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (hereafter *S.E.*), 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–74) XXII, 239.

2. Ibid., 243.

3. Ibid., 246–47.

4. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, ed., *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).

5. Ibid., 184. The source of the Nile, at the Ripon Falls on Lake Victoria Nyanza, had been first "discovered" by John Hanning Speke in the early morning of August 3, 1858. He announced this discovery in *Blackwood's Magazine* the following year and in 1863 he published his *Journal of the Source of the Nile,* but his claim was bitterly contested by a number of other geographers and explorers, led by Sir Richard Burton, Speke's former partner. The matter was due to be settled in September 1864 at the annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, where Speke and Burton were both invited to present their rival points of view in a kind of "Nile duel," as Burton put it. However, on the very day of the "duel," Speke accidentally shot himself while out hunting partridges, and controversy smoldered on until Henry Morton Stanley's expedition of 1874–77 confirmed Speke's claim. However, the Nile had still never been traversed continuously from mouth to source and, although "Baker of the Nile" (Samuel White Baker) and Colonel Charles George Gordon came close to this achievement, the Mahdist rising and the fall of Khartoum in 1885 blocked all further access from the North. In April 1894 Uganda was subjugated by the British, and early in 1896 the British Government appointed General Herbert Kitchener to lead an expedition south from Egypt to retake Omdurman and thus finally complete British control of the Nile from mouth to source, a goal eventually achieved by 1899, when, in Alan Moorehead's words, "by a new system of railways and steamers, it was now possible for a traveler to make his unmolested way along the entire length of the river" (Moorehead, *The White Nile* [New York: Harper, 1960]; Moorehead's book is the most informative study of this period of European exploration and imperial expansion). The main point I want to make is that the exploration and navigation of the Nile was still a topical issue at the very time Freud was writing.

6. Ibid., 219. This seems to be an allusion to Sir John Franklin's failure to find the Northwest Passage, and the wreck of the *Erebus* and the *Terror*. Freud later cited a dream by George Back, who took part in Franklin's first expedition, in *The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E.* IV, 132 (a footnote added in 1912).

7. Ibid., 323. Fridtjof Nansen's epic voyage in the *Fram,* an unsuccessful attempt to reach the North Pole by sea through the polar ice, took place from 1893 to 1896, and Nansen published his account of the journey in 1906. Freud included Nansen's dreams in *The Interpretation of Dreams,* which also has a section on "Explorers' Dreams," taken from Otto Nordenskjold, Mungo Park and others.

8. Ibid., 353. Heinrich Schliemann was first inspired to discover the ruins of Troy by a picture of Troy in flames in Ludwig Jerrer's *Illustrated History of the World,* a Christmas gift from his father when he was seven years old. From the moment he saw this engraving, he later claimed, he was determined to excavate the city. In 1870 he began digging at Hissarlik in Turkey, which he believed to be the true site of Troy, and in 1873 he discovered what he called "Priam's palace" and, soon afterward, a treasure of gold, silver and copper objects (diadems, rings, goblets, vases, etc.). In 1881 he published his book, *Ilios,* describing his discoveries (Leipzig: Brockhaus).

9. *The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E.* IV, 194–95. Freud first alludes to this dream in his letter to Fliess of January 3, 1897, cited above (Masson, *Complete Letters,* 219). On July 22, 1899, he compares completing the third part of his dream book ("the metapsychological") to attaining "Rome, Karlsbad," and he repeats the analogy, with increasing desperation, on September 16, 1899, October 9, 1899, and February 22, 1900 ("the stations at which one is thrown out are very numerous").

10. Masson, *Complete Letters,* 398. In this letter Freud describes himself "as in a continuous rage." See also the letter of April 14, 1898 (ibid., 309), in which Freud describes a caving expedition in the Alps, where the guide amused Freud with his commentary. In one cave, he was "full of humor. He was the discoverer of the cave, obviously a genius gone wrong; constantly spoke of his death, his conflicts with the priests, and his conquests in these subterranean realms. When he said that he had already been in thirty-six 'holes' in the Carso, I realized he was a neurotic and his conquistador exploits were an erotic equivalent." Another cave reminded Freud of Tartarus: "If Dante saw anything like this, he needed no great effort of imagination for his inferno." With Freud in this cave was Dr. Karl Lueger, the antisemitic "master of Vienna" and mayor of the city, a suitably diabolical apparition.

11. Ibid., 412.

12. John Huston, *An Open Book* (New York: Knopf, 1980).

13. Ibid., 7.

14. Ibid., 17.

15. John Huston, cited in Lawrence Grobel, *The Hustons* (New York: Avon, 1990) 126.

16. William Bolitho, Introduction to *Twelve Against the Gods* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1929), passim.

17. Ibid.

18. "If I cannot bend the higher powers, I will move the regions of Hell." See Mason, *Complete Letters,* 205, where Freud suggests the Virgil quote as the motto for the section on symptom formation in a projected book. He eventually used the quote on the title page of *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

19. Huston, *An Open Book,* 297.

20. Ibid., 294.

21. Peter Viertel, *Dangerous Friends* (New York: Doubleday) 40.

22. Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Words* (New York: Vintage, 1981) 49.

23. Ibid., 50–51.

24. Ibid., 133–34.

25. Ibid., 147.

26. In Simone de Beauvoir, *Adieux* (New York: Pantheon, 1984) 132, Sartre notes that "One of the heroic works that I wrote when I was eleven or twelve was *Goetz von Berlichingen*." Huston mentions Sartre's play *Goetz von Berlichingen* in *An Open Book,* where he calls it *Lucifer*. Curiously enough, *Lucifer* was also Sartre's first stab at a title for *Les Chemins de la Liberté*.

27. Sartre, *The Words,* 167–71.

28. Ibid., 209.

29. Ibid., 254.

30. Passage cut from *La Nausée,* cited in de Beauvoir, *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter* (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1989) 355. *La Nausée* originated in the 1920s as "the factum on contingency" on which Sartre embarked, according to Raymond Aron, after taking Léon Brunschvicg's course on Nietzsche at the Ecole Normale Supérieur. The manuscript went through three complete drafts, with three different titles and innumerable cuts, changes and revisions before it was finally published as a novel in 1938. See Annie Cohen-Solal, *Sartre: A Life* (London: Wm. Heinemann, 1987) 88.

31. De Beauvoir, *Adieux,* 312–13.

32. Ibid., 323.

33. Ibid., 328.

34. Freud, "A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis," *S.E.* XXII, 247.

35. Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Freud Scenario,* ed. J.-B. Pontalis, trans. Quintin Hoare (1984; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) 505, 539.

36. Ibid., 537–38.

37. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Sartre On Theater* (New York: Pantheon, 1976) 262.

38. Sartre, *The Words,* 18–19.

39. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Lettres au Castor* (Paris: Gallimard, 1983) II, 538.

40. Masson, *Complete Letters,* 202.

41. Freud, *S.E.* IV, 317–18.

42. Masson, *Complete Letters,* 230–31.

43. Masson, *Complete Letters,* 60.

44. Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud,* 3 vols. (New York: Basic Books, 1953) I, 305.

45. Freud, *S.E.* I, 272.

46. Freud, *S.E.* VII, 202.

47. Ibid.

48. Freud, *S.E.* IV, 299–301.

49. Masson, *Complete Letters,* 268.

50. Ibid.

51. For Orvieto, see especially Freud, *S.E.* III, 290–92, and VI, 2–4, 13, 34; and for Lake Trasimene, I, 196. In *The Interpretation of Dreams,* Freud recalled how the childhood incident in which his father had failed to protest after he was ordered off the pavement and his fur hat was knocked off his head by an anti-Semite, struck him as "unheroic conduct," which he contrasted mentally with "the scene in which Hannibal's father, Hamilcar Barca, made his boy swear before the household altar to take vengeance on the Romans." Lake Trasimene was the scene of Hannibal's greatest victory against the Romans, under Gaius Flaminius in 217 B.C., yet Hannibal never finally achieved his goal of conquering Rome. In a letter to Fliess on December 3, 1897, Freud noted that "my longing for Rome is deeply neurotic. It is connected with my schoolboy hero-worship of the Semitic Hannibal and in fact this year [actually 1896, when he visited Orvietohis own furthest point south] I have no more reached Rome than he did from Lake Trasimene." In *The Interpretation of Dreams,* Freud described how this journey "took me past Lake Trasimene" and that he "sadly turned back when I was only fifty miles from Rome." Freud recorded a series of four dreams about his own failure to reach Romein the first of these, interestingly enough, he dreamed that he was looking out of a railway carriage window at a view of the Tiber and the Ponte Sant'Angelo, the traditional point of entrance to the Vatican (*Interpretation, S.E.* IV, 194).

52. Freud, "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman," *S.E.* XVIII, 152.

53. Sartre, *The Freud Scenario,* 273.

54. Ibid., 278–81.

55. Ibid., 370.

56. Ibid., 373.

57. Ibid., 539.

58. Ibid., 382.

59. Robert Harvey, *Search for a Father* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

60. Huston, *An Open Book,* 3.

61. Lawrence Grobel, *The Hustons* (New York: Avon, 1989) 292.

62. Ibid., 295.

63. Ibid., passim, esp. 552–53.

Seven
Textual Trauma in *Kings Row* and *Freud*

Janet Walker

In this book, spiced with harlots, idiots, nymphomaniacs and homosexuals, there are three fathers who become sexually enamored of their daughters; . . . a sadistic doctor who performs unnecessary operations for the gloating pleasure of seeing his patients suffer to the human breaking point, and a whole horde of halfwitted, sensual creatures preoccupied with sex.
FROM A REVIEW OF THE BEST-SELLING NOVEL *KINGS ROW* (*DAILY NEWS*, JUNE 7, 1940)

It is difficult to imagine that a screen adaptation of the lurid novel described in the *Daily News* review (above) could possibly meet the standards of Hollywood's 1942 Production Code. But a film version of *Kings Row* did appear that year, directed by Sam Wood for Warner Bros. However, a change had taken place. The incestuous relationships that played such a prominent role in the novel had been excised. [1] The removal of incest from *Kings Row* resonates with its deletion from another story: the history of psychoanalysis. It is well known that in 1897 Sigmund Freud abandoned his "seduction theory," according to which he had attributed the cause of hysteria in his female patients to the traumatic effects of sexual seduction that they told him they had experienced as children. He had come to believe, instead, that his patients' reports were "derived from phantasies and not from real occurrences."[2] This scenario of the origins of psychoanalysiswhich provided the basis for John Huston's 1962 film *Freud*has been interpreted by some to mean that the fundamental psychic role of fantasy with respect to childhood sexuality must be premised on the repudiation of the reality of childhood sexual abuse.

On the other hand, against the view that childhood sexual abuse is not the primary cause of malady, we have the immense body of "incest survivor" literature produced mainly during the 1980s. Scores of books and many hundreds of articles and organizations bring together personal experience, sociological analysis and psychoanalytic commentary to document and address the incontrovertible frequency of childhood sexual abuse in Western

and non-Western patriarchally based societies. [3] They argue convincingly that in the United States somewhere between 10 and 25 percent of children are subject to childhood sexual abuse. But the point relevant to the discussion here is not the reality and devastating prevalence of childhood sexual abuse, which I accept uncategorically, but rather the fact that most of these recent books, including those written from a personal or sociological perspective (Florence Rush's *The Best-Kept Secret,* Diana Russell's *The Secret Trauma,* Sandra Butler's *Conspiracy of Silence*) and those written by psychoanalysts (Alice Miller's books, Jeffrey Masson's *Assault on Truth*) hold psychoanalysis accountable in significant part for the "conspiracy of silence" that enables the continued existence of childhood sexual assault. For these authors, for the tens of thousands of other researchers and clinicians who use this literature as their common reference point, and for their clients, Freud's concentration on fantasy is precisely the insurmountable difficulty posed by psychoanalysis.

In the meantime, some contemporary psychoanalytic theorists have resisted such polemical convictions about the incompatibility of children's fantasies and childhood assault. It has been pointed out that real world events and psychic processes, far from being mutually exclusive, are necessarily connected, both in Freud's work and in fact.[4] External and internal factors are inextricably intertwined in the etiology of neurosis. This contemporary theoretical emphasis has profound implications for feminism: indeed it is crucial to the "cultural construction of sexual difference."[5] As Jacqueline Rose argues, violence, including childhood sexual seduction, recognized outside of a psychoanalytic theory of fantasy serves only to shore up the dichotomies "inside/outside, victim/aggressor, real event/fantasy"[6] that stem from and undergird the "impulse toward mastery by which violence is enacted."[7]

My concern here is to bring these contemporary theoretical perspectives to bear on the textual analysis of two Hollywood films dealing with the subject of incest, *Kings Row* and *Freud*. Specifically, I am concerned with the difficulty that incest poses to the operations of scenarization and censorship active both in Hollywood representation and in psychoanalytic approaches to sexuality. All of the excisions discussed (the incest subplots from the films, real childhood sexual seduction from the etiology of hysteria and a theory of fantasy from antipsychoanalytic feminist accounts) are like surgeries that leave a kind of textual scarring around the site of the incision as well as the space for a resurgence of the complaint. As surgeries, they are radical but inconclusive. My analysis proceeds from the position that a textual excision can serve as what Ned Lukacher termed a "repressive ruse"a strategy to give covert expression to a deeply troubling subject.[8] Furthermore, as the review of the novel *Kings Row* reveals, we do come to know incest in spite of its repression from certain texts. Thus, my purpose is not only to discuss the mitigated absence of childhood sexual assault from Hollywood films, but to

explore its entangled presence as well in a body of subsidiary materials surrounding films, including, in this case, a source novel, reviews, numerous script versions, a movie trailer, censorship documents and psychoanalytic writings. In this expanded corpus one may indeed read the symptomological presence of childhood sexual assault.

What Is there where Incest Might Have Been?

In Jean-Paul Sartre's 1959 script for the film *Freud,* [9] in Charles Kaufman and Wolfgang Reinhardt's successive drafts of the screenplay dated April 14 and April 26, 1961, and in their final screenplay, dated August 9, 1961,[10] as well as, reportedly, in the previewed version of the film, a character named Magda appears who was removed from the final film as it was released.[11] In the presence of her father, Magda relates an incestuous sexual experience that is never considered to be a lie or fantasy. Instead, her claims are confirmed by her father's demeanor and the resulting abreaction of her hysterical symptoms.[12] But Magda's case is singled out as the exception that proves the rule: all the other case histories in the film demonstrate instead that the existence of childhood sexual abuse is merely fantasy. As the character Freud states "emphatically" to the character Dr. Breuer, "The case of Magda was an exception, a hideous freak. All the other patients who recalled an aggression by an adult gave expression to a fantasy . . . they 'dreamed it up' as we say."[13] Moreover, Magda has been replaced in the final version with another character, Cecily (Susannah York), who is generally taken to be a composite of Anna O. and others whose case histories became *Studies on Hysteria*. And with Cecily, the suggestion of incest is made only to be revoked.

Near the end of the film, Freud (Montgomery Clift) prods Cecily to recall an occasion of incest from her past. Handled as a flashback accompanied by the adult Cecily's voice-over, the incestuous act she recounts is simultaneously depicted and denied. A dissolve to the child Cecily framed in a hand mirror opens the sequence. This is followed by a cut to Herr Koertner, Cecily's father, carrying his daughter to his bedroom, laying her down on his bed and removing her shoes and socks. "Is that when he promised you the doll?" Freud inquires. "Yes. No. No, it was later in the night when I woke up and cried," responds Cecily. "Why were you crying in the middle of the night?" asks Freud. In response to this question we share young Cecily's view of her father as he emerges from the bathroom and comes toward her on the bed, looming up out of a low angle shot. "Tall like a tower," she narrates, as her father turns out the light. As the screen fades to a brief interval of black, we hear Cecily's voice describing, "strong as a god when he embraced me." "And he promised you a doll if you wouldn't tell," finishes Freud. A brief image of Herr Koertner followed by a child crying,

then, evokes the incestuous act at the same time that the blank screen insists on its cinematic unrepresentability.

But there is more to come. Cecily appears cured, but, inexplicably, she is still attached to the doll she should logically abhor as the reminder of her molestation. In a response that is at once self-absorbed and radical in its acknowledgment of the analyst's psychological makeup, Freud searches for the solution to Cecily's conundrum in his own psychosexual history. He discovers that his own memory of his father molesting his sister is false, created by his childhood desire for his mother and jealousy of the father who "took her away." "I invented a theory to dishonor my father," Freud concludes. Thus armed with the material of his self-analysis, Freud returns to Cecily's case. A reconstructed version of the same supposed incest scene follows. "Shall I tell you a story?" Freud asks the grown-up Cecily. In the "story" he tells, which is represented in another flashback, the bedroom is replaced by a child's bed in the parlor, and the molestation is replaced by an accomplished and solicitous father. Thus, the story which is ostensibly Cecily's is re-presented with Freud as *metteur en scène* and narrator of events at which he was not present. This shift in authorial attribution explains, I believe, the pensive close-up of Freud which immediately precedes Cecily's original account of the past events, for it is Freud who will give the story the nuances that undermine Cecily's accusation of her father. In these two sequences, then, the indexical nature of cinematic representation acts to shore up the validity of psychoanalytic reconstruction as it is presented in the film.

Moreover, the interpretive work of the filmic Freud betrays a certain interested shift between event and explanation. This shift can also be seen in Freud's own writings. In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess about a dream in which he felt "over-affectionately" toward his own daughter Mathilde (aged eleven), Freud refuses to interpret the dream as evidence of the commonplace nature of fathers' incestuous wishes toward daughters. Instead he interprets the dream as the fulfillment of "my wish to pin down a father as the originator of neurosis and put an end to my persistent doubts." [14] Charles Bernheimer has rightly observed that, by "interpreting his dream as a confirmation of a purely theoretical desire, [Freud] displaces his incestuous impulse into the realm of theory [and] exonerates himself from a guilty complicity in male fantasies of seduction."[15] Here, as in the film, Freud shifts the terms of the argument to the benefit of the father by denying not only incest, but also any incestuous wishes the father might have.

In Freud's later writing, we come up against an interesting contradiction. In his 1918 essay "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" (the Wolf Man case), Freud advocates, alternatively, the need to reaffirm the psychologically formative power of real traumatic events. With reference to whether or not a patient's neurosis could be a deferred reaction to having witnessed

his parents' intercourse a *tergo,* Freud argues that it would be wrong to discount the reality of the experiences reported by the patient. To do so would fail to account for the gradualness of the construction of the patient's elaborate fantasy, for the sheer ingenuity such a construction would have required of the analysand, and for its role in the later synthesis of the analysis. [16] Freud also takes this opportunity to clarify, that his notion "of a turning away from reality, of a substitutive satisfaction obtained in phantasy" is not the whole of his theory: fantasies must be constructed from "material which has been acquired from some source or other."[17] Huston's *Freud,* therefore, departs from Freud's writings in its treatment of "acquired material" from Cecily's past, for in the film this material is not regarded as a productive source for substitutive fantasies, but rather as patently false, in need of revision.

Denial, Rage and Pinning down the *Pater*

While the idea that there may be a real basis for fantasy source material is repressed from the film *Freud,* it is actually present, contrary to general belief, in the literature of American psychoanalysis. The eminent psychoanalyst Phyllis Greenacre, for example, dealt explicitly with the significance of actual infantile sexual trauma in the pages of the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* and other publications.[18] Initially Greenacre acknowledged the traditional view that "it is of little or no significance whether or not [a sexual trauma] has actually occurred, its only significance being determined by the nature of the accompanying fantasy."[19] But she then proceeded with a thoughtful account of the particular relevance of actual sexual trauma as encountered in her own clinical work. "While the underlying fantasy . . . is of primary importance, . . . its later derivatives may be considerably influenced by whether or not it has been carried out in any active way."[20] In an actual traumatic experience, "the child may be confronted with a different reality than his fantasy had quite represented . . . an exaggerated, distorted, or particularly intensified form of apparent confirmation."[21]

According to Greenacre, "The denial that the actuality of a sexual event in childhood had *any* importance at all above that of the fantasy itself may be held to in proportion to the power of the wish to have it happen."[22] But notice the slippage Greenacre either allows or overlooks. The incestuous wish in the context of Greenacre's statement should be the daughter's. And yet the daughter is only one of the parties to the denial. Cecily represses that which Freud explains away completely"I invented a [false] theory to dishonor my father"the seduction never really happened. But if it is true, as Greenacre states, that denial masks incestuous desire, then the desire must be attributed as much to the fathers/analysts who deny that desire as to the daughters to whom desire is regularly attributed. In other words, belief that

sexual seduction is only important as fantasy and not as fact may be held in proportion to the power of the father's own incestuous wish.

The narrative of *Kings Row,* in spite of the dismissal of the explicit incest plot from the film version, provides an exceptionally good example of the apparently seductive daughter and the father as perpetrator of a denial. The story, set in a midwestern town, revolves around two families, each comprised of a doctor, his wife and an only daughter. Not much is known about Dr. Tower (Claude Rains), who is relatively new to the town when the story begins. He is said to be brilliant but is no longer practicing medicine. His wife is confined to the house for unexplained reasons, and near the beginning of the story Dr. Tower pulls his daughter, Cassandra (Betty Fields), out of school and restricts her to the house as well. In the course of the story the wife dies and Dr. Tower kills his now grown, stunningly beautiful daughter and commits suicide. He bequeaths his estate to a young man, Parris Mitchell (Robert Cummings), the protagonist of our story, to whom he acted as a surrogate father. Parris had studied medicine with Dr. Tower to prepare for studying psychiatry in Vienna, and had been involved in a secret affair with Cassandra, an affair supposedly known only to Parris's best friend, Drake McHugh (Ronald Reagan).

Dr. Tower, a brilliant physician, a passionate though highly controlled man up until then, murders his daughter. Where does this murderousness come from, wonders Parris? Dr. Tower has left a diary which Parris finds, reads and relates to Drake McHugh. In the novel, the diary reveals that Dr. Tower has perpetrated incest on his daughter Cassie.

> Parris: "I have to tell you first it looks like he'd been going kind of crazy for a long time . . . Well, not the usual kind of crazy. He was so proud of his intelligence that he began to think he was better than anybody else, and beyond any kind of law thatyou knowthat keeps us all kind of in place."
>
> Drake: "Just crazyplain crazy, if that's so, Parris."
>
> Parris: "No, not just *plain* crazy . . . Drake, do you know what incest is?"
>
> Drake: "You mean father and daughter. Was Dr. Tower?"
>
> Parris (nodding): "Incest was at the bottom of this last phase of the whole business . . . ." [23]

The film version, however, presents an attenuated version of a "father-son" relationship by erasing the novel's portrayal of incest and the more explicit sexual rivalry between Dr. Tower and Parris over Cassandra. In the film, the explanation for the murder is not Dr. Tower's madness or his proprietary jealousy over his daughter's body, but rather his wife's madness and, increasingly, his daughter's. Parris reads in Dr. Tower's journal, "Today, I noticed the first sign in Cassie . . . Dementia Praecox." Dr. Tower's homicide, or so the explanation goes in the film, was a kind of mercy killing car-

ried out for Cassie herself and for Parris. Dr. Tower knew of the affair and killed his daughter to protect Parris from the stunted, secluded life he himself had been forced to lead because of his wife's insanity. Moreover, while the erasure of incest and father-son rivalry is significant, the remaining actions stand precisely as the mark of other events that cannot be represented overtly. Where there was incest now there is denial, smoldering rage and murder. How can we come to grips with the father's violence? Another story comes to mind that involves the other doctor in *Kings Row*. Dr. Gordon (Charles Coburn) is also enraged by his daughter, Louise (Nancy Coleman), and in particular by his daughter's account of his own past actions. It is the story of this second father-daughter pair, I will argue, that represents both the implicit sexuality of some father-daughter relationships and the way in which the traumatic past is legible in violent actions in the present.

What of the past in *Kings Row?* Maureen Turim defines the flashback as "a privileged moment in unfolding that juxtaposes different moments of temporal reference. A juncture is wrought between present and past and two concepts are implied in this juncture: memory and history." [24] *Kings Row* does not use a flashback structure per se, but the work of the film overall is profoundly involved with remembering the past and weighing contradictory claims to memory and historical truth. Unlike other films where memories, depicted through flashbacks, enable a return to and a meditation on the past, however subjective, *Kings Row* makes the past an issue for the present by withholding any such enabling return to a visually represented past. Here the past does not intervene in the present, rather it is partitioned off from it by the semiopaque screen of memory.

Childhood and adulthood confront each other in *Kings Row* by way of a temporal ellipsis that joins the two time frames and hands the film's protagonist the tasks of interpreting and acting on actions in the present evaluated across the dissolve of time and memory. In the portion of the childhood sequences concerning Dr. Gordon, young Parris and his friend Drake McHugh come upon another boy crying on the sidewalk in front of his house. The boy relates that Dr. Gordon is inside operating on his father without anesthetic, ostensibly because the man's bad heart won't tolerate it. Horrible screams emanate from the house and the boy runs up the steps to pound futilely on the locked door. Like the boys, we are aware of a catastrophic event, but barred from seeing it. Furthermore, an ellipsis covering nearly a decade withholds the outcome which is later revealed: the boy's father died in agony.

But when an accident occurs, the eyewitness evidence and corroboration we have been denied will become crucial to determinations of character credibility. Drake McHugh, the object of Louise Gordon's unrequited love,

falls onto the train tracks and is operated on by Dr. Gordon, who amputates both of his legs. Louise learns from witnesses that her father has operated unnecessarily and surmises he has done so out of disgust for Drake's womanizing, and particularly because he has been courting her. She accuses her father of a whole career of such unnecessary, punitive operations, going back to the operation on the father she too had heard screaming when she was a child. Thus, the problem faced by Parris as a young, pioneering psychiatrist is to evaluate the legitimacy of Louise's version of the past. Is her accusation of her father legitimate as she attests or is it the false memory of a diseased mind as her father claims? Should she be believed or institutionalized? Is the father a crazed, barbaric surgeon willing to trade his daughter's life for his own, or is he a decent man, a victim of his daughter's deluded fantasies?

These are some of the questions brought up by the film and echoed eerily in the broader filmic and social discourses around allegations of abuse. But in the case of *Kings Row,* a reading is suggested. The spectator witnesses a moment in which Dr. Gordon, confronted by Louise with her knowledge of his punitive surgeries, strikes his daughter in the face. Interestingly, this is an action that the Production Code Administration (PCA) had asked to be modified. In a letter to Jack Warner, Joseph Breen wrote: "this action of Dr. Gordon striking Louise should be masked, [since if it is] done in a full shot it will be deleted by the censor boards." [25] Thus, though we have been barred from seeing the past operations by temporal ellipsis and the mise en scène, we are eyewitnesses to the telling violence of the present, masked though it may be by the positions of the actors' bodies. Louise's version of her father's past abuse of others is corroborated by his demonstrated capacity for violence in the present. The significant scene is here again the transferential one in which the actions of the present reenact the conflicts of the past and assert themselves as markers of historical and psychic import.

What light can Louise's treatment shed on Cassie's? In *Kings Row* we have two doctors' daughters whose lives are compared, whose sanity is questioned and who are exposed to their father's rage. In both cases, attributions of paternal abuse stand or fall on the basis of whether the young woman in question is judged sane or insane. Louise's case is not literally or even implicitly childhood sexual abuse. But sexual jealousy nevertheless carries an overdetermined meaning in the father-daughter relationship. Dr. Gordon didn't molest Louise, he just cut off the legs of the man she loved. One can understand, according to this sumbolic logic, the PCA's recommendation to "mask" Dr. Gordon's action when he strikes Louise. For that action, nonetheless, stands as the mark of abuses that can't be spoken and, more specifically, the mark of sexual jealousy that is suggested but simultaneously denied in Louise's case as in Cassandra's.

If we look to Greek mythology, we find that Cassandra, one of Priam's

daughters, "was a prophetess. Apollo had loved her and given her the power to foretell the future. Later he turned against her because she refused his love, and although he could not take back his gift . . . he made it of no account: no one ever believed her. . . . It was her fate always to know the disaster that was coming and be unable to avert it." [26] When the Greeks sacked Troy, they tore Cassandra from the altar of Athena's temple and gave her to Agamemnon, for she was "very beautiful, but very strange-looking . . . the flower of all captive women." But when she was about to enter the house of the son of Atreus she looked around "wildly" and cried out, " 'I hear children crying . . . Crying for wounds that bleed. A father feastedand the flesh [was] his children. . . .' Cassandra cried out that on that very day two more deaths would be added to the list, one her own."[27]

Cassandra Tower in *Kings Row,* both novel and film, follows this mythical model rather closely. She is a "captive woman," "very beautiful but very strange." She is confined to her home, a home in which a father could be said to "feast" on a child, and in which that child is finally murdered. But this Cassandra's role is most interesting with respect to the enunciative process of the film as laid out in the opening sequence: while Parris's story enacts history, Cassandra predicts its shape.

The film's opening suggests Cassandra's embarkation on a knowing but fateful journey that proceeds against the flow of the film's alternate work to deny her sexual exploitation. As the opening titles end, a horse-drawn wagon surges across the frame obscuring a sign that, when revealed a moment later, protests too much: "Kings Row, 1890, a good town, a good clean town, a good clean town to live in, and a good place to raise your children." Soon Cassie Tower appears with Parris Mitchell behind her, filing out of the schoolhouse. And the film's first dissolve brings us to Cassie, posed seductively by a tree in long shot and close-up and then in long shot again as Parris jumps down into the frame. The mise en scène and editing conspire to let Cassie lead and Parris follow as they arrive at Parris's pond for an intimate splash. Cassie asks Parris to unfasten the back of her dress, acknowledges that "girls have to go in gradual" and states that her papa will take a switch to her if he finds out, a risked whipping that reads retrospectively as sexual jealousy.

These connotations are further emphasized in the scene in which a crying Cassie, under the tree at the edge of Parris's property for the last time, tells Parris that she's been pulled out of school and issues her prediction: "Maybe I can't ever go anywhere. Maybe I'll just have to stay home like Mama does all the time." In fact, Cassie's words do predict the way in which she will be used "like mama" and they condense the Cassandra myth, putting together the dangers of the home, children's cries, sexual captivity and death. Of course, the excision of father-daughter incest from the plot renders the

full import of Cassandra Tower's predictions unrecognizable to moviegoers who have not read the novel and those who refuse to read between the lines. But her predictions may remain legible, as we have seen, because of the Cassandra myth and the parallels the film implicitly draws between the two doctors' families.

I indicated that a temporal ellipsis joins past with present and scenes of childhood with scenes of adulthood: a dissolve links the receding feet of Parris Mitchell as he ascends the few steps up and over the fence onto his estatewith his feet approaching as he comes back over the fence and walks into close-upnow a young man. In fact, this ellipsis immediately follows Cassie's lament, which occurs just after the sequence in which Parris and Drake McHugh overhear the man screaming who is being operated on. Thus her prediction may be seen, on a structural level, as having impelled Parris's entry into adulthood and its attendant sexual knowledge. The film's structure thus leaves to Parris, and to the audience, the task of determining the two doctors' actions during the intervening years.

The Dissociation of a Text

The concept of repression explains how ideas associated with conflict are turned back from textual consciousness. It explains, for example, how incest in *Kings Row* becomes dementia praecox. But repression cannot fully explain the traumatic past itself nor my claim that suggestions of incest nevertheless remain in *Kings Row*. As Janet Malcolm puts it, "The present . . . is the true focus of psychoanalysisnot the past." [28] The challenge, as I see it, is to account for the fact that the introduction of incest into a text very often results in a kind of textual multiplicity or heightened intertextuality: "a disturbance or alteration in the normally integrative [textual] function."[29] Except for the added word, I am quoting, not narrative film theory, but the entry for dissociative disorders from the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*. For I would argue that sexual trauma in Hollywood psychological films operates as *textual trauma,* overtaxing the filmic mechanisms for response and producing a dissociated text.

The best of the contemporary psychoanalytic literature on trauma[30] is concerned with the interrelationship of trauma, memory and fantasy, which posits an interactive rather than an either/ or relationship between the ground of real events and their manifestation as psychic fantasy and trauma. In *Trauma and Survival,* Elizabeth Waites makes this point from a historical perspective. She argues that when Freud turned away from Josef Breuer's notion of the "hypnoid state" to emphasize his own concept of repression, he "shaped the dynamics of forgetting" but also "obscur [ed] some of the most perplexing symptoms of hysterical patients . . . [such as] phenomena

associated with altered states of consciousness, particularly the oscillations in cognitive and perceptual experience and self-awareness characteristic of dissociative disorders." [31]

One of the ways contemporary literature on sexual assault has facilitated an interactive model of trauma is by locating the study of childhood sexual abuse within the context of studies of war trauma. In such studies, notably those dating from the Second World War,[32] the accepted knowledge of real battle experiences (as opposed to the questioned knowledge of childhood sexual assault) has tended to encourage conceptualizations of the relationship between real events and traumatic psychic constructions. The object of this psychoanalytically grounded literature is emphatically not to prove that war trauma is uniquely external and physiological or, in other words, that once removed from the threatening situation the soldier should feel no further effects. The point is rather to show that real events can produce effects that are "psychophysiological," "extensive" and "enduring."[33] The contemporary term "post-traumatic stress disorder" was coined to emphasize the psychic persistence of these effects.

Contemporary findings show that sexual assault, like war trauma, can result in post-traumatic stress disorders in which "the traumatic moment becomes encoded in an abnormal form of memory, which breaks spontaneously into consciousness, both as flashbacks during waking states and as traumatic nightmares during sleep."[34] Trauma, therefore, can result in dissociative disorders featuring amnesia, states of fugue and multiple personality, the latter a disorder in which the personality fragments into numerous partial personalities or "alters." A major difference, then, between repression and dissociation, between what Freud analyzed and what he left behind, is that "in a dissociation conceptualization, there is an amnesiac barrier that prevents the interchange of different memories [that nevertheless exist]. However, in a repression formulation, there is only an amnesia for unacceptable impulses."[35]

But what of the post-traumatic text, the film in which incest is simultaneously acknowledged and denied? It seems to me that the textual phenomena described so far (the memories of Cecily's abuse in *Freud,* the time warp in *Kings Row* that brings together a girl's sexual awakening and her incestuous destiny, the raging fathers) are constituted precisely as "spontaneous breaks into [textual] consciousness," as the nightmarish disguises of traumatic memory. Furthermore, as the remainder of this paper will suggest, the intertexts of *Kings Row* and *Freud*the various script versions, memos, reviews and other publicity materialmay be read as the textual "alters" of a post-traumatic and multiple text, for these "alters" serve very often "to hold or buffer traumatic experiences"[36] that cannot be integrated into the finished film, viewed as a kind of "host" personality.

I have argued that *Kings Row* is a case of repression: the incest subplot of the novel can find expression only through the film's temporal elisions and alternate explanations which amount to the "symptoms" and "parapraxes" of repression. But *Kings Row* is more than a case of repression. In the publicity campaign at the time of the film's release and in contemporary reviews, the theme of incest found another conduit, this time an intertextual one. Far from avoiding the incest theme, the film's reviews and even its trailer make incest a selling point. One review focuses expressly on what the book leaves out: "Gone are the references to the State Asylum. . . . Themes of incest, miscegenation, adultery and the like, so freely treated by the author, Henry Bellamann, are out, definitely. . . . As for the Tower family, that was only dementia praecox." [37] In fact, as another review suggests, the material from the novel is essential knowledge for a complete viewing of the film. In the words of reviewer Groverman Blake, "if you have read Henry Bellaman's [*sic*] story as it appeared in print you may wonder if the film version . . . of the father's motive in killing his daughter seems adequate and persuasive."[38] Even the film's trailer, though it never mentions the word incest, is organized around the suggestion that the problem of the film, the very one the spectator should wish to see resolved, is exactly how to suggest "incest, miscegenation, adultery and the like" without dealing with these issues explicitly. In the script for the trailer, whispered voices express skepticism that a film from such a book could ever be made, and a line reads, "The story of the town that lived in the shadows . . . to hide its secret shame."[39] In this way the potential audience member is prepared to go beyond reading "between the scenes"; the audience member is initiated more directly into a kind of parallel reading project in which the film itself is only a part of a highly fragmented, intertextual whole.

Freud too may be examined fruitfully as such a dissociated text. Diane Waldman and I have written about the progression from Sartre's screenplays to the released film as a progression from the acknowledgment of real sexual seduction to its denial.[40] In other words, we wrote about the film as a work of repression. At the time I was uncomfortable with the idea that the denial was complete, since I thought the text did couch the real event, but I was at a loss to say how. In retrospect I think my desire for openly represented incest was rather like the incest survivor's desire for corroboration of sexual assault memories by the perpetrator. That is, the desire for corroboration is understandable: in the words of Marie Balmary; "to become consciousin order to cureis to rediscover the witness to what we had known all alone."[41] But corroboration alone can never serve the complexities of traumatic memory because as Elizabeth Waites writes, "Memory for traumatic events can be extremely veridical, but if the events are unusual or outside the range of ordinary experience, veridical memories may themselves evoke feelings of unreality."[42] Moreover, trauma, which may sometimes be ex-

perienced consciously, is emphatically also a psychic process involving both memory and fantasy.

Returning with these thoughts to *Freud,* I question whether the repository of traumatic memory in the *Freud* text need be restricted to the film alone. Perhaps it is the multiple manifestations of the intertext that provide us with the fullest view of *Freud'*s management of the incest theme. There, in the intertext, we find Magda's sexual molestation, cut from the film, retained in the much negotiated and contradictory versions of the script in which all the possible reactions to sexual trauma are displayed. There, in Sartre's 1959 screenplay, we find Magda, under hypnosis, uttering "a dreadful scream" and crying out, "He hurt me! He frightened me! He wasn't my father any more! I'll never get married, I don't want to see that look." And we find her father's silent tears to corroborate what the screenplay calls her "confession." This is one father who does remember something of an unspeakable nature.

But the depiction of incest, even in the early versions of the screenplay, is generally indirect rather than overt. Both the fact and the difficulty of that subject matter, rather than its simple representation or omission, come to structure the negotiations surrounding its passage into filmic form. In Sartre's script, a scream and an allusive statement stand in for the moment and substance of memory. In the screenplays dated April 14, 1961, and August 9, 1961, Magda is not the child depicted in the incestuous flashback; instead, she watches another "prototypical" child shown wrestling with her father, a child whose situation she recognizes immediately: [43]

> FLASHBACK TOEXTERIOR MOUNTAINOUS COUNTRYSIDEDAY
>
> MAGDA'S VOICE: He takes off his left glove, I see his bare hand. He touches the child's thigh. She is wearing white lace panties. . . .
>
> BACK TO SCENEINTERIOR FREUD'S OFFICEDAY
>
> MAGDA'S VOICE: I didn't wear them. On another day . . . very long ago, I was very little . . . The day my father took off his gloves.

Here the image from the past sidesteps the personal import of the charge by substituting for Magda and her father an unknown father and child.

In these ways, the absence of Magda in the final film is foreshadowed by the attenuation of her claims in earlier versions of the script. Nevertheless, the representations of incest in the *Freud* intertexts, allusive as they are, suggest the range of possibilities for acknowledging childhood sexual molestation, a range which includes the admission of incestuous relations, their denial, the admission of incest with the proviso that it was a "prototypical" event and not a specific one and even (going back to Cecily) the suggestion that incest memories are iatrogenica product of psychoanalytic analysis. The intertexts, then, are the repository of traumatic memory, buffered, but persistent.

The viewer's appreciation of the filmic suggestion of sexual assault is strongly affected by whether he or she has seen a trailer or read reviews or a source novel where one exists. It is affected by whether he or she has had previous exposure to the historical material dealt with in the film or perhaps some relevant personal experiences. The spectator's reading is affected, in other words, by his or her reception of the intertext. Of course the same could be said for the spectators of every film, but the distinction I would make here (and it is quantitative rather than qualitative) is that "traumatic texts" dealing with the socially and psychically incendiary topic of sexual assault encourage a contestatory or split reading that harbors simultaneously the suggestions that incest did and did not really occur.

At a time in history when picking up a popular magazine or turning on the radio or television means hearing about the sad plight of another man innocently accused by his misguided daughter of the perpetration of incestuous assault, in these salad days of the antifeminist backlash, we must insist that the unmasking of one false memory should in no way be seen to undermine the credibility and import of every other memory. We must take back for feminism a conception of sexual assault that involves its psychic dimensions as well as its physical ones and a reading practice alert to the distinction. This, then, is a call to attend to the complexity of the constitutive interrelationship of trauma and memory in filmic representation and in real life.

Notes

Special thanks are due to Kathryn Kalinak who drew my attention to the materials on *Kings Row* in the Warner Bros. Archives, to Diane Waldman with whom I collaborated on an earlier essay on *Freud,* to Margaret McMillan whose interest in psychoanalytic history helped inspire my own, and to Janet Bergstrom who encouraged me to write this piece and served, once again, as an energetic editor.

1. The story synopses, treatments and scripts for the film *Kings Row* show that the incestuous relationship between Dr. Tower and his daughter Cassie was removed between the synopsis by Harriet Hinsdale, dated July 17, 1940, and the treatment credited to screenwriter Casey Robinson, dated August 30, 1940. I could locate no letters or memos detailing the necessity for the excision, but I would speculate that it was "understood" to be necessary in light of the Production Code prohibition against "sex perversions" (the word incest itself never appears in the Production Code) and carried out as a matter of course. See the *Kings Row* file, Warner Bros. Archives, Doheny Library, University of Southern California.

2. Sigmund Freud, *The Complete Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (New York: Norton, 1966) 584. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson's *The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory* (New York: Penguin, 1985) initiated a widely publicized controversy about this change in Freud's thinking and its allegedly deliberate suppression from the first published edition of Freud's letters to Fliess.

3. See, for example, Florence Rush, *The Best-Kept Secret: Sexual Abuse of Children* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1986); Diana Russell, *The Secret Trauma: Incest in the Lives of Girls and Women* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Judith Herman, *Father-Daughter Incest* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Sandra Butler, *Conspiracy of Silence: The Trauma of Incest* (New York: Bantam, 1978); Alice Miller, *Thou Shalt Not Be Aware: Society's Betrayal of the Child* (New York: New American Library, 1986); Alice Miller, *Banished Knowledge: Facing Childhood Injuries* (New York: Doubleday, 1990); and Masson, *Assault on Truth*.

4. See Diane Waldman and Janet Walker, "John Huston's *Freud* and Textual Repression: A Psychoanalytic Feminist Reading," in *Close Viewings,* ed. Peter Lehman (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1990). Waldman and I draw on contemporary analyses of Freud's work to make the point that Freud returned time and time again in scattered writings to discussions of the significance of real childhood sexual abuse, even after he had supposedly abandoned the seduction theory.

5. Richard Feldstein and Judith Roof eds., *Feminism and Psychoanalysis* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) 10. In this anthology, see in particular Jacqueline Rose's "Where Does the Misery Come From? Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Event." See also Teresa Brennan ed., *Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989); Charles Bernheimer and Claire Kahane eds., *In Dora's Case: Freud-Hysteria-Feminism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and Jacqueline Rose, *Sexuality in the Field of Vision* (London: Verso, 1986).

6. Rose, "Where Does the Misery Come From?" 32.

7. Feldstein and Roof, *Feminism and Psychoanalysis,* 4. Also supportive of the notion that real events and psychic formations must be understood together is Marie Balmary's *Psychoanalyzing Psychoanalysis: Freud and the Hidden Fault of the Father,* translated and introduced by Ned Lukacher (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). Balmary uses an array of historical documents to attribute Freud's repudiation of his original theory to his unconscious work of mourning for his father. In brief, Freud represses, displaces and resists the notion of real childhood sexual molestation but, by virtue of the ephemeral memory trace or screen memory left by the violent event, it is repressed but not forgotten.

8. This term is used by Ned Lukacher in his introduction to Marie Balmary's book (xi).

9. Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Freud Scenario,* ed. J.-B. Pontalis, trans. Quintin Hoare (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

10. Both screenplays may be consulted in the John Huston Collection at the Margaret Herrick Library, Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences.

11. This last piece of information is conveyed in John Huston's autobiography, *An Open Book* (New York: Knopf, 1980).

12. In this discussion I am continuing work on the film *Freud* pursued previously with Diane Waldman (op. cit.) and in my book, *Couching Resistance: Women, Film and Psychoanalytic Psychiatry* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

13. Screenplay draft dated April 14, 1961, John Huston Collection.

14. Sigmund Freud in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, May 31, 1897, Sigmund Freud, "Extracts from the Fliess Papers," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological*

Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953–74) I, 206. The letter is reproduced in a slightly different translation in *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904,* trans. and ed. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) 249. There the phrase reads, "my wish to catch a *Pater* as the originator of neurosis and thus [the dream] puts an end to my ever recurring doubts."

15. Bernheimer and Kahane, Introduction, Part I, *In Dora's Case,* 39.

16. Freud, "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (1918)," in his *Three Case Histories,* translated and introduced by Philip Rieff (New York: Collier Books, 1963) 236.

17. Ibid., 243.

18. See, for example, Phyllis Greenacre, "The Influence of Infantile Trauma on Genetic Patterns (1967)," in *Emotional Growth: Psychoanalytic Studies of the Gifted and a Great Variety of Other Individuals* I (New York: International Universities Press, 1971).

19. Ibid., 276.

20. Ibid., 277–78.

21. Ibid., 281–83.

22. Ibid., 276.

23. Henry Bellamann, *Kings Row* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1942) 339–40.

24. Maureen Turim, *Flashbacks in Film* (New York: Routledge, 1989) 1.

25. Letter dated April 24, 1941 to Jack Warner from Joseph Breen (Warner Bros. Archives).

26. Edith Hamilton, *Mythology* (NewYork: Mentor Books, 1940) 202.

27. Ibid., 242–43.

28. Janet Malcolm, "Six Roses ou Cirrhose?" *The Purloined Clinic* (New York: Knopf, 1992) 41–42.

29. *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,* 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1987): "dissociative disorders."

30. See also Herman and Richard P. Kluft, M.D., Ph.D., eds., *Childhood Antecedents of Multiple Personality* (Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1985).

31. Elizabeth Waites, *Trauma and Survival: Post-traumatic and Dissociative Disorders in Women* (New York: Norton, 1993) 6.

32. See, for example, A. Kardiner and H. Spiegel, *War, Stress, and Neurotic Illness* (rev. ed. *The Traumatic Neuroses of War;* New York: Hoeber, 1947); R. Grinker and J. P. Spiegel, *Men Under Stress* (Philadelphia: Blakeston, 1945); cited and discussed in Judith Herman, *Trauma and Recovery* (New York: Basic Books, 1992).

33. Herman, *Trauma and Recovery,* 39.

34. Ibid., 39.

35. Edward J. Frischholz, "The Relationship Among Dissociation, Hypnosis, and Child Abuse in the Development of Multiple Personality Disorder," in Kluft, *Childhood Antecedents of Multiple Personality,* 108.

36. Frank W. Putnam, Jr., M.D., "Dissociation as a Response to Extreme Trauma," in ibid., 73.

37. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* April 5, 1942.

38. Groverman Blake, " 'Kings Row' Comes to Capitol ScreenFilm Taken From Henry Bellaman [*sic*] Book," *Cincinnati Times-Star,* April 6, 1942.

39. The script of the trailer may be found in the *Kings Row* "Publicity and Press Clippings" file in the Warner Bros. Archives.

40. Waldman and Walker, "John Huston's *Freud* and Textual Repression."

41. Balmary, *Psychoanalyzing Psychoanalysis,* 161–62.

42. Waites, *Trauma and Survival,* 28.

43. Geoffrey Shurlock's and John A. Vizzard's instructions to replace Magda and her father with a "prototype father and child" are communicated in a memorandum dated August 11, 1961, to John Huston from his publicist William Gordon, John Huston Collection. In the final shooting script dated February 10, 1962, one flashback does actually depict a "young and beautiful Magda," but she merely walks along the edge of a lake. When it comes time for the suggestive actions to be depicted, the father undressing the daughter is not Magda's father, but his hands tremble, Magda recounts, "like my father's did long, long ago when I was a little girl and supposed to go swimming. My own father."

Eight
Freud and the Psychoanalytic Situation on the Screen

Alain de Mijolla, M.D.

When I was a small child I used to make adults laugh by singing the songs, often rather licentious ones, of Maurice Chevalier. As a result, this artist was at the heart of an event in my life, linked to the cinema, that is partly the cause of this essay and perhaps even of my involvement in psychoanalysis.

In 1939 Robert Siodmak, a film director who was fleeing the Nazis, spent some time in France before going on to the United States. He made several films there, one of which was *Pièges*. Although I was only six and a half years old and it was not an appropriate film for my age, I was taken to see it precisely because the star was Maurice Chevalier. The Second World War began soon afterward, followed by the Occupation of France by the Germans. *Pièges,* of course, was banned. As far as I was concerned, its content disappeared into a forgetfulness so intense that it should be designated instead as repression. When I began psychoanalytic treatment in 1960, I referred to the film several times, certain that it was important for me.

This "screen memory" might have remained undeciphered forever if the film had not been shown on television one evening in the 1970s. I don't need to tell you that nothing could stop me from watching it. It was an amazing experience: the images and the dialogue of this film turned out to be full of associative links with my life, my parents, my fantasies, the things I liked and disliked. [1]

About *Pièges,* I need say only that the hero, played by Chevalier (who was therefore my model for identificationthe type of secondary identification I described in *Les visiteurs du moi* as, precisely, "screen identification"),[2] was unjustly accused of being a sadistic murderer of young women and was sentenced to death. He was finally saved only because an old detective interrogated the man he thought was his best friend and proved that the friend was guilty, using arguments that were purely psychological. You can

imagine my stupefaction when, already very moved by the memories this film had awakened, the psychoanalyst I had become in the meantime heard the murderer ask the man who was exposing him, with furious irony: "You have read Freud?" It turned out that my memory at the age of six was actually rather good: a reference to Sigmund Freud in a film from 1939, in a story interrupted by silly songs! A memory trace from an entertainment film engraved thirty years earlier on the unconscious of a child who was going to become a psychoanalyst, associating Freud's name with a criminal investigation that would prove one of his Oedipal models innocent. Even though Freud's image did not appear in the film, this mode of underground transmission constitutes a good introduction to what I have to say about "Freud on the screen."

I am not going to talk about psychoanalysts on the screen, because nine times out of ten we see psychiatrists or psychotherapists rather than psychoanalysts, as Glen and Krin Gabbard and Marc Vernet have pointed out. [3] Instead, I have limited my subject to the films that show Freud himself. They fall into two categories: fictional works and filmed "documents" left to us by Freud's contemporaries such as Philip Lehrman, Mark Brunswick, Princess Marie Bonaparte and René Laforgue, all of whom had been analyzed by Freud. We will begin with the second category.[4]

Freud on the Screen: Filmed Documents

What place do these audiovisual archives occupy in research on the history of psychoanalysis? The films that represent Freud do not show us any of the seminal events of that history, such as the presentation of the Rat Man case in Salzburg in 1908 or the invasion of Freud's apartment by Nazis thirty years later. Although these documents merely show a man between the ages of sixty-nine and eighty-two, increasingly weakened by illness, they nevertheless offer us moving and silent images of one of those illustrious personages whose biographers put so much effort into trying to bring to life. In the absence of these films, we would be limited to still photographs and memoirs.

In September 1929, a few months after Philip Lehrman shot *Sigmund Freud, His Family and Colleagues, 1928–1947,* Smiley Blanton noted:

> A few seconds later, a frail, small-statured, grey-haired man with a gray beard appeared in the hallway and came toward me. Although he looked older than in the photographs I had seen, I recognized the approaching figure to be that of Freud himself. He was carrying a cigar in his hand, and there was something almost diffident in his manner as he addressed me. "Is this Dr. Blanton?" he asked in a low voice. His articulation was somewhat indistinct, doubtless due to the operations he has undergone for cancer of the upper right jawbone . . . . The impressions that stand out after this first meeting are Freud's smallness

> of stature (about 5'4", I should judge), his soft and almost deprecating manner, the way in which he makes you feel at ease yet combines this with a detachment which leaves you free to express yourself. I also got the impression of frailness. He is partly bald, his head is not large, and his forehead, while high, is not as high as mine. I should add that his command of English is superb, luckily for an American who knows almost no German. [5]

Five years later, in 1934, Joseph Wortis wrote: "He was short of stature, slight of build, and looked intensely pale and serious. . . . Sometimes he bent sideways and leaned on his desk, looking keen. . . . His speech was low and muffled and the metal appliance in his mouth (which he had worn since his operation) seemed to cause him much annoyance. His German was precise and deliberate, and he spoke his syllables and words with emphasis."[6] These phrases create images. If they are brought together with information drawn from filmed documents, we get a more precise impression of the contours and especially the mobility of a more human Freud than the static portraits we had of him.

The filmed documents of Freud during his lifetime do not speak for themselves. They are the product of manipulations that must be taken into account and whose parameters must be determined. Who wanted to contemplate Freud on the screen and why?

It is clear that these films made by amateurs will not interest anyone who does not have an emotional or intellectual connection with psychoanalysis and its founder. They belong to the category of home movies and are destined as such for Freud's family and friends and for the psychoanalytic community who have found in them the confirmation or denial of memories of things that have been experienced or reported.

In the montage-film at the Freud Museum in London, Anna Freud comments joyfully on the sequence showing a conversation between her father and his old friend, the archaeology professor Emanuel Löwy, in a garden in Pötzleindorf. These are the best images in the film, she says, because Freud did not know he was being filmed. In fact, she reminds us that he did not like to be photographed or filmed and that he adopted unnatural poses in front of the camera. She and she alone could recognize the fugitive expression of the "real" Freud, that is to say, her own Freud, whose memory the artificial image in this scene could bring back to life. Her oral testimony prolongs and completes the effect of the film as a visual document because it draws our attention to the fact that this personage, whom one sees leaning toward his friend in a familiar way, speaking animatedly, is more authentic in her eyesand therefore in our eyes if we identify with her proximity to her fatherthan certain other sequences in which one sees Freud pretending to read a book or, as in Philip Lehrman's film, opening his mail in front of the camera.

But it is a question of artificial families linked to family romances that we

Figure 18.
Sigmund Freud, Vienna, February 1929.

Figure 19.
Sigmund Freud and his daughter Anna, Vienna, February 1929.
Both photographs © by Lynne Lehrman Weiner (all rights reserved).
From the documentary film *Sigmund Freud, His Family and Colleagues, 1928–1947,* edited and produced by Lynne Lehrman Weiner and photographed by Philip R. Lehrman, M.D.

doubtless never stop writing unconsciously. In the same way that devotees of Marcel Proust consider Aunt Léonie to be their own aunt, and the characters of *A la recherche du temps perdu* to be their own loved ones, Freud's followers call Jakob, Amalia or Anna by their first names with a familiarity that corresponds to their identification with the "primal family." A sense of belonging of this kind, connected with the pride of having a prestigious professional ancestry, is no doubt behind Freud's analysands' fixing certain characteristics of their psychoanalyst on film. They did this with all the more

insistence because they did not see him during their therapy (given Freud's practice of sitting behind his patients so that they did not make eye contact during the analytic session).

For everyone, and especially for psychoanalysts, filmed documents provide a reservoir for the completion and enrichment of images they have derived from books. They find the Founding Father in these films and they note with emotion his gestures, his relationship to the space that surrounds him, the arrangement of his office, etc. For those who have been in analysis or have become psychoanalysts, such images give new depth to fantasies linked to their experiences or their life work.

There is an old debate whereby some state that biographical data pertaining to the author add nothing to the comprehension of a text. I have written about this problem elsewhere, [7] recalling how Freud, who was so uncooperative with his own biographers, regretted not knowing anything about Shakespeare's life and noted at the end of his preface to the book on President Woodrow Wilson: "We cannot deny that in this case, as in all others, a more intimate knowledge of the man would have made it possible to have a more precise appreciation of his works."[8]

The amateur silent films contain images that bear conscious meanings and unconscious resonances which modify our perception of the founder of psychoanalysis. In Philip Lehrman's film, Freud suddenly and angrily throws away his cigar stub, which he has smoked to the very end. He pushes away his daughter Anna's arm as she tries to help him when they go outdoors for a walk. We see his anxious disarray when he poses near the window in his office, the movements of his jaw betraying his irritation at the prosthesis in his mouth. His permanent agitation is rendered even more obvious because he walks back and forth from a sunny area where his face can be seen clearly to a corner in the shadows where he vanishes into the darkness. He resembles a frail bird as he stands in the snow in his dark overcoat as his family and friends encourage the family dogs to perform for the camera.

All of these details, while trivial from the perspective of History with a capital H, solicit in us the "interpretation machine" of the other's unconscious that Freud postulated in *Totem and Taboo*. They contribute to giving us a better sense, rather than comprehension, of Freud's relationship to others, to his family and students as well as his patients: they show us glimpses of his anxiety, moments of abandonment and brusque rejection, his addiction to tobacco, his solitude in the midst of external agitation.

Of course, the sound of voices is missing. Soon we will deplore the absence of depth or smell, so great is our regret at not having been able to have witnessed the past, the scenes experienced by the characters of our ideal museum, those who form constituent parts of ourselves. These cinematographic documents occupy a privileged place among the ways that re-

searchers can satisfy their biographical curiosity. Fiction films, on the other hand, can give us the momentary illusion of mastering a past that has escaped us forever by recreating it in a narrative framework.

The Psychoanalytic Situation in Fiction Films

Numerous works have been devoted to the analysis of the few fiction films in which Freud appears. I would like to discuss John Huston's feature film *Freud* (1962), Axel Corti's Austrian television docudrama *Der junge Freud* (1978), and Hugh Brody's *1919* (1983), an English film in which Freud is evoked in a particularly original manner.

Freud shows a young man who has not yet become a psychoanalyst, whereas *Der junge Freud* is largely a flashback that begins with Freud's emigration in 1938. It is astonishing that filmmakers have not dramatized incidents from other periods of Freud's lifehis relationship and break with Carl Jung, for examplebut it is as if they were obeying the order Freud himself gave: my life is of no interest and my history is the history of the beginning of psychoanalysis.

Rather than tear apart these fiction films for their naiveté or their historical inaccuracy, I prefer to recall what Georges Sadoul wrote about them: "To grasp the value of this kind of testimony, imagine what the worst commercial film shot in the times of Amenophis IV, Julius Caesar, Lao Tsu, Frédéric Barberousse, Mahomet, Ivan the Terrible, Louis XIV or Washington would represent for historians today. Whatever their genre, these films constitute incomparable treasures for the future that touch history in general and also the history of mores, costumes, gestures, the arts (including cinema), language and technology." [9] Moreover, a commercial film takes on the power of positive or negative propaganda which forms the basis of judgments made by the masses, even as its makers have been inspired, consciously or unconsciously, by the culture in which they live and create. Where Freud and psychoanalysis are concerned, in addition to these socio-cultural parameters, one also has the profound resonances that the often wild parapsychoanalytic progress of the film awakens within those making it.

Quite typical in this respect is Huston's *Freud,* the first film devoted to Freud's biography. Based on an interminable scenario written by Jean-Paul Sartre, a philosopher who was rather hostile to psychoanalytic notions, it shows what the American public wanted to think about Freudian psychoanalysis. This is the main interest of the film today. I am not going to emphasize the many liberties taken with history. Stimulated by the publication of the first volumes of Ernest Jones's biography and the publication of Freud's letters to Wilhelm Fliess, *Freud* mixed Sartre's obsessions with those of the Hollywood group who rewrote and interpreted his screenplay.

In the film, Freud almost always appears to be furious, has a "gloomy

look," is "rigid," "pale," absolutely devoid of humor and trapped in his own neurosis until he turns into a lucid Sartrean consciousness by ridding himself of the protective and hated fathers with whom he had surrounded himself. Driven by the hostility of the Viennese doctors, needled by antisemitism, he becomes "engaged," according to Sartre's conceptions, in a revolutionary struggle for the liberation of oppressed hysterics, who have been unjustly accused of pretending.

The violence of these external conflicts is symbolized by three fathersan alcoholic Theodor Meynert, a senile Jakob Freud and a soft Josef Breuer. These father-son conflicts motivate Sartre's script, although he poses an adjacent question: what was Freud's sexuality? The film, however, moves to erase this aspect of the screenplay. In her journal on July 16, 1958, Simone de Beauvoir wrote:

> Jones does not provide a deep explanation of Freud's specific neurosis nor how he got out of it . . . Such are questions that he does not ask: for example, the relationship between Freud and his wife. It is easy to say that the relationship was "excellent," but were Freud's depressions and migraines linked to his domestic life or not? After all, he was a very dynamic man: witness his passion for traveling. Monogamous, no doubt, but why, precisely? This question is one of those that Jones eschews . . . . The most touching moment is when he discovers his mistake about hysteria: he had believed that all his patients had been "seduced" by their fathers and . . . then he understood that his patients had invented everything. What a denial! What a shock! . . . It is touching to see these notions that became so scholastic and mechanical, for example, transference, became revealed in such a lively experience . . . . In his photographs, his face becomes more and more intense with age and also more and more closed and, above all, sad. [10]

In their conflictual relationship during the shooting of the film, Huston and Montgomery Clift accentuate a general "hystericization" that characterizes *Freud* and that was already present in Sartre's scenario. In 1965, Huston confided to the French critic Robert Benayoun: "The basic idea, of Freud the adventurer, the explorer of his own unconscious, comes from me. I wanted to concentrate on this episode in the manner of a detective story." He also specified: "For me, hypnosis has a magical quality, almost sacred."[11]

As we shall stress, hypnotic treatment and catharsis are the only aspects of Freudian method that are presented to the public. At no point does the film represent the psychoanalytic situation: indeed, this characterizes all the films that pretend to show psychoanalysts in action. Marc Vernet has given a good description of Hollywood's need to promote the detective story and the suspense surrounding an enigma that will be unveiled in films pretending to deal with psychoanalysis. Huston's *Freud* conforms to this convention and also presents a classical character who, alone against the world and especially against himself, must insure the triumph of a truth that he re-

veals through suffering. In the final analysis, Freud does not differ much from a lawyer or a policeman (remember *Pièges*) seeking justice who overcomes prejudice (his own and others') to save a man who has been unjustly condemned.

Censorship erased the question posed by Sartre and de Beauvoir: where in this entire story is Freud's sexuality? Huston had to submit to the stated and unstated imperatives of American censorship (the unstated ones were in his own mind). He was constrained to adapt his film to the ideological requirements then prevailing in the world of psychiatry and psychoanalysis, as well as the principal religious groups. Later he deplored the fact that the film had been "literally mutilated in its essential scenes." [12] I refer you to Janet Walker's *Couching Resistance* for numerous reactions to the film.[13]

The greatest fear was that Freud's image could be harmed by excessively shocking scenes. Freud's family was opposed to having any of its living members represented, hence the childless couple one sees.[14] The theme of prostitution, which Sartre stressed so insistently that one might wonder whether this might not have been a response (conscious or unconscious) to his questions about Freud's sexuality, was strongly rejected by Hollywood censors, advised by several psychoanalysts, because it "has nothing whatever to do with Freud from the historical point of view."[15] It must not be forgotten that at the time, as J.-B. Pontalis reminds us, research on the history of psychoanalysis was almost nonexistent.[16] In any event, it was necessary to avoid the risk of tarnishing the image of psychoanalytic theory and practice which its American propagators wanted to promote as a science closely tied to medicine.

If the film can be criticized in many respects, we can credit it for having done away with the official portrayal of Freud imposed upon the psychoanalysts of my generation, namely the old man with glasses and a white beard, the noble scholar whom we were supposed to admire with a certain religiosity. Even though Montgomery Clift's acting always seemed artificial to me, the personality we saw on the screen did allow us to imagine a Freud closer to ourselves, our age and our enthusiasms. Above all, it enabled our fantasies of identification with his discovery and allowed us to hope that perhaps we too could revolutionize the world.

Time has passed, and the rare films that show Freud no longer bear this romantic hope. They usually reflect the evolution of the public's image of psychoanalysis after the illusion had been denounced that it was the source of miracles. But this is not true of *Der junge Freud,* a 1978 Austrian tele-film by Axel Corti. This is a serious work which begins with Freud leaving Vienna to emigrate to England and then, through a series of flashbacks, shows Freud's progressive discovery of psychoanalysis. Certain liberties are taken with history for the purpose of condensation rather than distortion.

Freud is shown as a wise student. He is obstinate about his research, but

he does not have Montgomery Cliff's troubled aura. Through a technical artifice, a sort of interview with Freud is intercut with dramatic scenes so that sometimes Freud takes himself out of a dramatized scene to speak to an interviewer whose voice we hear but who is not seen. The film is intended to be educational and belongs more to the documentary genre than dramatic fiction. For this reason, it is less dependent than Huston's film on idealization and identification.

Once more we see the pre-psychoanalytic Freud. A long section is devoted to his experiments with cocaine and the legend of Josef Breuer. In fact, we witness Freud's most precocious period, since there is no scene of psychotherapy except for a rather fleeting one with a young man. The film ends with the publication of *Studies on Hysteria,* when Freud takes the train to join Fliess in Breslau, an image that recalls the film's opening image, in which Freud leaves Vienna by train as an exile forty-three years later. This is the only film in which I have seen a rather long treatment of Freud's relationship with Fliess, whom Sartre had written into his scenario as a paranoid villain, but who did not appear in the film *Freud*.

1919, made in England in 1984 by Hugh Brody based on an idea by Michael Ignatieff, is the only film, to my knowledge, that can give psychoanalysts the feeling of an authentic perception of what happens during the course of psychoanalytic therapy. Its subject is an imaginary meeting in Vienna in the 1970s of two former patients of Freud's who were on his couch in 1919: the Wolf Man and the patient whose story is told in "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman." Now in their old age, they speak to each other about their lives and their psychoanalytic therapy, united by their failed "treatment," in the medical sense, and by their feelings about what their meetings with Freud have represented and continue to represent in their lives, even though the young woman's analysis was broken off because of negative transference.

Contemporary scenes in 1970s Vienna alternate with flashbacks that return us to the time when the two main characters, played by younger actors, were in psychoanalysis. This alternation of temporality is further cut into by the insertion of images from silent documentary films or newsreels that evoke the period of the patients' childhoodthe house of the Wolf Man's father, for instanceor other moments in their lives, such as the Bolshevik revolution or the entry of the Nazis into Austria in 1938. We see these analysands lying on the couch in Freud's office, faithfully reconstituted on the basis of Edmund Engelman's photographs, where they speak to their analyst, who replies to them, as they had spoken during their analytic sessions. But the shots are framed so that we never see Freud.

In fact, we only hear his voice, slightly veiled as the memoir writers described it, asking questions, suggesting interpretations, joking and sometimes scolding. By suggesting his presence rather than representing it visually, it

becomes all the stronger. Through the fantasies this absence cannot fail to call up in the spectator who identifies with these analysands in that they do not see their analyst and they will never see him again since he has been dead for more than thirty years, the film gives Freud, the transference and the psychoanalytic situation a cinematic evocation of truly moving authenticity.

The psychoanalytic situation has almost never been shown in the cinema, aside from this film. Nothing, in fact, is less cinematic, because nothing is less visual or less apt to provide the material for a dramatic scene, except in rare moments. Film directors have not been mistaken about this: one cannot reproach them for having privileged Freud the pupil of Charcot over Freud the psychoanalyst.

Among the technical conditions set out by Freud as being essential for analysis, we find, to begin with, the free associations of the analysand's ideas and positioning the analyst outside the field of vision of the analysand. These necessities are opposed to the dynamics of the cinema. The need to dramatize action in order to engage the spectator's interest has resulted in privileging, we can note again, the familiar situation of investigating a mystery that must be solved. But the mystery entails a dramatic scene so that the solution can be represented visually, and a suspenseful crescendo can only be found in the reawakening of an originary traumatic scene. As in the time of Charcot, the etiology of trauma is represented, which Freud had to struggle against in order to argue for his hypothesis that psychic reality was the specific object of his research.

Pontalis has shown that Freud's approach was to occupy the interior space that Charcot had ignored in favor of the exteriority of the etiology and the symptomatic contortions of his hysterics. [17] The cinema has almost always failed to make this interiority meaningful when it has tried to put the analytic situation on the screen. This failure can also be seen when it comes to representing dreams, as in G. W. Pabst's *Secrets of a Soul* or the dream Alfred Hitchcock asked Salvador Dali to illustrate for *Spellbound*.

I would add that the time of analysis has a rhythm that is very different from that of the cinema, and it is very difficult to render the sensation of that tempo. The immediate fall into hypnotic sleep and the transference attached to hypnosis are the opposite of the slow process of working through, which has to include the meaning of the breaks necessitated by a sequence of sessions and the duration of psychoanalytic therapy. *1919* was able to take into account these specific aspects of the psychoanalytic situation that are very difficult to represent visually. I could even say that by mixing the present-day story, the story of the analysis, the story of childhood and the historical story, this film almost manages to give a cinematographic translation of that crucial Freudian notion *après-coup or Nachträglichkeit* (deferred action), *1919,* by never showing Freud although he is constantly present in the emotional memories of his analysands, managed to render perceptible that "absent

third party" that is necessary for the economy and dynamics of every psychoanalytic session. Both the patient and the analyst pursue, in parallel, the evocation of someone who is missing and around whom their conscious discourse is organized as well as their silences and their unconscious fantasies. This convergence allows for the identifications in both directions that are necessary for the psychoanalytic process to be pursued and remain alive. This "absent third party" can never be represented since it is but a fantasmatic organizer, a catalytic agent.

Films are magical because the preconscious and unconscious motives of their creators slip between even the most carefully controlled images. Who could imagine what a given scene or line of dialogue might awaken or engrave in the memory of the person contemplating a film? Who could guess what needs it might give rise to, what nostalgia it might call up to show Freud, even a caricature, or a scene of psychoanalytic therapy, even if it is only a scene of hypnotic catharsis? Who could know what resonance the film might have for one of the spectators watching it, and what uncertainty risks appearing in the story he tells of his own history, with perhaps the sense that everything might not have happened as he always believed it had?

Translated by Janet Bergstrom

Notes

1. My example raises the issue of the impact that audiovisual documents, which have become so common since video cameras became available, can have on the approach individuals may now undertake to their own history in the course of their psychoanalytic treatment.

2. Alain de Mijolla, *Les visiteurs du moi* (1981; 2nd ed., Paris: Belles Lettres, 1986). A summary in English may be found in "Unconscious Identification Fantasies and Family Prehistory," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 68 (1987): 397–403.

3. Krin Gabbard and Glen O. Gabbard, *Psychiatry and the Cinema* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Marc Vernet, "Freud: Effets spéciaux. Mise en scène: U.S.A.," *Communications* 23 (1975): 223–34.

4. To my knowledge, these films are: *Sigmund Freud, His Family and Colleagues, 1928–1947,* edited by Lynne Lehrman Weiner from footage taken by' her father, Philip R. Lehrman; *Freud: 1930–1939,* edited by Clifford York from footage taken by Mark Brunswick and Marie Bonaparte, with commentary by Anna Freud (The Freud Museum, London); *Sigmund Freud: Home Movies,* edited from footage filmed by Marie Bonaparte (Library of Congress and Freud Archives, 1992); and a montage of footage shot by René Laforgue, which belongs to Mme. Délia Laforgue.

5. Smiley Blanton, M.D., *Diary of My Analysis with Sigmund Freud* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1971) 19–20, 22.

6. Joseph Wortis, *Fragments of an Analysis with Freud* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954) 8–9.

7. Alain de Mijolla, "Freud, la biographie, son autobiographie et ses biographes," *Revue internationale d'Histoire de la Psychanalyse* 6 (1993): 81–108.

8. Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt, *Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-Eighth President of the United States: A Psychological Study* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967) xvii.

9. Georges Sadoul, "Le Cinéma depuis 1895," *L'Histoire et ses méthodes, Encyclopédie de la Pléiade* 11, ed. Raymond Queneau (Paris: Gallimard, 1961) 778.

10. Simone de Beauvoir, *La force des choses* (Paris: Gallimard, 1963) 452–53.

11. Robert Benayoun, *Positif* 70 (1965): 18.

12. Ibid.

13. Janet Walker, *Couching Resistance: Women, Film and Psychoanalytic Psychiatry* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) 144–60.

14. It was essentially Anna Freud who was opposed to every film project about her father. We know, for example, that through the intermediary of Marianne Kris, she convinced Marilyn Monroe, who had consulted Anna Freud while making a film in London, not to play the part of Cecily that John Huston had in mind for her. John Huston, *An Open Book* (New York: Knopf, 1980) 31.

15. Cf. Janet Walker, *Couching Resistance*.

16. J.-B. Pontalis, Préface, in Jean-Paul Sartre, *Le Scénario Freud* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984) 14.

17. J.-B. Pontalis, "Entre Freud et Charcot" in his *Entre le rêve et la douleur* (Paris: Gallimard, 1977) 16–17.

Nine
Hitchcock's Trilogy:
A Logic of Mise en Scène

Ayako Saito

Alfred Hitchcock's *Vertigo* (1958), *North by Northwest* (1959) and *Psycho* (1960) are sometimes referred to as a trilogy, probably because they are three monumental pieces that more or less epitomize Hitchcock's oeuvre. Curiously, little analysis has been devoted to these three films *as* a trilogy, perhaps because each film, with its richness, complexity and eccentricity, deserves an extensive investigation of its own. Frequently discussions of one of the three films will refer to the other two, but rarely are they grouped together. Some critics, however, while not referring to *Vertigo, North by Northwest* and *Psycho* as a trilogy, have pointed out that the three have similarities in spite of their differences. For example, Hitchcock's biographer Donald Spoto writes:

> That this picture [*Psycho*] followed the wounded romanticism of *Vertigo* and the genial cynicism of *North by Northwest* is . . . not so surprising. All three films have as their emotional focus a desperate, duplicitous blond; all three films have at the center a personality that is unknown (the real Madeleine Elster in *Vertigo*) or nonexistent (the fictitious George Kaplan . . . in *North by Northwest*) or long dead (Mrs. Bates, the killer's mother in *Psycho*). [1]

Spoto does not present an extensive analysis of the three films nor does he suggest any internal logic that might link them. Instead he describes several elements they have in common which he believes illuminate Hitchcock's biography. In fact, Spoto seems to argue that these films represent the director's emotional life directly: "Amid Hitchcock's desperate and desperately controlled emotional life, these films became a triptych of pain and delusion and death, created from the depths of private frustration and longing . . . ."[2]

Thomas M. Leitch, on the other hand, discusses *Vertigo, North by Northwest* and *Psycho* as a group in his book *Find the Director and Other Hitchcock*

Games. [3] Leitch discusses them along with a fourth film, *The Wrong Man* (1957), because their subject is mental disintegration, "madness," as he puts it.[4] Whereas Spoto sees a direct relationship between these three films and Hitchcock's personal life, Leitch examines the trilogy with respect to Hitchcock's manipulation of the relationship between the spectator and the film or, to be more specific, between the spectator's psychological reaction to madness and the director's desire to see that reaction. As he writes: "*North by Northwest* recapitulates a great deal of *Vertigo*'s material in a context which controls its consequences, persuades the audience that it doesn't really matter, and so releases its comic potential,"[5] as if to suggest that Hitchcock has ultimate power over his audience. However, it seems to me that the boundary between director and spectator might not be as distinct as Leitch wishes to demonstrate: it might be impossible to separate the director's pleasure and identification with the characters in these films from his audience's pleasure and identification with them. Indeed, I would argue that beyond his intention to construct Hitchcock as the manipulator of his films and audience, Leitch's analysis of the three films reveals that they are inordinately haunted by the theme of madness. Contrary to Leitch's argument, Hitchcock's conscious control as director may not be absolute.

It is this idea of "madness" that I would like to examine. I will consider the trilogy as a textual whole, a single filmic system,[6] and will look at this text in the light of three psychical structures: melancholia, mania and paranoia/schizophrenia.[7] My analysis of this trilogy endeavors to demonstrate the degree to which the narrative, the visual style and the dominant affectivity of each filmmelancholic in *Vertigo,* manic in *North by Northwest* and paranoid in *Psycho*are interrelated and, in fact, are determined by one another.

The Trilogy: Basic Hypotheses

Let me stress that my project is neither to "diagnose" these texts nor to define them as pathological. The purpose of my investigation is to explore the question of affect in film analysis. It seems to me that this question has attracted too little theoretical attention within psychoanalytic film theory. This lack of emphasis on affect may be partly due to the fact that it is considered to belong to the empirical realm. However, I would suggest that the neglect of affect by theory is also largely due to the strong emphasis on the Lacanian psychoanalytic model, which revolves around questions of language and the gaze. Indeed, the Lacanian model attempts to eliminate the question of affect from the vocabulary of psychoanalysis precisely because of affect's empirical status.[8] As a result (directly or indirectly) of the Lacanian position, there has been little interest in exploring the question of affect.

For example, the problem of how to distinguish affect from related terms

such as feeling or emotion has hardly been raised by film theorists. But these terms have different histories and contexts, [9] and refer to different states and/or degrees of affective experience, although they are not mutually exclusive and it may be impossible to separate them completely in practical terms. Technically, however, they can be differentiated: feeling is a general term for the affective[10] aspect of experience, often with special emphasis on the subjective side of experience, whereas emotion is a state of excitement, marked by strong, often distinct feeling involving bodily changes. On the other hand, affect is used differently from these two terms, particularly in psychoanalytic theory: affect is any kind of feeling or emotion *attached to ideas*. Affect is defined by Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, who note that it is a "term borrowed by psychoanalysis from German psychological usage": "It connotes any affective state, whether painful or pleasant, whether vague or well defined, and whether it is manifested in the form of a massive discharge or in the form of a general mood. According to Freud, each instinct expresses itself in terms of affect and in terms of ideas (*Vorstellungen*). The affect is the qualitative expression of the quantity of instinctual energy and of its fluctuations."[11]

For our discussion, two technical points should be underscored in order to clarify the difference between affect and emotion or feelings: (1) affect is defined as having a special relationship to the drives, as is the case with representation (*Vorstellung*); (2) affect involves a transformation of instinctual energy from quantity to quality, as in the transformation of instinctual energy into anxiety.[12] The question of affect is so profound and complex that it demands an entirely different project, one that has been addressed by writers such as the French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst André Green and several others.[13] I rely on their research as the theoretical basis for my own study, which I will limit to the question of affect as it is relevant to film analysis.

The differentiation between affect and emotion or feeling in psychoanalytic theory makes it possible for us to discuss affect in the cinema in terms of textual analysis. It allows us to trace an affective movement of the text, which can be distinguished from the direct emotional response to the text as it is subjectively experienced by the spectator. Green provides many significant insights for our purposes in his paper "Conceptions of Affect."[14] Green reminds us that affect is "not the emotional state of the primitive experience, but its reproduction."[15] Analyzing affect in a filmic text, in the technical sense, is not equivalent to analyzing the spectator's immediate emotional reaction to a film, although this may be a point of departure. They are closely related, but in effect work at different levels: one may argue that analyzing emotion involves an examination of a more physiological process because emotion is a direct bodily and mental response to external stimuli.[16] Green also points out that "affect is not a direct emotional expression,

but a *trace,* a *residue,* awakened by a repetition." [17] The analysis of affect, then, lies in *the process of analyzing the textual movement* in which affects are manifested through cinematic form and the structure of repetition.[18]

I employ three psychopathological structuresmelancholic, manic and paranoid/schizoidas frames of reference in order to suggest one possible way of analyzing different modalities of affect via different psychic structures. I will provide brief definitions of the three structures as a provisional guide for my discussion. These definitions are intended to be descriptive rather than diagnostic in nature.

Melancholia is a psychotic disorder characterized by the state of dejection, depression or withdrawal and the inhibition of all activity, accompanied by delusions of guilt, excessive self-reproach, suicidal ideas, unnameable fears and an overall feeling of sadness. Mania, by contrast, is characterized by such physical symptoms as psychomotor excitement, great distractibility and hyperactivity, accompanied often by a happy though unstable and sometimes irritable emotional attitude. The most interesting characteristic of mania is a state called the "flight of ideas"[19] which is often induced by associations with sound. In the manic state, the patient often manifests delusions of grandeur and feelings of omnipotence.[20] Paranoia is defined as a "chronic psychosis characterized by more or less systematized delusion, with a predominance of ideas of reference but with no weakening of the intellect."[21] That is to say, the paranoid delusion, which is typically persecutory in nature, does not affect the intellectual capacity of the patient, unlike schizophrenia. It is built upon ideas that are systematically linked by a referential logic which may or may not have a basis in reality. Perhaps the most typical forms of paranoia are delusions of persecution. I would add that the relationship between paranoia and schizophrenia is very close,[22] although they are not the same clinical entities, and that generally both melancholia and mania are classified as affective disorders,[23] different from schizophrenia or paranoia.[24] Let me stress, however, that these classifications are by no means absolute, that they function as points of reference and that there are borderline cases.[25]

The three structures have three different dominant affectivities and related psychic mechanisms. The three kinds of affective configuration based on the three structures may indicate different categories according to which representation is organized: (1) excessive sadness and dejection induced by the loss of the object which leads to total withdrawal in the melancholic state; (2) excessive happiness and activity in the manic state in which a strong sense of denial is present; (3) and in the paranoid state, isolation, hypersensitivity, suspicion and fear of persecution, narcissistic fixation on an object or an idea (delusion), and the inversion of love and hate. In the case of schizophrenia, psychiatrists have long recognized "the double aspect of affect: on the one hand, affective indifference, and on

the other, paradoxical affectivity expressing itself in acts from the most explosive and unexpected impulses." [26] Affect in schizophrenia is tinged with hatred full of destructive urges, as Green observes: "The destructive attacks are directed at all psychic processes: at the object, at the body of the subject, and above all, at his thought. Through a paradoxical reversal, affect is not only always infiltrated with hatred, but also hated as affect."[27] The paradoxicality of affect in schizophrenia may indicate the total disavowal of the trauma along with its affect,[28] and thereby one may say that the regressive process is much more archaic in schizophrenia[29] than in affective disorders or in paranoia.[30]

Hitchcock's trilogy offers us a particularly interesting example because it illustrates the ways in which different affective configurations are related to different cinematic styles. The three films constitute a trilogy not only because of their similarities and related thematic concerns, but also because their differences mark the affective configurations which are, along with representation, part of a larger systematic organization of psychic responses to traumatic loss. The three psychopathological modes presented in the trilogy are three possible affective modalities by which the subject deals with traumatic loss:[31] (1) by mourning the loss and treating the self as the lost object, as the guilty melancholic subject does in *Vertigo;* (2) by denying the loss of the object and effecting a magical reunion, as the omnipotent manic subject does in *North by Northwest;* (3) by annihilating the self and fusing with the lost object by projective fragmentation and murderous aggression in order to preserve it at all costs, as the paranoid subject does in *Psycho*. (In *Psycho,* however, Norman's disavowal is so complete as to render him schizophrenic, placing the subject in the realm of total psychosis.)

In each case, the loss of the object represents an idea that is fundamentally unacceptable to the subject. The trilogy presents three possible ways of dealing with the loss of the object: repression, denial or repudiation. Hitchcock articulates these mechanisms by using three different cinematic styles with distinct rhythms: (1) a circular textual movement created by tracking camera movements and long takes in *Vertigo;* (2) rhythmic editing with stark contrasts in shot composition in *North by Northwest;* (3) sudden changes in pace and rhythm, with a composition that heavily relies on the shot/reverse-shot structure and tight close-ups in *Psycho*.

Moreover, the curious relationship among melancholia, mania, paranoia and schizophrenia manifests itself in the trilogy. The affective shift from the melancholic to the manic in *Vertigo* and *North by Northwest* has an internal logic. The close relationship between mania and melancholia has often been pointed out in the literature of psychiatry.[32] If we understand the close internal relationship between these two disorders as constituting the opposite poles of affectivity, then the movement from the melancholic (*Vertigo*) to

the manic (*North by Northwest*) can be understood as the shift from one extreme of an affective fluctuation to the other.

On the other hand, the similarity between *Vertigo* and *Psycho* is also very curious, especially with reference to guilt and punishment. Some psycho-analysts, like Guy Rosolato, speak of melancholia as an internalized form of paranoia, [33] even though they are nosologically different: the reversal of the paranoiac's persecutory fear, which is directed at the external object which was once introjected, is the melancholic's self-reproach and delusion of guilt in which the superego functions as the persecutor inside the subject and reproaches the self.[34] In structural terms, melancholia and paranoia may be considered somewhat similar, but they are quite different in terms of the quality of affects (sadness, fear/aggression, hatred) and the relationship between the subject and the object (introjection vs. projection). Green, on the other hand, places paranoia between manic-depression (psychosis) and schizophrenia.[35] In the trilogy, a manic fantasy experienced by Roger Thornhill, the protagonist of *North by Northwest,* is curiously placed between Scottie's melancholic fantasy in *Vertigo* and both protagonists' (Marion Crane and Norman Bates's) paranoid/schizoid fantasy in *Psycho*. The increasing shift from manic aggression to paranoia we observe in Roger in *North by Northwest* foreshadows the paranoid subject, Marion, as well as the threatening schizophrenic subject, Norman, in *Psycho*.[36]

It is not simply that madness is at the heart of the trilogy, as Leitch argues. The strange textual movement from *Vertigo* to *North by Northwest* then back to *Psycho* may correspond to an itinerary of the melancholic subject who, after having made the futile attempt to resurrect the lost object by magical reunion, retroactively returns to the more regressive paranoid position.[37] On the other hand, the structure of repetition found in the intertextual relationship among the films of the trilogy bears witness to the underlying affective logic which drives the narrative forward, conferring specific affective tones and configurations on each of the films.

Analysis

It's too late. VERTIGO

One may say that *Vertigo* is something of an aberration in Hitchcock's oeuvre because, as François Truffaut remarked, the film "unfolds at a deliberate pace with a contemplative rhythm that contrasts sharply with [Hitchcock's] other pictures, which are mostly based on swift motion and sudden transitions."[38] Indeed, the director uses the tracking shot extensively and effectively throughout the film, which is not typical of his style. I would add, however, that this is precisely the reason why, whenever Hitchcock uses the tracking shot, it always has specific narrative and visual significance.[39] The

"contemplative rhythm" produced by a series of long takes in *Vertigo* contributes to the slow movement of the film and is rather rare for Hitchcock. [40] The slow circular movement of spiral figures in the opening title sequence epitomizes the film's overall composition and structure;[41] subsequently, both the camera movement and the narrative structure of *Vertigo* are circular and repetitive, evoking a vertiginous effect in the spectator.

I would also emphasize that the predominant mood of the film is melancholic, with its overall darkness and deep sadness tinged with sadism, as Freud beautifully described melancholia in his paper "Mourning and Melancholia."[42] Here, one finds a remarkable harmony between what is represented and how it is represented:[43] the film itself *becomes* melancholic and vertiginous, even as it is *about* the protagonist's melancholia and vertigo. Hitchcock uses a specific formal strategy to represent Scottie's (James Stewart's) mental state, as if to suggest that what the film aims at representing is not *action,* as is typical of Hitchcock, but rather *affect* or a *state* of mind: Scottie's acrophobia and "acute melancholia." The film's "deliberate pace, with a contemplative rhythm" is, in Hitchcock's words, "perfectly natural since we're telling the story from the viewpoint of a man who's in an emotional crisis."[44]

The melancholic mood is accentuated by sparse dialogue (which is also rather unusual for Hitchcock, with the exception of *Psycho,* which I will discuss later) and enhanced by Bernard Herrmann's expressive, romantic musical score, both of which contribute to the film's quality of "sadness without cause."[45] I should note here that this idea of textual mood is particularly important for my discussion in that mood is understood as a "*tendency* to some affect," as Freud observes.[46] While affect is "the psychic representation of energy displacements caused by external and internal traumas," according to Julia Kristeva, who is drawing on Edith Jacobson's work, and is thus, technically speaking, bound to the specific idea or object, mood is a " 'generalized transference' (E. Jacobson) that stamps the *entire* behavior and all the sign systems (from motor functions to speech production and idealization) without either identifying with them or disorganizing them."[47] Mood and affect are not equivalent. In the following analysis, however, I refer to the textual mood and to the structure of visual and narrative repetition as key indices that point to partial "traces" of affect within the text.

Vertigo is haunted by loss at every level: the film's narrative revolves around the three repetitive losses from which Scottie suffers. First, his colleague from the police force falls to his death while trying to save Scottie from falling to his own death from a rooftop. As a result, Scottie suffers from acrophobia, a neurotic symptom of the traumatic affect associated with having witnessed this death and with the sense of guilt that it was he who should have fallen, not the other man. Second, Scottie witnesses the woman he loves fall to her death from a bell tower, but he is helpless to save her because of his acrophobia. He has been assigned by a school friend (Elster)

to shadow the latter's wife (Madeleine) whom Elster claims is on the verge of insanity, possessed by the spirit of a mad woman (Carlotta) in a painting. Scottie falls in love with Madeleine. He tries to prevent her from committing suicide, but he fails because of his acrophobia and she throws herself from a bell tower. The first trauma is thus repeated. Scottie falls into "acute melancholia" (a psychotic reaction against the loss of the object) and is hospitalized. As soon as he gets out of the hospital, he begins to search for Madeleine everywhere, as if he unconsciously refuses to acknowledge her death. Thirdly and finally, another woman (Judy), who reminds him of Madeleine because she resembles her physically and who, in fact, turns out to be the same person, also eventually falls to her death before Scottie's eyes from the same tower as Madeleine and almost in the same way.

In this labyrinth of repetition, *Vertigo* follows the spiraling trauma of the protagonist's loss and guilt, or, to be more precise, it is the story of his *inability* to cope with this trauma and therefore his perpetuation of entrapment in the very cycles of loss he wants to escape. When Scottie finds Judy (who looks almost like Madeleine but is less refined), he is determined to make her "the same" (that is, to make her "perfect," insisting that she wear the same elegant clothes as Madeleine, that she duplicate Madeleine's subtle make-up, hair style, and so on) in order to undo the loss. Unconsciously, he tries to absolve his guilt by bringing Madeleine back to life again. Just as Scottie completes Judy's transformation to Madeleine, he realizes that they are the same person and that Madeleine's death had been faked. In an attempt to cure his acrophobia by reenacting and working through the trauma, he tries to restage the scene of Madeleine's (fake) fall, but this time he loses her (Judy/Madeleine) eternally because Judy actually does fall and die, thereby killing both women. Scottie is given a second chance to undo the loss, only to find himself perpetuating it. The phrase "It's too late," first uttered by Madeleine before she runs to the tower to commit the "false" suicide and then repeated by Scottie in the final scene before Judy falls to her death from the tower, underscores this double loss and at the same time emphasizes the irreversibility and entrapment of loss as such.

Madness is not explained psychologically; instead, the film itself represents a distinct form of madness. Scottie's experience of acrophobia is represented in a specific shot using a special technique to which Truffaut drew attention. [48] Obviously this shot, a point-of-view shot from Scottie's perspective that appears every time he feels vertigo, was designed to make the spectator physically *experience* Scottie's vertigo and his emotional crisis. But if Scottie's anxiety and fear of heights are represented in this unusual shot, it is because his melancholia is masked by his acrophobia, almost as a defense mechanism. But his melancholic affect cannot be controlled: it is inscribed across the form and structure of the entire film. Scottie's erotic fixation with Madeleine, tinged by his unconscious attempt to undo the first loss (the policeman) and to deny his guilt by saving her, is marked by the

circular movement of the camera. The slow, wandering camera movement which follows Scottie and Madeleine as they drive around San Francisco corresponds to Scottie's mental map through the mnemic traces of this movement, which he later desperately evokes in his search for the lost object, Madeleine. If Scottie's acrophobia is represented in the shot that is intended to produce a vertiginous effect in the spectator, one might argue that his melancholia is inscribed in the film's textual movement, which relies heavily on the structure of repetition, a sign of a certain affective configuration. For example, the deaths of Madeleine and Judy are represented in exactly the same way, shot for shot, creating an effect of *déjà vu* in the spectator.

The fascination with and longing for the lost image of a dead woman in *Vertigo* is intricately woven into the formal structure of the spiraling camera movement itself: "thus in *Vertigo* the great spiral can become the vertigo of the hero, but also the circuit he maps out in his car, or the curl in the heroine's hair." [49] It does not seem to be coincidental that the film's very title, *Vertigo,* epitomizes its confrontation with the enigma of image and its fascination. This self-reflexive aspect of the film is so thoroughly investigated that the film's title becomes more than a title. A film about "vertigo" becomes a film about cinema and image as such by way of making itself a metaphorical inscription of the cinematic apparatus and experience via the apparatus and experience themselves.

The constantly moving camera in *Vertigo* thus embodies Scottie's melancholic search for the lost object, as well as the moving and fluctuating nature of Scottie's bordering (and perhaps borderline, between neurotic and psychotic) subjectivity which constantly transgresses the frontier between subject and object, fantasy and reality, internal and external.[50] *Vertigo* is ultimately about Scottie's obsessive love and mourning for Madeleine, the lost object. The film bears witness to the protagonist's traumatic loss of the love object and his failure to overcome that loss as well as his anxiety over losing something without being able to understand the nature of his loss or its attendant anxiety. Freud points out that the melancholic is aware of the loss which induces melancholia but is still unable to understand "what" has been lost:

> Let us . . . apply to melancholia what we have learnt about mourning. In one set of cases it is evident that melancholia too may be the reaction to the loss of a loved object . . . , but one cannot see clearly what it is that has been lost, and it is all the more reasonable to suppose that the patient cannot consciously perceive what he has lost either. This, indeed, might be so even if the patient is aware of the loss which has given rise to his melancholia, but only in the sense that he knows *whom* he has lost but not *what* he has lost in him.[51]

Vertigo is about Scottie's impotence to recognize what exactly he has lost in his loss of Madeleine and thereby to accept the loss, making it impossible

for him to mourn. He thus has no recourse but to bury himself in melancholia. The structural repetitions and slow tracking movements which emphasize his inability to understand actually evoke the loss of direction and subsequent endless circularity of melancholia. In a sense, madness itself structures the film.

The film's narrative also revolves around the lost object, which induces guilt in Scottie precisely by repetition: the death of his colleague by falling from a great height is repeated in the form of Madeleine's death. The first loss opens the story and functions as its prologue. The second loss is repeated in the third (the death of Judy/Madeleine), making these two parts almost symmetrical, but with slight differences into which Hitchcock weaves Scottie's madness, his melancholia and his desperate attempts at reparation. When repeated, each loss awakens the painful affect of the previous one. Scottie's "acute melancholia" functions as a line which renders the narrative symmetrical, so to speak, because it is situated between two losses of the love object who turns out to be the same woman. Even though the narrative suggests that Scottie manages to cure his acrophobia when he finally climbs the stairs of the church tower just after he violently accuses Judy of being Elster's accomplice and thus acts out his hidden aggression, the film ends with yet another, more threatening, loss. At the very moment in which Judy has almost become "the same" as Madeleine, she plunges to her death. After having been given a second chance, Scottie stands alone at the top of the tower (fig. 20), a witness to Judy's death, which represents his second and final loss of Madeleine. As foreshadowed by the nightmare which ends with Scottie in exactly the same position he finds himself in at the end of the film (fig. 21), [52] he is thrown into an eternal abyss of loss.

Behind loss are guilt and aggression, which are inevitable in melancholia. *Vertigo* faithfully follows this logic. If acrophobia is Scottie's neurotic symptom, induced by his colleague's fall, it masks a deeper guilt complex which is at the heart of his melancholia. His acrophobia is a defense against being thrown into the deeper abyss of psychotic despair. At the inquest into Madeleine's death, Scottie is criticized for his impotence, though he is found not guilty of any crime: "once before, under similar circumstances, Mr. Ferguson allowed a police colleague to fall to his death. . . . Of course, Mr. Ferguson is to be congratulated on having once saved the woman's life [Madeleine's faked attempt to drown herself]. . . . It is a pity that, knowing her suicidal tendencies, he did not make a greater effort the second time." The official's words at the hearing evoke the threatening voice of the superego which impoverishes the ego itself, causing melancholia. It is not coincidental that when we next see Scottie after the hearing, he is in a melancholic stupor in a hospital. Scottie's fall into melancholia, moreover, doubles and mirrors other melancholias in the film through a relay of identifications: he becomes melancholic over the traumatic loss of the loved object

Figure 20.
Vertigo (Alfred Hitchcock, 1958).

Figure 21.
Vertigo.

because of his own inability to suffer this loss except by identifying himself with "mad" Madeleine, who herself was supposed to be identified with melancholic Carlotta. Freud describes this melancholic logic of ambivalence and guilt as follows: "If the love for the objecta love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given uptakes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering." [53] From this melancholic logic we understand that the obsessive nature of Scottie's "re-making" of Judy results not only from Scottie's longing for the lost object, Madeleine, but also from the reversal of his self-inflicted pain and punishment, which, in fact, are nothing but his reproaches against the loved object. This is a classical psychic operation in melancholia. As Green describes the affective logic of melancholia, "hatred attacks the ego as it attacks the lost object."[54]

Not only is *Vertigo* about the protagonist's melancholia, it is also about his obsessional fixation with the image of a mad woman. It is important to remember that Scottie, and the whole film, is haunted by the image of Carlotta, in the words of the bookseller, "Sad Carlotta, Mad Carlotta." Carlotta is Madeleine's dead mother, who displaces Madeleine in Scottie's nightmare. In the brief dream sequence in which Scottie traverses the line between neurosis (acrophobia) and psychosis (melancholia), he identifies with Carlotta and, metonymically, with Madeleine. The mourning mother, Carlotta, appears prominently in this nightmare sequence (displacing the dead Madeleine, who is absent throughout the dream), thus establishing Scottie's obsession with Judy/Madeleine later in the film as a form of acting out in a psychoanalytic as well as a performative sense. Freud writes, "the complex of melancholia behaves like an open wound, drawing to itself cathectic energies . . . from all directions, and emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished."[55] Scottie's aggression toward Judy articulates this narcissistic wound to the (male) ego "which leads it to endure these sadistic investments on an equal footing with the subjective sentiment of sorrow."[56] The image of the mad mother will haunt all three films of the trilogy.[57]

In some sense, however, real madness haunts Madeleine/Judy as well as Scottie. Madeleine pretends to be mad, but in fact it is she who is lost and split in her own subjectivity because she is deprived of her own language except as the object of male desire throughout the film. Aside from her flashback, the film is told from Scottie's point of view.[58] There is hardly any shot taken from her subjective position, though, upon careful examination, there are two exceptions. A strange point-of-view shot of the empty sky is inserted during both journeys to the Mission: each time, a shot of Madeleine/Judy looking up is followed by a tracking shot of the empty sky, and then a shot of her looking down (figs. 22–24). Although the shot of the sky does not reveal her emotions as would a close-up of her face (and the two shots of

Figure 22.
Vertigo.

Figure 23.
Vertigo.

Figure 24.
Vertigo.

Madeleine/Judy that bracket it do not show much of her expression), the empty sky, especially when repeated during the second drive to the Mission, is loaded with a strange sadness: twice she fails to gain Scottie, just as Scottie has twice lost his love object.

Like the subjective shot of the void that Scottie sees himself falling into in his nightmare, this tracking shot of the empty sky curiously reveals a hollow space in the narrative. That is to say, because of its ambiguity, it threatens the whole narrative logic of the film, which follows Scottie's subjectivity. One may indeed ask: does Hitchcock want to imply that the woman's subjectivity is as "empty" as the sky she looks up at? Or is the shot shown twice merely to demonstrate that Madeleine/Judy "remembers" that she has been on this road before in order to maximize the effect of suspense?

Perhaps there is a third explanation. What is disclosed in this brief shot is the impossibility of *her* desire to be and not to be Madeleine. [59] Madeleine is the narcissistic imago and ego ideal she created for herself, although not entirely by herself, but which is now eternally lost. She can gain Scottie's love only by effacing her own subjectivity and making herself into an image. It is not only Scottie's suffering but also Madeleine/Judy's deep sorrow and guilt that causes her fall from the tower. The shot of the empty sky reveals that she is, like Scottie, a melancholic "guilty" subject. The very tracking movement showing this emptiness is also the only time in the film in which *her* underlying melancholic affect, her encrypted subjectivity, is exposed. Although Judy's death is not presented as suicide, the manner in which she dies suggests the completion of two doubles—Scottie and Madeleine, and Madeleine and Judy—and therefore implies that her death is indeed his.

In *Vertigo,* we ultimately witness a splitting of the object (Madeleine/Judy), whereas the ego of the subject (Scottie) is still intact. In other words, mistaken identity occurs in the object but not in the subject. The subject's defense mechanism remains at the level of the depressive position, as Edith Jacobson argues: "[manic-depressives' acute regressive process] does not lead to a complete disintegration of the personality, but is reversible." [60] Scottie's unsolved melancholia, despite the apparent cure of his neurosis (which is therefore shown to be a screen neurosis) that is implied in the ambiguous ending of the film as well as his temporary affective discharge just before reproducing his primary loss when he accuses Judy of complicity with Elster, contradicts the seeming closure of the narrative. It is this very contradiction, based on the reversibility of the manic-depressive psychic mechanism, that makes the film's ending rather obscure and open, thereby creating a certain textual space, a lapse which may lead the subject into a more aggressive defensethat is, a manic one. Again, as Freud writes: "The most remarkable characteristic of melancholia, and the one in most need of explanation, is its tendency to change round into mania, a state which is the opposite of it in its symptoms."[61]

So morbidly sad, and how is it I feel like laughing? NORTH BY NORTHWEST

Unlike *Vertigo, North by Northwest* is a typical "Hitchcockian" film. According to Truffaut, it is "the picture that epitomizes the whole of [Hitchcock's] work in America."[62] The narrative revolves around mistaken identity and is filled with displaced Oedipal configurations, a frequently recurring motif in Hitchcock. The film is full of action and suspense, light jokes and a sensation of rapid movement. It lacks, one might say, the kind of psychological depth found in *Vertigo*; indeed *North by Northwest* contrasts well with *Vertigo*.

To put it another way, the film's predominant mood is manic, which, as Freud observed, is the opposite of melancholia but closely related to it. Characteristics of mania mentioned earlier such as hyperactivity and distractibility are easily detected in the film. Cary Grant's constant talking, unlike James Stewart's introverted silence, creates a sense of surfaceness. As Geoffrey Hartman, in his discussion of the film, "Plenty of Nothing: Hitchcock's *North by Northwest,*" observes:

> In *North by Northwest* words are generally specious, as in the bad-faith monologue of Cary Grant to his secretary (they don't make secretaries like that any more!) which opens the film; or they are entrapping lies; or jerky, cool banter, similar to motions in the silent movies; or deliciously inappropriate comments (Saint to Grant, after his harrowing escape from the deadly plane, an encounter which she, of course, had helped engineer: "How did it go today?"). . . . The face of those worded images remains smooth, slippery . . . .[63]

In *North by Northwest* Hitchcock employs a totally different formal strategy from the one he used in *Vertigo:* the camera no longer wanders searchingly. As Raymond Bellour points out, "in *North by Northwest* the camera was fixed in the great majority of shots, and . . . the use of camera movement was less systematic." [64] While in *Vertigo* long tracking movements of the camera predominate, in *North by Northwest* Hitchcock constructs a visual structure with classical narrative economy, as Bellour has demonstrated.[65] Interestingly, the narrative structure is repetitive but not circular: the entire film is neatly punctuated with a number of similar departure and arrival scenes.[66] This repetition creates a strange illusion of movement without actually going anywhere. Unlike the harmonious textual movement of *Vertigo, North by Northwest* is marked by the juxtaposition of opposites: excessive dialogue vs. total silence,[67] extreme long shots vs. extreme close-ups (as in the Mount Rushmore sequence), horizontal compositions vs. vertical lines. In *North by Northwest,* when a tracking shot occurs, it follows the characters' movements so closely that the sense of camera movement is erased.[68] This fact is rather curious because the film manages to evoke an overall sensation of movement in the viewer. Consider, for example, the crop-dusting and the Mount Rushmore sequences, which feature great suspense, action and dramatic climaxes: in fact, the camera only pans horizontally a few times. Otherwise, it moves with the characters so that the spectator can follow their actions.[69]

The film's paradoxical style is thus governed by the principle of illusion and masking. Hitchcock uses fixed camera movement in conjunction with rapid editing to accentuate contrast and rhythm: close-ups or medium-shots are juxtaposed with extremely wide shots of drastically different spaces. Perhaps Hitchcock comes close to Eisenstein's montage as collision in *North by Northwest*. However, if Eisenstein's montage was aimed at creating synthesis, Hitchcock's montage in this film works toward disorientation and fragmentation. The textual movement of *North by Northwest* consists of the illusion of movement: the actions go nowhere, despite the fact that the film constantly evokes motion. Instead of the spiraling circularity of *Vertigo*'s composition, *North by Northwest* is governed by horizontal and diagonal lines (consider the opening titles), which indicate spatial movement from one point to another without temporal integration.

The paradox of illusion and masking at the formal level of the film corresponds well to the mechanism of denial that structures the narrative. One could argue that *North by Northwest* is about the control and mastery of a game of mistaken identity, full of lurking anxiety and fear. However, this control and mastery is inseparable from the mechanism of denial, which is the basis of mania according to Melanie Klein.[70] She argues: "In mania . . . denial is associated with an overactivity, although this excess of activity . . . often bears no relation to any actual results achieved."[71] She also points out

that in mania the ego "endeavors ceaselessly to *master and control* all its objects, and the evidence of this effort is its hyperactivity." [72] Roger's chaotic world results from his not being able to see; he keeps himself so busy that he hardly has time to worry about his own predicament.[73] In contrast to the vulnerable Scottie who falls into melancholia, the protagonist of *North by Northwest* is fully on guard (albeit not successfully), magically if clumsily protected against unknown threats and persecution.

The aggressive, comic mood of the film goes hand in hand with the hyperbolic quest for knowledge to control and master the unknown Other, which turns out to be a journey of escape from the Oedipal mother. The comic quality here masks anxiety and fear, which are denied on the surface, and is thus tied to the manic denial of losing the mother: the chaos starts, in fact, when Roger fails to reach his mother. The omnipotent manic subject in *North by Northwest* denies the lurking danger of loss by effecting a magical reunion, replacing one Mrs. Thornhill with another. It is, therefore, the subject's narcissistic wounds of guilt and "smallness" (wonderfully articulated by Roger's comment, "big face with small razor")[74] which are induced by the Oedipal father, who turns into a persecutory figure through projection.

Beneath *North by Northwest*'s playfulness is a constant underlying oscillation between persecutory fear and manic denial. Consider the elevator scene in which Mrs. Thornhill asks the two men who have abducted Roger, "Are you gentlemen really trying to kill my son?" The camera pans around inside the elevator, showing other people bursting into manic laughter so as to deny the reality of the underlying fear: these men *are* trying to kill her son. If in *Vertigo* the presence of the Oedipal mother was only implied in Scottie's dream (his secret identification with Carlotta), the trauma goes back a little further in *North by Northwest*. Indeed, the film's narrative revolves around the Oedipal configuration. In one sense, Roger has to undergo the persecutory fear of castration by the symbolic father who is split into two (the good father/the Professor and the bad father/Vandamm) in order to establish the mother substitute (Eve as the bad phallic mother/Eve as Mrs. Thornhill, the good castrated mother) as the love object.

Unlike *Vertigo* in which the object is split, in *North by Northwest* it is the subject who is threatened by splitting into Roger Thornhill and the unknown other, George Kaplan. But because Roger knows eventually that Kaplan does not exist, the threat of losing the self can be denied. The film shows that Roger's aggressive action against the unknown threat has a sadistic bent, which is also an important aspect of being manic: although it is not Roger himself who kills, three people are killed because of him (Mr. Townsend and two men in the truck). These Oedipal erotic urges, paralleled with increasing paranoia, act "as if the destructive urges had assumed the mask of the erotic urges," which Roger denies, "lending to the manic episode its carnivalesque appearance."[75]

The affective logic between melancholia and mania accords well in many respects with the nearly exact opposition of the textual operation of *North by Northwest* with that of *Vertigo,* although there are many underlying similarities. The two films complement each other symmetrically: they mimic the way the melancholic and manic modes alternate. One of the CIA agents articulates this affective logic when he remarks about Townsend's death: "So morbidly sad, and how is it I feel like laughing?" This trivial phrase, uttered by an unimportant character almost as a joke or slip of the tongue, again epitomizes the underlying melancholic character of the film which has to be repudiated, encapsulating the manic-melancholic mixture at work throughout *North by Northwest*.

In fact, one can find the transition from the melancholic to the manic already in *Vertigo*. The predominantly melancholic mood in *Vertigo* begins subtly to change in the last third of the film when Scottie tries to transform Judy into Madeleine. At this point the film shifts to the manic mode, increasing the obsessive nature of Scottie's desire to control and master the object: he becomes a "maniac" in making Judy into Madeleine, which is the only way for him to deny his traumatic loss and consummate his erotic desires. At the end of the film, Scottie's hidden aggression explodes when he realizes that there is no Madeleine (Judy not only masqueraded as Madeleine but she was also Elster's mistress) and the whole plot was planned by Elster (the symbolic father) so that Scottie would "witness" Madeleine's presumed death. Judy's betrayal becomes all the more traumatic for Scottie because the plot reveals that the woman he loved was as guilty as he was: the mad woman (Madeleine) reveals herself to be the bad mother (Judy). Thus the underlying Oedipal configuration in *Vertigo* is foregrounded in the sequence in which Scottie reproaches Judy for her deceptions, foreshadowing the narrative configuration of *North by Northwest*.

In this sense, *North by Northwest* takes up where *Vertigo* leaves off, in the way that the strange logic of melancholia and mania work. I am tempted to argue that Roger Thornhill is the (illusory) embodiment of the manic yet desperate fantasy of Scottie, who is eternally at a loss. Scottie's acrophobia is cured, probably, but he is thrown back into the eternal void of traumatic affect: in the final shot of the film, as I noted earlier, Scottie takes up the same position he occupied in the endless fall into blank space that concluded his nightmare. The phobia serves only as a screen for the male subject's psychosis, which annihilates the woman. The manic defense starts precisely from the failure of the subject to overcome the depressive position precipitated by the eternal loss of the lost object. *North by Northwest* is like Scottie's wishful dream, only to be revealed as the false flashback of *Vertigo*. Scottie is left in empty space, whose nothingness Roger wants to disavow.

This "nothingness" is, perhaps, the most striking paradox (and revelation) in *North by Northwest* and should be understood in the context of its underlying melancholia. As Hartman writes: "The characters have little

depth: they are flat, they simply fall for, or toward, each other. They are 'blanks,' decoys often: persons that need to become real, or be saved from their own role-playing. The heavy psychoanalytic stuff . . . points to a crypt or a vacuity, like the middle initial in the R.O.T. that appears on Roger Thomhill's monogrammed matchbook, signifying a central blank or zero." [76] In *North by Northwest,* this signifier O is a ghost, constantly threatened by the emptiness and infinity of zero. This signifier functions, one can almost argue, as the manic ego itself: as Green describes it, the manic ego "is a bottomless pit. It empties and fills itself at the same rate."[77]

Interestingly, the controlling phallic mother, Mrs. Thornhill, never reappears after the scene in which she questions Roger's persecutors in the elevator. She herself becomes an imaginary signifier by virtue of her absence. Indeed, it is through her absence and through the symbolic act of murdering the father (Mr. Townsend) that the film gradually accentuates the persecutory aspect with the (re)appearance of the castrating symbolic father figures (the Professor and Vandamm). While in *Vertigo* Elster was the symbolic father, in *North by Northwest,* the father is divided in two. In *Psycho,* as we will see, the father disappears entirely from the memory screen.[78]

At the conclusion of *North by Northwest* Roger finds a "good mother" and a replacement for his own phallic mother in Eve: "Come on, Mrs. Thornhill," he says to Eve as he pulls her up from the sheer face of a cliff onto the upper berth of his sleeping car on a train. But this indeed may be merely a wishful fantasy, as Hartman points out: "The improbable ending is a high-angle shot that saves as it kills; yet that it saves is not for sure. The last image of Roger's and Eve's bedding down may be a fantasy flash."[79]

The magical reunion of the happy ending of *North by Northwest* is thus rather ambiguous, with a sense of manic victory which may be nothing but a facade. Perhaps marriage for the third time may not work. If *North by Northwest* takes up where *Vertigo* leaves off, it is only to return to the nightmare which begins the trilogy and eventually leads to *Psycho*. Whereas *Vertigo* begins with a sequence in which Scottie finds himself clinging to the edge of a tall building as a policeman reaches out to try to pull him up (figs. 25–26), *North by Northwest* ends with Roger hanging onto a rocky cliff to save Eve from falling to her death (figs. 27–28)[80] before an artificial fantasy flash, as if to indicate that *North by Northwest* is indeed the manic wishful dream of succeeding in saving the love object. And so we return to the beginning.

You've never had an empty moment. PSYCHO

The opening panoramic shot of *Psycho,* the last film in the trilogy, strangely echoes the panoramic shot of San Francisco in *Vertigo* which occurs just after Scottie's nightmare sequence and just before we see him confined to

Figure 25.
Vertigo.

Figure 26.
Vertigo.

Figure 27.
North by Northwest (Alfred Hitchcock, 1959).

Figure 28.
North by Northwest.

the hospital, suffering from acute melancholia. Curiously enough, the slow pace of *Psycho,* especially at the beginning, is much closer to the visual style of *Vertigo* than *North by Northwest*. Yet, compared with the dreamlike quality of *Vertigo,* the world *Psycho* evokes is realistic, especially in its cold black and white photography, as Bellour observed: "night so dark and day so somber." [81] As if to suggest that *North by Northwest*'s magical reunion *was* indeed only a screen memory (just as the ending of *Vertigo* may actually overturn the simple cure of acrophobia and aggravate its underlying melancholia, thus evoking the manic defense in *North by Northwest*), the predominant mood in *Psycho* is cold, isolated, abrupt and depressive, in sharp contrast to the lighthearted comedy in *North by Northwest*. Hitchcock resorts to a very different mood in *Psycho,* with its extreme forms of murder and perversion.

The overall pace of the film is much slower than *North by Northwest,* rather closer to *Vertigo*. But unlike *Vertigo,* in which the movement is circular, the movement in *Psycho* is best described as disjunctive, as foreshadowed by the broken lines in the title sequence. The film changes pace with jarring transitions. Consider, for example, the abrupt shift from Marion taking a shower to the brutal slashing murder. Although contrasting juxtapositions also constitute a key structuring principle of *North by Northwest,* the contrast is much more violent and discordant in *Psycho*. Temporal duration in *Psycho* is extremely disconnected, generating a broken, fragmented tempo on the textual level. The narrative structure in *Psycho* is not symmetrically repetitive (as if to prevent affect from being awakened), which is rather uncharacteristic of Hitchcock and the classical text generally, as Bellour argues.[82] This indicates that *Psycho* has a different type of affective configuration. The only narrative events that are repeated are the murders of Marion and the private detective Arbogast (though visually the two scenes are quite different) and the scenes at the front desk of the motel, which are meticulously repeated three times with Marion, Arbogast, and finally Sam and Lila. One may argue that the disjunctiveness and narrative asymmetry owe much to Hitchcock's calculated maximizing of dramatic effect, especially in terms of the horror genre. It seems, however, that this disjunctiveness also owes much to the paranoid/schizoid mechanism which governs the textual movement of the film. That only the murders involve repetition suggests that affective logic in *Psycho* is generally controlled or suppressed except at certain eruptive, destructive moments which lead directly to death.

This movement is closely related to the function of the camera as a textual agent in *Psycho*. The camera moves so as to frame the characters, to catch and delimit them: it insistently follows them, constantly framing and re-framing the space in which they move, as if it fears the space off-screen and is attempting to eliminate it by any means. In contrast to *Vertigo* and *North by Northwest,* spatial confinement is prominent in *Psycho,*[83] even from the beginning. After the opening panoramic shot, the camera moves through

the window of a cheap hotel room to the bed where two lovers lie. The filmic space is restricted to their bodies framed tightly in an angular shot, paralleling the characters' situations in the narrative (Marion and Sam lack the money that would allow Sam to get a divorce). As Hitchcock says, the way the camera enters the room sets the film's voyeuristic mechanism in motion ("[the opening] also allows the viewer to become a Peeping Tom"), [84] simultaneously establishing the camera as a third eye. Not only is the space limited by the camera and the frame, but the characters (Sam and Marion) also become the subject of the camera's study and scrutiny. The active participation of the camera, which works as an agent of (the director's) manipulation of screen space and framing, helps emphasize the film's fragmentary, disjunctive nature. The camera itself in turn performs a persecutory function at the level of narrative and representation (and spectatorship).

Despite Hitchcock's explanation that the first third of the film was "a red herring"[85] (all the details about Marion's theft and journey are meant to distract the viewer and make the murder in the shower as shocking as possible), this part of the film leading up to Marion's murder is in fact crucial to the film's affective logic. It focuses on Marion's anxiety as the guilty subject and her persecutory fear, which also makes her the paranoid subject. The sequence in which she drives to flee the scene of the crime, a journey which leads her to the Bates Motel, provides an illuminating example of the persecutory function created by cinematic devices. Curiously, this whole sequence is reminiscent of the drive to the Mission in *Vertigo,* despite the differences in mood. The way the camera holds the face of the character, moving with the car, is very similar. However, the tracking shot in Marion's journey does not wander as it does in *Vertigo*. Instead, it follows straight lines, eliminating the surrounding space and fixing the subject's gaze on an immobile point.

Moreover, in *Psycho,* voice becomes another important element which issues from off-screen space, almost like auditory hallucinations of a schizophrenic nature.[86] After Marion sees her employer on a street corner with Mr. Cassidy, whose $40,000 she has stolen, we hear what Marion hears as she drives: the curiously persecutory voice-over of the men gossiping about her. She hears their voices again just before she reaches the Bates Motel in the rain. On the one hand, the voice-over has a narrative function: it informs the spectator indirectly of what might be happening at the office when they find that Marion has stolen the money. Instead of giving a descriptive shot of that scene, Hitchcock uses voice-over which makes the whole scene imaginary and internal, as if the scene indeed might be Marion's delusion. Because we only have the voice-over, we cannot determine if the information we hear represents what is actually happening. In effect, however, it does not matter. What does matter is that Marion has internalized her guilt and is now threatened by a persecutory fantasy. In other words,

there is no way of distinguishing between the imaginary and the real, because in *Psycho* they are one and the same thing.

Hitchcock also uses point-of-view shots extensively in conjunction with the shot/reverse-shot structure, again to confine space within a shot and fix the gaze of the characters on a limited, closed space, accentuating persecutory anxiety. The entire exchange between Marion and the motorcycle policeman who interrupts her attempt to drive out of town utilizes this structure. What gives the sequence its effect of uneasiness (in addition to the narrative suspense, whether the policeman will notice anything "strange" about Marion) is precisely the spatial and temporal gap, albeit momentary, lurking between the shots. Just as off-screen space is eliminated by the frame, the gap between shots in the shot/reverse-shot structure has to be sutured immediately so that no affective lingering can emerge from that space.

Hand in hand with the extensive use of point-of-view shots, extreme close-ups (like the close-ups of Roger in the cliff scenes at the end of *North by Northwest,* or Scottie's face in the car in *Vertigo*) are conspicuous in the sequence when Marion drives toward the motel. However, unlike Scottie's expressive, searching face in *Vertigo,* extreme close-ups in *Psycho* do not reveal anything but opaque anxiety, again fixing the character's face within the frame. [87] What the close-ups in *Psycho* do reveal is only the lack of (or to put it another way, the difficulty of reading) affect in the central characters, Marion and Norman. Their faces do not "express" their inner world, as Lila's does later. Or, if they do, they remain so opaque that what we have is only vague empathic identification to which we cling because we have nothing else. However, as Wood observed, our attempt seems futile because the identification itself is constantly betrayed by the director.[88] When Truffaut spoke of the audience's emotional involvement with both Marion and Norman, Hitchcock replied: "I doubt whether the identification is that close."[89] This comment implies that the director was aware of the ambiguity of identification in the film, and possibly worked to achieve this ambiguity, which was precisely the pointto create (paranoid) uneasiness in *Psycho*.

Even Marion, with whom we are supposed to identify, is enigmatic. Though she is the central character until her death, she remains curiously silent. We hear the voices of other charactersher employer Cassidy, her co-worker, her sister, even Sambut not hers. Strangest of all, however, is her peculiar expression just before reaching the Bates Motel. A strange, cold, almost sinister grin appears on Marion's face when she hears the voice-over which persecutes her for her crime (fig. 29). Her expression is quite paradoxical. Until then, she has acted as a guilty persontense and anxiousbut at the moment she hears Cassidy's imaginary words ("I'll replace it [his $40,000] with her fine soft flesh"), her persecutory fantasy suddenly shifts from something threatening into a perverse pleasure.

After she grins, the rain starts, the world gets darker, she is lost and finds

Figure 29.
Psycho (Alfred Hitchcock, 1960).

herself at the Bates Motel. One can almost say that the murder is virtually determined the moment she reveals her paradoxical affectivity with another paranoid/schizoid, Norman. The grin recurs later in the film: at the very end, when Norman's face changes into his mother's through superimposition (figs. 30–31). Just like the tracking shot of the empty sky which evokes Judy/Madeleine's point of view in *Vertigo,* this shot of Marion's grin, which does not have any narrative significance or logical coherence, unexpectedly discloses, in a passing moment, her paradoxical affectivity.

If Marion is the paranoid subject in the film, Norman is the schizoid subject whose self is fused with fragmented object representations. The splitting of the ego triggered by the death of his mother is a real threat to Norman which throws him into a state of panic, whereas in *North by Northwest* splitting functions as a defense mechanism which allows the subject to deny the lurking paranoid fear of intrusion. In Norman the splitting is so complete that external reality is repudiated and what is left instead is nothing but the subject's psychotic creation of neo-reality where there is no difference between the imaginary and the real or between subject and object. In this psychotic neo-reality, the Other (Norman's mummification of the dead mother), now perceived as fragments (Marion's stabbed body), has



Figure 30.
Psycho.



Figure 31.
Psycho.

taken over Norman in order to keep the dead object alive (Norman becomes his mother).

The degree of regression articulated in each psychopathological mode proceeds retroactively in the trilogy. The traumatic affect goes back to a deeper level of regression in *Psycho* (the paranoid/ schizoid position) than in *Vertigo* (the depressive position), after achieving a provisional, and illusory, manic victory in *North by Northwest*. As the manic defense starts from the failure of the subject to overcome the depressive position, the paranoid defense starts from the failure of the subject to sustain the manic victory of denial. Because the persecutory fear and anxiety are rather unsuccessfully denied in *North by Northwest,* the latent manic destructiveness comes to the foreground in *Psycho*. The manic defense mechanism of *North by Northwest* leaves no trace, only nothingness and a persecutory fear.

In *Psycho,* this "emptiness" has to be filled, as on the one hand the camera has to eliminate empty space in the frame, and on the other Norman must "fill" or "stuff" the dead bodies of birds and humans so as to emulate life. The remarkable parlor sequence, in which Marion and Norman have supper, establishes the double relationship between Norman and Marion, and between Marion and the stuffed bird as the object of Norman's desire. Not surprisingly, the sequence is again structured meticulously through shot/reverse-shot patterns, as was the scene with the motorcycle cop. They talk about birds, the mother and "emptiness." Referring to Norman's "hobby" (taxidermy, which he defends as "more than a hobby"), [90] Marion asks him, "Is your time so empty?" Norman's answer is "No," adding that he has other things to do and he has to take care of his mother.[91] Norman later says to her, "You've never had any empty moments in your entire life, have you?" We remember that this fear of decomposition (ROT) and anxiety are tied to the nothingness, the emptiness in *North by Northwest*. Marion's answer to Norman's question, "Only my share," represents a tacit and dangerous agreement that unexpectedly activates Norman's hidden, aggressive fantasy. It implies that Marion, too, is falling prey to Norman's schizoid impulses, which readily provide him with the rationale that her emptiness must be filled and her fantasy must become real.

The shot/reverse-shot structure, including point-of-view shots, illuminates the field of vision and the function of the (paranoid) gaze in *Psycho,* as well as the agency of the camera in creating the penetrating gaze and confining vision. The paranoid structure of *Psycho* culminates in the shower scene itself through the rapid montage, which relies heavily on the shot/reverse-shot structure, and by the explicit sound effects which evoke the sound of slashing. Here the camera becomes both knife and murderer, revealing that the nature of cinematic suture as such entails the paranoid mechanism because it calls upon the psychic mechanism that tries to fill in the loss, just as Norman has stuffed the dead bodies of the birds that decorate his office: one of

the characteristics of paranoid/schizoid subjects is their intolerance of any psychic loss, which they experience as panic. Here, the loss becomes the "lack" which signifies incompleteness as a result of the total internalization of the loss of the object. From a schizoid logic, one may argue, Norman is murdering Marion not to destroy her but to possess her entirely by becoming her. Murder is only a means by which he can fragment her body, making it into particles, "splitting" her so that he can become her by incorporating the fragments. Green points out that the affective logic of paranoia often evokes the crime of passion. [92] Marion's affect of passion (for Sam and money) makes her the bad object for Norman, whose destructive affect in turn is entirely invested in paradoxical affectivity: annihilating her, projecting the incompatible idea onto Marion, the bad object, like his mother, but at the same time fragmenting and devouring her in order to incorporate her. In the murder scenes, therefore, traumatic affect discloses itself in an extremely violent fashion because its original libidinal cathexis (Norman's desire for his dead mother, that is) has been repressed without any vent: it is the explosion of raw libidinal energy generated by traumatic affect that increases the violent nature of the murder scenes.

The spiral movement from *Vertigo* reappears in *Psycho* in Marion's eye and in the blood swirling down the drain in the shower (figs. 32–35). Interestingly, in *Vertigo* as well as in *North by Northwest,* murders involve the protagonistsScottie and Rogerrather indirectly. The bird's-eye shot of Arbogast's murder in *Psycho* recalls two specific shots in *Vertigo* and *North by Northwest* (figs. 36–38). Both shots are closely related to the protagonists' escape after an act of symbolic murder, according to an Oedipal configuration. In *Vertigo,* a bird's-eye shot from the top of the church tower shows Scottie running away from the scene of Madeleine's suicide, and this shot signifies Scottie's defeat by his symbolic father, Elster, over the mother, Madeleine. In *North by Northwest,* there is a very similar bird's-eye shot from the top of the United Nations building after Roger witnesses Townsend's murder; here, Townsend turns out to be a false father, so Roger escapes the guilt that Scottie was unable to avoid. When considered within the affective configuration of the textual whole, we may find that a qualitative shift in meaning is located in these apparently insignificant shots. Affect never manifests itself in the form of direct emotion, as Green points out, precisely because it is a question of the process of transformational structuralization between quantities and qualities.

Both Scottie and Roger could somehow manage to escape from the scene of the murder, imaginary or symbolic, but there is no way out in *Psycho* because the subject himself is the murderer. Here, the camera itself becomes the threatening agent, involving the spectator as a witness to the murder (and the murderer). That is to say, the signification process performed by rapid montage has an inherently paranoid bent, as Jacqueline Rose demonstrated,[93] because the structure of cinematic "suture," a concept derived



Figure 32.
Vertigo.



Figure 33.
Psycho.



Figure 34.
Psycho.



Figure 36.
Psycho.



Figure 37.
North by Northwest.



Figure 38.
Vertigo.

from the Lacanian model of language, by definition fills the gap between signifiers, leaving no place, so to speak, for affects. [94] But when we analyze the murderous effect in *Psycho* in intertextual terms, we are able to see why affects have to be eliminated at any cost.

On a rare occasion, Jacques Lacan spoke of the relationship between affect and language, despite his desire to eliminate affect from the theoretical field of psychoanalysis: "Affect . . . befalls a body whose essence it is said is to dwell in language . . . affect, I repeat, befalls it on account of its not finding dwelling-room, at least not to its taste. This we call moroseness, or equally, moodiness. Is this a sin, a grain of madness, or a true touch of the real?"[95] The shot/reverse-shot structure used extensively in *Psycho* shuts out affective impulses which are unable to find "dwelling-room," as Lacan put it, constantly sutured in the gap between shots or else diffused and displaced. The displaced affects, however, erupt when awakened by the repetition of the original experience, which is the unrepresented death of Mrs. Bates (supposedly, Norman's first murder).[96] The murder thus takes place in the culminating moment of the trauma: in order to keep his psychotic reality (the real), Norman has to annihilate Marion, who has awakened Norman's desire and who may thus awaken the dead mother. The textual connection to *Vertigo,* however, implies an underlying depression at the heart of Norman's paranoid psychosis.

In his paper "The Dead Mother" Green discusses "the dead mother complex" in relation to a particular form of depression and loss of the object, which provides us with a useful insight. According to Green, this complex is precipitated by the death of "an imago which has been constituted

in the child's mind, following maternal depression, brutally transforming a living object . . . into a distant figure, toneless, practically inanimate." [97] The dead mother complex has "a unique movement with two aspects: *the decathexis of the maternal object and the unconscious identification with the dead mother*. The decathexis, which is principally affective, but also representative, constitutes a psychic murder of the object, accompanied without hatred."[98] In the real clinical picture this particular form of depression does not involve homicidal impulses, as it does in the dramatic situation in *Psycho*. However, the violent but rather affectless murder in *Psycho* which seems to be governed by schizoid impulses may actually have a depressive origin. This depression, which Green relates to "blank mourning," in which the subject feels "himself to be empty, blank,"[99] is not exactly the same as the affective logic of melancholia, but it results from the loss of the object. Even though *Psycho* is governed by a paranoid/schizoid affective logic, an original fantasy is at work in the film in Norman's desperate attempt to fill in the emptiness through a fantasy "to nourish the dead mother, to maintain her perpetually embalmed."[100] Curiously, various images from both *Vertigo* and *North by Northwest* haunt the image of the dead mother in *Psycho:* the mad mother, Madeleine (Carlotta), and the bad (phallic) mother, Mrs. Thornhill, are resurrected as Mrs. Bates, whose guise Norman assumes as a psychotic defense. And it is the figure of the dead mother which haunts all of *Psycho,* not only the sequences at the Bates Motel but the film's opening as well. In the hotel room in Phoenix, Marion speaks to Sam of her mother's photograph which sits on her mantel at home, and Sam expresses a desire to turn that photograph to the wall. What is murderous in the film, then, is the mother's gaze, not only Mrs. Bates's but also Marion's, which comes back from the grave. Norman describes this gaze as "cruel eyes studying you."[101] In *Psycho* the cruel eyes are also the eyes of the camera.[102]

CRYPTIC TRAJECTORY: "*We all go a little mad sometimes*."

The trilogy comes full circle. In the textual trajectory of the three films, *Vertigo, North by Northwest* and *Psyho,* we find that there is a haunting image of the mad woman and of emptiness. Madness underlying the trilogy involves the presence of a mad mother who is the lost object. But the mad mother is also the dead mother who is buried in a "crypt,"[103] that is, the textual unconscious of the trilogy. At the end of the trilogy, the dead mother who had been kept in the crypt (in the textual sense of being "inscribed" or "encrypted" in the first two films, and in the literal and metaphorical senses of "the dark, dank cellar" of Norman's unconscious in *Psycho*) is violently pulled out of the swamp when the car containing Marion's body is recovered (figs. 39–40).[104] The open grave in *Vertigo* (fig. 41) turns into the muddy swamp in *Psycho,* the ultimate horror of the dead being resurrected

Figure 39.
Psycho.



Figure 41.
Vertigo.

from decay and decomposition, being awakened, opening up the wound of loss, evoking a memory of the melancholic mother who has been buried "without legal burial place." [105] The entombed image of the crypt in the trilogy which evokes the dead mother may give us a key to understanding why the very last image of *Psycho* is not the superimposed face of Norman/the mother, which would be logical from the narrative point of view, but rather the car being pulled out of the swamp.[106]

The image of the dead mother in relation to the mad mother connects the signifier O and another cryptic signifier in *Psycho*. As I discussed in the analysis of *North by Northwest,* the signifier O, which signifies either emptiness or fullness, is inscribed in both *Vertigo* and *North by Northwest,* while the mad mother remains absent. In *Psycho* the absence of the dead mother is eternally foreclosed. The car that Marion drives to the motel and that we see at the end of the film has a license plate which reads NFB 418. Hitchcock displays this plate in close-up in a relatively long take when Norman drives the car with Marion's body in its trunk to a nearby swamp. On the other hand, the license plate on Marion's first car, which she sold on the way to the Bates Motel to conceal her theft, read ANL 709. One critic discusses the "ANL" with reference to scatology, arguing that it is related to "anal."[107] What would be said about NFB, then, what would it signify? Norman Bates? But what of the F? Perhaps it is the woman (*f*emale) that he fills himself with (in the sense that when Norman stuffs the bird, the bird is the woman, and he stuffs himself with the woman, that is, his mother, thereby filling himself with the woman), the ultimate object Norman desires to preserve. Just as the signifier O, "nothing," stands in the middle of the initials R.O.T.,

the other aspect of the signifier O, "fullness," stands in the middle of NFB. It is the logic of a crypt which is at work here. The three kinds of fantasies presented in the trilogymelancholic, manic and paranoid/schizoiddeal with loss and the affects induced by loss.

Some interesting questions remain: to whom does this crypt belong? Put another way, what would be the relationship between the textual unconscious that emerges in the process of reading and the director's unconscious? What kind of role do the director's own obsessions play in the affective configuration of the text? There can be no definite answer to this question, but there is a curious figure which haunts the production site of the trilogy. I have indicated that Scottie's melancholia echoes the melancholia of Vera Miles's character in *The Wrong Man*. Vera Miles is the actress Hitchcock wanted to play Madeleine in *Vertigo*. Interestingly, in *Psycho* it is Vera Miles who comes back to open the crypt of Norman's mother. Hitchcock had to give up the idea of casting Miles for Madeleine because she became pregnant, an event which constituted, one might say, a metaphoric betrayal of the mother in the Oedipal triangulation. [108] She nonetheless comes back in *Psycho* to reveal Norman's psychosis, the ultimate trauma of matricide induced by the underlying defense against his fear of patricide and separation from the mother. Does Hitchcock's disappointment and disgust with a pregnant Vera Miles haunt the trilogy in an unconscious manner?[109] I do not intend to claim that the maternal figure in the trilogy is indeed Miles, but only to suggest that this biographical entry would provide us, albeit at a different level, with a thread which connects the textual unconscious to the director's desire, unconscious or conscious. An affective tie which links the trilogy may be found in the process of its creation through which the director's secret fiction and desire are materialized.

The apparently different styles of the trilogy are inter- and intra-textually connected, once we understand them in the light of an underlying affective logic, namely the incorporation of a loss which the subject is unable to recognize because it was buried before being registered and thus its wound was unable to heal. The secret fiction which runs through the trilogy is a fiction of madness,[110] haunted by the mad/bad/dead mother, which transposes affect into rhythms, signs and forms, and from which different cinematic styles are generated. Hitchcock's trilogy, unique as it is, represents the articulation of three different modalities of that transposition.

In this essay I have attempted an analysis of Hitchcock's trilogy as a textual whole that sheds light on three different affective modes (melancholic, manic and paranoid/schizoid) not in order to diagnose the film's characters or their director, but rather to trace out a certain affective logic which seems to govern their textual movement. By presenting an analysis of three

films according to their affective logic, I hoped to broach the question of affect in relation to language and representation, a question which has received little attention in film theory largely due to the influence of the Lacanian model of psychoanalysis and its attempt to eliminate affect from consideration. I started with a working hypothesis that three psychic structures are representational manifestations of the structural configuration of affect that correspond to certain cinematic modes within the text. The textual trajectory of *Vertigo, North by Northwest* and *Psycho* is one of affects, which I have attempted to distinguish from the emotional response of the spectator. I started from *Vertigo* with its melancholic affect, which turns manic in *North by Northwest,* and then reverts to the more regressive stage of the paranoid-schizoid position in *Psycho*. In my analysis of the trilogy, I tried to demonstrate that analyzing structures and configurations of affect is inseparable from the construction of the filmic text in that the very process of textual elaboration on various levels produces contradictory affects, even if what is manifested may only be their traces. It is these affects in their qualitative and quantitative overflow, or lack thereof, that determine a certain aspect of textual and intertextual movement, a "logic of mise en scène," inducing structures of repetition and displacement. *Vertigo, North by Northwest* and *Psycho* are independent works, but when examined together they are revealed to compose an even more fascinating textual whole.

Notes

I would like to thank Steve Mamber and Samuel Weber for their comments on the initial version of this paper, and Lisa Fluor, Susan Anicad and Anthony Head for their generous help. I am deeply indebted for the completion of the essay to Janet Bergstrom, who drew my attention to many crucial points, and especially to Alison McKee, for her insightful comments on the content and structure of every version. I have borrowed the phrase "une logique de la mise en scène" from Marie-Claude Lambotte, *Esthétique de la mélancolie* (Paris: Aubier, 1984).

1. Donald Spoto, *The Dark Side of Genius: The Life of Alfred Hitchcock* (New York: Ballantine, 1983) 463.

2. Ibid.

3. Thomas M. Leitch, *Find the Director and Other Hitchcock Games* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991) 189–221.

4. Leitch writes: "*The Wrong Man* . . . is not a masterpiece, but it inaugurates a series of masterpieces*Vertigo, North by Northwest,* and *Psycho*all organized around the same subject, personal disintegration, which they all treat as a nightmare. Surprisingly, Hitchcock had treated madness only marginally in most of his films. When he presented psychopathic killers like Uncle Charlie or Bruno Anthony, he had always, emphasized the contrast between their apparently normal social behavior and the homicidal impulses this behavior conceals. But madness is at the heart of *The Wrong Man* and the films that follow. . . ." Ibid., 189.

5. Ibid., 206. Leitch continues: "The tragic nightmare of *Vertigo,* turned comic in *North by Northwest,* reappears in starker terms in *Psycho* in the unexpected mode of black comedy." Ibid., 214.

6. I am using "textual analysis" in Stephen Heath's sense of the term. See "Film and System: Terms of Analysis, Part I," *Screen* 16:1 (1975) 7–77. Textual analysis itself is best exemplified by Raymond Bellour's analyses of Hitchcock's filmssee his *Analyse de films* (Paris: Albatros, 1979)and Thierry Kuntzel's "The Film-Work, 2," *Camera Obscura* 5 (1980): 39–62.

7. I am aware that it may be problematic to employ these psychiatric terminologies for several reasons. First, these classifications are classical and they may no longer be used in the contemporary practice of psychiatry. I can say, however, that they were still broadly used, at least in Japan, some twenty years ago. Second, they are themselves controversial and subject to historical and other interpretations. These nosological guidelines are to a certain extent subject to cultural differences: for example, American psychiatry has a different diagnostic system (published in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,* known as *DSM*) than its European counterparts (mainly German and French) and a different understanding of disease which considers various forms of disorders as reactions to various stresses and malfunctions, rather than being "endogenous," as German psychiatry used to define them. There is also an increasing tendency to move against rigorous nosology and psychopathology toward the cure. However, *DSM* probably serves as an international guideline.

> For the purposes of my discussion, I am using these classifications as frames of reference for different psychic structures, and therefore I will later provide only a general discussion of them. My references for these classifications include: Karl Abraham, *Selected Papers of Karl Abraham,* trans. Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey (1927; London: Hogarth Press, 1949); Peter Buckley, ed., *Essential Papers on Psychosis* (New York: New York University Press, 1988); Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization,* trans. Richard Howard (1965; New York: Vintage, 1988); Alfred Freedman and Harold I. Kaplan, eds., *Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry* (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1967); Stanley W. Jackson, *Melancholia and Depression: From Hippocratic Times to Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Melanie Klein, *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, 1921–1945* (London: Hogarth Press, 1948); Emil Kraepelin, *Manic-Depressive Insanity and Paranoia,* ed. George M. Robertson, trans. R. Mary Barclay (Edinburgh: Livingstone, 1921).
>
> My references arise from different and diverse theoretical fields of psychiatry and psychoanalysis. They may not always be philosophically compatible, but they touch upon the question of affect in one way or another and help illuminate it.

8. André Green describes the position of the Lacanian school concerning affect as follows: "The school which adheres strictly to Lacanian theory excludes affect altogethershowering sarcasm on all who refer to it, in other words the whole psychoanalytic communityand they take the statute of representation, which they have stripped down to the (bare) essentials, to the extreme. . . . The unconscious is no longer structured like a verbal language but like a mathematical language." "Passions and Their Vicissitudes," *On Private Madness* (Madison, Conn.: International Universities Press, 1986) 234–35. For Lacan, theorizing affect as such is meaningless

because affect exists in language and nowhere else. I think, however, that the Lacanian understanding of affect is closely related to the opaque field of the Real, a domain of endlessly missed reality engulfed in a chain of signifiers. See Jacques Lacan, "The Unconscious and Repetition," in particular the section "Tuché and Automaton," in his *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis,* ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1978) 17–64.

9. For a succinct account of the distinctions between passion, emotion and affect, see "The Passions, Affections, and Emotions," in Jackson, *Melancholia and Depression,* 14–25. For a more comprehensive discussion, see H. N. Gardiner, Ruth C. Metcalf and John G. Beebe-Center, *Feeling and Emotion: A History of Theories* (1937; Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970).

10. I should add that the adjectival form "affective" is frequently used for feeling (affective state, affective tone, etc.).

11. Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis,* trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Norton, 1973) 13.

12. See, in particular, Green's discussion of affect in terms of Freud's writing on metapsychology in his article "Conceptions of Affect," in *On Private Madness,* 181-91.

13. A number of works deal with the question of affect, particularly in relation to Lacanian psychoanalysis and its philosophical context. See, for example, André Green, *Le discours vivant: la conception psychanalytique de l'affect* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973); Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, *The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis, and Affect* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Léon Chertok and Isabelle Stengers, *A Critique of Psychoanalytic Reason: Hypnosis as a Scientific Problem from Lavoisier to Lacan,* trans. Martha Noel Evans in collaboration with the authors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Michel Henry, *The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis,* trans. Douglas Brick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).

14. Green, "Conceptions of Affect," 174–213. My understanding of the question of affect in psychoanalysis is greatly indebted to this insightful article. The context in which Green discusses affect is the clinical field of psychoanalytic practice.

15. Ibid., 177.

16. For example, the spectator may be overwhelmed physically by an extreme close-up of an expressive face in Carl T. Dreyer's *The Passion of Joan of Arc*. To take another example, if the spectator weeps over a film, especially a melodramatic one, we may term this an emotional experience. An analysis of the film, however, may show affective displacement and repetition in the text which can be shown to generate traces of that spectatorial response (weeping).

17. Green, "Conceptions of Affect," 179 (emphasis in the original).

18. It is, therefore, rather tempting to say that the spectator has an emotional response although the film does not have an emotional structure of its own because it is not an organic entity; rather, it has the structure of affect. Accordingly, we may observe unconscious ideas of a director and their affects in a film, but the affective structure of the film, taken as a whole, is unlikely to be directly attached to the director's unconscious ideas.

19. "Rapid succession of superficially related, or entirely unrelated, ideas, oc-

curring in states of mania."James Drever, *A Dictionary of Psychology,* rev. ed. by Harvey Wallerstein (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964) 99.

20. Freud, writes in *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis:* "In some forms of the disease, indeed, something of a contrary sort occurs in the intervals; the ego finds itself in a blissful state of intoxication, it celebrates a triumph, as though the super-ego had lost all its strength or had melted into the ego; and thus liberated, manic ego permits itself a truly uninhibited satisfaction of all its appetites." *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (hereafter referred to as *S.E.*), trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953–1974) XXII, 60–61.

21. Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis,* 296.

22. Freud proposed the term, "paraphrenia," which "he felt could be more easily paired up with 'paranoia.' " Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis,* 410. On the other hand, as Laplanche and Pontalis mention elsewhere, Freud's pupil Eugen Bleuler classified paranoia under schizophrenia (ibid., 296–97), and Melanie Klein divided the early infantile stage into the paranoid/schizoid and depressive positions. This closeness is the reason I have chosen to refer to one kind of structure as "paranoid/schizoid" in my discussion.

23. As far as I know, psychiatry groups both melancholia and mania together under affective disorders and they are often classified as cyclical psychoses. Emil Kraepelin categorized both mania and melancholia under the name of manic-depressive insanity, which manifests these opposite forms in alternation. He writes: "Manic-depressive insanity comprehends, on one hand, the entire domain of so-called periodic and circular insanity, and, on the other, simple mania. . . . *Manic-depressive insanity,* as its name indicates, takes its course in simple attacks, which either present the signs of so-called manic excitement (flight of ideas, exaltation, and hyperactivity), or those of a peculiar psychic depression with psychomotor inhibition, or a mixture of the two states." Kraepelin, *Psychiatrie, Ein Lehrbuch für Studierende und Ärzte,* vol. 2 (Leipzig: Barth, 1909–15): 359–61. Quoted in Jackson, *Melancholia and Depression,* 190.

24. Bleuler groups paranoia with schizophrenia though Freud was insistent on differentiating paranoia from schizophrenia. Paranoia and schizophrenia, however, are generally grouped together insofar as neither is classified as an affective disorder. Schizophrenia is characterized by hallucinations which are generally auditory in nature as well as a strong tendency toward deterioration of the entire personality (abulia, depersonalization); this is not the case with paranoia, whose main symptoms are delusions.

25. For a discussion of definitions of "borderline," see Green's article "The Borderline Concept: A Conceptual Framework for the Understanding of Borderline Patients," in *On Private Madness,* 60–83. The diagnostic distinction between manic-depressive affective disorder and schizophrenia can be very difficult, especially when schizophrenic forms manifest periodic phases or when affective disorder is accompanied by schizophrenic persecutory delusions and disordered thought.

26. Green, "L'affect dans les structures cliniques," *Le discours vivant,* 165–66 (translation by Lisa Fluor).

27. Ibid., 166 (translation by Lisa Fluor).

28. Freud writes of psychosis: "There is, however, a much more energetic and successful kind of defense. Here, the ego rejects (*verwirft*) the incompatible idea together, with its affect and behaves as if the idea had never occurred to the ego at all." Quoted in Laplanche and Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis,* 166.

29. "From the clinical point of view," Laplanche and Pontalis write, "schizophrenia takes a variety of apparently very disparate forms. The following characteristics are the ones usually picked out as typical: incoherence of thought, action and affectivity (denoted by the classical terms 'discordance,' 'dissociation' and 'disintegration'); detachment from a reality accompanied by a turning in upon the self and the predominance of a mental life given over to the production of phantasies (autism); a delusional activity which may be marked in a greater or lesser degree, and which is always badly systematized. Lastly, the disease, which evolves at the most variable of paces towards an intellectual and affective 'deterioration,' often ending up by presenting states of apparent dementia, is defined as *chronic* by most psychiatrists, who consider it inadmissible to diagnose schizophrenia in the absence of this major trait." *The Language of Psycho-Analysis,* 408.

30. According to Edith Jacobson in her paper "Cyclothymic Depression": "Possibly, it is the depth and the nature of the regression that determine the development of a manic-depressive or a paranoid schizophrenic psychosis. Manic-depressives seem, at some point, to have reached a higher level in the differentiation and integration of the psychic systems. Consequently, the acute regressive process during their episodes does not go so far as in schizophrenics and is of a different type. Usually, it does not lead to a complete disintegration of the personality, but is reversible. It stops at a point that still allows a rather complete recovery. Bleuler described as a characteristic difference between the schizophrenic and the manic-depressive that the fears of the former refer to disasters occurring at the present time, those of the latter to future catastrophes. I believe that from the metapsychological point of view, this difference indicates that in the schizophrenic the object and self representations in the system ego actually break down to the point of dissolution, whereas the manic-depressive only feels threatened. His anxiety may be severe, but they are not true states of panic. . . ." Edith Jacobson, *Depression: Comparative Studies of Normal, Neurotic, and Psychotic Conditions* (New York: International Universities Press, 1971) 230–31.

31. Slavoj Zizek *, in his extremely interesting discussion of the Hitchcockian system, points out that "if we consider [Hitchcock's films] as a whole, we have an accidental, random series, but as soon as we separate them into linked triads. . ., each triad can then be seen to be linked by some theme, some common principle." He continues: "For example, take the following five films: *The Wrong Man, Vertigo, North by Northwest, Psycho* and *The Birds:* no single theme can be found to link all the films in such a series, yet such themes can be found if we consider them in groups of three. . . . As for the great trilogy *Vertigo, North by Northwest* and *Psycho,* it is very tempting to regard these three key films as the articulation of three different versions of filling the gap in the Other; their formal problem is the samethe relationship between a lack and a factor (a person) that tries to compensate for it. . . ." He goes on to argue that the three versions are *imaginary, symbolic* and *real,* the Lacanian triad of the psychic structure. He does not elaborate on the trilogy, but concentrates on a discussion of *The Birds*. See "Hitchcock," *October* 38 (1986): 103–4.

32. As Jackson writes: "That mania and melancholia might be connected, even intimately connected, is a notion that goes back many centuries indeed. . . . Whether it is *la folie à double forme* of Baillarger, *la folie circulaire* of Falret Père, or *the circular insanity* as these conditions came to be termed in Englishwhether it is *das manisch-depressive Irresein* of Kraepelin or *manic-depressive psychosis* as this came to be translatedor whether it is the *bipolar disease* of more modern psychiatrists, this newer idea has been suggested as a possibility by some and asserted as a fact by others for a long time now. The earlier history of associating melancholic conditions with manic conditions has surely played a part in these later suggestions and assertions that they were essentially phases in a single disorder. And both the earlier and later history probably reflect observations of the transition in the same person from melancholic state to manic state, or vice versa." *Melancholia and Depression,* 249. See also Jackson's chapter devoted to this issue, "The Various Relationships of Mania and Melancholia," ibid., 249–73.

33. See Guy Rosolato, "The Narcissistic Axis of Depression," *Psychoanalysis in France,* ed. Serge Lebovici and Daniel Widlöcher (New York: International Universities Press, 1980) 269–301.

34. As Rosolato writes: "Melancholia, another attempt at recovery through delusion, takes over to alter what would have been its course in a non-psychotic structure, thus revealing the corresponding unconscious. This fixation at the level of paranoid structure makes it possible to view melancholia as an internalized form of paranoia: the introjected object and the superego become the poles in the struggle between persecutor and persecuted. What is at stake in that struggle is not the relation with the external object, but the sector of internal psychic reality that has been transferred into the introjected object." Ibid., 274.

35. Green, "L'affect dans les structures cliniques," 169.

36. As Melanie Klein writes: "Freud has stated that mania has for its basis the same contents as melancholia and is, in fact, a way of escape from that state. I would suggest that in mania the ego seeks refuge not only from melancholia but also from a paranoiac condition which it is unable to master." "A Contribution to the Psycho-genesis of Manic-Depressive States," *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis,* 297.

37. Rosolato writes: "The inability to emerge from a dual relationship and come to grips with mourning and castration, the sensitivity to the causes triggering depression, the shift from depression to melancholiaall proceed from the magnitude of a persistent 'paranoid' organization." "The Narcissistic Axis of Depression," 273.

38. François Truffaut, *Hitchcock,* rev. ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985) 246.

39. For example, the extremely long tracking (dolly) shot in *Notorious* is persecutory and symbolic in nature, operating at the intellectual level because it reveals that "the key" is in Alicia's (Ingrid Bergman's) hand. In this case, the purpose of the shot is embedded within the dramatic language. In contrast, the opening tracking shot in *Rebecca* creates an ambiguous subjectivity because it does not seem to hold any narrative significance, but rather it sets a certain tone for the narrative that follows. This tracking shot is accompanied by the voice-over which is imaginary in nature, generating a psychical movement of searching into the past specifically because of the reference to the dream about Manderley.

40. Deleuze notes the contemplative pace of *Vertigo* when he writes that it "communicates a genuine image to us; and, certainly, what is vertiginous, is, in the heroine's heart, the relation of the Same with the Same which passes through all the variations of its relations with others (the dead woman, the husband, the inspector). But we cannot forget the other, more ordinary, Vertigothat of the inspector who is incapable of climbing the bell-tower staircase, living in a strange state of contemplation which is communicated to the whole film and which is rare in Hitchcock." Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image,* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) 204–5.

41. Deleuze refers to François Regnault's study of Hitchcock, "Système formel d'Hitchcock (Fascicule de Résultats)," *Alfred Hitchcock,* ed. Jean Narboni (Paris: Editions de l'Etoile*Cahiers du cinéma,* 1980). Paraphrasing Regnault's analysis, Deleuze writes: "Analyzing certain Hitchcock films François Regnault identifies a global movement for each one, or a 'principal geometric or dynamic form,' which can appear in the pure state in the credits: 'the spirals of *Vertigo,* the broken lines and the contrasting black and white structure of *Psycho,* the arrowing Cartesian coordinates of *North by Northwest*. . . .' And perhaps the general movements of these films are in turn the components of a still more general movement which would express the whole of Hitchcock's works, and the way in which this work evolved and changed. But no less interesting is the other direction where a general movementturned towards a changing wholeis decomposed into relative movements, into local forms turned towards the respective positions of the parts of a set, the attributions to persons or objects, the distributions between elements." Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image,* 21–22.

42. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," *S.E.* XIV, 239–60.

43. Robin Wood points out: "*Vertigo* seems to me of all Hitchcock's films the one nearest to perfection. Indeed, its profundity is inseparable from the perfection of form. . . . Form and technique here become the perfect expression of concerns both deep and universal." Robin Wood, *Hitchcock's Films Revisited* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) 129.

44. Truffaut, *Hitchcock,* 246.

45. "Sadness without cause" is an element long associated with melancholia. Jackson writes: "*Sadness without cause* . . . emerged as a common element in descriptive outlines of melancholia during the sixteenth century, but the notion was by no means new at that time. . . . All these various phrases . . . assume or imply a category of sadnesses where the cause is apparent . . .: sadness in response to losses, disappointments, failures, and the like. Many times these sadnesses have been categorized as melancholias and depressions, especially when the unhappy state has seemed disproportionate to the cause." *Melancholia and Depression,* 315, 317. In *Vertigo,* there is a cause for Scottie's melancholia, i.e., Madeleine's death and his colleague's death. However, because Scottie's affects attached to the deaths are suppressed in his nightmare and shut out in the stupor he experiences in his acute melancholia, they in turn stamp the whole film with an excessive mood of longing and melancholy.

46. Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (New York: Avon Books, 1965) 525 (emphasis in the original).

47. Julia Kristeva, *Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia,* trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) 21 (emphasis in the original). For a general discussion of mood from a psychoanalytic perspective, see Edith Jacobson's paper, "Normal and Pathological Moods: Their Nature and Functions," in her *Depression,* 66–106.

48. Truffaut, *Hitchcock,* 246. This shot is described as "a track-out combined with a forward zoom" and Hitchcock seems to have been very proud of it.

49. In his study of the formal structure of Hitchcock's system, François Regnault writes: "*Vertigo,* c'est l'histoire d'un vertige (dont le héros est atteint), mais aussi d'un enroulement (il suit une femme en voiture en tournant en rond dans San Francisco; elle a dans les cheveux une boucle en spirale qui compte beaucoup dans l'histoire), car dans l'intrigue le milieu rejoint petit à petit le début lorsqu'il s'agit de faire coïncider la femme numéro 2 avec la femme numéro 1, qui est en fait la même. Le héros est donc roulé et aussi embobiné (*et au point où forme et contenu se rejoignent en une même métaphore, de tels jeux de mots sont fondés* [my emphasis]). Mais *tout* film aussi est une bobine qui enroule une histoire. Tout film est un tel vertige, une telle boucle." "Système formel d'Hitchcock (Fascicule de Résultats)," 22.

50. See Green's "The Borderline Concept: A Conceptual Framework for the Understanding of Borderline Patients," in *On Private Madness,* 60–83.

51. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," 245.

52. This dream sequence, which is situated before Scottie's hospitalization, is very important because it functions both to *retell* and to *foretell* the whole narrative. It is indeed remarkable that within this short sequence (lasting 120 seconds), the whole narrative is told in condensed form, as in a real dream. The final shot of the nightmare anticipates the final shot of the film, and the first shot of the nightmare refers back to the very first shot of the film.

53. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," 251.

54. Green, "L'affect dans les structures cliniques," 158.

55. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," 253.

56. Green, "L'affect dans les structures cliniques," 158–59.

57. As I wish to return to the figure of the mad mother at the end of the essay, I should point out here that the image of the melancholic mother may be traced back to Vera Miles's character (Rose Balestrero) in *The Wrong Man,* the film prior to *Vertigo,* who is afflicted by melancholia because she blames herself for her husband's (Henry Fonda's) predicament. Curiously; her melancholic stupor will be repeated exactly by Scottie when he falls into "acute melancholia." The hospital visits in *The Wrong Man* and *Vertigo* also have an uncanny resemblance, accentuated by similar visual compositions and Bernard Herrmann's music. And it seems perfectly logical that after Scottie's identification with Mad Carlotta, as revealed in his nightmare, he finds himself in a total stupor.

58. Laura Mulvey points out: "In *Vertigo,* subjective camera predominates. Apart from one flashback from Judy's point of view, narrative is woven around what Scottie sees or fails to see. The audience follows the growth of his erotic obsession and subsequent despair precisely from his point of view." "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," *Visual and Other Pleasures* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989) 24.

59. Teresa de Lauretis provides an insightful feminist critique of the impossibility of Madeleine's desire and the underlying desire for the (dead) Mother in Vertigo. Teresa de Lauretis, *Alice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema* (Bloomington: Indiana University, Press, 1984) 153–55.

60. Jacobson, "Cyclothymic Depression," 230.

61. Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," 253.

62. Truffaut, *Hitchcock,* 249.

63. Geoffrey Hartman, "Plenty of Nothing: Hitchcock's *North by Northwest," The Yale Review* 71 (1981): 14.

64. Quoted in Janet Bergstrom, "Alternation, Segmentation, Hypnosis: Interview with Raymond Bellour," *Camera Obscura,* nos. 3–4 (summer 1979): 75.

65. Raymond Bellour, "Le blocage symbolique," *Communications* 23 (1975): 235–50.

66. The pattern is similar to the one Raymond Bellour traces in his analysis of *The Birds* in "*The Birds:* Analysis of a Sequence." English translation distributed in mimeographed form by the British Film Institute, London (no translator credited [1972]); originally published as "*Les Oiseaux:* analyse d'une séquence," *Cahiers du Cinéma,* no. 216 (October 1969).

67. Even Roger's chattiness is often contrasted with total silence, as in the crop-dusting scene, giving way to action, which becomes prominent in the latter half of the film.

68. There is an important exception to this rule, however: the shots which involve the couple formation with Oedipal triangulation (i.e., the love scenes in the train and in the elevator) and the shots which are taken from moving vehicles when Roger is on the run. In other words, when the camera movement is explicit and conspicuous, it is still closely related to the specific traumatic affect created in the film: love and hate in Oedipal conflict, on the one hand, and anxiety and panic related to castration, on the other.

69. Truffaut, *Hitchcock,* 254.

70. Klein claims that "mania is based on the mechanism of denial." Melanie Klein, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States," *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis,* 297.

71. Ibid., 297–98.

72. Ibid., 298 (emphasis in the original).

73. As Robin Wood observes, Roger is a "man who lives purely on the surface, refusing all commitment or responsibility (appropriately, he is in advertising) . . . , his life all the more a chaos for the fact that he doesn't recognize it as such; a man who relies above all on the exterior trappings of modern civilization . . . for protection, who substitutes bustle and speed for a sense of direction or purpose. . . ." *Hitchcock's Films Revisited,* 134.

74. Raymond Bellour drew attention to this phrase in his analysis of the Oedipal trajectory in *North by Northwest:* see his "Le blocage symbolique," *Communications* 23 (1975): 250–53.

75. Green, "L'affect dans les structures cliniques," 164.

76. Hartman, "Plenty of Nothing," 17. I should add here that Roger's initialsR.O.T.also foreshadow the fear of decomposition (rot) underlying Norman's madness in *Psycho*.

77. Green, "L'affect dans les structures cliniques," 164.

78. However, as I will discuss in the section on *Psycho,* this absent father generates, in a sense, the film's whole narrative when he dies.

79. Hartman, "Plenty of Nothing," 16.

80. The transition from this scene on the cliff to the next scene in which Roger pulls Eve onto rite upper berth of a sleeping car on a train is a very curious one. Hitchcock uses extreme close-ups of Roger and Eve's faces which almost cover the whole screen, shown alternately in shot/reverse-shot. First, there is a close-up of Leonard's shoe stepping on Roger's hand; then Leonard is shot down and we hear alarming music similar to the music used in *Vertigo* for the zoom in/dolly out shot which is intended to mimic the experience of vertigo. Next the microfilm is revealed, and the Professor makes a joke about a real gun. Then, we see an extreme close-up of Roger's mask-like face (almost like the close-up of Scottie in the nightmare sequence) as he says to Eve, "Reach, here, come, UP, now," then an extreme close-up of Eve, full of horror and anxiety, who replies, "No, I can't make it," and another close-up of Roger, encouraging her, "Yes, you can make it," which seamlessly turns into his smiling face as he says, "Come along, Mrs. Thornhill." Because of the extreme close-ups, which do not leave any background space in the frame, the whole transition becomes spatially disoriented, which allows us to describe the last image as a "fantasy flash."

81. Raymond Bellour, "Psychosis, Neurosis, Perversion," *Camera Obscura,* nos. 3–4 (1979): 105.

82. Ibid., 105–32.

83. Part of the reason may be practical: Hitchcock made *Psycho* as a low budget film, using studio facilities rather than shooting on location. But Hitchcock could have made it differently had he wanted to.

84. Truffaut, *Hitchcock,* 266.

85. Ibid., 269.

86. And of course, another curious voice-over is Mrs. Bates's, which according to the narrative logic, comes from Norman himself. But the woman's voice haunts the film because it lacks an enunciatory source, coming as it does from off-screen.

87. In this regard, it is interesting to recall Cary Grant's mask-like face in the penultimate extreme close-up, when he is trying to keep Eve from falling off the precipice to her death. His face is hard to read because it shows no emotion, anticipating the close-ups in *Psycho*. In the next shot, however, which will be superimposed onto the final shot in the train, a smile appears on his face.

88. Robin Brood writes of the meaninglessness of Marion's murder: "Nevernot even in *Vertigo*has identification been broken off so brutally. At the time, so engrossed are we in Marion, so secure in her potential salvation, that we can scarcely believe it is happening; when it is over, and she is dead, we are left shocked, with nothing to cling to, the apparent center of the film entirely dissolved." *Hitchcock's Films Revisited,* 146.

89. Truffaut, *Hitchcock,* 272.

90. Norman continues: "A hobby is supposed to pass the time, not fill it."

91. Norman actually says, "No. Well, I run the office and, uh, tend the cabins and grounds and do the, uh, little errands for my motherthe, uh, ones she allows I might be capable of doing."

92. Green, "L'affect dans les structures cliniques," 169–73.

93. Jacqueline Rose argues in her discussion of *The Birds,* especially in terms of the question of female sexuality, that the classical filmic system is grounded in an imaginary structuration whose principle of instability can be "referred to the paranoid characterization of that structure and its attendant aggressivity. . . . In *The Birds,* the situation is more complex, because the film internalizes the paranoia latent to the cinematic codification." Jacqueline Rose, "Paranoia and the Film System," *Screen* 17:4 (1976–77) 93–94.

94. David Macey, in his book *Lacan in Contexts* (London: Verso, 1988) 43, points out: "Whereas Freud comes to psychoanalysis via hysteria, Lacan comes to it via paranoia." Later he refers to Lacan's mirror stage, a concept crucial to psychoanalytic film theory, in relation to Lacan and surrealism, saying: "A similar notion of *dédoublement* and of simultaneous perceptions is apparent in some of Lacan's references to the mirror stage and to the narcissistic construction and function of the ego. Lacan describes the perception of the mirror image as involving pre-formed images and *Gestalten,* and occasionally refers to [it] as 'paranoiac knowledge' (*connaissance paranoïaque*). . . . An element of paranoia is, that is, implicit in the narcissism of the ego" (ibid., 63). It is logical that Rose discusses the filmic system and paranoia within a Lacanian framework.

95. Jacques Lacan, "Television," *October* 40 (spring 1987): 27–28.

96. This is the explanation for Norman's psychosis stated by a psychiatrist at the end of the film. Norman gives his own interpretation to Marion in the parlor: "[Mrs. Bates] had to raise me all by herself after my father died. I was only five and it must have been quite a strain for her . . . Anyway, a few years ago, mother met this man and, and he talked her into building this motel . . . And when he died too it was . . . just too great a shock for her. And the way he died!" And he continues: "It was just too great a loss for her. She had nothing left." If Norman's identification with the mother was at work, one can even detect a possible homosexual desire for the man as well, and it was "too great a loss" for Norman.

97. Green, "The Dead Mother," in *On Private Madness,* 142.

98. Ibid., 150–51.

99. Ibid., 162.

100. Ibid. I will quote at length a passage from Green's article in which he discusses the function of projection, a major feature of the paranoid structure, in relation to the maternal object: "Thus an abundant literature describes . . . this omnipresent internal breast [referring to the Kleinian perspective] which threatens the infant with annihilation, with fragmentation and infernal cruelty of all kinds, that a mirror-relation links, with the baby, who defends himself . . . by projection. When the schizo-paranoid phase starts to give way to the depressive position, the latter,

> which coincides with the unification that links the object and the ego, has as a fundamental characteristic the progressive cessation of the projective activity, and the fact that the infant becomes able to assume his own aggressive driveshe becomes 'responsible' with regard to them, in a way, which in turn encourages him to take care of the maternal object, to worry about her, to fear losing her, by reflecting his aggressivity onto himself by way of archaic guilt and with the aim of reparation." Ibid., 165.

101. These are Norman's words referring to the mental hospital, "a madhouse," as he puts it, when Marion suggested that Mrs. Bates might be put "some place." These cruel eyes are indeed at the heart of the mechanism of both Norman's and Marion's, therefore the film's, paranoid fear and persecutory fantasy.

102. The maternal figure which is lost throughout *Psycho* will return in *The Birds* three years later. Since his first film in 1922, Hitchcock continued to make films every year until 1960, the year he made *Psycho*. He had a break, however, after *Psycho* until 1962 when he launched into making *The Birds,* and the year after that he made *Marnie*. After *Psycho,* both *The Birds* and to a certain extent, *Marnie,* are indeed about the destructive, threatening maternal figure, "the maternal superego," as Zizek * rightly argues in his article "Hitchcock." But in *The Birds,* the mother is not dead any more, and it is the eyes that kill. The mother is represented, thus articulated, unlike in the trilogy where the mother remains absent, unrepresentable or else able to be represented only in death.

103. See the articles by Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, "A Poetics of Psychoanalysis: 'The Lost ObjectMe,' " *SubStance* 43 (1984), and "IntrojectionIncorporation: *Mourning or Melancholia,*" in Lebovici and Widlöcher, *Psychoanalysis in France,* 3–16, and Abraham and Torok's book, *The Wolf Mans' Magic Word: A Cryptonymy,* trans. Nicolas Rand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), with its forward by Jacques Derrida, "*Fors:* The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok."

104. Takuya Nishitani pointed out, in his presentation for a Film Studies Group meeting at Kyoto University on June 25, 1994, that in some European languages, "mother" seems to have a similar origin "moeder-mother" to "modder-mud." See, for example, the entry for "mother" in Noah Webster's *An American Dictionary of the English Language* (New York: S. Converse, 1828).

105. Abraham and Torok, "A Poetics of Psychoanalysis: 'The Lost ObjectMe,' " 4.

106. In her article "*Psycho:* The Institutionalization of Female Sexuality" (*Wide Angle* 5:1 [1982], 49–55), Barbara Klinger provides a feminist reading of this final shot in a critique of Bellour's article "Psychosis, Neurosis, Perversion." For Klinger, the transformation of the image of Norman/ the mother into the car articulates the phallocentric order of classical Hollywood cinema, which denies sexual difference. Her argument relies on the assumption that the car is a phallic image and that Marion's sexuality has been transformed into the phallus through narrative displacement. I find her equation of the car with the phallus too simple; it weakens her argument, which is otherwise insightful.

107. David Sterritt, *The Films of Alfred Hitchcock* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 108.

108. Spoto, *The Dark Side of Genius,* 417: "The resentment at which [Hitchcock] considered Vera Miles's impudent ingratitude [for not taking the role in the film] smoldered forever after. 'I nearly had a relapse when she broke the news,' he said twenty years later. 'It was her third child, and I told her that one child was expected, two was sufficient, but that three was really obscene.' "

109. Curiously, when Hitchcock wanted to make *No Bail for the Judge* with Audrey Hepburn after *North by Northwest,* word was sent that Hepburn "was pregnant and would have to be released from the film. . . . Hitchcock was in New York when he received the news, and the corridors of the Saint Regis Hotel shook with a rare outburst of anger." Spoto, *The Dark Side of Genius,* 444–47. Spoto continues: "Not only the pregnant Miles but also the pregnant Hepburn refused Hitchcock."

110. Norman says in the parlor sequence, "We all go a little mad sometimes," after spearing of his mother ("She just goes a little mad sometimes . . ."), as if to suggest that "we," the spectators, are also accomplices to, or willing bearers of, this secret fiction of madness.

Ten
More! From Melodrama to Magnitude

Joan Copjec

The Invention of Crying

My initial premise is this: crying was an invention of the late eighteenth century. I offer as proof of this thesis the fact that at this precise historical moment there emerged a brand new literary formmelodramawhich was specifically designed to give people something to cry about. Now, I realize that some of you are saying to yourselves, "I think she's got her dates wrong. I seem to remember something about people crying before then. Weren't there even professional mourners in some former societies?" I will grant you this: tears were shed from time to time before the eighteenth century, and even as a public duty, but never before was there such a universal weeping, such a general social incitement to cry. I suggest, then, that we pay closer attention to this modern social imperative in order to distinguish crying in the modern sensethe sense which accounts, for example, for Jean-Jacques Rousseau's dwelling, in *The Essay on the Origins of Language, The Confessions, Emile,* on the importance and necessity of pity; for Denis Diderot's theatrical dictate, "First touch me, astonish me, tear me apart, startle me, make me cry . . . you will please my eye afterward if you can"; [1] and for the wholly new emphasis in art and art criticism on the sentimental, empathetic relation between spectator and characterto distinguish this *modern* crying from all the lachrymation of earlier times.

I am, of course, not the first to view melodramathe genre whose overt purpose was to facilitate this new outpouring of tearsas evidence of a social revolution. In *The Melodramatic Imagination* Peter Brooks also defines melodrama as an "enduring mode of the *modern* imagination" (my emphasis) and similarly links it to Rousseau, specifically to the opening passage of *The Confessions* in which Rousseau addresses himself to "my kind" even as

he emphatically asserts his basic difference from them. Rousseau paradoxically insists not only on his uniqueness among men, but on the necessity of relating this uniqueness in its entirety, of "saying it all." [2] Brooks connects this modern compulsion to say all immediately to melodrama, arguing that the felt inadequacy of language to make everything absolutely clear is compensated for, in melodrama, by the grandiose gesture, the schematic tableau, the expressive raise en scène, music, the inarticulate cry, all those mute signs which we commonly take as characteristic of the genre and which make visible what is otherwise absent and ineffable in the narrative, by words alone.

While Brooks's basic argument is convincing, even inspired, several major objections to it must be raised. In preparation for doing so, I offer the following accountsomewhat different in its terms from Brooks's versionof the source of the compulsion to speak the whole truth, which so suddenly erupted as the eighteenth century drew to a close. At this time, we know, a new entitythe citizenwas at once constructed and inserted into a similarly novel sort of space: a public space populated by the citizen's fellows, his kind. For just recently, the freshly minted notion of universal humanity had opened the door not only for the citizen, but for countless others like him, all of whom appeared on the modern stage at the same time. If the notion of universal humanity gave modern man the right to see himself as beyond compare, the only one quite like him, it also determined that he would not be alone in doing so; in this he was exactly like the others. In order, then, for the citizen to become countable among his fellowsto become comparable or equal to them in his right to claim his own uniquenesssomething had to be *discounted*.

Michael Fried has analyzed the decisive shift that took place in painting during this period as a fundamental shift in representation itself, which abandoned its former "theatricality" to embrace a new strategy of "absorption."[3] He argues that in mid-century, painting began to obey Diderot's imperative, "Act as if the curtain never rose!" That is, it began to carry on as though the beholder who stood in front of the painting were not there, even to obliterate his existence, by preoccupying itself with its own supposedly autonomous, represented space. Curiously, however, this self-absorption aimed not at an absolute denial of the beholder, but rather at his "absorption." The word *absorption* creates some confusion for this analysis, for Fried uses it in discussing two different strategies of these new paintings: their tendency to represent the beholder as a spectator in the painting itself and their attempt to arrest the beholder's attention, to capture him in their thrall. And yet the second strategy does not seem to be appropriately described as an attempt at absorption, for these paintings sought less to encourage the beholder's contemplation than to assault or move him: to strike him. Rather than effacing its relation to the beholder, painting gave this relation a much greater weight and a different emphasis as it sought to *act* directly upon him

in some way. How to explain the apparent inconsistencies of this shift, except in this way: if the beholder's empirical existence had to be scrupulously disregarded in order for the represented field to appear to be related to nothing but itself, to be autonomous, this did not preventbut, indeed, necessitatedthe emergence of a different beholder, this time in the order of the real. How to explain the shift in the strategy of painting, in other words, except by referencing the "logic of suture" by which Jacques-Alain Miller interprets Gottlob Frege's dismissal of the empirical subject from his formal logic as the very gesture that cleared the way for the subject of psychoanalysis? [4]

This mutation of the space of representation was absolutely in step with the concurrent mutation of social space. Here, too, the citizen's absorptionor sutureinto the public space, his entrance into a system of social relations as a putative equal, his very presence *in* the social scene, was secured only via an annihilation of his presence *on* the scene. For clarity's sake, let me translate this into still other terms. Whereas in the seventeenth century Descartes conceived the cogito as a kind of spectator on the scene of the world, which represented itself to the cogito, in the next century this notion had to be substantially revised as the representational model that had underpinned it gave way in the very manner Fried suggests. That is, at the later date, the cogito could no longer be conceived to be in attendance at the theater of a representable or thinkable world, since this worldwhich had begun to act as if the curtain were permanently drawnwas now conceived as that which *shunned* the cogito. The cogito, in short, or being itself, had become real, that is, antinomic to symbolic representation, unabsorbable in it. If the two terms, *cogito* and *representation,* were nevertheless sutured together, it was a radical, internal antagonism that bound them together. In the social realm this meant that the citizen had to surrender the private kernel of his being, his *absolute* particularity, in order to enter a social reality in which he was comparable to others. From this point on, privacy and publicity did indeed become rigorously demarcated, but notat least not primarilyas two different kinds of symbolic space. The great social revolutions created only one new spacepublic spacewhich it defined as the symbolic effacement not of every difference or particularity, but of every inalienable or incommensurable difference. It was these differences which defined the private. They were not assigned to a separate symbolic location, but were rather emptied of all symbolic content. And here Fried's term *absorption* seems utterly appropriate once again. For if public space defined itself in total disregard of another (private) space that marked its external boundaries, this is because publicitylike paintinghad *absorbed* its limits in the form of an internal reminder that it had turned its back on something. This internal limit ensured the inexhaustibility of both painting and public space, rather than, as one might half expect, their rigid limitation.

For their absorption of that which is by definition unabsorbable (how can something that has no content be absorbed?) only served to guarantee their own otherness to themselves, their own suspicious regard of what currently constituted their contents.

The notion of the universal subject that subtends this monumental shift to the "absorptive" model of representation is, thus considered, neither as simple nor as dismissible as recent assaults on it have claimed. For what the notion describes is the internal antagonism that binds the citizen's commensurability with others to his absolute *in*commensurability. The universal subject names this particular antagonism, not some abstract and wholly ahistoricizable generality. Later, psychoanalysis came into existence as the self-appointed guardian of this antagonism, which it made it its business to elaborate. The concept of the unconscious, for example, is one such attempt at elaboration, for it can properly be understood only as the cogito retroactively redefined, that is, as the citizen's private, unabsorbable being. Similarly, the concept of castration was invented to explain how being comes to be unrepresentable in a language that would be comprehensible to all. If at the dawn of our modernity the desire to say everything could not be abated, we have, psychoanalysis claims, castration to blame, for it does not stop separating us from our innermost, or unconscious, selves.

Yet by placing psychoanalysis in the context of the revolutions that took place at the dawn of modern social reality, I want to encourage the recognition that it is not only the subject who is at fault for failing to put into words everything he or she feels compelled to say; it is not only the subject, but the Otherpublic space or the social orderwhich is castrated. The very condition of modern public space is that it remain blind to or ignorant of some aspect of the citizens it takes up or absorbs. The eighteenth-century fascination with blindness stems, undoubtedly, from this condition. Check the *Confessions* once again and you will see that Rousseau seems at times to be frantic and desperate, not so much because of his own inability to know the truth about himself as because of the obdurate opacity of others, his fellow men, who seem incapable of understanding the truth he proclaims. Each of their replies to him indicates that they have missed something in his speech, something has passed by unobserved, some inarticulate remainder has persisted, no matter how carefully he had chosen his words.

Now, *this remainder, I would argue, is the point of the cry let loose by the revolutions at the close of the eighteenth century*. That is to say, the flood of tears that issued from this moment was not immediately the expression of a sentiment, of a bond of sympathy between citizens (which is, of course, the usual interpretation), but was rather evidence of the fact that something had become unassimilable in our social reality. The cry marked not the recognition of some similarity between citizens, but a crucial *lack* of recognition. The weeping that ushered in the nineteenth century signaled the painful, because antagonistic, join between symbolic and real (between public recog-

nition and its sabotage) and not the sympathetic or imaginary relations that united us all. Wordless residue of a failed communication, the cry was also an unvoiced appeal to the Other to pay closer attention, to listen a little longer to what our words *wanted* to say. The cry was a plea for recognition. It thus kept the conversation going and was in this sense the very condition of publicity or the social contract between citizens. As Rousseau's *Confessions* illustrate, the other's failures to comprehend became the source of our engagement with him. It is no wonder, then, that crying becamenot socially respectable, that is the wrong way to look at itbut socially *necessary,* for it came to perform the task of marking the Other's *failure* and thus the citizen's *right:* to attract the Other's attention to all that had not yet been publicly recognized.

I am not, however, simply recommending that we place psychoanalysis in the context of these social revolutions in order to understand it, I am also urging a consideration of what psychoanalysis adds to our understanding of these modern social relations. If castration can be defined as that failure in the Other that makes room for the citizen's political pursuit of recognition, then it should be clear that the very concept of citizenship requires us to address the question of sexual difference. To some this desire to distinguish *two* will seem to be part of an outdated project, lately replaced by the embrace of a far greater number of gender identities. But the problem with the current social constructivist focus on gender is that it falls prey to the very binary thinking that psychoanalysis opposed and superseded. Sigmund Freud's theory of sexual difference avoids the binary alternatives of an essentialism that would reduce sex to an innate, biological substance *and* of a social constructivism that would reduce it to a product of culture. To say that psychoanalysis locates sex on the ontological rather than the ontic level would be misleading insofar as *ontological* implies some precomprehension. Let us say, then, that sexual difference belongs to the order of the real, taking care to recall that the real is lodged within the symbolic and never, ever stands alone. Far from foreclosing the question of particularities or differences that resist absorption into universal propositions, the psychoanalytic definition of sex demands that we retain the notion of a citizen's inalienable differenceeven as we work toward including such differences in an all. The universal has, in other words, a *practical* status in psychoanalysis; it operates though not as a regulative idea, but as an address.

Sexual difference testifies to the fact that there are *two* ways in which this antagonismor antinomybetween one's unique being and one's commonality with others can be structured. In psychoanalysis, male and female are not defined in relation to each other, but in relation to an absolute enjoyment (*jouissance*) that structurally eludes each. To put it in different terms, male and female are two paradoxical "solutions" to the material impossibility of complete satisfaction or complete coincidence with oneself. One of the enduring problems of these solutions, however, is that the paradox they

instantiate is often felt by the subject to be intolerable, who thus tries to resolve it. What Jacques Lacan calls the "impostures of masculinity" are attempts to resolve the male paradox, while the "masquerades of femininity" are attempts to resolve the female paradox. The first set of resolutions clings to the deluded belief that there can be a universal without exception, while the second forwards the misguided belief that the particular can forever evade inclusion in the universal, in public space. On the contrary, the "more appropriate" general solutions maintain, in the first case, that there is no totality that is not incomplete and, in the second, that we cannot speak exclusively in terms of particularitiesparticulars are not-all. Since I have detailed the logics of these two solutions elsewhere, [5] I will be brief here in stating how they may be derived from Freud's theory. Freud makes this fundamental distinction: while the boy's scenario of castration begins with the Oedipus complex and ends with the threat of castration, the girl's scenario begins with castration and ends with Oedipal love. What is the distinction Freud is attempting to draw? It is this: for the boy castration involves prohibition, whereas for the girl it does not. Her castration takes place without the father's intervention, without interdiction. The reluctance to accord Freud's distinction the full value it deserves is due to the fact that it seems to depend on an immediacy of sight in the girl's case. The priority of castration in her scenario has been interpreted to mean that it is located in a visibility that precedes symbolic structuration. But it is possible to interpret this priority of castration in another way, as bearing witness to a certain inescapability or *impossibility* that contrasts with the *prohibition* that is crucial for the boy. Let me explain. The father's interdiction forbids the boy's access to something. To enter the world as a man, it cautions, you must give up one thing. The social order or space of the Other into which the boy makes his way is thus one that is always incomplete. *Not everything can be included in it*. The social world into which the girl enters is also a failed one, but not because it is incomplete or lacks anything. The fact that prohibition does not figure in her castration means not that not everything can be included in the Other, but that *nothing can be excluded* from it. Yet the imperative to include, or not say "no," does not give the woman any more opportunity to say everything than the imperative to exclude something, the parental interdiction, gives the man, since no all can form where inclusion knows no limit. This impossibility of constructing an allwhether this is a complete image of herself or of the social space into which she is insertedis what determines the woman's castration, the inaccessibility of some part of her body, some *jouissance*. For, contrary to a widespread misinterpretation, the supplemental or nonphallic *jouissance* that results from her lack of lack is not enjoyed by the woman *as her own body*. In other words, if one links the absence of prohibition to the girl's castration (rather than to a *failure* of castration), one sees that this absence cuts her off from a part of herself and

does not bind her to an imaginary relation (which no threat forces her to surrender) to herself or her child or mother. Through her excess *jouissance,* the woman enjoys the *Other* body, which is not her own.

Now, if melodramato return to our discussion of that genre and Brooks's analysis of itresults from the inability and consequent compulsion to say everything, we must ask ourselves: *which* inability are we talking about? The one that issues from a prohibition, or the one that issues from an impossibility? The one that defines the male antimony or the one that defines the female one? If the answer I give is the latter, it is not in order to sanction the stereotype of women as prone to tears, but to suggest that the logic of the general compulsion to speak the whole truth is, in melodrama, female specific.

Before proceeding with a justification for my reply regarding the particular form of melodrama, I will make a slight digression on the subject of novelistic form in general. By the end of the eighteenth century, two different types of narration had become distinguishable: omniscient and free indirect. Both narrational strategies bear witness to what Gilles Deleuze has referred to as our "thoroughly modern belief" that every subject is "reflected in a transcendental subject who thinks it and in which it thinks itself. . . . [T]here is no subject which acts without another which watches it act, and which grasps it as acted; itself assuming the freedom of which it deprives the former." [6] I should point out that in making this observation, Deleuze refers exclusively to free indirect speech; I am arguing that it applies equally to omniscient narration. The point is, in each case we are presented not with a substantial or fully realized narrator, but with a shadowy, insubstantial figure, the same sort of indeterminate Other to which the eighteenth-century subject found it necessary to address himself or herself generally. Both kinds of narrator bear witness to a linguistic impotence, a modern lack of linguistic guarantee, that forced the subject to seek the meaning of his own words in the place of the Other and to make his or her own value dependent on the Other's recognition. The emergence of *two* types of narrator is significant, of course, and testifies surely to the fact that the loss of foundations resulted not in a simple inability to say all, but in a double failure.

Let us take omniscient narration first. One of the hallmarks of the social world depicted by this mode of narration is its homogeneity. The homogeneous, realist world posed by omniscient narration fosters the belief that "we all inhabit the same world and the same meanings are available to all."[7] But the condition of this homogeneity or potential consensus is the extraction from it of one element: precisely, the narrator. Although homogeneous, the world created by omniscient narration is always incomplete since one character, the one who narrates the fiction, is never allowed to take up residence in the fictional world. While this world is hermetically

sealed and distanced in the past, the narrator, in a temporal disjunction that can never be healed, exists always and only in an unspecified present.

Totally lacking any specification, this present can contain no corporealized being; the narrator who dwells there is, in other words, disembodied, pure voice. This has led critics to assume that the narrator is merely an abstract point produced by "the extension to infinity provided by infinite consensus." [8] In other words, if realism holds out the promise of a total consensus wherein all obstacles to mutual recognition and understanding will have proved to have been only temporary, resolvable, this is because it posits the existence of some abstract being available to anyone who will simply slough off, purify himself of, the particularities of character or situation that limit his comprehension of the world. According to this reading, the world of the fiction is the world in which this particular, individual existence, with all its attendant conflicts and misunderstandings, is lived, while the narrator represents that abstract point which supports the promise of eventual resolution.

In my reading, however, the fact that the psychologically empty omniscient narrator has no discernible character, no concrete particularity, indicates not that he is abstract, but that he can only be supposedsince he may never be encountered in the space of the fiction. Nonencountered, the narrator is then both necessary to the fiction and totally impotent with respect to it. For his removal from the diegesis and status as an exception act both to guarantee the consistency of the fictionwhich may proceed untroubled by the contradictions his inclusion would entailand to ensure that the narrator will always watch on helplessly as the characters hang from precipices, walk down dark streets, suffer undeserved fates.

Free Indirect: Melodrama and Excess

Alongside this first mode of narration there developed a second. Most often referred to as free indirect discourse, this mode of narration neither represents a character's thoughts and words directly nor reports them wholly indirectly. Rather, between narrator and character there occurs "an exchange of linguistic ardors,"[9] whereby the narrator either adopts the lexical features of the character's discourse or lends to the character his or her own speech. As illustration you might think, on the one hand, of those moments in *Madame Bovary* where Gustave Flaubert lends Emma's banal ideas and insipid fantasies a kind of dignity by relating them to us in his own elevated style. On the other hand you might think of that point in Yvonne Rainer's *Film About a Woman Who . . .* when the narrator reports, "She wanted to bash his fucking face in." The adjective that attaches to his face does not offer an objective description and does not therefore belong to an omniscient, objective narrator; it belongs to the woman who wanted to do the bashing.

In addition to this lexical peculiarity, free indirect discourse is character-

ized by the frequent use of the imperfect or conditional tense rather than the simple past; a use of shifters that maintain the presence of the narrated events; typographical features, such as dashes, exclamation points and so on, that underline the reported emotions; and by a general increased attention to the affective states of the characters. The development of the free indirect style is often attributed to women writers such as Fanny Burney and Jane Austen, who is credited with perfecting it. I, too, would associate it with women, but not directly as a kind of emotionalism; I would instead suggest that it be considered in relation to the second logic of castration, the one that results from the absence of a prohibition or of a limit.

The distinction between these two modes of narration boils down to something like the following. Omniscient narration presents us with a world that is consistent *because* it lacks something. This is a world whose status as objective, historical fact results from its exclusion of life or being, of contingency, as that which is heterogeneous to it. To this impotent, because dead, world, we must add a narrator, not as an objective representation or sensible object, but as an idea or a principle of intelligibility. In other words, it is impossible to think this world, cut off from us, isolated in a definite past; we cannot enliven it, think its present relation to us, without thinking of it as being thought outside itself, preserved, alive, by a faculty of thinking.

When, on the other hand, free indirect narration is at work in a text, the represented world is no longer incomplete; it is inconsistent. It is characterized by a profound ambiguity, an absolute undecidability. It is very often unclear, for example, whether the "mimicking" of the character's idiom and intonations mocks or expresses sympathy for the character. Additionally, rather than dead speech, a diegetic space cut off from life (enclosed in the past), and a narrator whose existence is merely intelligible, that is, whose status is simply a principle of intelligibility, free indirect narration presents us, in Pier Paolo Pasolini's words, with "reanimated speech," and with "the purring of meditative thought, of grumbling, of regretting, of recriminating, etc." [10] This reanimation of speech marks the presence of another enjoyment that exceeds the phallic one. The difference between omniscient narration and free indirect speech is, in short, the difference between a limited and an unlimited symbolic; free indirect narration is not constructed through the imposition of a limit, as omniscient narration clearly is.

My more immediate point, however, is that the use of free indirect speech is solidary with the emergence of melodrama. Not only does melodrama center on dramatic situations that elicit tears from its audience, it does so by registering the female logic of failure which makes the cry the inevitable remainder that results from the subtraction of the Other's reply from all that is implied by our address to it. Andmost importantlythe mode of excess that distinguishes melodrama as a genre must, I would argue, be reconsidered in terms provided by free indirect speech.

In *The Melodramatic Imagination,* Brooks proposes that melodramatic excess manifests a "striving beyond," specifically, an "attempt to go beyond the surface of the real to a true, hidden reality, to open the world of spirit." [11] Film theorists, who have rightly followed Brooks in seeing excess as a salient feature of the genre, locate this excess in the mise en scène, which they read as an attempt surreptitiously to say something which the narrative cannot, since it is prohibited from doing so by some code, whether that of a Hays-restricted Hollywood or, more generally, that of bourgeois morality or nineteenth-century realism.

It is clear from this that both Brooks and film theorists conceive melodramatic excess according to a logic of lack and supplement, whereby a whole is simultaneously thought to exist and to require one more element to complete itself. The excess is considered to be a surplus at the same time as it is considered to be necessary to a telling of the whole truth. The mechanism that governs this paradoxical contention is precisely the *prohibition* that constructs the whole by barring entry to what is otherheterogeneousto it. This explanation, which relies on the same sort of logic of lack and supplement that defines the masculine relation to *jouissance,* has several disadvantages. First, it obscures the specificity of melodrama, which figures instead a feminine relation to *jouissance*. Second, it conceives melodrama too simplistically as merely an exception to, or as expressing exceptions to, the realist mode of fiction rather than as exemplifying a different, non-complementary mode of its own. Third, it mischaracterizes the very nature of melodramatic excess insofar as it sees it as vehicling a determinate message, however vague it may first appear for having to represent itself in a nonverbal or nonnarrative form.

Alternatively, I would suggest that melodrama constructs not a diegetic reality in which one manages to gesture, however covertly, toward what one is forbidden to say, but that it constructs instead an *indeterminate* reality, one about which nothing definite can be said. This is so because the excess melodrama comports is *not the result of a prohibition* that closes off the diegetic space by excluding something from it, but is rather the *cause of the diegesis's inability to close itself off*. It is because something has *not* been prohibited, has not been excluded from melodrama that it seems to comport an excess, an unspecifiable "more," something that reanimates it.

One does not have to look very long for evidence to back up this argument; the *serial form* of melodramaexaggerated in television soap operas, but plainly visible in what has been referred to as the genre's "indefinitely expandable middle"provides ample proof. The seriality of melodrama, its inability to come to an end, to form a consistent whole, is not an accidental but a fundamental feature of it. On the basis of this observation, it becomes possible and necessary to challenge the accuracy of the critical perception that the characters in melodrama are defined through conflict

with other characters. The opposite appears to be true: the conflict between characters is, in melodrama, not exhaustive, that is, it does not take place without leaving a residue of questions or opening other narrative avenues than the ones it purportedly concerns. The characters are never reducible to their relations with each other because some aspect of their being spills over, falls outside the various, serial relations in which they become engaged. This means, ultimately, that the different characters do not share a world.

Think, for example, of Douglas Sirk's *Imitation of Life*. In this film, the narrative of the black family (Annie and Sarah Jane) is ultimately revealed to extend beyond the supportive and subservient relations mother and daughter have with the white family (Lora and Susie). Annie's funeral, which takes place in a black church, introduces us to characters, music, and events that are completely new to us, though they have been part of Annie's life all along. Because we have been viewing her, until now, from Lora and Susie's point of view, we have seen nothing of this, nothing of this part of her. The shift of focus, the disjunction, is felt to be radical because we have been unprepared for it. What we took for a diegetic world commonly shared by two families suddenly collapses, all measure extracted from it. Sirk's strategy here should not be confused with that which would produce a "Rashomon effect," wherein different points of view collide and vie with each other regarding the truth of their representations of the same event. In *Imitation of Life* the dominant point of view is hollowed out not because it is directly challenged by the point of view suggested by the funeral sequence, but because the relations we took to be the subject of the film are abruptly exposed as nonnecessary ones. It is, it turns out, mere chance and contiguity that bound the narratives of the two families together, and in a much more external way than we were ever led to suspect before the final scenes. Before the ending, we had believed that the chance encounter of the two families and their subsequent existence under one roof had forged a more intimate relation; now we can see that this is not so. Living alongside Lora and Susie, Annie and Sarah Jane have lived substantially alone.

It is this which explains Sirk's claim that he would have made *Imitation of Life,* the film that culminated his career, for the title alone. That is to say, one would be mistaken if one were to conceive the *inauthenticity* that so fascinated Sirk as that which made the lives of his characters secondhand and sorry, or compromised, versions of some ideal dimly grasped, for this would simply reduce the film to the narrative clichés it mocks. What determines the film'sand melodrama'sinauthenticity is not the fact that the characters all judge their own successes and failures in someone else's terms, but that none of the characters can provide the measure of any other. To state this in Lacanian terms, it is not primarily the characters (the small others), but rather the big Other who is charged in melodrama with inauthenticity, in the sense that it is incapable of supplying the grounding or

validation for any character's existence. The fault of the Other, mark you, is characterized specifically as inauthenticity rather than impotence, or: impotence is figured more precisely in this genre as inauthenticity. The irreality of melodrama, the sense that, as Brooks says, its "grandiose gestures and intense emotions are undermotivated," or, as Deleuze says of free indirect speech, that the referential function has somehow been suspended, registers this inauthenticity or unfoundedness, this lack of guarantee. [12]

Again, this accords with my argument that it is not prohibition and lack, but the lack of lack that defines melodrama's excess. Its failure to construct a world for its characters to inhabit, the seriality of the genre, does not lead it merely to focus concretely on one character after the other. Melodrama's claim is not that the world is infinite, but rather that we cannot definitely or unambiguously say anything about it. In brief, melodrama makes an *indefinite judgment* regarding the world; it stops short of stating whether or not it actually exists. The genre betrays a profound distrust of the signifier, which it regards as incapable of vouching for the independent existence of the reality it constructs.

The Ethics of the Absolute All

By denying a constitutive role to prohibition, I do not wish also to deny that ethics is an important topos of melodrama. Melodramatic plots are typically supposed to revolve around issues of morality, of virtue and vice, and the quandaries that attend the disappearance from the modern world of objective, commonly held standards of the good. The stereotypes of innocent, pre-Raphaelite virgins and fiendish rakes who take advantage of them are evidence that melodrama, like wrestling,[13] is concerned with specularizing justice in a world which is unsure what justice should look like. And like wrestling, melodrama manages this less by fixing it so that virtue always wins out as by amplifying the gestures of suffering, that is, by installing the moral law *a contrario,* by making plainly legible its transgressions and its transgressors. But this description fits some examples of the genreearly stage melodramas, Charles Dickens, D. W. Griffithbetter than others. Later, more realistic melodramas, which are not given to these moral polarizations, do not fit the description as well. While suffering is still rawly exposed in them, their links to the early forms are not at all obvious. More needs to be said about these links. What allows us to think these two moments as instances of the *same* genre? On what basis can we claim that they participate in the *same* ethical problematic which is defined, I would agree, by the collapse of an objectifiable good? I will offer an answer to these questions via a discussion of one of the most debated scenes from one of the later examples of melodrama, the final scene of *Stella Dallas,* a tearjerker of the first order.

Here, for those who have not seen it, is a summary of the plot: Stella, an energetic, ambitious, working-class woman, marries the rather dull, upper-class Steven Dallas. Soon after, they have a child, a girl, and Stella begins to devote all her attention to her, attending less and less to Steven. The couple become alienated from each other and start to live apart. Eventually Steven reencounters his former fiancée, a woman more suited to him, temperamentally and socially. Believing her daughter will be better off with her father and this woman whom he plans to marry, Stella pretends that she has decided to pursue interests other than motherhood and absents herself from her daughter's life. In the final scene, the daughter's wedding day, Stella shows up in the street outside the apartment where the ceremony is taking place and, unobserved by anyone inside, gazes through the window as the vows are pronounced.

The question on which most analyses of the film hinge is this: how are we to account for the rhapsodic look on Stella's face and her jaunty gait as she turns away from the scene of the wedding and walks toward the camera? Two quite different accounts mark the extreme points of the debate. According to one, what lights her face and lightens her step is spectatorial pleasure, she is suffused with a reflected glow from the happy image she sees through the window. This glow, however, comes at a cost; Stella has had to make herself a blank screen to receive it. She has, through her self-sacrificethat is, by surrendering her daughter, or more exactly, disappearing from her daughter's lifemade herself anonymous. [14] A second interpretation focuses not on this sacrifice, but on the fact that the look of triumphant pleasure adorns a face *turned away from* the window; it argues that this look indicates Stella's jubilant detachment from the world. She has finally said good-bye even to her spectatorial attachment to it.[15]

These two readings, seemingly at odds, are united on certain points. Both view Stella as exterior to the epithalamic world on view through the window, whether her exteriority is read as an *exclusion* she is tricked by society into accepting or as a *detachment* she freely elects. That is, whether she is thought to surrender her daughter and her own pleasure in order to be merely vicariously absorbed into the world or to leave the world behind in order *not* to surrender anything, Stella and her world are presented as antinomic. My own view would impeach both claims. I will argue instead that the final scene presents us with *a world that includes Stella* and, further, that this is an extraordinary accomplishment.

Let me focus a while longer on Stella's position as spectator. Most critics have noted a parallel between the final scene and an earlier one in which Stella, on a movie date with her future husband, Steven, watches spellbound as a love scene unfolds on the movie screen. The equation of these two scenes has led critics to associate Stella's pleasure not with her own *involvement* with a romantic love, but with her *viewing* of it. In other words, Stella has been

observed to haveas Lacan said of Doraa certain "passion for identifying herself with all the sentimental dramas . . . , of sustaining behind the scenes everything that can pass for passion, but which is not her affair." [16] Her pleasure is connected to her position outside the scene, not in it.

Stella's passion is, in psychoanalytic terms, hysterical. To the hysteric the fact that the father is a "man without means," that he is impotent, is never disguised. She is acutely aware of it, as all her constant complaints, stormy refusals and bitter objections will testify. Yet she is not content simply to complain; like the beautiful soul, she always takes an activeand ingeniousrole in securing her own dissatisfaction. If she cannot find in the whole wide world a man who can measure up to her expectations, well, then, she will make one up. The hysteric, Lacan has said, "makes the man." Knowing that her father is impotent with Frau K., Dora cleverly arranges it so there is at least an appearance of his amatory potency. Yet in order to stage this little theater of satisfaction, she has to keep herself unsatisfied, disgusted with the whole mess. She thus subtracts herself not only from the immediate tawdry quadrille in which everyone wants to embroil her, but from the whole pathetic bourgeois milieu in which she is condemned to live. Distancing herself from her world, the hysteric eroticizes her solitude while acting as puppeteer of an erotic coupling elsewhere.

Few would object to accepting this as a description of Stella's structural position as spectator. My only innovation is to suggest that it accounts, in some sense, for more of the film than has been supposed. This description's explanatory power extends well beyond the parallels it perceives between the scene at the movies and the final scene. Let me explain: early in the film we are presented with an image of Stella reading a newspaper which reports the breakup of Steven and his fiancée, Helen, after the suicide of Steven's father. The faces of the severed couple are seen over the spectatorial shoulder of a demonstrably interested Stella. Now, a surface reading of this shot would see it as the moment at which the scheming Stella hatches her plot to snare Steven, to escape her working-class existence by seeking security in the arms of an upper-class man. But the framing of the shot and the fact that it is not only Steven's image but Helen's as well that is pictured in the paper demand that we place this scene alongside the other two in which Stella is seen gazing at romantic couples. What information does the newspaper impart to the sentimental Stella? It tells the story of a ruined father who had, he thought, no other option than suicide and of a son so broken that he could not sustain his relation with the woman he loves; in short, it gives further evidence that her social realityupper as well as lower classesis littered with weakened men. Nothing prevents us, thenin fact the entire working out of the plot confirms our suspicionsfrom reading Stella's response in a scheme much more complex than the one the surface

reading allows. From the beginning, I am arguing, what Stella ultimately aims at is not her own union with Steven, but the salvaging of his relation to Helenin other words, the forming of a couple from which she would be excluded.

It is only by recognizing that it is this *hysterical* fantasy which is at issue in the film that we can make sense of otherwise incomprehensible details. We see, for example, almost nothing of Stella's marriage to Steven. At the first possible (screen) moment, that is, after the birth of their daughter, Stella turns away from Steven to embrace her child. If Stella were simply the fun-loving, adventurous spirit critics have taken her to be, this would be intelligible only as a terrible miscalculation. As she herself says later and in various ways, "I don't get any fun out of a good time anymore. All the time I'm out, I'm thinking of her . . . and I just want to get back to her," or: "Lollie uses up all the feelings I've got and I don't have any left for anyone else." In turning toward Laurel, Stella turns to embrace not life but isolation; she retreats from the world into a fantasy of self-sufficiency.

As the regrets come in one by one while mother and daughter await the arrival of birthday party invitees, the shrinking of their world becomes painfully palpable. It is as if we were witnessing the progressive vanishing of any outside, while the two women are abandoned to their solitude. One might object that this is a condition that Stella endures rather than courts, but the film offers contrary evidence. The train ride which precipitates the onslaught of civilized refusals is undertaken immediately after Laurel's teacher asks Stella to allow her daughter to go on a trip to Boston. At the moment she is threatened with the loss of her daughter, Stella uncharacteristically leaves her to enjoy a rare moment of pleasure outside her home. On the train she and her déclassé friend, Ed Munn, engage in some harmless fun by putting itching powder on their fellow passengers. This provokes the censorious gaze of the passengers, primary among them the teacher who proposed taking Laurel to Boston.

Two points should be noted. First, her railway antics end up *protecting* Stella from the threatened loss of her daughter. Second, the censorious gaze Stella solicits is marked as *blind*. Since the film's audience is first made privy to the innocence of these anticsthe platonic nature of Stella's feelings for Ed is made explicit in the scenethe passengers' subsequent misreading of them as vulgar erotic display is clearly undercut. We know what this playful behavior looks like to the passengers and we know that they are wrong. In other words, the film contains a denunciation of the snooty upper-class gaze and does not offer it, as other critics have wrongly insisted, as a privileged point of view. Our position as audience is then the hysterical one, distanced from and critical of the social milieu that cannot afford Stella a place.

This is a good point to return to a more general discussion of melodrama

and my promise to elucidate the relation between its early and late forms. First, it is necessary to reconsider the avowed relation of melodrama to the modern problematic of ethics, wherein an objective standard of the good can no longer be employed. A difficulty arises with any psychoanalytic intervention into this area, since psychoanalysis has failed to deliver an adequate account of the woman's relation to ethical judgment, Freud himself going so far as to claim that the girl's psychical trajectory from castration to Oedipus impairs the development of any "moral sensibility." As a result of the priority of her castration, he reasons, the girl ends up locating power outside herself, in a father or some substitute, rather than in herself. She does not, then, readily feel the force, the strength of the superegoic demand that comes from within. [17]

Now, it seems to me that ethical judgment has too long and too narrowly been associated with superegoic might, with a sadistic voice that bespeaks a terrifying and threatening power. The problem may be that ethics has been thought from the side of the male, whose castration is felt as a threat that imposes a limit. The voice of ethical demand was thus conceived as the demand to transgress this limit, to burst the bounds of his world in order to become the all-powerful agent of his own life. It may be necessary, however, to privilege the woman to arrive at an adequate notion of ethics. Starting from her position, it is possible to argue that our ethical vocation is better conceived not in terms of *might,* but in terms of *magnitude*.

As I argued earlier, since the girl's castration takes place without the father's intervention, that is, without the imposition of a limit, the symbolic into which the woman enters appears to her flawed in a different way than it does to the man. For her the symbolic fault resides in the fact that the absence of a limit robs the world of its solidity, its reality. She is obliged to assume a skeptical attitude to symbolic, or social, reality, which can only appear to her to be somewhat false, a mere semblance. She is, of course, correct in her suspicions, for, unable to dredge up a signifier for her, the symbolic *is* a bit of a sham. The ethical imperative calls upon the woman to respond to this inauthenticity of the symbolic, which prevents a stable, believable world from forming. Melodrama, for its part, not only exposes us to the unfoundedness of the world, it also presents a particular kind of ethical response to it. It attempts to redress the particular symbolic failure it acknowledges by making up for the lack that causes it. That is, it responds to the absence of limit by imposing *imaginary* limits. This response is not characteristic, however, of woman as such, but of a particular type of womanthe hysteric.

Hysteria, defined as an ethical attitude, is the attempt to "cure" symbolic inauthenticity by means of the imaginary. Freud's dictum, "hysteria condenses," is a more pithy way of saying that the hysteric is especially prone

to the sort of synthesizing or schematizing we connect with the philosophical imagination. [18] Confronted with the very real inadequacies of phallic *jouissance,* the insufficiency of ardors that stumble and cool before obstacles, that go endlessly astray, confronted with the monotony of a passionless succession of events, the hysteric takes the reins of her world by constructing imaginary resolutions, that is, by imposing limits via a comprehensive, imaginative seizure of events. All the static tableaux, the schematic and stereotypical polarizations of characters, the *voix du sang* plot twists by which improbable discoveries of previously unknown blood relations bring disparate events to a sudden and climactic halt, all these well-known elements of early melodrama, I would claim, result from the violent imposition of imaginary boundaries on a symbolic that presents itself as pure succession and that will not allow itself to be otherwise grasped. The imagination brings into being a passionate world, but it does so by spatializing time, freezing it in tableaux constructions. Like Dora who stood for two hours before the Sistine Madonna, the hysteric attempts through her picturing imagination to hold back the relentless and lackluster progression of time.

What we see in early melodramas are the effects of the limits imposed by imagination: the spatialization of time. If these effects have largely disappeared from later, more realistic melodramas, this is because emphasis later shifts from these effects to their causes. Limits can be imposed, the world can be comprehensively seized only because the hysteric purchases this comprehension with her being. In other words, the condition of the world thus constituted is that the hysteric never step foot in it. As I indicated earlier in speaking of Stella, the hysteric *makes herself the limit* of the world she brings into beingand she does so precisely by subtracting herself from it. What we find in later melodramas are what we might call "narratives of retreat," in which the heroine (or hero) subtracts herself in order to give birth to a consistent social order, to narrative resolution and clarity. *Stella Dallas,* as I have so far described itas a narrative of Stella's refusal to join the worldfits into this category.

But the hysteric's imaginary attempts at resolution create flimsy structures, as anyone familiar with melodrama knowsand they are marked as such. The schematizations of early forms are rigid and scarcely credible and the narratives of self-sacrifice common to the later forms still index the deep inadequacies of the social world they depict. This makes sense when you realize that the hysterical solution intends not to *erase* the hysteric so much as *mark her erasure* in order to hold open the possibility of some eventual recognition of her. If events pass by in an endless series, this is because they pass her by; what makes the series of her life's events a *mere* series is their inability to signify her, to count her as part of them. The melodramatic tales of innocence misrecognized, virtue unrewarded, secrets taken to the grave

relate over and over again *that* something is *not written* in a symbolic too inadequate to do so.

Even the distribution of knowledge in these narratives signals this hysterical manipulation. The hysteric not only retards time but, through a characteristic precipitousness, leaps ahead of it to find her pretty pictures temporally wanting. The evidence of this? Her superior knowledge, which leaves every would-be master behind in his understanding. In melodrama, typically, this hysterical structure determines the superiority of the audience's knowledge over that of the characters. Characters constantly find out too lateif at allinformation and truths we already know. [19] The imaginary world of melodrama, always a step or two behind us, is constructed *not* as ideal, but as fundamentally lackingin knowledge, among other things. This faultfinding, however, works not in the service of some feminist revolution, but in the service of the ideal of masculine potency, which is maintained in this way as a possibility held out, on the horizonif only the diegetic world would catch up with the hysteric, who constantly bounds over it. In making up and flaunting her romantic, imaginary scenarios and her various flashy imagesincluding images of her own bodyshe also flaunts, then, their stagey, cardboard character, the fact that behind this excess of visibility she remains invisible. Stella's "excess visibility" must be understood in these terms. Whether or not she knows how to dress is not the point of *Stella Dallas* (which gives contradictory evidence on this question); the point is rather that she always dresses or makes up a body image so as to deceive the Other's gaze. Traipsing across the manicured lawns of the country club where she is staying with her daughter, Stelladressed improbably not only in too many frills but in a fur stole that is entirely inappropriate for the warm weather that allows everyone else to go without wrapsdoes not expose her true, carefree and whimsical being, as the commonplace reading would have it, but, rather, calculatedly *cloaks* her being, guards its mystery, behind this vulgar display.

But now that I have outlined ways in which *Stella Dallas* conforms to the definition of melodrama I propose, I want to reverse myself to say: it does not. That is, *Stella Dallas* is not a typical melodrama in that at the end Stella is shown to succeed where the hysteric, in celebrating failure, fails. Typically, I have been saying, the melodramatic heroine exiles herself from society; standing (literally or metaphorically) alone in the rain and cold, she insists on making her own body give mute testimony to all of society's failures. From the first melodramas to *The Bridges of Madison County*in which Francesca Johnson's dying wish is that her body not be buried, not be sacrificed to family and social rituals, but that it instead be allowed, as ashes, to pursue beyond death the very icon of her masculine idealit is the (usually female) body which resists society's clutches and submits itself as the very proof of its powerlessness. In the face of the uncertainties, ambiguities and disappointments which society offers her, the hysterical/melodramatic heroine

chooses the certainties of a body in retreat from and thus untarnished by social encroachments and constraints. For this belligerent refusal to sacrifice her unsanctioned enjoyment, she sacrifices everythingall her claims *within* societywhich in turn serves to justify her complaints that she gets nothing out of it, that it constantly fails to take account of her, to write her into its contracts.

There are several reasons why this description cannot be made to fit the final sequence of *Stella Dallas*. The comparison between the ending and the earlier scenes of Stella's gazing at couples breaks down because in the final scene, we are presented not with Stella's absence, but with her presence; in the final scene something positive reveals itself, something shows. Helen, Steven's fiancée, first alerts us to the difference the last sequence will introduce. Commenting on the letter sent by Stella in which she pretends to be too preoccupied with other things to bother with her daughter, Helen asks, "Couldn't you read between those pitiful lines?" because, of course, *she*Helenhas. *Stella Dallas* is different from ordinary melodramas because in the end it stops representing the impossibility of representing an ideal world in which Stella, too, would have a place; it ceases to represent the contingent eventsSteven's arrival home just when Ed Munn happens to be there, Laurel's teacher's chance witnessing of Stella's anticsthat function as the fulcra on which the hysteric balances her lack of faith and registers instead a successful encounter, a meeting between Stella and her world.

Rather than the usual lack of recognition, this film invites us in the end to share, "between the lines," some symbolic recognition which takes place between the characters. This "answer of the real," we could call it, is indicated not only by Helen's words, but by her gesture of opening the curtains in the room where the wedding is to take place. Rather than viewing this scene of passion across the neurotic barrier which, in earlier scenes, Stella set up between herself and the scene she viewed, we, as spectators, enter here into the scene first and look out as if to invite Stella in. Though she, in fact, remains outside, though the ceremony takes place unmindful of her presence, or proceeds as if the curtain were never opened, she is no longer excluded from it, but absorbed into it.

If the hysteric's response to symbolic impotence is in some sense an understandable solution, it is not the best one. While it makes clear how unsatisfactory the status quo really is, it is itself impotent. It leads only to skepticism regarding what we can expect from a flawed society or to a naive voluntarism about our possibilities of escaping from it, and often both at once. When I suggested earlier that the woman's ethical vocation should be rethought in terms of magnitude rather than might, it was because magnitude is the solution that actively succeeds where the hysteric falls into political irrelevance. The distinction I invoke between magnitude, or the absolute

all, and might, or the absolutely powerful, is taken from Kant's theorization of the two modes of the sublime. Although he wrote as powerfully as anyone ever has about the ineluctable limits of the symbolic, Kant was not a skeptic; he did not choose the path of the hysteric. Confronted with the same sort of impasse or symbolic failure that the hysteric so keenly observesthat is, with the impossibility of constructing a totality, a world, that would include the singularity which the hysteric makes her sole causeKant sought in his theory of the sublime some evidence of our ethical nature, some evidence that these limits did not ultimately constrain us, but that we could freely act *in* the world to alter it. And even though such an infinite totality (or universe of singularities) is impossible both as an *idea*infinity and totality being mutually exclusive termsand as an *image*since every image sets boundaries that can in the next moment be outstrippedthat is, though there was no question of his succeeding in finding an idea or image that would resolve the impasse, Kant did find the evidence he was looking for: in the positive feeling or sensation of the sublime, in the "*frisson* that . . . flashes through the body everywhere there is life in it," [20] in the experience of an exalting satisfaction. *Is it not this sensation that flashes through Stella Dallas's body?* Is it not this euphoric feeling which lights her face and lightens her step? My suggestion is that it is.

As a response to this particular impasse of the impossibility of the world, the sublime sentiment records the subjective "decision" to treat symbolic insufficiency not as an occasion for skepticism, but as a call to act. What Kant says is that the sublime sentiment marks the fact that the subject has resolved the impasse by means of the idea of *magnitude,* of an *absolute all,* a measure that is beyond measure, a grandeur that exceeds every conceivable greatness, because it gives measure its measure, it *gives* greatness its size. How is this possible; how is it possible to conceive a greatness beyond every conceivable greatness? Or a universal, a world, that would not efface the singularity of one's innermost being? Is this not, as Kant himself said and we repeated, impossible both as an idea and as an image? The answer Kant gives is that this idea does not present itself in the form of an *object of thought,* with definite boundaries and specific content, but as a *mode of thinking,* a way of proceeding in the face of the symbolic insufficiency reason confronts. This idea puts thought in the frame of mind to heed the imperative of reason: reason as if it were possible to construct an infinite world, a world that would include every singularity of being, every historical specificity. Nothing else makes sense to reason. To put it another way, the idea of magnitude obliges us to take the failures of reason (or, we could say, of our social reality) as signs of its unfinishedness, its lack of completion, and thus as that which invites us to continue to inject specificity into our thought, to continue thinking, in short. The idea of magnitude of which Kant speaks might also be appropri-

ately termed *love*. In the final session of *Encore,* his seminar on female sexuality, Lacan speaks of the act of love as a kind of fantasmatic bridging of what is otherwise absolutely unconjoinable. Just as Kant had first pinpointed a structural impasse and then seemed to reverse himself by proposing a way beyond it, so here Lacan suggests that the obstacles that always derail the signifier (something never stops not writing itself) dissolve in love, which captures something that would otherwise be lost. So, too, does *Stella Dallas* break through the impasse it had set up; where formerly it had been a narrative of sacrifice, it suddenly becomes a narrative of love. Throughout the film Stella has sacrificed everything to keep herself and her daughter outside the circuit of symbolic exchange. Her righteous acts of sacrifice sustained her lack of faith in a society she refused to inhabit. At the film's close, however, Stella's strategy has shifted; she has sacrificed her strategy of sacrifice to adopt a different, an ethical strategy that I hesitate to name: love. Isn't this the same old story; isn't this the way women are always devalued, by assigning them some secondary, nurturing role to play? An ethics of love, an ethics of care, what's the difference? First, as I have plainly said, I am not advocating a separate ethics for women, distinct from that which belongs to men, but a definition of ethics that is made visible through an examination of the woman's position. Second, the conception of love I am endorsing must not be confused with others that would see it either as an ecstatic merging of the self with another or as some morbid fascination with the otherness of the other. Nor is love an illusion that disguises the failure of sexual relation. That is, love is not a matter of sacrificeof the self to the One, the self to the Other, or sex to the fiction of relation. [21]

In order to avoid these confusions, then, I prefer to speak of the subject's ethical vocation as that of the *absolute all,* that is, I prefer to give it this Kantian name, even as I attempt to link it to Lacan's most succinct definition of love: *love is giving what one does not have*. Not giving something one has, therefore, not sacrifice, but giving something that did not exist prior to its being given. *Love gives the absolute all,* that is, it allows us to go beyond the limited or incomplete world of phallic *jouissance,* in which singularity is annulled, by announcing that there *is* another *jouissance,* there is something beyond this incomplete world. If Lacan chooses to retain the negation, to say as he does that in love "something does not stop writing itself," this is because negation and repetition are the very marks of the symbolic. Lacan's formulation means, then, that in love some part of the real is linked to the signifier, some part of the real is formalized. The symbolic itself comes to comport this real excess. This does not mean that everything is finally said, that absolutely all is uttered in the language of love. What is voiced is something like a command or a kind of carnal cry: "More!"[22] This cry does not mark some lack of coincidence between the symbolic and the real, but

their fleshy/formal join. Yet the cry is not a statement, it does not describe the absolute all, a universe without exception; it is an imperative to speak. It enjoins us to say all, to speak of every singularity, without exception.

If I am inclined to read the ending of *Stella Dallas* in terms of this idea of the absolute all, it is not only because of the look of exaltation on Stella's face or the way Helen's words and gestures seem to inscribe a response of the real. In an "answering shot," the camera, too, inscribes such a response. Gazing out through the uncurtained window, Helen tells Laurel that she is sure that if her mother knew about the wedding, nothing in the world would keep her away. The next shot is a high angle shot that extends Helen and Laurel's look outside; it is into this shot that Stella enters, as if she were meeting their gaze. The policeman who stands guard by the window is a signifier of the law and thus of negation. Yet rather than representing a barrier that Stella cannot cross, by seeming to accompany more than actually preventing her movements, he comes to stand for a certain necessity, for the negation that marks the part of being to which the symbolic, in occasional sublime moments, gives us access.

These readings are all ultimately sanctioned by the fact that Stella does turn away from the window and walks toward the camera. In each of my viewings of the film, this last section has always seemed startling. If Stella were satisfied merely to be an outside observer of her world, the final image of her would not be this one; the film would have concluded with her gazing up at the window. A surfeit of space unfolds as she walks toward the camera. This is not a narrative space, that is, it cannot be captured for the narrative. Because it unfurls before our eyes unclaimed by narrative action, it has a presence that strikes us as more immediate than the other spaces of the film. Having given up the anonymity which she used to tuck beneath her flamboyant appearance, Stella, striding across this space, seems to give herself *in the present* her own autonomy. This autonomy is not the fictional sort, such as the one the hysteric, for example, might locate outside the law; it is actual. That is, it works *within* the law to make it responsive to the uniqueness of one's being.

The sentiment of the sublime has been described as the feeling of community. This is too abstract, and it finesses the definition of community. *Stella Dallas* helps us to formulate a more concrete definition: the sublime is, "I am part of the whole." I, in my incommensurable uniqueness, form part of the world. By turning away from the window, Stella does not turn her back on the word as such, but on the imaginary limits she used to set on it in order to dream of some ideal father, charming Don Juan, or perfect daughter, who could complete her. Stella no longer has to wait in vain for some savior to appear on her impossible horizon; she has positioned herself in a here and a now and it is from this point that her hopes spring.

Notes

1. Quoted from Diderot by Michael Fried in *Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and the Beholder in the Age of Diderot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) 78.

2. Peter Brooks, *The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama and the Mode of Excess* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976) 16.

3. Fried, *Absorption and Theatricality*.

4. Jacques-Alain Miller, "Suture (elements of the logic of the signifier)," *Screen* 18:4 (winter 1977–78).

5. See "Sex and the Euthanasia of Reason," the final chapter of my book *Read My Desire: Lacan against the Historicists* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994).

6. Gilles Deleuze, "The Perception-Image," in *Cinema 1: Movement-Image,* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 74.

7. Elizabeth Ermarth, "The Narrator as Nobody," in *Realism and Consensus in the English Novel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) 65.

8. Ibid., 76.

9. Pier Paolo Pasolini, "Comments on Free Indirect Discourse," in *Heretical Empiricism,* trans. Ben Lawton and Louise K. Barnett (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988) 87.

10. Ibid., 85; see also Pasolini's "The Cinema of Poetry" in the same volume.

11. Brooks, *The Melodramatic Imagination,* 5.

12. Ibid., 2; Deleuze, 76.

13. I am here trying to call attention to the fact that the argument by Peter Brooks is similar to the one Roland Barthes makes in "The World of Wrestling," in *Mythologies* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972).

14. One thinks particularly of Linda Williams's fine essay, "Something Else Besides a Mother: *Stella Dallas* and the Maternal Melodrama," in Christine Gledhill, ed., *Home Is Where the Heart Is* (London: British Film Institute, 1987).

15. See, for this argument, William Rothman's subtle and perceptive essay, "Pathos and Transfiguration in the Face of the Camera: A Reading of *Stella Dallas,*" in his *The "I" of the Camera* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988).

16. Jacques Lacan, *Le Transfert: Séminaire VIII* (Paris: Seuil, 1991) 289.

17. Catherine Millot makes this relation clear in "Paradoxes du surmoi," a chapter of her book *Nobodaddy: L'hystérie dans le siècle* (Paris: Point hors ligne, 1988). This entire book lucidly states the relation of the hysteric to limits; I have borrowed many of its formulations for my argument here.

18. Sigmund Freud, "Psychoanalytic Notes upon an Autobiographical Case of Paranoia," *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* XII (London: Hogarth Press, 1957) 49.

19. For a discussion of melodrama and the spectator's knowledge, see Steve Neale, "Melodrama and Tears," *Screen* 27:6 (November–December 1986).

20. This phrase actually comes from Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of*

View (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974) 33; it is quoted by Jacob Rogozinski in "The Gift of the World," in *Of the Sublime: Presence in Question* (Buffalo, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1993) 153.

21. After reading this paper to several audiences and constantly confronting objections to my positive invocation of love, I was pleased to discover an essay by Alain Badiou, "Qu'est-ce que l'amour?" in *Conditions* (Paris: Seuil, 1992), in which he lists these three conceptions of love in order to disclaim them. He calls them the fusional, the oblative, and the superstructural or illusory concepts of love. Badiou's own definition is quite similar to my own; and he also links love to the woman.

22. Jacques Lacan, *Encore: Séminaire XX* (Paris: Seuil, 1975) 132. "More" is, of course, one possible translation of *Encore*.

Eleven
Chantal Akerman:
Splitting

Janet Bergstrom

Chantal Akerman*: Jews have a big problem with the image: you do not have the right to make images. When you do, you are transgressing because images are linked to idolatry.*

Jean-Luc Godard*: And transgression interests you?*

Chantal Akerman*: Yes, probably. But that's why I try to make a very distilled cinema where there are no images that are, let's say, sensational. For example, instead of showing a "public" event because it is sensational, full of lots of things, I tell the story of something small nearby.* [1]

Displacements

Chantal Akerman told interviewers long ago, and then repeatedly as time went by, that the film she really wanted to make would tell the story of the diaspora of the Eastern European Jews. She referred to this dream-project when she was asked about her new films, films that might have been (and may yet prove to be) stepping stones to its realization, for instance, *Les Rendez-vous d'Anna* (1978). Following that film's release, Jean-Luc Godard conducted an interview with Akerman (an unusual occasion) in which he wanted to find out what, exactly, she did when she started working on a film (she began with writing, he began with images). To answer him, rather than talk about her current project, she preferred to describe "another film I have dreamed about making for a long time, a film about the diaspora."[2] Akerman wanted to adapt Isaac Bashevis Singer's two-volume historical novel, *The Manor* and *The Estate,* which moves back and forth from the Polish countryside to Warsaw and New York as it follows several interconnected families from 1880 to 1930, particularly in relation to the Jewish religion and traditions or their abandonment.[3] In response to Godard's persistent questions about images, she said she was searching for photographs so that she could visualize, for instance, the transition to industrialization in Poland. Already, though, she planned to reorient the novel to fit her own preoccupations: "The whole beginning of the book takes place in the country. But I don't like

the country, I don't like to film it. So I told myself: 'I am going to put that into a city because I love to film cities.' I love to film them because they have lines." [4] Horizontals, verticals: Akerman imagined the story in terms of the balanced, measured framing that is the cornerstone of her visual style. Nonetheless, we can see from an excerpt of the script published as late as 1987 that her film still followed the novels rather closely.[5]

Akerman had to wait nearly ten years before she could make a film about the world that Singer had portrayed. Her opportunity came when she proposed his name for a French television series on writers. To research her project for a half-hour documentary, she went to New York City, since Singer, a Polish Jew, had lived there for many years in exile. Unexpectedly, she stumbled upon "a lost world; in a way, a phantom world"[6] through hundreds of letters from immigrants published regularly since 1910 in an advice column in the Yiddish newspaper still in circulation, *The Jewish Forward*.[7] "In the letters readers sent in, they talked about their lives and their problems. There was news, there were jokes, what we call 'Jewish stories.' I was really moved by all these stories. I rewrote them in my own way, fictionalized."[8] She wanted her film to commemorate this disappearing tradition and give it new life, "to show what [Singer] had always written about: memory, identity, the force of life and the torment of exile."[9] To do this, she managed to obtain financing for a feature film, *Histoires d'Amérique: Food, Family, Philosophy* (1988).

Histoires d'Amérique is an ambitious, unconventional, avant-garde film about displaced Eastern European Jews trying to make a new life for themselves in New York City, their struggle to hold onto a sense of community and tradition, and their confusion about so many things in a nontraditional new worldillness, poverty, death, love, infidelity, longing for families left behind or who had sent them to America hoping to keep them out of harm's way. This was the first of Akerman's films explicitly devoted to the subject of Jewish experience. It is presented in a very different manner than Singer's novelistic pageant. Europe is never seen: the film is set on the fringes of New York City, whose skyline we can see across the water in the night behind the characters. As in so many of her films, Akerman used realistic description to build up a stylized, distanced narrative:

> To begin with, I had located a lot of places in New York to shoot in. Then I realized that everything was there in an abandoned area under the Williamsburg Bridge. Grass was growing in half-decayed houses as if nature were taking over. It gave me the feeling of science fiction rooted in the past. The New York sky is in the background, there were smells, noises, bits of color, graffiti, the very essence of the city. I was in a natural setting, but at the same time in a kind of studio: immediately, fiction was born from reality.[10]

Histoires d'Amérique does not have a traditional plot, but rather, as its name suggests, it is a collection of stories. The structure is permutational, familiar

from Akerman's early films which were heavily influenced by the experimental cinema she discovered when she lived in New York in the early 1970s. A series of self-contained vignettes succeed one other: characters stand outdoors, beautifully lit in the night, and address the camera directly, framed by horizontal and vertical lines that give the visual compositions great stability in counterpoint to the stories of uncertainty we hear. One after another, characters tell us about events in their lives and feelings that weigh on them, as if they have a great need to tell someone. The film audience takes the place of the newspaper reader or the psychoanalyst, giving the characters the opportunity to speak before a neutral listener, that space of release that Akerman has referred to and portrayed elsewhere, in other forms. [11] Many of them are young people who talk about situations that their parents' generation might have experienced. They are often worried and don't know what to do, especially without their families to help them, their loved ones still in Europe who may be in danger themselves and with whom they cannot communicate. Akerman calls it a face-to-face movie. These monologues alternate with traditional Jewish jokes, which seesaw back and forth between two people. The film is a testimony to the survival of a community built on shared traditions, since at the end, the characters we have seen separately meet each other at an outdoor dinner. Immediately they find common ground for animated conversations about subjects that, for them, are inseparable: their families and their philosophies of life. Food, family and philosophy form the basis of an idyllic shared community that did not experience, does not know about and therefore does not have to bear the weight of remembering the Holocaust in Europe.

When asked by Godard ten years before *Histoires d'Amérique,* after describing her dream of adapting Singer's novel, Akerman replied that, yes, she felt different from others because she was Jewish.

> Godard: How are you different?
>
> Akerman: I don't know, but there is a lot of common ground when I talk to other Jews. We understand each other.
>
> Godard: But do you live according to rituals or traditions? A minute ago, you said that you feel a real shock when you see Jews today who still wear the traditional hats, beards and side curls. Doesn't this shock also come from the fact that they claim to be fundamentally different from everyone else?
>
> Akerman: But the people who are like that aren't claiming anything, they are following rituals they cherish and believe in, that are necessary for them. It isn't a question of claiming something from outside, it has to do with their relationships with each other.
>
> Godard: But what about you? You don't follow these rituals, do you?
>
> Akerman: No, I have lost them.
>
> Godard: Does it disturb you to have lost them?

> Akerman: No. The strange thing is that I lost them without really having lost them completely. A lot still remainsin ordinary things, in everyday life, in love.
>
> Godard: And that's what you are going to try to look for in your film.
>
> Akerman: That's what I am going to try to look for, yes. What interests me about this novel is that there was a community that followed its rituals, that had doubts about a god, but doubts from within their belief: they didn't really call their belief in God into question, and so they didn't really question the rituals either. But from the moment they let go of one tiny thing, everything went, they were left to their passions and everything was permitted. [12]

Histoires d'Amérique is a fulfillment of the wish that modernity and exile had not destroyed the small rituals of Jewish daily life that had been passed down through the generations, before, in other words, everything had come undone. As Akerman explained elsewhere, she wanted to make the past come alive: if these stories could be told, so could others.

Akerman has described her relationship to her own Jewish heritage as a complicated one. Her parents were displaced Polish Jews who settled in Belgium. They had experienced things they needed to put behind them. Akerman repeated in many interviews that her mother was in a concentration campAuschwitzand she never said a word about it. One explanation for this silence, Akerman told the Belgian journal *Cinérgie,* was that survivors wanted to spare their children. But their repressed histories returned to haunt the second generation. "When I look at my parents, I see that they are very well integrated here. They have strong ties to Belgium. For them, coming here represented an extraordinary opportunity. They don't have this feeling of exile. In a way, they have made a break with their past. They have found a place here. They have found something more easily than I have. I think that we represent the generation in which the repressed comes back. That's why we have problems. Instead of asking questions about the past, they had to rebuild their lives. And because they didn't tell us about that past, because they didn't pass it down to us, what they did pass down was precisely this sense of uprootedness."[13] Both the jokes and the stories Akerman constructed based on the immigrants' letters served as a way into this unknown territory of memory, a way to replace the void of not knowing. "People of my parents' generation told themselves: we are going to spare them the story of what happened to us. Because they did not transmit their histories, I searched for a false memory, a kind of imaginary, reconstructed memory rather than the truth, as if I had no access to the things that were true . . . . The jokes are part of the same thing, like a return of the repressed. The jokes were told because life was unbearable. It was a way of denying what happened through mockery, keeping it at a distance

by making fun of it. When history becomes unbearable, you stage your own misery and laugh at it." [14]

Akerman created memories to mourn and to make up for the disruption of a continuous oral tradition passed down from one generation to the next, most importantly from mother to daughter. Almost all her films seem motivated by this need, but *Histoires d'Amérique* is the closest she has yet come to making her film of rememoration. Akerman explained when the film was released: "Instead of knowing my history by having it passed down directly from parents to child, I had to go through literature and read, for instance, Isaac Bashevis Singer. But that wasn't enough. His memories could never really be mine. So, from one kind of borrowing to another, I am constituted by imaginary memories. [*Histoires d'Amérique*] is a work of memory, but invented memories."[15]

Splitting

Akerman described her distinctive approach to the cinema at the time *Les Rendez-vous d'Anna* was released by drawing an analogy with Franz Kafka's "deterritorialization," his "minor literature," as it had been presented a few years earlier by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.[16] Her references to their reading of Kafka, as well as her own observations about Kafka's diaries and letters, provide a way to understand better two unique aspects of Akerman's films: first, her "voice" or her position of enunciation, which is presented to the audience as if it were split; and second, her unusual waypartly conscious and partly unconscious, I believeof focusing her films on her personal experiences. These two aspects are related, for personal experience is presented through Akerman's mode of enunciation as if an invisible wedge had been forced between the represented experience and the audience: we look onto a stylized world that would not be called autobiographical in the usual sense, as we have observed of *Histoires d'Amérique*. While Akerman uses some aspects of autobiography, she keeps her own life at a distance.

"Keeping a distance," in fact, is a key element of Akerman's cinema, more fundamental than a formal or stylistic strategy. Rather, Akerman's distance can be understood as a manifestation of the unconscious process of splitting. Freud's theory of the splitting of the ego in defense, in self-protection, is central to French psychoanalyst André Green's discussion of the psychical phenomenon he calls "the dead mother."[17] Green's analysis, along with Deleuze and Guattari's perspective on Kafka, sheds a great deal of light on recurring "dominants" (to use Eisenstein's term) in Akerman's films, for instance, why and how they return so often to a mother/daughter relationship. What is striking about the many interviews Akerman has given over

the past thirty years is not the autobiographical element per se, but rather how few of the events from her past she has spoken about repeatedly. It is that important nexus we need to look at more closely.

Akerman has protested almost every specialized category that critics, sympathetic to her work, have wanted to assign. On the other hand, she has described herself many times in a specific way that stresses her Jewish, non-French identity and her cinematic genealogy. For instance, in an interview with *Le Monde* in 1976 occasioned by the huge critical success of *Jeanne Dielman,* she stated succinctly: "I am Belgian, a Polish Jew by origin. I was born in Brussels June 6, 1950 and I wanted to make films very young, after I saw *Pierrot le fou* by Godard." [18] She has spoken freely about the decisive experience of living in New York in the early 1970s, the importance for her of the American feminist movement at that time, and the minimalist/structural films of Michael Snow and Andy Warhol. And she has repeated that her mother was in a concentration camp during the Second World War and that she would never talk about it.

Deterritorialization is explained by Deleuze and Guattari in the process of describing Kafka's work as an example of a "minor literature": "The problem of expression is staked out by Kafka not in an abstract and universal fashion but in relation to those literatures that are considered minor, for example, the Jewish literature of Warsaw and Prague. *A minor literature doesn't come from a minor* language [my emphasis]; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language. But the first characteristic of minor literature in any case is that in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization."[19] Later the authors summarize: "The three characteristics of minor literature are the deterritorialization of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation."[20] Akerman spoke about her unusual form of cinematic expression, that is, her mode of enunciation*how* she presents a fictional worldas well as what she chose to represent, in terms of this conception of minor literatureas if hers were a minor cinema inside the dominant cinemaprecisely because minor literature was strongly marked by Deleuze and Guattari as Jewish and nomadic, and because they posed the problem in terms of expression and its process. An essential part of their definition had to do with a form of enunciation in which personal expression also represents a collective state. This is precisely how she saw herself with respect to a much larger familial and Jewish history. She spoke about the correspondence she saw between Kafka's solitude as discussed by Deleuze and Guattari and her own sense that solitude was a necessity, even though she was still connected with others, as she put it, through "death, love, politics, sexuality, economics, the social."[21] Anyone who has seen Akerman's films will recognize solitude as one of their most haunting characteristics.

Akerman's films demonstrate aspects of splitting which one would not

need to describe in psychoanalytic terms; usually they are noted as formal features. But I would argue that they have an underlying unconscious motive. One of the aspects of Akerman's visual style that has been remarked on most is the rigorous separation she maintains between two distinct visual fields: the field occupied by the camera, which Akerman has often equated with her own view, and the field observed by the camera. There is an absence of the conventional shot/reverse shot rhetoric of editing and a skilled use of ellipsis which emphasizes the separation of these two spatial fields, which are also fields of meaning, and concomitantly the observational quality of Akerman's films. A choice has been made, and is continually manifested as we watch her films, *not* to draw the viewer into the psychological depths of dramatic verisimilitude. Instead, there is a split between what is represented and who is doing the representing, and an emphasis on the fact that the *énoncé* (statement) and the enunciation (the act of making the statement) are not the same thing. This strategy may be borrowed from avant-garde structural film, yet Akerman inflects it in many different ways in her obsessive, unique presentation of people, "characters" (sometimes fictionalized, sometimes not) who have a dense, suggestive opacity that cannot be penetrated. They are very often in transition or waiting, which is why train stations, bus stops, subways, hotels and elevators are so frequently seen, places where people are observed staring into space, alone in their own world of thought. The same thing may be seen in her films which have a strong documentary component where many people, who never become characters as such, are watched intently from the position of an outsider whom they do not know and who is, likewise, never shown on-screen, such as *Hotel Monterey* (1972), *News from Home* (1977) and *D'Est* (1992), as well as in her films with actors, such as *Les Rendez-vous d'Anna* or *Jeanne Dielman,* and *Toute une nuit* (1982), which combines documentary and fiction.

Transitional, "in-between" or split characteristics are common denominators of Akerman's films and take many forms. *Histoires d'Amérique: Food, Family, Philosophy,* with its half-French, half-English title, takes place in America but the characters are Jewish immigrants portrayed nonnaturalistically by actors. Their stories belong to the generation of their parents, but the actors are dressed in rather contemporary, possibly vintage, clothing so that temporality hovers somewhere between past and present. The film takes place in New York, but not quite, since the city forms the visual backdrop for the scenes. In many of Akerman's films there is a disjunctive use of language, usually "in between" English and French, as when the "daughter" in *News from Home* reads (in voice-over) her mother's letters in English with a strong French accent while we watch a succession of images of New York that never include either mother or daughter. A back-and-forth movement between Europe and New York, the old world and the new, is a key structural as well as imaginary component of a number of her films, not only

News from Home and *Histoires d'Amérique:* it is the premise of her latest feature, *A Couch in New York,* (1995), in which an American man, a psychoanalyst, exchanges apartments with a bohemian French woman. *Les Rendez-vous d'Anna* follows a young woman filmmaker as she travels from Germany to Belgium to France, with strong linguistic and territorial markings, for instance, when the two German men she encounters speak to her in French, a language foreign to them, as if Anna's impassive, non-German presence allowed them to give voice to personal thoughts welled up inside for which they had no outlet and which they recite as if they were confessions to themselves. Akerman's films also crisscross a line between commercial and independent cinema, as we would describe the situation in the United States, and they mix fictional and documentary modes of presentation, as in *D'Est* and the installation piece based on it, and most of her New York films, such as *News from Home, Hotel Monterey* and *La Chambre* (1973).

Splitting, in its psychoanalytic sense, allows for incompatible realities to co-exist in the subject's ego at the same time, unknown to each other. The "splitting of the ego," according to Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, is "a term used by Freud to denote a very specific phenomenon which he deems to be at work above all in fetishism and in the psychoses: the co-existence at the heart of the ego of two psychical attitudes towards external reality in so far as this stands in the way of an instinctual demand. The first of these attitudes takes reality into consideration, while the second disavows it and replaces it by a product of desire. The two attitudes persist side by side without influencing each other." [22]

On the one hand, Akerman's films represent what Brenda Longfellow has beautifully called "love letters to the mother."[23] Because *Jeanne Dielman* is devoted to observing a mother in what Akerman has described as loving detail; because in *News from Home* we can hear Akerman's voice as she reads letters sent from Belgium that express a mother's love and worry for her daughter, far away in New York; because in *Les Rendez-vous d'Anna,* the young filmmaker, Anna, makes her mother the center of her journey and her sole confidant about an unexpected night of love with another woman, when she thought about her mother; and because in *The Golden Eighties* (1985) Delphine Seyrig, named Jeanne as in *Jeanne Dielman,* is a survivor from the camps, appearances to the contrary, whose past emerges like a flash, unwelcomed, when she encounters the man who nursed her to health thirty years earlier, whose tenderness she finally responds to as lie evokes his memories of the days when she gradually got better, how he was afraid to tell her he had fallen in love, his pain when she suddenly disappeared because, Jeanne can only now explain, she did not know her benefactor loved her, and she now learns that he never married, that he remained devoted to her memorybecause of all this, we can agree that Akerman is effectively representing the mother's storyher own mother's storyas a love

story. It is also, we might hypothesize, a gift of reparation, as if the daughter's films are meant to give her mother a better past to make up for the terrible one she managed to endure.

Akerman's first film, *Saute ma ville* (1968), on the other hand, could be seen as an expression of needor a demand for attentionfrom the child. It is characteristic of children of survivors of the Holocaust that they understand from the earliest age that they must not express aggression against their parent (or parents) because the survivor has already suffered too much. The children are treated as if they are little adults who must protect their parents, who are often self-absorbed, for instance, in warding off possible dangers. The child's expressions of need must be suppressed and even punished, if not physically, then with blame and guilt. But because aggression is a basic component of any child's psychological makeup, it must surface somewhere, in some form. Often in children of survivors this aggression is directed against the self. But it can also be expressed in disguised acts of revenge against the parent, who has ignored or seemed to be indifferent to the child's need for the expression of parental love. **24**

Saute ma ville is a love letter of sorts, but it is also, I believe, a cry of despair and a claim for attention. Made in 1968 when Akerman was eighteen, she described this short film in the following way: "You see an adolescent girl, 18 years old, go into a kitchen, do ordinary things but in a way that is off-kilter, and finally commit suicide. The opposite of *Jeanne Dielman:* Jeanne, that was resignation. Here, it is rage and death."**25** The adolescent is played by Akerman and she chooses gas to kill herself. The film is structured around ordinary actions, like a series of gags with a rhythmic, chaplinesque side bespeaking mimicry. The humor, or the horror, emerges from the way that simple actions that take place in a kitchen, like cleaning, veer out of control. Many reviewers described it as a comedy. After leaving the film in the photo lab for two years because she didn't have any money and she had lost confidence, Akerman finally asked the director of the lab if he would watch it and give her his opinion: "it made him laugh," she said, "he liked it a lot."**26** Yet the girl "sings" (la-la-la-la) with the intrusiveness of a troubled child vying for attention, especially as she becomes louder and more persistent. The way the actions get off-track is also disturbing, because every action looks like the externalization of psychic implosion.

If this film represented a cry of distress, a plea for attention and perhaps an unconscious expression of transgressive aggression, it was not the only one of Akerman's to do so. The project she proposed to the Belgian Ministry of French Culture for funding after *Saute ma ville* was, Akerman said, about "a little girl, eight years old, who poisons her parents and is happy about it."**27** (Her proposal was turned down.) She described a film she made later in New York, called *New York, New York bis* (1984), a film she subsequently lost, as follows: "I made that film for myself. I arrive in New York, I

go to see a friend, I arrive at her apartment, she says, 'Wait, I'm a bit busy,' then I kill myself." [28] Aggression directed outward, aggression directed against the self. *Saute ma ville* ends with a romantic gesture that I do not believe has an equivalent in any of Akerman's later films. Holding a large bouquet of flowers down at her side, the girl sets fire to a letter (which we can't read), turns on the gas, and leans over the stove, awaiting the explosion that blows up not only "her city," but first of all herself. A sound-image carried over from this scene opens *Jeanne Dielman:* before the names appear in the opening credits, the loud sound of a jet of gas can be heard, a sound we hear later every time Jeanne turns on the kitchen stove.

When Akerman talks about how *Pierrot le fou* made her want to make films, she says that it was because Godard's film made her feel, viscerally, that films could tell a story in a completely different way than anything she had seen before. When I asked her if she would comment more specifically about *Pierrot le fou,* she replied, "When I saw *Pierrot le fou,* I realized that [film] was a language as strong as literature can be. I have not seen *Pierrot le fou* since that time, so I cannot even say what it was that had such a big effect on me, but it was like talking to one person."[29] Indeed, *Pierrot le fou* is permeated with extreme romanticism which ends in suicide. Jean-Paul Belmondo and Anna Karina cannot communicate; she continually makes up stories to hide the fact that she is lying to him and she will not reveal to him the *framework*the *meaning,* which is never clarified for the audience eitherwhich compels them to be endlessly on the move, and for her to keep leaving him. When finally he kills her in a confused gunfight, he loses his reason for living. Alone, he brushes azure blue paint across his face, wraps a belt of dynamite around his head, and blows himself up.

Another way to approach Akerman's cinematic mode and her repeated representation of subjects such as the mother in *Jeanne Dielman* and the child, whether the son in *Jeanne Dielman* or more explicitly the daughter, who appears in *Saute ma ville* and elsewhere, is by way of André Green's clinical description of "the dead mother." Green classifies "the dead mother" phenomenon among problems of mourning. Although he does not mention survivors from the camps or their childrenthe example he gives is a mother who has lost another child and withdraws from the one who surviveshis description fits this situation perfectly. Green's subject is not, he specifies, "the psychical consequences of the real death of the mother, but rather that of an imago which has been constituted in the child's mind, following maternal depression, brutally transforming a living object . . . into a distant figure, toneless, practically inanimate. . . . Thus, the dead mother, contrary to what one might think, is a mother who remains alive but who is, so to speak, psychically dead in the eyes of the young child in her care. . . ."[30] The child feels not only the effects of the loss of its mother's love, but also

"the loss of *meaning,* for the baby disposes of no explication to account for what has happened." [31]

> After the child has attempted in vain to repair the mother who is absorbed by her bereavement, which has made him feel the measure of his impotence, after having experienced the loss of his mother's love and the threat of the loss of the mother herself, and after he has fought against anxiety by various active methods, amongst which agitation, insomnia and nocturnal terrors are indications, the ego will deploy a series of defenses of a different kind. The first and most important is a unique movement with two aspects: *the decathexis of the maternal object and the unconscious identification with the dead mother*. The decathexis, which is principally affective, but also representative, constitutes a psychical murder of the object, accomplished without hatred. One will understand that the mother's affliction excludes the emergence of any contingency of hatred susceptible of damaging her image even more.[32]

If in *Jeanne Dielman* Akerman is attempting to portray this dead mother, to identify with her and to reconstitute her by giving her a violent outlet, enabling her to externalize, to act, in *Saute ma ville* Akerman shows the despair of a failed attempt to communicate: in Green's words, "failed complementarity." "The other aspect of the decathexis is the primary mode of identification with the object. This mirror identification is almost obligatory, after reactions of complementarity (artificial gaiety, agitation, etc.) have failed. This reactive symmetry is the only means by which to establish a reunion with the motherperhaps by way of sympathy. In fact there is no real reparation, but a mimicry, with the aim of continuing to possess the object (whom one can no longer have) by becoming, not like it but, the object itself."[33] The flowers in *Saute ma ville* give way to manic activity. The girl's disturbing dance with her mirror image, with its weird enthusiasm, corresponds to Green's description of the child's "frantic need for play which does not come about as in the freedom for playing, but under the *compulsion to imagine,* just as intellectual development is inscribed in a *compulsion to think* . . . ."[34] Other actions tilt into manic behavior without affect and without their expected practical objective, cascading out of control after beginning by mimicking a housewife's domestic routine: cooking, washing dishes, cleaning the kitchen floor, polishing shoes. Many of these specific activities will be reworked in meticulous detail in *Jeanne Dielman*. The girl's dislocated activity is the despairing prelude to self-entombment (taping shut the door and windows), aggression against the self, suicide.

And now we find a new context for the theme of solitude, which we previously encountered in connection with Kafka. "Arrested in their capacity to love, subjects who are under the empire of the dead mother can only aspire to autonomy. . . . Thus, solitude, which was a situation creating anxiety and to be avoided, changes sign. From negative it becomes positive. Having

previously been shunned, it is now sought after." [35] The reason it is now desired is because at least the child is able to control itself in solitude, having failed to control the object of its desire. *Jeanne Dielman* is the flip side of *Saute ma ville,* all control. Green describes the unconscious motive for the overriding need to maintain order in such cases:

> One also always finds the use of reality as a defense, as though the subject feels the need to cling to the presence of what is perceived as real and untouched by any projection, because he is far from sure of the distinction between fantasy and reality, which he does his utmost to keep apart. . . . When reality and fantasy are telescoped together, intense anxiety appears. Subjective and objective are confused, which gives the subject the impression of a threat of psychosis. *Order must be maintained at any price* [my emphasis], by a structuring anal reference which allows splitting to continue to function, and above all keeps the subject away from what he has learned of his unconscious . . . .[36]

What better description could one find of the stakes of this silent, distant and impassive mother's rigidly ordered daily routine and the consequences of its breakdown, which is also her own? As Akerman described her film in 1976, "I decided to show that this order that seemed so 'natural' could disintegrate with one speck of dust . . . Jeanne Dielman's defenses had snapped, and I wanted to show that in terms of the strongest sign of her oppression: prostitution, because things often explode through sexuality. Jeanne Dielman kills to recover her order, not because she has become conscious of something."[37] It is striking how much Green's description of the dead mother shares with one of the principal syndromes of survivors of the Holocaust and their children.

Akerman insists that she is not writing her own autobiography on the screen, yet in her interviews there is slippage between fiction and memory when it comes to her descriptions of the mother/ daughter relationship. Here are a few examples referring to *Jeanne Dielman,* selected from so many others that span Akerman's entire body of work.

> I remembered, at first fleetingly but then very strongly, that I wanted to dedicate this film to my mother: that I wanted to say "for my mother Natalia, called Nelly" and that I immediately repressed this idea out of modesty or censorship . . . and I also tell myself that if I had not known my mother, I would not have made this film, which is, however, absolutely not the portrait of my mother.[38]

> I began with several very precise images from my childhood: watching my mother at the stove; my mother carrying packages. . . . Why did I chose a beautiful woman? Because men always think that women inside their homes are ugly. My mother is beautiful.[39]

> I think that Delphine [Seyrig] carried with her all the roles that she had played up to then, that is to say, the cinema. . . . If I had used my mother, it would have only been my mother. [40]

> At the beginning, I thought I was simply telling the story of three days in the life of a woman, but later I realized that it was a film about occupying time to avoid anguish, to keep moving so as not to think about the fundamental thing which is being. There is also the contradictory aspect of these movements; when you see that woman, you tell yourself that it isn't possible; at the same time, I am talking about a woman I love who is my mother. All that is very ambiguous; for a lot of people, Jeanne Dielman could represent the ideal woman, but when you look at the life of an ideal woman, it is unbearable. The camera is not positioned to say that, but it is so obvious. For me this is very old; it goes back to images of my mother when I was a child.[41]

In a frequently cited passage from an interview with *Camera Obscura,* Akerman emphasized her love for the mother's gestures which she observed with so much care in *Jeanne Dielman,* and how her framing allowed her to express her love and respect for domestic movements that are normally elided in movies. Moreover, she emphasized her position as passionate onlooker.

> You *know* who is looking; you always know what the point of view is, all the time. It's always the same. But still, I was looking with a great deal of attention and the attention wasn't distanced. It was not a natural lookthat doesn't exist anyhow. For me, the way I looked at what was going on was a look of love and respect. Maybe that's difficult to understand but I really think that's it. I *let* her live her life in the middle of the frame. I didn't go in too close, but I was not *very* far away. I let her be in her space. It's not uncontrolled. But the camera was not voyeuristic in the commercial way because you always knew where I was. You know, it wasn't shot through the keyhole.[42]

Perhaps we can agree with Akerman, and yet suggest another meaning as well.

Akerman's point of view and framing in *Jeanne Dielman* also represent her control over the mother's every movement. This is, perhaps, the will to omnipotence that motivates every child, but in Akerman's case, given the history of her mother's refusal to speak about what must have seemed to be the most important thing in her past, the stakes were bigger. Not only was the framing of the film precise, every movement was rehearsed meticulously and adjusted to fit Akerman's conceptions. "With *Jeanne Dielman,* [Delphine Seyrig and I] rehearsed everything in the morning with video. It was very precise: how much time it takes to do this or that. . . . We would look at the tape together, and I would say, 'Don't come so close, do that faster, get closer when you do that, do this more smoothly, do that more forcefully.' Then it was ready. We shot from noon to seven."[43] Between *Saute*

ma ville and *Jeanne Dielman,* ambivalence is expressed in a twisting form that follows Green's description: I love you. You don't show love (affect) for me. I will imitate you and repeat your suffering. Or else: I should have died, or I will die for you, to substitute for your unspeakable pain. Or, again: I cry for help, for recognition of my subjectivity and need in my own (the daughter's) right. What could be more like Green's description of the dead mother than Jeanne Dielman's zero-degree of affect for her son, who does not even seem to notice because of his own abjection, except that he observes every single change in his mother's demeanor and routine as soon as it begins to come apart? Jeanne's inability to cope with the baby her neighbor deposits with her, the baby that shrieks every time Jeanne picks it up, is yet another sign. (We never see the second mother; her voice, from off-screen, belongs to Akerman.)

Here and there over the years, and often in connection with *News from Home* and *Les Rendez-vous d'Anna,* Akerman has talked about her identification with the wandering Jew. This is one of the instances in which she refers to Kafka. When asked about nomadism in her films and their relationship to her life in an interview with *Cahiers du Cinéma* in 1977, Akerman's response brought out another aspect of her identification with Kafka, Jewish identity and deterritorialization, namely, the absence of a homeland, a consequent supervaluation of the family, the anguish that the child who doesn't have children to promise the continuation of the family causes the parents, and the guilt leading to neurosis that is created in turn in the child.

> In fact, [nomadism is about] finding your place, and I don't know if you ever find your place. . . . I think that goes back to my Jewish origin. As far as I'm concerned, I don't have a relationship with any place. I am no more Parisian than Belgian. If I have to feel that I'm from somewhere, it would undoubtedly be New York more than anywhere else. I don't have the idea of land. Just the opposite. I have the feeling that I am not attached to the land under my feet. Among Jews, precisely, the family replaces everything. It is an even greater source of neurosis than elsewhere, if that's possible. For example, the fact that I have not yet had any children terrifies my father. The fact of not perpetuating [the family] is very serious. When one has no land, one must have children, or something like that. You only have to read Kafka: the relationship he had with his father, the fact that he didn't have children and that he wasn't married was absolutely unbearable for him and for others (in any case, he believed that it was for his father). [44]

At the beginning of *Histoires d'Amérique,* as we watch New York from a ship approaching the city (recalling *News from Home,* which ends with the New York skyline receding seen from a ship that is departing), we hear Akerman's voice reciting a traditional story: "A rabbi always passed through a village to get to the forest, and there, at the foot of a tree, and it was al-

ways the same one, he began to pray, and god heard him. His son too always passed through the same village to get to the forest, but he could not remember where the tree was, so he prayed at the foot of any old tree, and god heard him." Each generation remembers less, yet they are still able to perpetuate the tradition: "His great-grandson did not know where the tree, nor the forest nor the village were, not even the words of the prayer, but he still knew the story, so he told it to his children, and god heard him." She adds: "My own story is full of missing links, full of blanks, and I do not even have a child." [45] Whence the anguish of knowing that she is not continuing her own family, except, as Frieda Grafe has suggested,[46] by way of her films, especially this film which is dedicated to preserving the memory of the experiences of Eastern European Jewish families such as her own. Akerman passes down whatever remains of the traditional prayer for help, which also reiterates that there is someone to hear, a listener who, perhaps by that fact alone, gives comfort.

Akerman's video installation, *D'Est: Bordering on Fiction* (1995),[47] responds to this earlier work on reconstituting memories, replacing pain and death with life, however uncertain. In the first section of this three-part installation, *D'Est* (Akerman's documentary film) is projected continuously; in the second section, twenty-four eye-level television monitors are grouped in threes, each monitor repeating several shots from the film in a continuous loop; and in the final section, we find ourselves in a dark space with a single monitor on the floor showing the edge of a city at night, only the tops of buildings and street lights, with much of the frame black. The two previous sections had no commentary or characters, but real spaces and people which the spectator could watch or not as an outsider. Here a partial image is accompanied by Akerman's voice reading a text, along with Sonia Wieder-Atherton's somber cello accompaniment. In effect, Akerman, some twenty years later, is restating her reply to Godard about the relationship, for her, between filmmaking and writing, so profoundly have these ideas motivated her vocation. She begins by reading the Old Testament interdiction against creating images (Exodus 20:4–5). Following her reading of the commandment in Hebrew and French, she begins her own text by invoking writing, not images: "To write a film before even knowing it. To write to make an ending. . . . You always have to write when you want to make a film, even though you don't yet know anything about the film you want to make."[48] But the reason for writing is to capture images, in this case, for *D'Est,* which will take her through East Germany, Poland and Russia, places that recall her mother and father and the generations before them and before the Jewish diaspora. Akerman's position of enunciation is in between the interdiction and the creation of images, unable to forget the one, unable to stop the other. Near the end of her recitation, she describes images that haunt her, despite her attempts to replace them.

> Old images of evacuation, of people with packages marching in the snow toward an unknown place, of faces and bodies placed side by side, faces that vacillate between a strong life and the possibility of a death that would come to strike them without their having asked for anything.
>
> And it's always like that.
>
> Yesterday, today and tomorrow, there were, there will be, there are right now even, people that history (without a capital H) comes to strike. People who are there, rounded up in herds, waiting to be killed, hit, or starved; people who walk without knowing where they're going, in a group or all alone.
>
> There's nothing to be done; it's obsessive and it obsesses me. Despite the cello, despite the cinema. The film finished, I say to myself, *that's* what it was: once again, *that*. [49]

Part of the dilemma Akerman evokes is explored by the French historian Pierre Nora in his monumental, collaborative work on history and memory, *Les Lieux de mémoire,* in which the history of the present is considered in terms of places and shared traditions that contribute to a living sense of France as a nation, including its pluralities and regionalisms, from Joan of Arc to the monuments commemorating Verdun to the Tour de France.[50] In his introduction, Nora singles out the special problem that the Jewish tradition poses for the "art of memory," because according to that tradition, history is absolutely tied to memory in such a way that it represents an impossible psychological debt. "In [the Jewish] tradition, which has no other history than its own memory, to be Jewish is to remember that one is such; but once this incontestable memory has been interiorized, it eventually demands full recognition. What is being remembered? In a sense, it is memory itself. The psychologization of memory has thus given every individual the sense that his or her salvation ultimately depends on the repayment of an impossible debt."[51] Perhaps this is the nexus of Chantal Akerman's work that carries such a strong resonance, and not only for those in the Jewish tradition.

Notes

1. Jean-Luc Godard, "Entretien sur un projet: Chantal Akerman," *Ça Cinéma* no. 19 (1980): 12, 13. The interview is dated April 27, 1979. Translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.

2. Ibid., 9

3. Ibid., 10.

4. Ibid., 15.

5. "Le Manoir," by Chantal Akerman in collaboration with Eric de Kuyper, *Cahiers du Cinéma,* supplement to no. 400 (October 1987) [n.p.].

6. Jean-Luc Outers, "*Histoires d'Amérique,*" *Cinérgie* (February 1989): 6.

7. Ibid.

8. Jacqueline Aubenas, "Histoires d'Amérique," *Art & Culture* (January 1989): 56–57.

9. Ibid.

10. L. H. [Luc Honorez], "L'oncle d'Amérique de Chantal Akerman," *Le Soir,* February 15, 1989.

11. Asked about the hitchhiking sequence in *Je tu il elle,* Akerman insisted on the importance of the neutral listener: "I think it is much more important to talk about your life than to be driven somewhere. You have to realize what it can mean for someone to have the opportunity, all of a sudden, to have an apparently neutral listener, someone who enters your life for a brief moment and disappears afterward." Danièle Dubroux, Thérèse Giraud and Louis Skorecki, "Entretien avec Chantal Akerman," *Cahiers du Cinéma* (July 1977): 38.

12. Godard, "Entretien sur un projet," 11–12.

13. Outers, "*Histoires d'Amérique,*" 6.

14. Ibid.

15. Jacqueline Aubenas, "Souvenirs imaginaires," *Contreplongée* nos. 15–16 (November 1989): 31.

16. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature,* trans. Dana Polan (1975; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986). For Akerman's statements, see, for example, "Présentation," in her *Les Rendez-vous d'Anna* (Paris: Editions Albatros, 1978) 17–24; Michèle Levieux, "Du coté de chez Kafka" and "Propos de Chantal Akerman," *Ecran 78* (December 1978): 45–51.

17. André Green, "The Dead Mother," in his *On Private Madness* (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1986). In establishing the background for his contribution, Green makes reference to "authors who have laid the foundations of what we know about the problem of mourning: Freud, K. Abraham, M. Klein. But in particular the more recent studies of Winnicott, Kohut, N. Abraham, Torok, Rosolato" (143).

18. Louis Marcorelles, "Comment dire chef-d'oeuvre au féminin?" *Le Monde,* January 22, 1976.

19. Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka,* 16.

20. Ibid., 18.

21. Levieux, "Propos de Chantal Akerman," 45–51.

22. Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis,* trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (1967; New York: Norton, 1973) 427–29.

23. Brenda Longfellow, "Love Letters to the Mother: The Work of Chantal Akerman," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* 13:1–2 (1989) 73–90.

24. Martin S. Bergmann and Milton E. Jucovy eds., *Generations of the Holocaust* (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Helen Epstein, *Children of the Holocaust* (New York: Putnam's, 1979).

25. Claude-Marie Tremois, "Chantal Akerman: 'A partir de quelques images de mon enfance,' " *Télérama,* January 14, 1976, 66–68.

26. Dubroux et al., "Entretien," 39.

27. Jacques Siclier, "Un film hyperréaliste sur l'occupation du temps," *Le Monde,* January 22, 1976, 15.

28. Unpublished interview with the author, June 27, 1989 (English in original).

29. Ibid.

30. Green, "The Dead Mother," 142.

31. Ibid., 150.

32. Ibid., 150–51.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., 152.

35. Ibid., 156.

36. Ibid., 158.

37. Interview with Blandine Jeanson and Martine Storti, "Dans le plan des pomme de terre, il y a tout," *Libération,* February 9, 1976.

38. Gérard Courant, "*Jeanne Dielman,*" *Cinéma Différent* no. 1 [1976:]: 1.

39. Tremois, "Chantal Akerman," 66–68.

40. Marie-Claude Treilhou, "Chantal Akerman: La vie, il faut la mettre en scène." *Cinéma 76* (February 1976) 89–93.

41. Jeanson and Storti, "Dans le plan des pomme de terre, il y a tout."

42. Camera Obscura editors, "Interview with Chantal Akerman," *Camera Obscura* no. 2 (fall 1977) 114–21 (English in original). See also my essay on *Jeanne Dielman,* which precedes the interview.

43. Unpublished interview June 27, 1989.

44. Dubroux et al., "Entretien," 34–42.

45. English in original.

46. Frieda Grafe, "Die drei Fs der jüdischen Hausfrau: *Histoires d'Amérique,* ein neuer Film von Chantal Akerman," *Süddeutsche Zeitung,* February 2, 1990.

47. See the fine exhibition catalogue, *Bordering on Fiction: Chantal Akerman's D'Est* (Minneapolis: Walker Art Center, 1995).

48. Chantal Akerman, "La vingt-cinquième image," *Trafic* 17 (winter 1996): 57–58.

49. From the audio-text for the installation, cited in Catherine David, "*D'Est:* Akerman Variations," *Bordering on Fiction,* 63.

50. Pierre Nora, ed., *Les Lieux de mémoire,* 7 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1984).

51. Pierre Nora, "Between History and Memory: Les Lieux de mémoire," *Representations* 26 (spring 1989): 16. This essay was originally published as the introduction to *La République,* the first volume of *Les Lieux de mémoire*.

Contributors

Janet Bergstrom teaches Film Studies at UCLA. A founding editor of *Camera Obscura* from 1974 to 1992, she co-edited "The Spectatrix," a special issue of *Camera Obscura* (1989), and *Close Encounters: Film, Feminism and Science Fiction* (Minnesota, 1991). She has published essays on feminism, film theory and textual analysis, and on French and German émigré film directors. Her book, *Like A Road Movie: Chantal Akerman's Nomadic Cinema,* will be published by Indiana University Press.

Joan Copjec is the author of *Read My Desire: Lacan against the Historicists* (MIT, 1994) and the editor of Jacques Lacan's *Television* (Norton, 1990), *Shades of Noir* (Verso, 1993), *Supposing the Subject* (Verso, 1994), *Radical Evil* (Verso, 1995) and *Giving Ground: The Politics of Propinquity* (Verso, 1998). She is Professor of English, Comparative Literature and Media Study and Director of the Center for the Study of Psychoanalysis and Culture at the University of Buffalo, and editor of the S series for Verso Press.

Alain de Mijolla, M.D., is a Training and Supervising Analyst at the Société Psychanalytique de Paris, and President of the Association Internationale d'Histoire de la Psychanalyse, which he founded in 1985. His books include *Les visiteurs du moi, fantasmes d'identification* (Belles Lettres, 1981) and *Les mots de Freud* (Belles Lettres, 1982; revised and expanded 1989). He was the founding director of the *Revue internationale d'histoire de la psychanalyse* from 1988 to 1993. Since 1988, he has directed the collection "Histoire de la Psychanalyse" for the Presses Universitaires de France.

Mary Ann Doane is George Hazard Crooker University Professor of Modern Culture and Media at Brown University. She is the author of *The Desire to Desire: The Woman's Film of the 1940s* (Indiana, 1987) and *Femmes Fatales:*

Feminism, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis (Routledge, 1991). She is currently working on a book on technologies of temporality in modernity.

David James Fisher, Ph.D., is the author of *Romain Rolland and the Politics of Intellectual Engagement* (California, 1988) and *Cultural Theory and Psychoanalytic Tradition* (Transaction, 1991). He has published in the fields of European intellectual and cultural history, with a special interest in twentieth-century France, the history of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic cultural criticism. He practices psychoanalysis in Los Angeles, where he is a senior faculty member of the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Institute and a training and supervising analyst at the Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis.

Stephen Heath teaches at Jesus College, Cambridge University. He was a member of the editorial board of *Screen* in the 1970s and early 1980s. His books include *Questions of Cinema* (Indiana, 1981), *The Sexual Fix* (Macmillan, 1982) and *Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary* (Cambridge University Press, 1992). He also co-edited *The Cinematic Apparatus* (St. Martin's Press, 1980) and *Cinema and Language* (University Publications of America, 1983).

Ayako Saito is writing a dissertation on "Melancholy and Cinema" for her Ph.D. in Film Studies at UCLA. Previously, she earned degrees in Psychology (Pathography) at Sophia University, Tokyo and in Film Studies at the University of California at Irvine. She has published essays on psychoanalysis and cinema, on Jean-Luc Godard and feminism, and on feminist film theory, as well as translations of English-language essays, in *Imago, Image Forum, Eureka, Revue de la pensée d'aujourd'hui* and *ICONICS*. She is currently co-editing an anthology on theories of film.

Marc Vernet is Director of the Bibliothèque du Film (BIFI) in Paris. From 1983 to 1999 he taught film theory and history at the University of Paris III. A founding editor of *Iris* and *Cinémathèque,* he is the author of *Figures de l'absence* (Editions Cahiers du Cinéma, 1989) and co-author of *Lectures du film* (Albatros, 1975) and *Film Aesthetics* (Texas, 1999; originally 1983).

Janet Walker is Associate Professor of Film Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She is the author of *Couching Resistance: Women, Film and Psychoanalytic Psychiatry* (Minnesota, 1993) and co-editor with Diane Waldman of the collection *Feminism and Documentary* (forthcoming from Minnesota). Her current project is a book on trauma, history and memory in film and video.

Peter Wollen teaches Film Studies at UCLA. His books include *Signs and Meaning in the Cinema* (Indiana, 1969; revised 1972), which is currently being prepared for a newly revised and expanded edition, *Raiding the Icebox: Reflections on Twentieth-Century Culture* (Indiana, 1993), *Singin' in the Rain* (British Film Institute, 1992), *Visual Display,* co-edited with Lynne Cooke

(Bay Press, 1995) and *Howard Hawks: American Artist,* co-edited with Jim Hillier (British Film Institute, 1996). After co-writing Michelangelo Antonioni's *The Passenger* (1975, with Mark Peploe), he wrote and directed low-budget feature films, at first with Laura Mulvey, such as *Riddles of the Sphinx* (1977), and then solo, *Friendship's Death* (1987).

***Slavoj Zizek** ** is the author of works on philosophy, psychoanalysis and popular culture, including *Enjoy Your Symptom!: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out* (Routledge, 1992), *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology* (Duke, 1993), *The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality* (Verso, 1994) and *The Abyss of Freedom: Ages of the World* (Michigan, 1997). He also edited *Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Lacan (But Were Afraid to Ask Hitchcock*) (Verso, 1992), *Mapping Ideology* (Verso, 1994) and, with Renata Salecl, *Gaze and Voice as Love Objects* (Duke, 1996).

Index

A

Abel, Richard, 21n12

Abraham, Karl, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 36, 52n7, 52n8, 53n9, 90, 237n7, 289n17

Abraham, Nicolas, and Maria Torok, 14, 247n103, 289n17

absorption, 83, 250-53

acrophobia, 206-9, 211, 217, 221

actuality (filmic), 10, 81, 84

addiction, 158, 161-62, 192

affect, 6, 14, 104, 129, 137, 143-44, 146, 148, 201-8, 211, 213, 217, 221-24, 226-27, 231-32, 235-36, 237n7, 237-38n8, 238n9, 238n10, 238n12, 238n13, 238n14, 238n16, 238n18, 239n23, 239n24, 239n25, 240n28, 240n29, 242n45, 244n68, 283, 286;

- and the "dead mother," 15, 232, 283;
- and difference from emotion or feelings, 201-2;
- in film analysis, 6, 14, 89, 201-3, 205;
- Green's structural description of, 6, 202;
- and Lacan, 231;
- and mania, 14, 201, 203-4, 214, 214-17, 239n23, 241n32;
- and melancholia, 204-5, 207, 209, 211, 213, 217, 232;
- and melodrama, 17, 257;
- and mood, 202, 206, 216-17, 221-22, 231, 242n45;
- and paranoia, 14, 201, 204-5, 227, 232;
- and schizophrenia, 203-4, 232

affective configuration, 203-4, 208, 221, 227, 235

affective disorders, 203-4

affective logic, 205, 211, 217, 221-22, 227, 232, 235-36

aggressivity, 106, 108-9, 124n30, 133, 135, 137, 139, 144, 148-49, 158-59, 164, 173, 204-5, 209, 211, 214, 216-17, 226, 246n93, 247n100, 281-83

AI (artificial intelligence), 9, 107

Albarran, Pablo, 166

Alien, 36, 55n27

Althusser, Louis, 39

ambiguity, 101, 107-9, 112, 114, 119, 123n24, 213, 223, 257

ambivalence, 7, 15, 127-28, 141, 148, 211, 285

amnesia, 146, 181

analysand, 26, 35-36, 40, 42, 47, 128-29, 140, 150, 174, 191, 196-97

analyst (psychoanalyst), 1-2, 5-6, 11, 20, 25-26, 30, 35, 39, 40, 43, 45, 50, 51n3, 51n5, 52n8, 53n9, 84, 108, 123n21, 128-29, 132-33, 135-36, 138-41, 143-44, 151n5, 160, 166, 172, 174-75, 189, 191-98, 202, 205, 275, 277, 280

Andreas-Salomé, Lou, 7, 25, 26, 49, 50, 50n1, 51n5, 51n6

Anna O., 141, 173

antisemitism, 11, 133-35, 144, 147-48, 150, 151n8, 164, 168n10, 170n51, 194

Antigone, 37, 48

antipsychiatry, 142

apparatus, 40, 46, 58, 60-62, 64, 67-68, 82, 106;

cinematic, 3, 16, 32, 35, 44, 58,

80, 96, 208;

dispositif, 9, 96-98;

perceptual 29, 65;

photographic, 67, 73-78;

psychical, 26, 29, 52-53n8, 59, 63, 78, 84;

theory, 8, 32, 49;

VR, 104

archive, 4, 6, 9, 57, 82-83, 88-89, 94, 189

Aristotle, 9, 113

Aron, Raymond, 169n30

artificial intelligence (AI), 9, 107

L'Assassin musicien, 25

auditory hallucinations, 222

Austen, Jane, 257

authority, 94, 115, 137, 139-40, 146;

authoritarian,128, 135, 138

autobiography, 15, 29, 53n11, 126, 129, 143, 155, 156, 163, 165, 185n11, 277-78, 284

B

Bacall, Lauren, 166

bad faith, 127, 129, 156

Badiou, Alain, 272n21

"Baker of the Nile" (Samuel White Baker), 167

Balla, Giacomo, 87n27

Ballard, J. G., 8, 96

Balmary, Marie, 182, 185

Barthes, Roland, 2, 271

Baudelaire, Charles, 65

Baudry, Jean-Louis, 3, 20n2

Bellour, Raymond, 3, 14, 34, 88-89, 215, 221, 237n6, 244n64-66, 244n74, 247n106

Belmondo, Jean-Paul, 282

Benayoun, Robert, 194

Benjamin, Walter, 57, 65, 67

Bergman, Ingrid, 241n39

Bergson, Henri, 66, 83-84, 87n37

Bernheimer, Charles, 174

The Birds, 230n31, 244n66, 246n93, 247n102

bisexuality; 92, 130, 146

The Black Diamond Express, 43

Blanton, Smiley, 189

Bleuler, Eugen, 239n22, 239n24, 240n30

blind, 54n16, 93, 131, 136, 252

blind spot, 31, 94, 104, 138

Blue Velvet, 44

A Boat Leaving Harbour, 83

body, 63, 67-68, 73, 77, 91-93, 103, 105-6, 110-16, 119, 123n26, 128, 156-58, 176, 204, 224, 227, 231-32, 234, 254-55, 266-68

Bolitho, William, 155

Bonaparte, Princess Marie, 12, 189, 198n4

borderline, 124n29, 203, 208, 239n25, 243n50

Bordwell, David, 95n3

Bragaglia, Anton Giulio, 87n27

Braun, Marta, 69, 87n23, 87n27, 87n28, 87n37

Breen, Joseph, 178

Breuer, Josef, 132, 134-36, 138, 140, 144-46, 148, 158, 163, 165, 173, 180, 194, 196

The Bridges of Madison County, 266

Brooks, Peter, 13, 249, 250, 255, 258, 260, 271n13

Brunswick, Mark, 12, 189, 198n4

Burch, Noel, 80

Burney, Fanny, 257

Burton, Sir Richard, 167n5

Butler, Judith, 8, 106

Butler, Sandra, 172, 185n3

C

The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, 31

Cahiers du Cinéma, 3, 20n2, 286

Camera Obscura, 3, 285

Cartwright, Lisa, 67

castration, 36, 39, 41-42, 45-47, 106, 124n26, 137, 139, 216, 218, 241n37, 244n68, 252-54, 257, 264

cathartic method, 139, 194, 198

censorship, 12, 88, 93-94, 127, 140, 172-73, 195, 284

La Chambre, 280

Chaplin, Charlie, 8, 44, 101

chaplinesque, 102, 281

Charcot, Jean-Martin, 133, 144, 197

Chevalier, Maurice, 188

child abuse, 6, 161;

sexual, 171-173, 178, 181, 185n4

childhood trauma, 141

chronophotography, 10, 67, 69, 71, 73-80, 86

Clift, Montgomery, 132, 173, 194-96

codependence, 14, 115-16, 124n31

computer, 9, 82, 89, 98, 100-107, 109, 112-14, 117, 120, 123n21

concentration camp, 276, 278, 280, 282

conflict (psychical), 5, 128, 129, 133,

135-37, 140-41, 146, 150, 178, 180, 194, 244n68, 256;

father-son, 133, 194

consciousness, 9, 51n4, 60-61, 65-66, 78, 84, 103, 114, 127, 129, 134, 149, 180-81, 194

A Couch in New York, 280

counter-transference, 138

A Country Couple, 43

crying, 17, 109, 173, 177, 179, 183, 249-50, 252-53, 257, 269-70, 281, 286

crypt, 213, 218, 232, 234-35

cyberspace, 101-4, 106, 108, 110-12, 114, 120, 122n11, 125n27

cyber-subject, 6

D

Dagognet, François, 68-69

Dali, Salvador, 197

Dead Man, 1, 19

dead mother complex, 14-15, 211, 224, 227, 231-32, 234-35, 277, 282-84, 286, 289n17

death drive, 40, 45, 48, 59

de Beauvoir, Simone, 11, 127n4, 129, 131, 157-58, 169n26, 169n30, 194-95

deconstruction:

deconstructionist cyberspace ideologist, 110;

deconstructionist "decentered subject," 104;

"deconstructionist" or New Age celebrations of the liberating potentials of cyberspace, 120

deconstructionism, postmodernist, 101

Deep Ecology, 9, 114-16

defense (psychical), 6, 32, 48, 64, 128, 137-38, 146, 153, 207, 209, 214, 217, 221, 224, 226, 232, 235, 240n28, 277, 283-84

de Gaulle, Charles, 9, 119

de Kuyper, Eric, 288n5

de Lauretis, Teresa, 55n33, 244n59

Deleuze, Gilles, 7, 8, 15, 97, 100, 103, 122n6, 242n40, 242n41, 255, 260, 277-78

delusion, 93, 200, 203, 205, 222, 239n24, 239n25, 240n29, 241n34

dementia praecox, 176, 180, 182

Demeny, Georges, 80

denial (psychical), 83, 107, 158, 175-77, 182-83, 194, 203-4, 215-16, 226, 244n70

depth psychology, 136, 142

Derrida, Jacques, 59, 62, 86n4, 86n13, 123n21, 247n103

Descartes, René, 9, 112, 114, 251

Desnos, Robert, 32, 54

destructiveness, 144, 204, 216, 221, 226-27, 247n102

deterritorialization, 15, 277, 278, 286

Dickens, Charles, 260

Diderot, Denis, 13, 249-50

diegesis, 13, 256, 258

diegetic content, 45

diegetic reality, 45, 116, 258

diegetic space, 13, 257, 258

diegetic world, 259, 266

digital media, 4, 10, 89

digital technology, 9, 122

disavowal, 90, 107, 108, 115, 124n26, 204

discontinuity, 10, 60, 65-66, 75, 77

discourse network, 81-82

disintegration, 124n29;

mental, 108, 201, 214, 236n4, 240n29, 240n30

displacement, 61, 77, 92, 143, 206, 236, 238n16, 247n106

dissemination, 26, 102, 105

dissociated text, 180, 182

dissociation, 12, 181, 240n29

dissociative disorders, 180-81

dominant affectivity, 14, 201, 203

Dora, 37, 130, 132, 137, 185n5, 262, 265

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, 9, 120

Dr. Ehrlich's Magic Bullet, 156

Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler, 53n9

Duchamp, Marcel, 87n27

E

early cinema, 4, 6, 10, 80-82, 84-85;

nascent, 61;

prehistory of, 10;

"primitive," 43

Ebbinghaus, Hermann, 81

ecosystem, 115

ego, 32, 51n4, 53n10, 209, 211, 214, 216, 218, 224, 239n20, 240n28, 241n36, 246n94, 247n100, 277, 280, 283

ego ideal, 129, 149-50, 213

Ehrlich, Dr. Paul, 155

Eisenstein, Sergei, 8, 102, 215, 277

emotion, 31, 41, 59, 89-90, 109-10, 126-30, 135, 138, 143, 148, 186n18, 190, 192, 197, 200, 202-3, 206-7, 211, 223, 227, 236, 238n9, 238n13, 238n16, 238n18, 245n87, 257, 260

Empire of the Senses (L'Empire des sens), 25

Engelman, Edmund, 196

Enigma of the Unconscious (Rätsel des Unbewussten), 27, *28 fig.,* 42

enunciation, 15, 19, 77-79, 287

D'Est, 279, 280

D'Est: Bordering on Fiction, 280, 287

The Estate, 273

ethics, 5, 25, 48, 110, 115, 164-65, 260, 264, 267-69

excess, 13-14, 31, 36, 41, 49, 57-58, 77-78, 85, 98, 106, 115-16, 119-21, 123n26, 124n30, 124-25n31, 128, 144, 195, 203, 215, 242n45, 255, 257-58, 260, 266, 269

existentialism, 127, 129, 135-36, 151n2, 152

existential phenomenology, 164

existential psychoanalysis, 128, 142

F

fantasy, 5, 32-33, 35-40, 44, 46-48, 50, 55n33, 62, 97, 108, 111, 115, 127, 149, 158-59, 162, 171-72, 175-76, 180, 208, 217, 226, 232, 284;

- anamorphic, 9;
- fantasmatic real, 96-97;
- in film studies, 38;
- going through the, 37;
- hysterical, 13, 263;
- manic, 205;
- melancholic, 205;
- paranoid/schizoid, 205;
- persecutory, 223;
- and Schreber, 114;
- a statics *(une statique)* of, 37

fantasy flash, 218, 245n80

fantasy screen, 99

Fantomas, 157

father figure, 133, 143-44, 148, 163, 165, 218;

fatherhood and, 159, 166;

filial piety and, 139, 165-67;

paternal bond and, 163, 165-66

femininity, 35, 157, 163, 254, 258

feminism, 6, 12-13, 15, 20n1, 47, 92, 152n30, 172, 184, 185n5, 244n59, 247n106, 266, 278;

and antifeminism, 184

femme fatale, 8, 100

Ferenczi, Sándor, 25, 26, 51n3, 52n8, 142

fetishism, 6, 33, 42, 90-94, 97, 100, 280

figuration, 6, 8, 13, 27-31, 36, 41-43, 49, 53n10, 53n13, 111

Film About a Woman Who . . . , 256

film noir, 8, 94, 100

Finnegans Wake, 40, 43

Flaubert, Gustave, 127, 137, 256

Fliess, Wilhelm, 12, 130, 144, 146-49, 152n32, 154, 158, 160-65, 168n9, 170n51, 174, 184n2, 193, 196

flight of ideas (in mania), 203, 239n23

Fonda, Henry, 243n57

Foucault, Michel, 8, 100, 237n7

free association, 137, 140-41, 148-49, 163, 197

free indirect discourse, 6, 13, 255-57, 260

Frege, Gottlob, 251

Frenzy, 44

Freud, 6, 11-12, 30, 127, 132, 142, 152n30, 156, 158-60, 166, 171, 172-73, 175, 181-83, 185n4, 185n12, 193-94, 196

Freud, Anna, 132, 166, 190, *191 fig.,* 198n4, 199n14

Freud, Sigmund, 3-12, 20, 21n5, 25-26, *28 fig.,* 28-31, 33, 35-37, 39, 41-43, 49, 50n1, 51n3, 51n4, 51-52n7, 52-53n8, 53n9, 53n10, 61-67, 78-82, 84-85, 86n16, 91, 110, 114, 121, 121-22n5, 126-50, 151n2, 151n16, 153-67, 167n5, 167n6, 168n7, 168n9, 168n10, 168n18, 170n51, 171-75, 180-83, 184n2, 185n4, 185n5, 185n7, 185-86n14, 189-98, *191 figs.,* 198n4, 202, 206, 208, 211, 214, 238n12, 239n20, 239n22, 239n24, 240n28, 241n36, 246n94, 253-54, 264, 277, 180, 289n17

The Freud Scenario, 11, 126-28, 130-32, 135, 141, 149, 151n5, 160

Fried, Michael, 250-51

Friedberg, Anne: and *Close Up,* 52n7

Friese-Greene color film process, 33, 54n21

futurism: Italian, 77

G

Gabbard, Glen O., 252n30, 189, 198n3

Gabbard, Krin, 152n30, 189, 198n3

gaze, the, 6, 13-14, 31, 92, 104, 201, 223

Gidal, Peter, 45

Godard, Jean-Luc, 19, 273, 275-76, 278, 282, 287, 288n1

The Golden Eighties, 280

good faith, 127, 135

Gordon, Colonel Charles George, 167n5

Gore, John and Adelia, 155

Gore, Reah, 155

Grafe, Frieda, 287

Grant, Cary, 214, 245

The Great Dictator, 44

Green, André, 6, 14-15, 202, 204-5, 211, 218, 227, 231-32, 237n8, 238n12, 238n13, 238n14, 239n25, 243n50, 246n100, 277, 282-86, 289n17

Greenacre, Phyllis, 175, 186n18

Greenson, Ralph, 132

Griffith, D. W., 260

Guattari, Félix, 7, 15, 277-78

guilt, 11, 48, 91, 116, 124n30, 129, 137-42, 146-47, 149, 158-60, 163, 164, 174, 188, 203-7, 209, 211, 213, 216-17, 222-23, 227, 247n100, 281, 286

H

Habermas, Jurgen, 9, 121

Hamilcar, 147, 170n51

Hannibal, 147, 162, 170n51

Hartman, Geoffrey, 214, 217, 218, 245n76

Harvey, Robert, 165

hatred, 140, 147-48, 204-5, 211, 232, 283

H.D. (Hilda Doolittle), 8, 52

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 6, 8, 9, 97, 115, 122n8

Heidegger, Martin, 8, 103

Helmholtz, Hermann von, 67-68

Hemingway, Ernest, 156

Hepburn, Audrey, 248n109

Herrmann, Bernard, 206, 243n57

Histoires d'Amérique: Food, Family, Philosophy, 15, 274-77, 279, 280, 286

Histoire(s) du cinéma, 19

Hitchcock, Alfred, 6, 14, 44, 197, 200-201, 204-6, 209, 213, 214-15, 221-23, 234-35, 236n4, 237n6, 240n31, 242n40, 242n41, 242n43, 243n48, 243n49, 245n80, 245n83, 247n102, 248n108, 248n109

Holocaust, 135, 275;

children of survivors of the, 7, 14-15, 281, 284

homosexuality, 129, 139, 163, 171, 196, 246

Hotel Monterey, 279, 280

How It Feels To Be Run Over, 43

Huston, John, 6, 11-12, 30, 127-33, 140-42, 149, 152n30, 155-60, 165-66, 169n26, 171, 175, 185n4, 187n43, 193-96, 199n14

Huston, Walter, 155

hyperactivity, 105, 203, 214, 216

hyperrealism, 104

hypertext, 102-3

hypnosis, 12, 16, 19, 111, 183, 194, 197, 238n13

hysteria, 107, 133, 136, 154, 159, 161-63, 171-72, 185n5, 194, 246n94, 264

I

ideal ego, 106, 111

identification, 33-34, 38, 41-42, 47, 50, 106, 111-12, 124n31, 188, 191, 196, 198, 198n2;

and bisexuality, 92;

and the cinematic apparatus, 35;

and the dead mother complex, 232, 283;

as fantasy-construction, 46-47, 195;

and Hitchcock, 201, 223;

with Jewish identity, 286;

narcissistic, 211;

phallic, 47-48;

and *Psycho,* 223, 245n88, 246n96;

relationship between imaginary projection-identification and symbolic, 109, 111-12;

and the subject, 7, 33-34, 108;

with the symptom, 40, 47;

and *Vertigo,* 209, 216, 243n57

ideology, 3, 7, 21n4, 47, 100, 115-16, 122n13;

as fantasy-construction, 46;

of the subject, 33-34

illegibility, 10, 73, 77

imaginary, 14, 32, 35, 37, 49, 90, 93-94, 101, 106, 109, 111-12, 156-57, 164, 196, 223-24, 227, 240n31, 241n39, 246n93, 253, 255, 264-66, 270, 276-77, 279;

signifier, 3, 5, 8, 20n2, 49, 90, 218

imago, 158, 213, 231, 282

imitation, 9, 100-101, 122n7, 122n8

Imitation of Life, 259

inauthenticity, 259-60, 264

incest, 12, 96, 100, 139, 159, 171-77, 179-84, 184n1, 185n3

"incorporeal" sense-event, 97

indexicality, 68-69, 85, 174

Indiana Jones, 8, 99

infantile, 128, 147-48, 163

infantile sexuality, 159, 174-75

infantile stage, 239n22

infantile trauma, 186n18

inscription, 7, 34, 43, 59-61, 63-64, 68-69, 75, 78, 81, 85, 97, 112, 208

interface, 8-9, 98-99, 101-3, 108, 120, 128

Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels, 8, 103

interpretation, 127, 237n7, 252;

in film analysis, 8, 34-35, 49;

in the Freud scenario, 140, 148-49;

in *Psycho,* 246n96;

in psychoanalysis, 30, 37, 39-40, 192, 196, 254;

and *Stella Dallas,* 261

The Interpretation of Dreams, 3, 12, 59, 130, 147, 154, 160-61, 165, 167n6, 168n7, 168n9, 168n18, 170n51

intersubjectivity, 6, 11, 121, 129, 133, 136, 138, 140-42, 146, 148, 150

intertextual, 180, 182, 205, 231, 236

introjection, 205

J

Jackson, Stanley W., 237n7, 238n9, 239n23, 241n32, 242n45

Jacobson, Edith, 206, 214, 240n30, 243n47

Jameson, Fredric, 9, 114

Janssen, Pierre-César Jules, 71

Jarmusch, Jim, 1

Jeanne Dielman, 15, 278-86, 290n42

Je tu il elle, 289n11

The Jewish Forward, 274

Jews, 11, 129, 133-35, 144-45, 147-50, 154-55, 164, 167, 273, 274-76, 278-79, 286-88

Jones, Ernest, 12, 25-26, 53n8, 130, 133, 149, 150n32, 161, 165, 166, 193, 194

jouissance, 39-43, 48, 107, 121, 253-55, 258, 265, 269

Joyce, James, 8, 37, 39-40, 42-43, 47, 49, 55n36, 55n37, 55n40

Juarez, Benito, 155

Jung, Carl, 166, 193

Der junge Freud, 193, 195

K

Kafka, Franz, 6, 8, 9, 13, 15, 31, 41, 54n16, 98, 277-78, 283, 286

Kant, Immanuel, 6, 9, 37, 107, 125n31, 268-69, 271n20

Kaplan, E. Ann, 5, 21n5, 21n6, 23

Karina, Anna, 282

Kaufman, Charles, 132, 173

Keyes, Evelyn, 166

Khan, Masud, 32

Kings Row (film), 10, 171-73, 176-82, 184n1, 187n39

Kings Row (novel), 171-73, 176, 179-80, 182, 184

Kitchener, General Herbert, 167n5

Kittler, Friedrich, 58, 81-82

Klein, Melanie, 25, 50n2, 215, 237n7, 239n22, 241n36, 244n70, 246n100, 289n17

Klinger, Barbara, 247n106

Kracauer, Siegfried, 57, 85

Kraepelin, Emil, 237n7, 239n23, 241n32

Krafft-Ebing, Richard von, 154

Kris, Marianne, 166, 199n14

Kristeva, Julia, 206

Kuntzel, Thierry 3, 237n6

L

Lacan, Jacques, 3, 5-9, 13-14, 25, 30-33, 35-49, 51n4, 53n10, 53-54n13, 54n14, 56n46, 92, 97-98, 101, 104, 106, 108-13, 120-21, 123n21, 124n26, 124n31, 201, 231, 236, 237-38n8, 238n13, 240n31, 246n94, 254, 259, 262, 269, 271n5, 272n22

Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, 27

Laforgue, René, 12, 189, 198n4

Laing, R. D., and David Cooper, 142

Laplanche, Jean, 64, 202, 238n11, 239n22, 240n28, 240n29, 280

legibility, 10, 60, 69, 71, 73-75, 77-78, 81, 84-85

Lehrman, Philip, 12, 20, 51n3, 189-90, 192, 198n4

Leitch, Thomas M., 200-201, 205, 236n4, 237n5

Let There Be Light, 155

Lewin, B. D., 32, 54n19

Life and Adventures of Sylvia Scarlett, 33

Longfellow; Brenda, 15, 280

loss of the object, 203-4, 207, 227, 231-32

lost object, 92, 204-5, 208-9, 211, 217, 232, 247n103

Löwy, Emanuel, 190

Lucretius, 97

Lueger, Dr. Karl, 168n10

Lumière, 80-82

M

Macey, David, 246n94

madness, 16, 143, 176, 201, 205, 207, 209, 211, 231-32, 235, 236n4, 237n7, 237n8, 245n76, 248n110

Magda, 159, 173, 183, 187n43

magical reunion, 204-5, 216, 218, 221

magic realism, 122n11

Malcolm, Janet, 180

Malebranche, Nicolas de (and Malebranchean occasionalism), 9, 112-13, 123n26

mania, 14, 201, 203-5, 214-18, 221, 226, 235-36, 239n19, 239n20, 239n23, 241n32, 241n36, 244n70, 283

manic-depressive, 205, 214, 237n7, 239n23, 239n25, 240n30, 241n32, 241n36, 244n70

The Manor, 273

Marcuse, Herbert, 9, 108

Marey, Etienne-Jules, 6, 10, 58, 67-7l, *70 fig., 72 figs., 74-76 figs., 78-79 figs.,* 77-81, 83-85, 87n27, 87n28, 87n37

Marnie, 247n102

Marx, Harpo, 25

Marx, Karl, 8, 14, 115

Marxism, 46, 97, 102, 106, 129

mask, 37, 39, 46, 91, 105, 107, 109, 111-12, 164, 175, 178, 184, 207, 209, 215-16, 245n80, 245n87

Masson, Jeffrey, 172, 184n2, 185n3, 186n14

Master, 116-20, 125n32

materialism, 9, 63, 81, 82, 96-97, 99

meaninglessness, 10, 57, 81-82, 84, 237n8, 245n88

melancholia, 14, 144, 201, 203-9, 211, 214, 216-17, 221, 232, 234-36, 237n7, 238n9, 239n23, 241n32, 241n34, 241n36, 241n37, 242n45, 243n57, 247n103

melodrama, 6, 13, 17, 19, 142, 238n16, 249-50, 255-60, 263-67, 271n14, 271n19

memory, 10, 14, 19, 57-66, 78, 81, 84, 90, 92, 100, 131, 139, 141, 146, 148, 153, 162, 166, 167n1, 174, 177-78, 180-84, 185n7, 188-90, 198, 218, 221, 234, 274, 276-77, 280, 284, 287-88

memory-trace, 59, 63, 66, 185n7, 189

Metz, Christian, 3, 5, 9, 19, 22n3, 44, 88, 90-92

Meynert, Theodor, 133, 136-37, 144-45, 148, 158, 163, 194

Miles, Vera, 235, 243n57, 248n108, 248n109

Miller, Alice, 179, 185n3

Miller, Jacques-Alain, 37, 251

Millot, Catherine, 271n17

minor literature, 15, 277-78

mirror image, 106, 114, 246, 283

mnemic trace, 78

modernism, 77, 87n27, 102

modernity, 6, 10, 57-58, 61, 65, 67, 85, 116, 122n11, 252, 276

Monroe, Marilyn, 132, 166, 199n14

mood, 139, 202, 206, 214, 216-17, 221-22, 231, 242n45, 243n47

Moorehead, Alan, 167n5

Moretti, Franco, 122n11

motion, 45, 64-65, 67-68, 113, 158, 205, 214-15, 222. *See also* movement

motionless, 80

Moulin Rouge, 157

mourning, 143, 160, 185n7, 204, 206, 208, 211, 232, 241n37, 282

movement, 10, 31, 43, 58-59, 62, 66-68, 71, 73-75, 80-81, 83-84, 106, 113, 169-64, 192, 214-15, 232, 241n39, 249n40, 270, 279, 283, 285;

    camera, 204, 206, 208-9, 213, 215, 221, 227, 244n68;

    textual, 202-6, 208, 215, 221, 235-36, 242n41.

    See also motion

MPD (Multiple Personality Disorder), 9, 110-11

MUD (Multiple User Domains), 8, 104, 108-9, 110, 111

multimedia, 89

multiple personality, 181

Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD), 9, 110-11

Multiple User Domains (MUD), 8, 104, 108-9, 110, 111

Mulvey, Laura, 243n58

Muybridge, Eadweard, 69, *70 fig.,* 77-78, 83

myograph, 68

Le mystère des roches de Kador, 15-19, *17-19 figs*.

Mystic Writing-Pad, 29, 58, 60-62, 65

N

Nachträglichkeit (deferred action; *après coup*), 59, 86n13, 197

Nansen, Fridtjof, 154, 168n7

Napoleon, 9, 112

narcissism, 32, 35, 104, 131, 203, 211, 213, 216, 241n37, 246n94

negation, 66, 269, 270

Neumann, Hans, 27, 51n7, 52n8, 53n9

neurophysiology, 61, 63

neurosis, 142, 145-46, 164, 172, 174, 186n14, 194, 211, 214, 286

Never on Sunday, 25

New Age techno-spiritualism, 114-15

News from Home, 279, 280, 286

New York, New York bis, 281

1919, 193, 196-97

Nishitani, Takuya, 247n104

No Exit, 129, 156

nomadic literature, 7, 38, 278, 286

nonsense, 62, 81-82

Nora, Pierre, 288

North by Northwest, 3, 6, 14, 200-201, 204-5, 214-18, *220 fig.,* 221, 223-24, 226-27, *230 fig.,* 232, 234, 236, 237n5, 240n31, 242n41, 244n74, 244n109

nothingness, 12, 36-37, 39, 40, 47, 81, 98-100, 111, 127, 131, 157, 160, 214, 217, 226, 234, 245n88, 246n96

Notorious, 241n39

O

objet a, 31, 37, 39, 40, 95, 125n31

occasionalism, 113, 123-94n26

Oedipal father, 216

Oedipal mother, 216

Oedipus, 96, 141, 161, 164

Oedipus complex, 35, 38, 42, 130, 150, 158-59, 189, 214, 216-17, 227, 235, 244n68, 244n74, 254, 264

omniscient narration, 13, 255, 257

opacity, 10, 18, 31, 40, 60-61, 82, 84, 102-3, 123n21, 177, 223, 238, 252, 279

Othello, 9, 117

Other, the big, 36, 106-7, 113-14, 120, 123-24n26, 259

The Owl at Dawn, 122n8

P

panic, 97, 107, 224, 227, 240n30, 244n68

paranoia, 14, 35, 114, 201, 203-5, 216, 227, 237n7, 239n22, 239n24, 241n34, 241n36, 246n93, 246n94

paraphrenia, 239n22

Pardaillan, 156-58

The Parisian Dancer, 43

Pasolini, Pier Paolo, 13, 257

The Passion of Joan of Arc, 238n16

pathology, 58, 110, 129-30, 136, 149-50, 237n7

PCA (Production Code Administration), 178

pensée sauvage, 8, 102

perception, 32, 60, 62, 65, 94, 101, 104-5, 150, 192, 196, 246n94, 258

performativity, 112, 120, 123n21, 211

persecution, 203, 205, 216, 218, 222-23, 226, 239n25, 241n34, 241n39, 247n101

phallus, 33, 36, 41-42, 44, 46-48, 50, 106, 124n26, 216, 218, 232, 247n106, 254, 257, 265, 269

phenomenology, 103, 105, 122n8, 126-27, 163-64

phobia, 161-62, 206-9, 217, 221

phonography, 58, 87n32

phonoscope, 80

photography, 6, 10, 20, 53n13, 57-58, 63, 67-69, 71, 73-75, 77-80, 83, 85, 87n27, 87n32, 89-90, 166, 189-90, 194, 196, 221, 232, 273;

    sequential, 58, 77, 83, 87n32.

    See also chronophotography

physiology, 66-67;

    neurophysiology, 61, 63

Pièges, 188, 195

Pierrot le fou, 278, 282

Plato, 8-9, 21n5, 96, 98

Pleynet, Marcelin, 92

Pontalis, J.-B., 30, 132, 144, 149, 195, 197, 202, 239n22, 240n29, 280

popular culture, 36, 44

pornography, 38, 55n33

postmodern epoch of dissemination, 102

postmodernism, 103

postmodernist culture of simulation, 102

postmodernist deconstructionism, 101

postmodernist programmer, 103

postmodernist universe, 102

postmodernity, 114

postmodern New Age anti-Cartesianism, 114

"postmodern" racism, 121

postmodern relativism, 115

"postmodern" writers on cyberspace, 104

post-traumatic stress disorder, 181

potlatch, 118

pre-conscious, 129, 198

Production Code, 171, 184n1

Production Code Administration (PCA), 178

projection (psychical), 37, 109, 151n5, 205, 216, 246n100, 284

Propp, Vladimir, 94

protection of the organism against stimuli, 61, 64-65

Proust, Marcel, 65, 191

psyche, 9, 12-15, 17-19, 26, 27, 30, 35, 38, 41, 47-53, 58-59, 61-62, 64, 66, 78, 82, 84-85, 87, 91, 94, 98, 104, 107, 127-28, 137-38, 141, 143-44, 146, 149, 154-55, 171-72, 178, 180-81, 183-85, 197, 201, 203-4, 206, 211, 214, 226-27, 232, 236, 237n7, 239n23, 240n30, 240n31, 241n34, 241n39, 264, 277, 280-83

psychiatrist, 138, 144, 155, 178, 189, 202-3, 240n29, 241n32, 246n9

psychiatry, 5, 128, 142, 152n30, 154, 176, 185n12, 195, 204, 237n7, 239n23

Psycho, 6, 14, 200-201, 204-6, 218, 221-23, *224-25 figs.,* 226-27, *228-30 figs.,* 231-

32, *233 fig.,* 234-36, 236n4, 237n5, 240n31, 242n41, 245n76, 245n78, 245n83, 245n87, 247n102, 247n106

psychoanalyst, 1-2, 5-6, 11, 20, 25-26, 30, 35, 39, 40, 43, 45, 50, 51n3, 51n5, 52n8, 53n9, 84, 108, 123n21, 128-29, 132-33, 135-36, 138-41, 143-44, 151n5, 152n32, 160, 166, 172, 174-75, 189, 191-98, 202, 205, 275, 277, 280

psychophysics, 81-82

psychosis, 40, 114, 124n27, 203-5, 207-9, 211, 217, 224, 231-32, 235, 237n7, 240n28, 240n30, 241n32, 241n34, 246n96, 284

public space, 98, 250-52, 254

R

Rabinbach, Anson, 68

railway phobia, 161

Rainer, Yvonne, 256

random generators, 82

Rat Man, 189

Real, the, 9, 14, 31-33, 36-42, 44-47, 49, 96, 101, 103, 114-15, 120-21, 223-24, 231, 238n8, 251, 253, 258, 267, 269-70

realism, 124n26, 256, 258

Rear Window, 44

Rebecca, 241n39

recording technologies: in early modernity, 13, 62, 68-69, 71, 73, 78-83

Reflections in a Golden Eye, 166

Regnault, François, 242n41, 243n49

regression, 32, 226, 240n30

reification, 127-28, 135, 150

Reinhardt, Max, 132

Reinhardt, Wolfgang, 132, 156, 173

Reisefieber (travel fever), 161

Remains of the Day, 44

Les Rendez-vous d'Anna, 15, 273, 277, 279, 280, 286

Le Rendez-vous des quais, 93-94

reparation, 209, 247n100, 281, 283

repetition, 37, 81, 94, 162, 203, 205-9, 215, 221, 231, 236, 238n8, 238n16, 269

repression, 25, 29, 45-46, 127, 146, 162, 172, 180-81

repressive desublimation, 108

repudiation, 128, 153, 171, 185n7, 204

resistance, 4, 27, 35, 39, 41, 54n13, 54n23, 59, 61-63, 82, 84, 90-91, 94, 95n3, 136-40, 185n12, 195

Richardson, Dorothy, 41

Rilke, Rainer Maria, 84

RL (real life), 103, 107-8, 110, 114

Robocop, the, 8, 105

Rogozinski, Jacob, 272

Rolland, Romain, 153, 166

Roquentin, 157

Rose, Jacqueline, 38, 172, 185n5, 227, 246n93, 246n94

Rosolato, Guy, 205, 241n34, 241n37, 289n17

Rothman, William, 271n15

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 249-50, 252-53

Rush, Florence, 185n3

Russell, Diana, 172, 185n3

S

Sachs, Hanns, 26-27, 36, 42, 51-52n7, 52n8, 53n9

sadism, 144, 149, 171, 188, 206, 211, 216, 264

sadness without cause, 206, 242n45

sadomasochism, 98, 108, 138

Sadoul, Georges, 193

Saki, 8, 97

Sartre, Jean-Baptiste, 143, 160, 163

Sartre, Jean-Paul, 6, 10-12, 30, 126-45, 147, 149-50, 151n2, 151n5, 155-60, 164-67, 169n26, 169n30, 193, 195-96

Saute ma ville, 15, 281-85

Schelling, Friedrich, 8, 97, 99, 115

schizophrenia, 14, 201, 203-5, 239n22, 239n24, 239n25, 240n29

Schliemann, Heinrich, 154, 168n8

Schreber, Judge, 9, 114, 124n27

Schweitzer, Charles, 126

science fiction, 9, 98, 121n1, 274

scopophilia (scoptophilia), 9, 25, 88, 162

Screen (journal), 3-4, 7-8, 20n2, 33

screen, 8-9, 21n5, 54n13, 69, 96-103, 108-9, 110, 120, 177, 217, 261;

computer, 99, 101-2, 109-11;

dream, 32, 54n19;

fantasy, 39, 43, 100;

memory, 218;

movie, 12-13, 16-17, 19, 26, 31-35, 37, 39, 43, 45, 89, 173-74, 189-90, 195, 197, 222, 245, 261, 263, 284;

TV, 109

screen identification, 188

screen memory, 54n23, 92, 141, 185n7, 188, 221

screen neurosis, 214

screen of the interface, 99, 101-2, 108

screen persona, 107, 109, 111

screen projection, 151

Searle, John, 8, 107

Secrets of a Soul (Geheimnisse einer Seele), 8, 26, 27, 197

"seduction theory" (of hysteria), 159, 171, 184n2, 185

Sekula, Allan, 57

self-analysis, 12, 129-30, 133, 136, 139-40, 143-44, 147-48, 158-59, 165, 174

semblance, 97, 100, 104, 106, 113, 120, 264

sense-event, 97, 100, 103

senses, 85, 123-24, 153;

deficient, 68, 78, 80;

assaulted by modernity, 65;

attacked by VR, 105

Serres, Michel, 59

sexual difference, 3, 18, 35, 91-92, 172, 247n106, 253

sexual harassment, 107, 124n30

sexuality, 26, 55n33, 59, 103, 106, 149, 162, 172, 177, 185n5, 194-95, 278, 284;

and bisexuality, 92, 130, 146;

childhood, 159, 171;

female, 246n93, 247n106, 269;

and homosexuality, 129, 163, 196;

as origin of neuroses, 134;

and psychosexuality, 149

Seyrig, Delphine, 280, 285

shellshock, 65

Sherlock, Jr., 17

Sigmund Freud, His Family and Colleagues, 1928-1947, 20, 51n3, 189, 198n4

Signorelli, Luca, 162

Simmel, Georg, 57

simulation, 9, 32, 100-102, 104, 122n7

Singer, Isaac Bashevis, 273-75, 277

sinthome, 39-40, 40-43, 51

Siodmak, Robert, 188

Sirk, Douglas, 259

slip of the tongue, 82, 102n5, 217

Snow, Michael, 278

solitude, 192, 262-63, 278, 283-84

spectator, 7, 20, 22n1, 31-33, 43, 81, 89-90, 94-95, 178, 182, 197, 201, 207, 215, 222, 227, 238n16, 238n18, 249-51, 287

Speke, John Harming, 167n5

sphymograph, 68

spiral, 43, 206-8, 215, 227, 242n41, 243n49

splitting:

of the ego, 15, 111, 115, 216, 224, 227, 277-78, 280, 284;

of the object, 214

Spoto, Donald, 200-201, 248n108, 248n109

Stalin, Joseph, 9, 115-16

stargate, 121n1

Stargate, 8, 97

states of fugue, 181

Stella Dallas, 6, 13, 260, 265-70, 271n14, 271n15

Stewart, James, 206, 214

Stone, Allucquere Rosanne, 8, 123n15

storage, 10, 58, 61, 63-64, 66, 78-80, 84, 89, 98

sublime, 107, 268, 270, 272n20

suicide, 164, 176, 207, 213, 227, 262, 281-83

superego, 11, 52n8, 98, 115-16, 124n30, 129, 143, 149-50, 160, 205, 209, 241n34, 247n102, 264

supplement, 106, 254, 258

suprasensible, 9, 97-98

surface, 13, 30-32, 41, 60, 65, 71, 73-75, 97-99, 104-6, 214, 216, 244n73, 258, 262, 281

surrealism, 246n94

suture, 7, 33-34, 223, 226-27, 231, 251

Symbolic, the, 30, 35-37, 39-40, 42, 47, 91, 97, 99, 101, 108-10, 113, 124n26, 253, 264, 268-70

symptom, 33, 35-37, 39-40, 42-43, 45-48, 51n3, 58, 66, 80, 130, 139, 141, 143, 145, 161, 168n18, 173, 180, 182, 197, 203, 206, 209, 214, 239n24

symptomatology, 136-37, 173

system *Pcpt.-Cs*. *See* system perceptionconsciousness

system perception-consciousness, 60, 65, 78

T

talking cure, 137

techno-biology, 104-5

technology, 6, 10, 62, 82, 84, 102, 104, 112, 123n15, 193;

computer, 82;

digital, 9, 122;

genetic, 104;

modernist, 102;

MUD (Multiple User Domains), 104;

opaque, 102;

phonography as, 87n32;

photographic, 78, 85;

of temporality, 58

Terminator 2, 8, 99

textual analysis, 3, 6, 14, 172, 202, 237n6

thermodynamics, 59, 64, 68

Thing, the *(das Ding),* 36, 38-39, 41-50, 55n27, 107

time:

problem of storage of, 10, 57-58;

in modernity, 57;

for Waiter Benjamin, 67;

for Henri Bergson, 66, 83-84;

for early cinema, 10, 58, 80-84;

for Sigmund Freud, 10, 59-67, 77-78, 84-85;

for Etienne-Jules Marey, 10, 67-80, 84-85

topographical model, 128

Toute une nuit, 279

trace, 10, 26, 27, 34, 50, 59-63, 65-67, 69, 75, 77-78, 82, 85, 86n13, 89-90, 95, 185n7, 189, 203, 206, 208, 226, 236, 238n16

transference (in psychoanalysis), 6, 12, 35, 41, 54n23, 118, 128, 136-40, 145-46, 149, 157, 178, 194, 196-97, 206

transparency, 60, 65, 102-3, 109, 154

trauma, 12, 38-39, 41-42, 46, 59, 110, 121, 125n36, 148, 172, 174, 180-83, 185n3, 197, 204, 206;

childhood sexual, 134, 141, 171, 175, 177, 180-81, 186n18;

in the Freud scenario, 183;

modernity as, 57-58;

in *Le mystère des roches de Kador,* 16, 18;

in *North by Northwest,* 216, 244;

pathological, 10;

in *Psycho,* 226-27, 231, 235;

sexual, 180;

and the voice, 101;

war, 65, 200, 155, 181, 186n32;

in *Vertigo,* 207-9, 217

traumatic affect, 206

traumatic loss, 204

traumatic memory, 181-84

"traumatic texts," 12, 180-81, 184

Treasure of the Sierra Madre, 166

The Trial (film), 98

The Trial (novel), 9, 98

Truffaut, François, 205, 207, 214, 223, 243n48

Turim, Maureen, 177

Turkle, Sherry, 8, 102-4, 107-8, 110, 122n12

U

UFA, 27, 32, 41, 52n8

Uncle Josh at the Moving Picture Show, 43

unconscious, 11, 15, 20, 26, 28-30, 35, 37-42, 56n46, 59-61, 63-66, 78, 84-86, 127-32, 139, 145-46, 148-49, 151n2, 156, 159-60, 164, 185, 189, 191-95, 198, 207, 232, 235, 237-38n8, 238n18, 241n34, 252, 277, 279, 281, 283-84

unrepresentable, the, 37, 43, 47, 66, 88, 247n102, 252

V

Valvasor, Janez, 8, 99

Vaughn, Dai, 82-83, 85

Vernet, Marc, 189, 194

vertigo, 206, 207, 208, 245n80

Vertigo, 6, 14, 200-201, 204-9, *210 fig.,* 211, *212-13 figs.,* 213, 214-18, *219 fig.,* 221-24, 226-27, *228 fig., 231 fig.,* 231-32, *234 fig.,* 234-36, 236n4, 236n5, 240n31, 242n40, 242n41, 242n43, 242n45, 243n49, 243n57, 243n58, 244n59, 245n80, 245n88

Viertel, Peter, 156

violence, 32, 43, 63, 105, 108, 129, 139, 142, 149, 172, 177-78, 194

virtual body, 115

virtual communities, 123n21

virtual fantasmatic "reality" 101

virtual infinity, 118

virtual memory, 100

virtual play, 111

virtual self-image, 108

virtual sex, 110

virtual space, 64, 100, 103-5, 113

virtual universe, 98, 103, 117

voyeurism, 42, 90, 94

VR (virtual reality), 8-9, 14, 98, 100-101, 104-5, 108-9, 111, 113-16, 122n7

W

Wagner, Richard, 125n33

Waites, Elizabeth, 180, 182

Waldman, Diane, 152n30, 182, 185n4, 185n12

Walker, Janet, 195

Warhol, Andy, 278

Warner, Jack, 178

Warner Bros., 155-56, 171, 184

Welles, Orson, 8, 9, 98, 158

Williams, Linda, 271

Wilson, Woodrow, 192

wired universe, 114, 123

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 26

Wolf Man, 82, 174, 196

Wood, Robin, 223, 242n43, 244n73, 245n88

Woolf, Virginia, 8, 30-31, 33, 40-41, 43, 53n12, 54n21

working through, 12, 59, 108, 150, 197, 207

Wortis, Joseph, 190

The Wrong Man, 201, 235, 236n4, 240n31, 243n57

Y

York, Alvin, 155

York, Susannah, 132, 173

Young Mr. Lincoln, 3, 20n2

Z

Zévaco, Michel, 156-57

zoon teknikos, 99

Compositor: Prestige Topography

Text: 10/12 Baskerville

Display: Baskerville

Printer and binder: Thomson-Shore, Inc.